Explained: Why Central Govt Needs to Compensate States for Collapse in GST Collections

Summary: I went looking for the legal reasons being offered by the central government to not compensate the state governments for the dramatic fall in GST collections. I found a central government paper explaining the logic with a lot of legalese. This piece tries to summarise the legalese in simple English. Along with that, I offer many reasons as to why the central government needs to adequately compensate the states. This is definitely not something you will read in the mainstream media.

As has been reported almost everywhere by now, the central government doesn’t want to compensate the state governments for a shortfall in goods and services tax (GST) collections that is going to happen through this year.

In an earlier piece I had explained why this was a bad decision. In today’s piece we will try and understand the central government’s reasoning behind this decision, at the same time we shall also see why the central government is in a much better position to deal with the situation than states are.

The Story So Far

The GST collections between April and June this year have been around 34.5% lower at Rs 2.73 lakh crore than during the same period in July 2019. As the economy contracts in the aftermath of covid-19, the collections will continue to remain subdued during the remaining part of the year.

The central government needs to share a significant part of the GST with the state governments. Over and above this, there is also a guarantee of 14% growth in GST collections for states for the first five years until 2022. If this is not achieved, the central government needs to compensate the state governments for any shortfall.  The central government has decided not to do so.

The Legalese

This public paper explains the central government’s position on the issue. Let’s see why the government is saying what it is saying.

The Constitution (101st Amendment) Act 2016 contains the following provision:

“Parliament shall, by law, on the recommendation of the Goods and Services Tax Council, provide for compensation to the States for loss of revenue arising on account of implementation of the goods and services tax [emphasis added] for a period of five years.”

Following the above provision, the Parliament enacted the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act 2017. The preamble of this Act reads as follows:

“An Act to provide for compensation to the States for the loss of revenue arising on account of implementation of the goods and services tax [emphasis added] in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act.”

In fact, the emphasised parts (in bold italics) in both the 101st amendment as well as the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act 2017, read exactly the same. What does this mean in simple English? It means that state governments will be provided a compensation if there is a loss of revenue on account of problems with the implementation of GST (of course, there have been problems galore, but let’s not go there now).

Hence, the central government could have used this technicality in denying the state governments any compensation for a fall in GST collections.

As the policy paper referred to earlier points out: “The Constitution and the preamble to the Act lay out the spirit and purpose of the GST compensation: namely that it is to compensate states for loss of revenue “arising on account of implementation of GST”. The wording of the Constitution and statutory preamble make it clear that the spirit of the law is not to compensate states for all types of revenue losses, but rather for that loss arising from GST implementation.” Ultimately, the GST collections in 2020-21 will fall majorly because of the negative economic impact of the covid-19 pandemic and not just because of the loss of revenue thanks to the botched up implementation of the GST by the central government.

The interesting thing is that the government hasn’t used the above explanation to deny compensating the states for the GST shortfall. It has gone deeper into the legalese to deny the states a compensation.

But before we get into that, the central government has this to say about the GST shortfall: “Parliament obviously could not have contemplated a historically unprecedented situation of huge losses of revenue [thanks to the spread of covid-19] from the base—arising from an Act of God [emphasis added] quite independently of GST implementation—affecting both Central and State revenues, direct and indirect.”

This is where the act of god phrase came into being, also telling us that the government doesn’t do or say anything without putting it on kagaz [paper] first.

Now let’s get back to why the government has denied compensating the states for the GST shortfall. The Section 7 of the the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act 2017, provides the detailed mechanism for the calculation as well as the payment of compensation to the state governments when there is a shortfall.

Nevertheless, Section 7 doesn’t make any distinction between the shortfall in GST collections happening due to implementations reasons and non-implementation reasons. As the government paper points out: “Compensation is payable for the entire shortfall (even if it is not on account of GST implementation). This position has been clarified by the Attorney General and is accepted by the Central Government [emphasis in the original].”

So, if this interpretation has been accepted by the central government, why isn’t it compensating the state governments? If your head is already spinning by now, I don’t blame you for it. The legalese behind which the central government is hiding keeps getting better. Let’s move ahead.

The Section 10 of the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act 2017 prescribes the manner of payment of the compensation to state governments in case of a shortfall. Let’s look at this pointwise.

1) The compensation is to be paid out of the non-lapsable GST Compensation Fund.

2) Money flows into the GST Compensation Fund from the GST Compensation Cess levied on sin and luxury goods under Section 8, which includes everything from cigarettes to expensive cars. This is made clear under Section 10(1).

3) Section 10(1) also makes it clear that money can flow into the GST Compensation Fund through “such other amounts as may be recommended by the Council”. Hence, other than the GST Compensation Cess only something cleared by the Council can flow into the GST Compensation Fund.

4) Section 10(2) says that compensation under Section 7 “shall be paid out of the Fund”.

Basically, what the government is saying here is that any compensation to state governments on account of a loss of revenue needs to be paid out of the GST Compensation Fund.

So, the government summarises its position by saying: “The states are entitled to compensation…regardless of the cause of the shortfall. However, compensation is to be paid only from the Compensation Fund and it is not an obligation of the Government of India in the event of a shortfall. It is for the GST Council to decide on the mode of making good the shortfall.”

Of course, with the GST collections falling, the compensation cess will not be enough to make up for the shortfall. Also, what the central government is saying is that the GST Council is a different entity from it. This is the point being made on the basis of some complicated legalese. And this rather complicated legalese has been used to basically shaft, for the lack of a better word, the state governments. The central government paper also talks about the spirit of the law.

As far as the act of god point goes, if a fall in GST collections due to covid-19 is act of god for the central government, it is also an act of god for the state governments as well. What are they expected to do in such a scenario?

And given that, the law needs to be changed, simply because the facts have changed and the situation that has arisen currently wasn’t taken into account when the law was first framed. If every law was perfect as it was written first time around, there wouldn’t be so many amendments going around. As the famous British economist, John Maynard Keynes, once supposedly said: “When the facts changeI change my mind. What do you do, sir?

The Central Government Needs to Compensate

The central government needs to compensate the state governments for this shortfall in GST collections. The state governments are at the forefront of fighting the pandemic and hence, need money. Also, state governments spend more money than the central government during the course of any year and that needs to be kept in mind as well, in a scenario, where the private expenditure has collapsed dramatically post covid.

Also, as the government paper points out: “The notion of borrowing by the GST Council is not practically or legally feasible or desirable. This leaves the options of Central or state borrowing.” Let’s look at what the central government is offering the states as a compensation.

1) The shortfall arising out of the loss of revenue due to the GST implementation has been estimated by the central government to be at Rs 97,000 crore. The state governments can borrow this money under a special window coordinated by the finance ministry. The states can repay both principal and interest by using the money they receive from the compensation cess. Also, this borrowing shall not be treated as debt. Hence, it will not limit any state’s overall borrowing ability.

2) The overall shortfall (thanks to implementation and covid impact) in GST collections has been estimated to be at Rs 2.35 lakh crore. The state governments can borrow this entire amount from the market. An amount of Rs 1.38 lakh crore (Rs 2.35 lakh crore minus Rs 97,000 crore) will be considered to be as debt of the state governments. The state governments will have to repay this debt from their own resources. They can repay the principle from the compensation cess.

The government’s logic in getting states to borrow directly from the market is rather bizarre. Nevertheless, let’s take a look at this.

This is what the government paper says: “The Government of India faces a very large borrowing requirement this year. Additional borrowing by the Centre influences the yields on Central government securities (g-secs) and has other macro-economic repercussions. The yield on G-secs acts as a benchmark for State borrowing as well as private sector borrowing. Hence any rise in Central borrowing costs ipso facto drives up borrowing costs for all borrowers, including not only the States but also the entire private sector. On the other hand, the yields on State Government securities do not directly influence other yields and do not have the same type of macroeconomic repercussions.”

What does this mean in simple English (now how many times will I end up saying this)? The central government will end up borrowing more this year than in other years. In this scenario, it will end up needing a greater amount of financial savings to fund itself. This will push up interest rates at which the central government borrows. When the rate of interest at which the central government borrows goes up, the rate of interest for the entire financial system goes up because lending to the central government is the safest form of lending. When this happens, both the private sector as well as the state governments will end up paying higher interest rates on the money they borrow.

The central government’s contention is that the above logic does not apply to when state governments borrow. Their borrowing doesn’t end up pushing overall interest rates.

This is bizarre to say the least. If the state government borrows more from the same pool of savings, it will end up pushing the overall interest rates in the financial system, upwards.

The question is why doesn’t the central government want to borrow more. The government originally expected to borrow Rs 7.8 lakh crore to finance its fiscal deficit in 2020-21. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends. This has already been increased by more than 50% to Rs 12 lakh crore. Any further borrowing will mean, the central government’s already terrible numbers on the fiscal front, will end up looking even more terrible.

I guess that is the logic running in the minds of the babus at the finance ministry and their minister. The trouble is this logic doesn’t hold. Irrespective who borrows, the state governments or the central government, the public debt or the overall debt of the public sector, will go up. Further, there is an implicit sovereign guarantee on state government debt.

As Shaktikanta Das, the governor of the RBI said in November 2019: “There is an implicit sovereign guarantee in them… On the due date of repayment, RBI automatically debits the state government account and makes the repayment. So, there is an implicit sovereign guarantee.” Hence, ultimately, if there is any trouble on this front, it is the central government’s problem.

Further, the central government is in a much better position to raise money. It can sell its stakes in public sector enterprises. It can also sell their land. It has access to a variety of cesses (tax on tax) from which it can earn money. This is money it doesn’t need to share with state governments. It also has access to the profit made by the Reserve Bank of India, as well as its reserves. The ability of the state governments to tax post GST has come down.

Also, various central government institutions (from banks to insurance companies) end up buying bonds issued by the state governments. In that sense the interest on these bonds gets paid to them. The profits made by these institutions end up with the central government, one way or another (corporate income tax/dividends/special dividends etc.).

Hence, there are many reasons as to why the central government should compensate the state governments for a fall in GST collections. But the biggest reason as the deputy chief minister of Bihar, Sushil Modi told the the Press Trust of India: “It is the commitment of the central government to compensate the states for the shortfall in GST collections. It’s true that it is legally not binding on the Centre, but morally, it is.”

Modi belongs to the BJP.

Why is the stock market going up when the economy is going down?

The total collections of the goods and services tax (GST) between March and July stood at Rs 2.73 lakh crore. This is 34.5% lower than what the government earned during the same period in 2019.

The stock market index Nifty 50 has rallied by 53% to 11,648 points between March 23 and August 28. It had touched this year’s low of 7,610 points on March 23.

So, what’s the point in comparing the Nifty 50 with GST collections? The GST is basically a tax on consumption. If the GST collections are down by more than a third, what that basically means is that private consumption is down majorly.

When consumption is down, the company earnings are bound to take a beating. Take the case of two-wheelers and cars. When people don’t buy as many of them as they used to, their production takes a beating. When that happens, it has an impact right down the value chain. It means lower production of steel, steering, glass, tyres, etc. A lower production of tyres means a lower demand for rubber.

A lower production on the whole means lower demand for power. Industrial power largely subsidises farm power and home power (where power is stolen). If industrial power consumption goes down, the losses of state electricity boards go up. When this happens, their ability to keep paying power generation companies goes down. When these companies don’t get paid, they are in no position to repay loans they have taken from banks. So, the cycle works.

Many people buy two-wheelers and cars on loans from banks and non-banking finance companies. When the buying falls, the total amount of loans given by banks also comes down. When banks don’t get enough loans, they need to cut the interest rate on their fixed deposits.

When this happens, people who are saving towards a goal, need to save more. This means they need to cut down on their consumption. Further, people who are largely dependent on interest from bank deposits will see their incomes fall. This means they need to cut down on their consumption as well.

This cycle will also lead to a fall company earnings. A Business Standard results tracker for 1,946 companies reveals that the sales of these companies for April to June 2020 were down 23.1% in comparison to the same period in 2019. The net profit for these companies was down 60.8%.

The stock market does not wait for things to happen. It discounted for this possibility and the Nifty fell by 32.1% between end February and March 23. The market was adjusting for an era of falling company earnings. But it didn’t stay at those low levels and has rallied by more than 50% since then.

The trouble now is that the valuations are way off the chart. The price to earnings ratio of the Nifty 50 index, as of August 28, stood at 32.92. This means that investors are ready to pay close to Rs 33 for every rupee of earning for stocks that make up the Nifty 50 index. Such a level has never been seen before. Not during the dotcom bubble era and not even during early 2008 when the stock market rallied to its then highest level.

Why has the stock market jumped as much as it has? Does this mean that the company earnings will jump big time in the near future? Not at all. The covid-induced recession is not going to go anytime quickly. Also, the pandemic is now gradually making its way into rural India.

So, why is the stock market rallying? The Western central banks led by the Federal Reserve of the United States, the American central bank, have printed a lot of money post February, in order to drive down interest rates and get people and businesses to borrow and spend. The Federal Reserve has printed more than $2.8 trillion between February 26 and August 5. Some of this money has made it into India.

During this financial year, the foreign institutional investors have net invested a total of Rs 83,682 crore into Indian stocks, after going easy on investing in India over the last few years. This is clearly an impact of the easy money policies being run in much of the Western world.

Further, the participation of the retail investors in the stock market has increased during the course of this year. Between December 2019 and June 2020, the number of demat accounts has gone up by 39 lakhs or 10% to 4.32 crore accounts. In fact, between March end, after a physical lockdown to tackle covid was introduced, and up to June, the number of demat accounts has gone up by 24 lakhs.

The latest monthly bulletin of Securities and Exchange Board of India, the stock market regulator, points out: “We have seen a huge surge in participation of retail investors in the equity market in the last few months. The fact that there is also a surge in opening up of demat accounts suggests that many of these retail investors are perhaps first time investors in the stock market.”

With after tax return on bank fixed deposits down to 4-5% when inflation is close to 7%, these investors are coming to the stock market, in search of higher returns.

The question is, with the stock market at all time high valuations, will their good times continue? Or once the dust has settled, is another generation of investors ready to equate stock market investing to gambling? On that your guess is as good as mine.

This article originally appeared in the Deccan Herald on August 30, 2020.

The New Indian Express Reviews Bad Money, Calls It Brave and Brilliant


The New Indian Express has reviewed my book Bad Money.

It has this to say about the book.

Kaul’s book is brave and brilliant, and must be made mandatory reading for all.

Kaul’s Bad Money is never less than engrossing.”

You can read the complete review here.

The book is available at all major bookstores all across India.

You can also buy it on Amazon. 

 

India’s MIDNIGHT TRYST with GST is Turning into a Priyadarshan Comedy

Summary: 

There must be some kind of way outta here
Said the joker to the thief
There’s too much confusion
I can’t get no relief.

— Bob Dylan, All Along the Watchtower.

 

India’s midnight tryst with the Goods and Services Tax (GST) is a little over three years old and is looking more and more like a bad joke which, we brought upon ourselves.

The state of GST takes me back to the last thirty minutes of several Priyadarshan comedies, where everyone is running after everyone else and no one knows what is really happening. (Actually, it can also compared to the ending of the wonderful comedy Andaz Apna Apna).

In reel life, all this confusion has the audience in splits. In real life, those going through the experience feel like they are a part of surreal black comedy.

Yesterday, the finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman said that the covid-19 pandemic was an act of god and that would impact GST collections negatively. An act of god is essentially a natural hazard which is beyond human control, something like an earthquake or a tsunami for that matter. No one can be held responsible for it.

The act of god has led to a situation where the GST collections have nose-dived. This is hardly surprising given that private-consumption has come down over the last few months. Also, by characterising the fall as an act of god, the central government doesn’t want to be held responsible for the fall in GST collections.

Nevertheless, it needs to be said here that GST collections weren’t doing well even before covid-19 struck. Let’s take a look at the growth/fall in GST collections between August 2018 and February 2020, before the covid pandemic struck.

All is well?

   
Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.

The above chart clearly shows that the growth in GST collections had been falling since early 2019 though it did recover a little since late last year, before stabilizing at half of the peak growth. In November 2018, the growth in GST collections was 16.5%. In February 2020, it was at 8.3%.

The point here being that the growth in GST collections had slowed down since early 2019. It picked up again in late 2019, thanks to a cap on the input tax credit that certain businesses could take. Festival season sales also helped.

This slower growth in GST collections was a reflection of a broader economic slowdown, for which the botched up implementation of GST was also hugely responsible. Of course, the spread of the covid pandemic has only made the situation much worse, with GST collections falling between March and July.

In a normal scenario, a fall in tax collections would mean lower expenditure by the government. But the situation that prevails is nowhere near normal. With private consumption falling, the governments (states and central) are expected to continue spending money, in order to keep the economy going.  Also, state governments are at the forefront of fighting the epidemic and they need money to do that.

The GST collections are split between the central government and the state governments. One of the carrots that the central government had offered to the states in a bid to make GST acceptable and to hasten India’s midnight tryst with GST, was a promise of a compensation if the GST revenues did not grow by 14% from one year to the next. The GST(Compensation to States) Act, guarantees state governments a revenue protection of 14% for the first five years of GST.

Of course, it doesn’t take rocket science to understand that GST revenues will contract in 2020-21, the current financial year. Hence, as per the GST(Compensation to States) Act, state governments need to paid a compensation by the central government.
As per the law, a compensation needs to be paid to state governments every two months. In fact, the compensation due to states for the period April to July 2020, stands at Rs 1.5 lakh crore.

This money comes from the compensation cess which is levied on both sin and luxury goods. The trouble is that like the overall GST collections, the growth in collections of the compensation cess had been falling through most of 2019. This can be seen in the following chart.

To sin or not to sin?


Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.

In June 2020 and July 2020, the collections of compensation cess fell by 9.4% and 15%, respectively. It needs to be said that even during an economic slowdown or a contraction, the consumption of sin and luxury goods does not fall at the same pace as the overall consumption. But despite that, the compensation cess collected in 2020-21 will not be enough to pay state governments to ensure a 14% growth in overall GST earned.

The shortfall in GST collections as per the central government is expected to be at Rs 2.35 lakh crore. It has said that this shortfall cannot be paid for through the consolidated fund of India, which is a repository for all the money earned by the central government through taxes as well as the money it borrows.

Basically, the central government after promising a 14% growth protection to states on GST, has come back and told them, hey, now that we are in trouble, you are on your own. It reminds me of an old line in buses in North India, sawari apne samaan ke khud zimmedar hai (the travellers are responsible for what they are carrying). The joke, the way the drivers of these buses drove, was, sawari apni jaan ke bhi khud zimmedar hai (the passengers are also responsible for their lives). This is the kind of joke that the central government has just cracked on state governments. This is black humour of the finest kind, which you won’t even see in an Anurag Kashyap movie.

In order to fulfil the gap, the options offered to the state governments by the central government are: 1) To borrow Rs 97,000 crore at a reasonable rate of interest from a special window at the Reserve Bank of India. The Rs 97,000 crore number is an estimate of GST loss due to implementation issues. 2) To borrow the entire gap of Rs 2.35 lakh crore. These options are only for 2020-21. The states can repay the money in the years to come by using the GST compensation cess they receive in the years to come.

This leads to a few points:

1) The central government basically sold the state governments a dummy in promising a 14% growth in GST collections. A narrative was created, it was marketed and then the constituents of the narrative were abandoned.

2) The state governments were also responsible for this to some extent given their resistance to the original law. Also, the central government was in a hurry to ensure India’s midnight tryst with GST, in order to create a narrative.

3) It is easier for the central government to borrow than for the states to do so. It seems here that the central government doesn’t want to spoil its fiscal deficit number any further than it already will this year. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends.

Nevertheless, whatever be the case, the total government borrowing (centre + states) is bound to go up. So, I really can’t understand what is the fuss around the central government borrowing more. Also, with the GST in place, the ability of state governments to tax more is rather limited. Their main taxes on alcohol, real estate, petroleum products and vehicles, have already taken a huge beating this year.

4) It will be interesting to see the legal logic being used by the central government to take this stance. From what I understand, the GST Council and the central government are being considered separate entities (Maybe some lawyer can explain this in simple English).

5) If the state governments borrow from the market, how is it going to impact bond yields?

6) Also, the compensation cess on luxury and sin goods, will now have to be extended beyond 2022 and this will not go down well with businesses, which are already struggling.

7) There is bound to be in increase in compensation cess on some luxury and sin goods during this financial year. That remains the easiest way for the government to increase tax revenues. Also, I sincerely hope the GST Council doesn’t start increasing tax rates on normal goods in a bid to shore up revenues (Governments and government bodies have a tendency to do that).

Of course, the move hasn’t gone down well with state governments. Sushil Modi, the deputy chief minister of Bihar told this to the Press Trust of India, even before the GST Council meet: “It is the commitment of the central government to compensate the states for the shortfall in GST collections. It’s true that it is legally not binding on the Centre, but morally, it is.” Modi belongs to the BJP.

West Bengal finance minister Amit Mitra said: “The question is who should borrow. The Centre… can get a better rate and has more debt servicing capacity.” The finance minister of Delhi, Manish Sisodia, accused the Centre of “betraying” federalism by “refusing” to pay GST compensation to states.

As stated earlier, these options are only for 2020-21. What happens next year? With covid-19 pandemic continuing, the negative economic impact of this might be felt next year as well. The states have a week’s time to get back to the GST Council.

Of course, until then and even beyond, all the confusion will prevail. As I said, the entire scenario now looks like the last thirty minutes of a Priyadarshan movie, where everyone is going after everyone else, and no one knows what is actually happening. The irony is that this is in real life and not something to laugh at. But then when a government talks about an act of god to wriggle out of something that it clearly promised to many other governments, what else can one do anyway but laugh in pain.

There’s has got to be some difference between the government of the world’s largest democracy and an insurance company?

 

The ‘GULZAR’ Principle of Investing for Regular Income and Safe Returns

Summary: There is no real way of earning a regular and a safe income that is enough to meet the monthly expenses.

The headline was a clickbait. But now that I have your attention, let me explain the logic behind it.

The title song of the 1979 Hindi film Gol Maal was written by the lyricist Gulzar (Honestly, calling him just a lyricist is doing his talent a great disservice. Other than being a lyricist, he has written screenplays and dialogues for a huge number of Hindi films. He is a poet and a short story writer. He is also a translator of repute. Oh, and he has also directed a whole host of Hindi movies as well as a few TV serials along the way. Also, for the millennials, Hrishikesh Mukherjee made Gol Maal, much before Rohit Shetty started using the title for everything he could possibly think of).

Now getting back to the point I was trying to make. In the title song of Gol Maal there is a line which goes: “paisa kamane ke liye bhi paisa chahiye,” essentially meaning, in order to earn money, you first need money. And that is what I am going to write about today.

In the twenty months, as the economy has gone downhill, people have been getting in touch with me on email and the social media, with a very basic financial query. The numbers were small first but post-covid this has turned into a deluge. The question being asked is how a reasonable monthly income can be generated from savings, without taking any risk, in a safe way.

The answer to this question has become very important as people have lost their jobs or seen their salaries being slashed and incomes falling. What does not help is the fact that the post-tax return from bank fixed deposits are now largely in the range of 4-5%. The inflation as measured by the consumer price index is close to 7%.

Before I try answering this question, it is important to understand why interest rates on bank fixed deposits have fallen. The simple answer to this lies in the fact that there is too much money floating around in the financial system, with the banks not knowing possibly what to do with it.

Between March 27 and July 31, a period of little over four months, the non-food credit given by banks has contracted by Rs 1.32 lakh crore or around 1.3%. The banks give loans to the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and other state procurement agencies to primarily buy rice and wheat directly from the farmers at the minimum support price declared by the government. Once these loans are deducted from the overall loans given by banks, what remains is non-food credit.

What does non-food credit contracting tells us? It tells us on the whole borrowers have been repaying loans and at the same time not taking on enough new loans. It also tells us that banks are reluctant to lend. Further, as we shall see, there has been a huge surge in fixed deposits with banks, as people have increased their savings in the aftermath of the spread of the covid-19 pandemic. Banks will take time to lend all this money out.

Between March 27 and July 31, the total deposits of banks have gone up by Rs 5.95 lakh crore or 4.4%. In an environment, where the non-food credit of banks has contracted whereas deposits have jumped big-time, it is but natural that interest rates on fixed deposits have fallen. In fact, the weighted average term deposit interest rate or simply put average fixed deposit interest rate has fallen from 6.45% in February to 6% in June, the latest data available. Now that we are in August, the interest rates may have possibly fallen even more.

In fact, there is nothing new about interest rates on fixed deposits falling, this has been going on for close to eight years now. Having said that, interest rates shouldn’t be looked at in isolation, it is important to compare them with the prevailing rate of inflation. Take a look at the following chart. It plots the average interest rate on fixed deposits during the course of a year, along with inflation as measured by the consumer price index. The difference between the two is referred to as the real rate of return on fixed deposits.

Interest v/s Inflation


Source: Reserve Bank of India.

What does the above chart tell us? Between 2014-15 and 2018-19, there was a healthy difference between the average interest paid on fixed deposits and inflation. (Of course, this is without taking tax on fixed deposit interest into account, else, the difference would have been lower).

These were the years when first Dr Raghuram Rajan and then Dr Urjit Patel were at the helm at the Reserve Bank of India. In 2019-20, the real return on fixed deposits narrowed to 1.6%. Shaktikanta Das took over as RBI Governor in December 2018.

Let’s take a look at the real return on fixed deposits month wise since December 2018, the month when Das took over as RBI Governor. The real return on fixed deposits as explained earlier is the average interest rate on fixed deposits minus the prevailing rate of inflation.

Crash in real returns


Source: Author calculations on data from the Reserve Bank of India.

This chart is as clear as anything can get. The real rate of return on fixed deposits has simply collapsed since end of 2018. This has happened as the interest rate on fixed deposits has fallen and inflation has gone up.

The interest rate on fixed deposits has fallen primarily because the rate of loan growth for banks has crashed over this period. This we can see from the following chart.

Loan growth crash


Source: Reserve Bank of India.

The above chart clearly tells us that the loan growth of banks has crashed since December 2018. In fact, for the week ended July 31, it stood at just 5.4%. Given this, the Indian economy was slowing down even before covid-19 pandemic struck.

Hence, as economic growth has slowed down, the loan growth of banks has slowed down and this has led to fixed deposit interest rates coming down as well. The point being that in economics everything is linked.

Of course, there is more to this than just the economy slowing down. Since February,  like the rest of the central banks, the RBI has printed and pumped money into the financial system to drive down interest rates, in the hope of getting businesses and people to borrow more.

Also, with collapse in tax revenues, the government will have to borrow more this year, in order to keep its expenditure going. Hence, it likes the idea of borrowing more at lower interest rates. The RBI goes along with this because among other things it also acts as the debt manager of the government.

The problem is that India’s economic crisis has grown worse since the covid pandemic hit the world, leading to a lot of individuals losing their jobs or facing salary cuts. Small businesses have been majorly hit and incomes have come down dramatically.

In this environment, people are now looking to generate some sort of a regular income from their savings. Of course, most them want to do this in a risk free way. As one gentleman recently asked me: “I am currently not employed after having worked in the corporate sector for 10 years. My request to you is to honestly guide me on how and where to invest to earn steady income especially when the fixed deposit interest rates have fallen so low.”

The first thing I can clearly say is that the gentleman believes that there is a solution to his problem. He believes that it is possible to generate a good steady income despite fixed deposit interest rates having fallen.

I see this belief among many people. My guess is, it stems from the fact that way too many personal finance publications believe in offering solutions to everything. I mean, why will a reader read you, if at the end of it you say something like there aren’t really any solutions to this problem that you might have. At least, that’s how their thinking operates. Also, they need advertisers. And advertisers love solutions to everything, even when none really exist.

In June 2020, the average rate of interest on a fixed deposit was 6%. Once we take income tax into account, the rate of return would be much lower. Of course, there are banks out there which are offering a rate of interest of 7% or more. Nevertheless, these banks are perceived to be among the riskier ones. So, the question is are you willing to take on more risk, for a 1-1.5% higher return? If yes, then these investments are for you.

While, we live in an era where no bank is going to go bust, they can and have been put under a moratorium or periods under which only a limited amount of money can be withdrawn from them. And money that can’t be spent when it is needed, is essentially useless. Hence, if you do end up putting money in a bank which offers a 1-1.5% higher return, do remember not to put all your money into it.

There are corporate fixed deposits which offer a slightly higher return but again they don’t have the same safety as a bank does.

If you are senior citizen, you can look at the Senior Citizens Savings Scheme. But that comes with the pain of dealing with the post office.

Debt mutual funds as many people have found out over the last one year, come with their own share of risks. They were marketed to be as safe as fixed deposits, but they weren’t anywhere close. Also, irrespective of what financial planners and wealth managers might say, debt mutual funds are fairly complicated products, which I am sure most people selling them don’t understand. And that’s why they are able to sell them in the first place.

A lot of individuals in the last few months have turned towards investing in stocks. The logic is that the stock market has rallied from its March low. On March 23, the BSE Sensex, India’s premier stock market index was at 25,981 points. Yesterday, August 26, it closed at 39,074 points, a jump of over 50% in a period of a little over five months. This rally has been driven by a few stocks and if you had invested in the right stocks, you would have ended up with good gains by now.

While, one can’t question this logic, but what one needs to remember is that on January 12, the Sensex was at 41,965 points. From there to March 23, it fell by 38% in a little over two months. The point being the stock market can fall as fast or even faster than it can rise. Also, do remember this basic point that a 50% fall can wipe off a 100% gain. (A 38% fall would have written off a 61% gain).

Hence, the larger point here as I mentioned in this piece I wrote a few days back is, just because an investor takes a higher risk by investing in stocks, it doesn’t mean he will always end up with higher returns, precisely the reason the word ‘risk’ is used in the first place. And by the way, the 10-year return on stocks (including dividends) is less than 9% per year.

So, the question is what should a person looking for a regular and safe income, actually do? As helpless as it might sound, there aren’t many options going around beyond the humble fixed deposit, especially for people who aren’t senior citizens. The trouble is the fixed deposit interest rates are at very low levels.

If you need to generate a monthly income of Rs 20,000 at 6% per year, this needs an investment of Rs 40 lakh.

The moral of the story here being that if you want to generate a regular safe income which is enough to meet your monthly needs, you need to invest more money. Or as Gulzar wrote in Gol Maal: “paisa kamane ke liye bhi paisa chahiye.” I would like to call this the Gulzar principle of investing for a regular income and safe returns.

Also, there are corollaries to this. These are very difficult times. Hence, there is a good chance of individuals ending up in a situation where they might have to spend their savings (rather than just the return on savings) to keep meeting expenditure.

Let’s take the example of a middle-class household with monthly expenses of Rs 50,000. In order to generate this income through a fixed deposit, an investment of Rs 1 crore is needed. Of course, the chances of a middle-class household with expenses of Rs 50,000 per month having savings of a crore, are rather minimal. In this scenario, they will have to resort to spending their savings. Given this, as I keep saying, the return of capital is much more important now than the return on capital.

In the short run, the only way to generate a good regular and safe income is find a job or any other source of income by selling the skills that one has (Like I write. I can do that for a media house or do it individually). In the long run, the next time you see interest rates of 8-9% available on fixed deposits or any other safe investment, invest in these assets and lock in the high returns for as long as possible.

While, this might not sound much like a solution but that is the long and the short of it.