Month: December 2014 | Page 3

15 December, 2014

How ITC can help fix the fiscal deficit

Vivek Kaul

So this column should complete my trilogy on the fiscal position of the government (You can read the previous two pieces here and here).
Late last week, the ministry of finance declared the total amount of indirect taxes collected during the period April to November 2014. The collections have been shown in the following table, which makes for a very interesting reading.
The indirect tax collections during the month of November 2014 grew by 19.4%, in comparison to November 2013. But between April and November 2014 the number grew by only 7.1%, in comparison to the same period last year.

Tax Head	(Rs. in crores)		% Growth	April to November		% Growth
	Nov 2013	Nov 2014	% Growth	2013-14	2014-15	% Growth
Customs	13137	17185	30.8	111844	123308	10.2
Central Excise*	13544	14952	10.4	102988	102762	(-) 0.2
Service Tax	10224	11923	16.6	91982	102592	11.5
Total	36905	44060	19.4	306814	328662	7.1

Source: Press Information Bureau

The indirect tax collection target for this financial year is at Rs 6,24,902 crore. The total amount collected last year stood at Rs 5,19,520 crore. Hence, it was assumed that the indirect tax collection would grow by 20.3% from what was achieved last year.
This assumed growth in indirect tax collections is turning out to be extremely optimistic. The growth in collections for the first eight months of the year, as can be seen from the above table, has been only 7.1%. In fact, the collection of excise duty has fallen by 0.2%.
There are several reasons why assuming a more than 20% growth in indirect taxes was unrealistic to start with. The annual budget had assumed that the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) for this financial year would grow by 13.4% to Rs 12,876,653 crore.
Ultimately, the indirect taxes that can be collected are also a function of the economic growth. If the economy is expected to grow 13.4% (nominal), how can indirect taxes can be assumed to grow by more than 20%?
There was this basic disconnect to start with. A similar mistake was made in the 2013-2014 as well. It was initially assumed that indirect taxes of Rs 5,65,003 crore would be collected. The final number came in at Rs 5,19,520 crore, which was 8% lower.
In fact, the indirect tax collected in 2013-2014 grew by 9.5% in comparison to 2012-2013, when the number had stood at Rs 4,74,483 crore. So, if the growth in indirect taxes last year was 9.5%, assuming a growth of 20.3% in this year’s number was being highly optimistic to start with.
And all that optimism seems to be going against the government now. The growth in indirect taxes in the first eight months of the year has been at 7.1%. If the same growth continues through the remaining four months of the financial year, the government will end up with a total collection of Rs 5,56,406 crore, or around Rs 68,496 crore lower (Rs 6,24,902 crore minus Rs 5,56,406 crore) lower than what had been estimated at the time the budget was presented.
Even if the government manages to increase the collections in the remaining part of the year by 10% in comparison to last year’s target, it will manage to reach only Rs 5,71,472 crore or Rs 53,430 crore (Rs 6,24,902 crore minus Rs 5,71,472 crore) lower than this year’s target.
While this mistake can’t be corrected, it is important to ensure that the same mistake is not made in the next budget, which will be presented in February 2015.It is important to look at the assumptions that have been used by bureaucrats that were used to make these overtly optimistic projections. As an editorial in The Financial Express points out: “One of the first things Jaitley needs to do is to get the chief economic advisor to relook the tax model the ministry uses.”
Further, this is clearly not a good sign for the government. It will make it even more difficult to control the burgeoning fiscal deficit, which for the first seven months of the financial year (April to October 2014) stood at 89.6% of the annual target.
So, what can the government do to meet its fiscal deficit target of Rs 5,31,177 crore or 4.1% of the GDP? As I had explained in the column that appeared on December 12, 2014, the government will start slashing its “asset creating” capital expenditure. This is obviously not good for the economy.
But there is something else that the government can do. Through the Specified Undertaking of the Unit Trust of India(SUUTI), the government owns shares in ITC and L&T worth Rs 46,970 crore (Using the closing prices as on December 12, 2014, and the shareholding pattern valid as on September 30, 2014).
The shares in ITC are worth Rs 35,479 crore. There is no real reason that the government should be owning shares in ITC. (To read the complete argument click here). There is nothing strategic about the cigarettes, hotels, paper and retail businesses, in which ITC operates. But the government continues to hold on to stake.
Economist Surjit Bhalla offered a reason in a recent column when he wrote: “A suggested explanation for the Indian government (read that as politicians and IAS bureaucrats, plus others) not selling Ashoka or ITC is that they gain enormously from “kickbacks” in the form of discounted or free rooms, or discounted or free dinners, or discounted or free marriage parties.”
In fact, the government can even get a premium to the current market price by selling its SUUTI stake in ITC to the United Kingdom based BAT, which had been trying to raise its stake in ITC for many years. Nevertheless, what the previous government did in April 2010 was to ban all foreign direct investment(FDI) in cigarette industry, citing health reasons. If FDI was banned in the cigarette industry because cigarettes are bad for health, why is the government holding on to its stake in ITC then?
The current government has an opportunity in setting this right and sell the stake that it owns in ITC through SUUTI to whoever is willing to pay the highest price. For the period of three months ending September 30, 2014, ITC made a total operating profit of Rs 3583.26 crore. Of this the cigarettes business contributed Rs 2882.06 crore.
Why should a government own stake in a company which still makes a little more than 80% of its operating profit from selling cigarettes is a question worth asking, even though we may not get an answer for it.

The article originally appeared on www.equitymaster.com as a part of The Daily Reckoning, on Dec 15, 2014

12 December, 2014

High price not EMIs: Dear Jaitley, here is why Indians are not buying homes

Sometimes I wonder if the finance minister Arun Jaitley has ever heard of Abraham Maslow. Maslow was an American psychologist who among other things also came up with the law of the instrument, which is better known as Maslow’s hammer.
As Maslow put it: “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.”
The idea was also put forward by the American philosopher Abraham Kaplan, when he said: “Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding.”
What the idea essentially tries to communicate is the habit of using the one tool for all purposes. In Jaitley’s case this tool seems to be a cut in the “repo rate”, or the rate at which the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) lends to banks.
In the recent past, he has asked the RBI to cut the repo rate time and again. Once the RBI starts cutting the repo rate, banks will start cutting the interest rates at which they give loans, the belief is.
At lower rates people will borrow and spend more and the Indian economy will grow at a much faster rate. For Jaitley its all about lower interest rates. “Now time has come with moderate inflation to bring down the rates. If you bring down the rates, people will start borrowing from banks to pay for their flats and houses. The EMIs will go down,” he said yesterday.
The statement was essentially a continuation of the pressure that Jaitley has been trying to build on the RBI to cut the repo rate. But will it make any difference?
Let’s try and understand this through an example of an individual trying to buy a home in Mumbai. In a recent research report the real estate research firm Liases Foras had pointed out that the weighted average price of a flat in Mumbai was Rs 1.34 crore.
I had written a piece around this data in early November showing how expensive flats in Mumbai and other cities were vis a vis the average income of people in living in those cities. One criticism that came in was that the weighted average price arrived at was on a higher side because the data had taken only premium projects into account.
There is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that is not the case. Nevertheless let’s take that into account and assume that the actual weighted average price of a flat in Mumbai is 75% of the price that Liases Foras had arrived at.
This works out to around Rs 1 crore. Let’s say an individual decides to buy such a flat and takes on a home loan to do so. A bank would normally give around 80% of the market price of a house as a home loan. So, the individual takes a loan of Rs 80 lakh (80% of Rs 1 crore) to be repaid over a period of 20 years. The remaining Rs 20 lakh he puts from his savings.
The RBI governor Raghuram Rajan in a recent speech said that the average interest rate on a home loan these days was 10.7%. Let’s assume that the individual borrows at the average interest rate. The EMI on this loan works out to Rs 80,948.
Let’s say the interest rate on the home loan comes down by 50 basis points (one basis point is one hundredth of a percentage) to 10.2%. The EMI on this loan works out to Rs 78,265 or Rs 2,683 lower.
If the interest rates are cut by 100 basis points and the interest rate on the home loan falls to 9.7%, the EMI will fall by around Rs 5,330. So, will an individual who has the ability of making a downpayment of Rs 20 lakh and taking on a home loan of Rs 80 lakh, buy a home simply because the EMI is Rs 2,683-5,330 lower?
An individual who has the ability to take on a home loan of Rs 80 lakh must be making around Rs 1.65 lakh per month(as per the home loan eligiblity calculator available on www.hdfc.com). And that is clearly a lot of money. Only a small set of individuals make that kind of money, even in a city like Mumbai.
The same exercise can be repeated for other cities as well, and the results will remain the same. The larger point is that the fact that Indians are not buying homes has got nothing to do with high interest rates and EMIs and everything to do with the fact that homes are atrociously expensive. And instead of asking the RBI to cut interest rates, Jaitely should be looking at ways through which home prices can be brought down to more reasonable levels.
He could start with ensuring that better data on real state is available to the people of this country.
Currently, the National Housing Bank has the Residex index, which gives some idea of the prevailing price trends across various cities. But the information is not up-to-date enough to be of much use. As of now, the data is available only up to June 2014. Also, the data is declared every three months. Something of this sort should be declared on a monthly basis.
Further, anyone trying to buy a home essentially has no data that he can look at to figure out what the prevailing price trend is. Typically, he has to go with what the brokers tell him. And brokers are not normally thinking about the best interests of the individual trying to buy a home.
For starters, the government could try and aggregate the stamp duty data from the twenty biggest cities in India. This will tell us the average price at which “homes” are “supposedly” being sold. Along with that the number of transactions being registered will give us some idea of what the demand situation is.
Of course, given the black money transactions that happen in real estate, the average price that we get through this route may not be totally correct. Nevertheless, this is not a bad starting point. Further, in order to cut down on black money transactions the government needs to ensure that the circle rate is close to the prevailing market value in any area.
A property when it is sold needs to be registered at the actual transaction value or the prevailing circle rate, whichever is higher. The stamp duty needs to paid on this value. Typically, the market rate tends to be much higher than the prevailing circles rate. This essentially leads to a situation where transactions are declared at the circle rate and not the market rate, ensuring that a significant part of the transaction happens in black. It also leads to lower tax collections for the government.
Further, in areas where the difference between the market rate and the circle rate is high attract a lot of black money. As Anuj Puri chairman and country head, Jones Lang LaSalle India, told Mint in September 2014, “Reduction in the gap between circle and market rates means that the region becomes less attractive for those who are seeking to offload unaccounted-for funds, and more attractive for genuine buyers.”
These are the steps that Jaitley should be thinking about instead of asking the RBI to cut interest rates almost every time he speaks.

The article appeared originally on www.FirstBiz.com on Dec 12, 2014

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

12 December, 2014

Jaitley may end up doing a Chidambaram to meet fiscal deficit target

Vivek Kaul

In yesterday’s column I had explained how the fiscal deficit of the government of India between April and October 2014 was at its highest level since 1998. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends.
This despite the fact global oil prices have been falling for a while now. This has not helped the government primarily because like his predecessors the current finance minister Arun Jaitley also assumed a low oil subsidy number at the time he presented the budget in July 2014.
When the previous finance minister P Chidambaram presented the budget for the financial year 2013-2014, he assumed that Rs 65,000 crore would be spent towards oil subsidy. The actual number came in at Rs 85,480 crore, which was 31.5% higher.
This has been standard operating procedure for finance ministers over the years, where they start with a low oil subsidy number at the beginning of the year and end up spending much more by the time the year ends. What this does is that it makes the fiscal deficit number look more respectable at the time the budget is presented.
Jaitley did the same thing as his predecessor by assuming that oil subsidy for the year would work out to Rs 63,426.95 crore. This despite the fact that subsidies worth Rs 35,000 crore which were to be paid in 2013-2014, had been postponed to this financial year. So, in effect Jaitley only had a little more than Rs 28,400 crore to play around with on the oil subsidy front.
Oil prices started falling a few months back. This wasn’t known at the time the budget was presented in July earlier this year. In the budget it was assumed that oil prices would average at $110 per barre during the course of this financial year. As on December 10, 2014, the price of the Indian basket of crude oil stood at $63.16 per barrel.
Given that, Jaitley assumed a lower number to start with, the government is not going to benefit on the fiscal deficit front, due to a fall in oil prices. As Neelkanth Mishra and Ravi Shankar of Credit Suisse write in a recent research note titled 2015 Outlook: Growth at any price?: “The…budgeted amount for fuel subsidies (Rs 63,400 crore, 0.5% of GDP)…may not change much for financial year 2014-2015, as Rs35,000 crore of the oil subsidy is already spent.”
The analysts also wrote that there won’t be much change in the fertiliser subsidy amount of close to Rs 73,000 crore, as well. Mishra and Shankar write that “it will be difficult for the government to reduce food subsidies”.
Given this, Jaitley isn’t really in a position to cut down subsidies. What he will have to do is to start cutting down on plan expenditure, like Chidambaram had done. As I had explained in yesterday’s piece, the government expenditure is categorised into two kinds—planned and non planned. Planned expenditure is essentially money that goes towards creation of productive assets through schemes and programmes sponsored by the central government.
Non-plan expenditure is an outcome of planned expenditure. For example, the government constructs a highway using money categorised as a planned expenditure. But the money that goes towards the maintenance of that highway is non-planned expenditure. Interest payments on debt, pensions, salaries, subsidies and maintenance expenditure are all non-plan expenditure.
As is obvious a lot of non-plan expenditure is largely regular expenditure that cannot be done away with. The government needs to keep paying salaries, pensions and interest on debt, on time. These expenses cannot be postponed. Hence, the asset creating plan expenditure gets slashed.
This is what the previous finance minister Chidambaram did in 2012-2013 and 2013-2014. In 2012-2013, he had budgeted Rs 5,21,025 crore towards plan expenditure. The final expenditure came in 20.6% lower at Rs 4,13,625 crore. In 2013-2014, the plan expenditure was budgeted at Rs 5,55,322 crore. The final expenditure came in 14.4% lower at Rs 4,75,532 crore.
This helped Chidambaram to cut down on the overall government expenditure majorly. Jaitley will have to do something similar, if he wants to achieve the fiscal deficit target of Rs 5,31,177 crore or 4.1% of GDP, that he has set.
As economists Taimur Baig, and Kaushik Das of Deutsche Bank Research write in a recent research note titled India 2015 Outlook: Turning the cycle and structure around: “The government’s 2014-2015 fiscal deficit target of 4.1% of GDP will likely be achieved, but by cutting capital expenditure for the third straight year in a row. We estimate that the government will have to cut capital expenditure by at least Rs 70,000 crore…to make up for the significant shortfall in tax collection and disinvestment target.”
Supporters of Jaitley say that Chidambarm left him with unpaid bills of more than Rs 1,00,000 crore. Fair point. But Jaitley knew about this at the time he presented the budget. So, what stopped him from taking these unpaid bills into account while presenting the budget earlier this year?
If he had done that he wouldn’t have been able to present a fiscal deficit number of Rs 5,31,177 crore or 4.1% of GDP. The number would have been much higher. Nevertheless, that would have been the real fiscal deficit number, instead of the unrealistic and fictional number that was presented at the time of the budget. It is not surprising that Jaitley will have a tough time in meeting this number.
As I said in yesterday’s piece, the first step towards solving a problem is acknowledging that it exists. Jaitley and the BJP had an excellent opportunity to do this. And they let that go.
Another reason for the government to worry is the disinvestment target of Rs 58,400 crore. With basically three months left for the financial year to get over, the disinvestment of shares that the government owns in government and non-government companies has barely started.
As Baig and Das point out: “We expect the government to rely on disinvestments as a key source of revenue to reduce the fiscal deficit, but as seen from this year’s experience, there is no guarantee that such a strategy would work. Further, trade union activism could come in the way of the government pursuing an aggressive disinvestments/privatization agenda, which then will likely put pressure back on expenditure compression (particularly capital expenditure) to achieve the headline fiscal deficit target.”
Also, what does nothelp is the fact that growth in tax collections is nowhere near what had been assumed initially. The direct taxes (corporation and income tax primarily) were assumed to grow at 15.7%, in comparison to the last financial year. They have grown at only 5.5% between April and October 2014.
The indirect taxes (customs duty, excise duty and service tax) were supposed to grow at 20.3%. They have grown by only 5.9%
The situation clearly does not look good. And given that finance ministers do not like to miss targets they set, it is more than likely that Jaitley will now do a Chidambaram and slash asset creating plan expenditure majorly in the months to come. In fact, the plan expenditure for the first seven months of the financial year fell by 0.4% to Rs 2,66,991 crore.
As the old French saying goes: “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose”. The more things change, the more they remain the same.

The article originally appeared on www.equitymaster.com as a part of The Daily Reckoning, on Dec 12, 2014

11 December, 2014

Despite low oil prices, India may not gain much. Here’s why

Vivek Kaul

Oil prices have been falling for a while now. The price of the Indian basket of crude oil as on December 10, 2014, stood at $63.16 per barrel. At the beginning of this financial year, as on April 1, 2014, the price had stood at $104.56 per barrel. Hence, prices have fallen by close to 40% since then.
Analysts expect that oil prices will continue to remain low in 2015. In a report titled 2015: It Likely Gets Worse Before It Gets Better analysts at Morgan Stanley give three possible scenarios for the price of oil. In the worst possible scenario they expect the price of oil to touch $43 per barrel in the second quarter of 2015 (i.e. the period between April and June 2015).
As the Morgan Stanley analysts write: “ With OPEC on the sidelines, oil prices face their greatest threat since 2009…Without intervention, physical markets and prices will face serious pressure, with 2Q15[April to June 2015] likely marking the peak period of dislocation.”
As I have explained on previous occasions the Saudi Arabia led Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) is interested in driving down the price of oil to ensure that shale oil firms operating in the United States and Canada become unviable. This is why OPEC hasn’t cut oil production majorly in recent months, even though oil prices have fallen dramatically.
The conventional thinking is that a fall in oil prices will benefit India tremendously. A major reason for the same is that India imports nearly four fifths of the oil that it consumes. Hence, a fall in oil prices will mean that there will be lower oil imports and this will mean a lower trade deficit (i.e. the difference between imports and exports).
Further, lower oil prices will also mean lower inflation and a lower fiscal deficit for the government. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends. In the years gone by, the government did not allow the oil marketing companies to sell diesel, cooking gas and kerosene oil, at a price that was viable for them. The government compensated these companies for a part of the under-recoveries.
This led to the government expenditure shooting up which pushed up the fiscal deficit. While this sounds good in theory, things are not as straightforward as they are made out to be. Neelkanth Mishra and Ravi Shankar of Credit Suisse discredit this argument in their recent research report titled 2015 Outlook: Growth at any price?
Let’s look at these points one by one. The government had budged Rs 63,426.95 crore as oil subsidy for this financial year. This as always has been the case in the past was a very optimistic assumption, given that a significant part of the oil subsidies for the last financial year were unpaid. The oil subsidies that had not been paid for during the course of the last financial year amounted to Rs 35,000 crore. This has been paid from this year’s budget. Given this, despite a dramatic fall in oil prices there isn’t going to be a huge impact on the fiscal deficit. If oil prices continue to remain low during the course of the next financial year (April 2015 to March 2016) it will benefit the government on the fiscal deficit front, feel the Credit Suisse analysts.
What about inflation? Petrol and diesel together make up for around 2% of the consumer price index. Over and above this, the government has raised the excise duty on petrol and diesel twice in the recent past. This has reduced the “passthrough to consumer prices”. Hence, consumers haven’t benefited as much as they should have.
Further, “LPG[domestic cooking gas] and kerosene, which have higher weights[in the consumer price index],are still subsidised, so the fall in crude will not directly impact retail prices,” write Mishra and Shankar.
Now let’s look at the trade deficit or the difference between imports and exports. Oil imports in the month of October 2014 fell by 19% to $15.2 billion in comparison to the same period last year. Despite this, the overall trade deficit for the month rose to $13.3 billion from $10.6 billion a year ago.
Why is that the case? With global growth slowing down, exports slowed down by 5% to $26 billion. Further, India seems to have rediscovered its appetite for gold with gold imports rising by 280% to $4.17 billion from $1.09 billion in October 2013.
So, despite falling oil prices India may not gain much immediately. Also, falling oil prices mean lower incomes for oil exporting countries and this will slow down their consumer demand, which will have an impact on Indian exports.
Professor Eswar Prasad of Cornell University explained this in an interview to CNBC. As he said: “Right now if oil goes to USD 65 or even slightly lower it is not a big negative but it does imply that there is going to be a lot of weakness in external demand and countries in Latin America like Venezuela which already have a very difficult situation, emerging markets like Russia and of course the Middle Eastern countries plus some of the European economies like the UK and Norway that rely on oil exports to a significant extent are going to be facing fairly difficult situations. This will affect their budgets and their current account balances which in turn will affect their consumption demand. So, softness in consumption demand is ultimately not good for anybody in the world including India.”
Neelkanth Mishra of Credit Suisse also made a similar point in an interview to The Economic Times. Mishra’s argument was that if oil exporting countries earn lower, their sovereign wealth funds will invest a lower amount of money in other countries, including India.
As he said: “Further, capital flows get impacted, too — if you look at the sources of funds that invest in India, it’s primarily the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), the pension funds and the insurance funds. If Norway, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, or Kuwait are not going to see the kind of surpluses that they used to then they will have less capital to send out, which will mean that capital flows into India will not be as strong as they were.”
Norway, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia run the three biggest sovereign wealth funds in the world.
To conclude, what these points clearly tell us is that a fall in oil prices will not benefit India as much as it is being made out to be.

The article originally appeared on www.FirstBiz.com on Dec 11, 2014

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

11 December, 2014

As tax collections slow down, govt fiscal deficit shoots to its highest level in 16 years

Vivek Kaul

The Controller General of Accounts declares the fiscal deficit number at the end of every month. The cycle works with a delay of month. So, at the end of November 2014, the fiscal deficit for the first seven months of the financial year (April to October 2014) was declared.
The fiscal deficit for this period stood at a rather worrying 89.6% of the annual target of Rs 5,31,177 crore. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends.
One reason the fiscal deficit is number is so high is because the government’s expenditure is spread all through the year, whereas it earns a substantial part of its income only towards the end of the year. But even keeping that point in mind, the fiscal deficit for the first seven months of this financial year is substantially high than it usually has been in the years gone by.
For the period April to October 2013, the fiscal deficit had stood at 84.4% of the annual target for that year. In fact, the accompanying table shows us that the fiscal deficit for the first seven months of this financial year has been the highest over the last sixteen years.

Period	Fiscal deficit as a proportion of the annual target
April to Oct 2014	89.60%
April to Oct 2013	84.40%
April to Oct 2012	71.60%
April to Oct 2011	74.40%
April to Oct 2010	42.60%
April to Oct 2009	61.10%
April to Oct 2008	87.80%
April to Oct 2007	54.50%
April to Oct 2006	58.60%
April to Oct 2005	60.90%
April to Oct 2004	45.20%
April to Oct 2003	56.00%
April to Oct 2002	51.50%
April to Oct 2001	54.50%
April to Oct 2000	45.70%
April to Oct 1999	72.20%
April to Oct 1998	67.00%

Source: www.cga.nic.in

Also, I couldn’t look for data beyond 1998, given that it wasn’t available online. The table makes for a very interesting reading. The fiscal deficit level up to October 2007 was under control. It took off once the government decided to crank up expenditure to meet its social obligations.
Further, the average fiscal deficit for the first seven months of the year between 1998 and 2013 stood at 61.75% of the annual target. Hence, the number for this year at 89.6% of the annual target, is very high indeed.
Why has this happened? The income of the government during the period has gone up by only 5.3%. The budget presented in July earlier this year assumed that the income would grow by 15.6% in comparison to the last financial year.
The collection of direct as well as indirect taxes has been significantly slower than what was assumed. The direct taxes (corporation and income tax primarily) were assumed to grow at 15.7% in comparison to the last financial year. They have grown at only 5.5%.
The indirect taxes (customs duty, excise duty and service tax) were supposed to grow at 20.3%. They have grown by only 5.9%. In fact, within indirect taxes, the collection of customs duty has fallen by 1.7%.
What this clearly tells us is that the finance minister Arun Jaitley made very aggressive assumptions when it came to growth in tax collection and will now have a tough time meeting the numbers.
What makes the situation worse is the fact that Jaitley’s predecessor, P Chidambaram, had made the same mistake. In fact, in 2013-2014, Chidambaram had projected a total gross tax collection of Rs 12,35,870 crore. The final collection stood around 6.2% lower at Rs 11,58,906 crore. Given this, Jaitley could have avoided falling into the same trap and worked with a more realistic set of numbers. But then those projections wouldn’t have projected “acche din”, the plank on which the Bhartiya Janata Party had fought the Lok Sabha elections.
Even with such a huge fall in tax collections, Chidambaram managed to beat the fiscal deficit target that he had set by essentially pushing expenditure of more than Rs 1,00,000 crore into the next financial year (i.e. the current financial year 2014-2015).
Chidambaram essentially ended up passing on what was his problem to Jaitley. Jaitley cannot do that because he will continue to be the finance minister (or someone else from the BJP government will).
So what can Jaitley do if he needs to meet the fiscal deficit target of Rs 5,31,177 crore or 4.1% of GDP that he has set? The first thing that will happen and is already happening is that the plan expenditure will be slashed. The plan expenditure for the first seven months of the year fell by 0.4% to Rs 2,66,991 crore.
This was the strategy followed by Chidambaram as well in 2013-2014. The plan expenditure target at the time of the presentation of the budget was at Rs 5,55,322 crore. The actual number came in 14.4% lower at Rs 4,75,532 crore. This is how a major part of government expenditure was controlled.
The government expenditure is categorised into two kinds—planned and non planned. Planned expenditure is essentially money that goes towards creation of productive assets through schemes and programmes sponsored by the central government.
Non-plan expenditure is an outcome of planned expenditure. For example, the government constructs a highway using money categorised as a planned expenditure. But the money that goes towards the maintenance of that highway is non-planned expenditure. Interest payments on debt, pensions, salaries, subsidies and maintenance expenditure are all non-plan expenditure.
As is obvious a lot of non-plan expenditure is largely regular expenditure that cannot be done away with. The government needs to keep paying salaries, pensions and interest on debt, on time. These expenses cannot be postponed. Hence, the asset creating plan expenditure gets slashed.
The second thing that the government is doing is not passing on the benefit of falling oil prices to the consumers. It has increased the excise duty on petrol and diesel twice, since deregulating diesel prices in October.
The third thing the government will have to do is to get aggressive on the disinvestment front in the period up to March 2015. The disinvestment target for the year is Rs 58,425 crore. But until now the government has gone slow on selling shares that it owns both in government and non-government companies because of reasons only it can best explain.
The recent sale of shares in the Steel Authority of India Ltd(SAIL) was pushed through with more than a little help from the Life Insurance Corporation of India and other government owned financial firms. This is nothing but moving money from one arm of the government to another arm. It cannot be categorised as genuine disinvestment.
This is something that Chidambaram and the UPA government regularly did in order to meet the disinvestment target. Despite this they couldn’t meet the disinvestment target in 2013-2014. The government had hoped to earn Rs 54,000 crore but earned only Rs 19,027 crore.
Also, selling assets to fund regular yearly expenditure is not a healthy practice. If at all the government wants to sell its stake in companies, it should be directing that money towards a special fund which could be used to improve the poor physical infrastructure throughout the country. Right now, the money collected through this route goes into the Consolidated Funds of India.
In the months to come we could also see the government forcing cash rich companies like Coal India (which has more than Rs 50,000 crore of cash on its books) to pay a special interim dividend to the government, as was the case last year.
This is the way I see things panning out over the next few months. Nevertheless, the proper thing to do would be to put out the right fiscal deficit number, instead of trying to use accounting and other tricks to hide it.
The first step towards solving a problem is to acknowledge that it exists.

The article originally appeared on www.equitymaster.com as a part of The Daily Reckoning, on Dec 11, 2014