What Arun Jaitley can learn from marketers and real estate agents

Fostering Public Leadership - World Economic Forum - India Economic Summit 2010Vivek Kaul


I need to confess at the very start that I should have written this column a few days back. But more important things happened and this idea had to take a back seat. Nevertheless, as they say, it’s better late than never.
So, let’s start this column with two examples—one borrowed and one personal. The idea behind both the examples is to illustrate two concepts from behavioural economics—contrast effect and anchoring.
In the book
The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less, Barry Schwartz discusses an example of a high-end catalog seller, who was selling an automatic bread maker for $279. As he writes “Sometime later, the catalog seller began to offer a large capacity, deluxe version for $429. They didn’t sell too many of these expensive bread makers, but sales of the less expensive one almost doubled! With the expensive bread maker serving as anchor, the $279 machine had become a bargain.”
Essentially, there are two things that are happening here. The buyer first gets “anchored” on to high price of the deluxe version of bread maker which is priced at $429. After this the contrast effect takes over. The bread maker priced at $279 seems cheaper than the deluxe version and people end up buying it.
As John Allen Paulos writes in A Mathematician Plays the Stock Market “Most of us suffer from a common psychological failing. We credit and easily become attached to any number we hear. This tendency is called “anchoring effect.””
And once an individual is anchored on to a number, he then tends to compare it with other numbers that are thrown at him. Marketers exploit this very well. As Schwartz points out “When we see outdoor gas grills on the market for $8,000, it seems quite reasonable to buy one for $1,200. When a wristwatch that is no more accurate than one you can buy for $50 sells for $20,000, it seems reasonable to buy one for $2,000. Even if companies sell almost none of their highest-priced models, they can reap enormous benefits from producing such models because they help induce people to buy cheaper ( but still extremely expensive) ones.”
This was the borrowed example. Now let me discuss the personal example. Sometime in May 2006, I was suddenly asked to leave the apartment that I lived in because the landlord had not been paying the society charges for a very long time. And thus started the search for another apartment to rent. Affordable apartments in Central Mumbai tend to be in buildings that are not in best shape.
Given this, real estate agents use a trick where they try and exploit the contrast effect. The first few apartments that they show are in a really bad shape. After having done this they show an apartment which is slightly better than the ones shown earlier, but the rent is significantly higher.
The attractiveness of the apartment shown later is increased significantly by showing a few “run down” apartments earlier.
The idea behind sharing these two examples was to explain the idea of anchoring and contrast effect. I hope both these concepts are clear by now. Now let me move on to real issue that I want to talk about in this column.
On November 18,
the finance minister Arun Jaitley said in a speechInflation, especially food inflation, has moderated in the last few months and global fuel prices have also come down. Therefore, if RBI, which is a highly professional organisation, in its wisdom decides to bring down the cost of capital, it will give a good fillip to the Indian economy.”
In simple English, Jaitley, as he has often done in the past, was asking the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to cut the repo rate. Repo rate is the interest rate at which RBI lends to banks. The idea is essentially that at lower interest rates, people will borrow and spend more, and companies will invest and expand. This will lead to faster economic growth. While this sounds good in theory, as I had argued a few days back,
it isn’t as simple it is made out to be.
One argument offered by those asking the RBI to cut interest rates is that inflation as measured by the consumer price index has fallen to 5.52% in October 2014. It was at 6.46 % in September 2014 and 10.17% in October 2013.
Nevertheless, is inflation really low? Or are Jaitley and others like him who have been demanding an interest rate cut just becoming victims of anchoring and the contrast effect?
The inflation figure of greater than 10% which had been prevalent over the last few years is anchored into their minds. And in comparison to that an inflation of 5.52% does sound low. Hence, the contrast effect is at work here.
Further, it is worth remembering that this so called low inflation has been prevalent only for a few months. Chances are that food prices might start rising again. The government has forecast that the output of 
kharif crops will be much lower than last year and this might start pushing food prices upwards all over again. Also, recent data showsthat vegetable and cereal prices have started rising again because of the delayed monsoon.
Central banks of developed countries typically tend to have an inflation target of 2%. In the recent past they have been unable to meet even that number. Large parts of the world might now be heading towards deflationary scenario, where prices will fall.
In October, the consumer price inflation in China stood
at 1.6%, well below the targeted 3.5%. Also, in January earlier this year the Report of the Expert Committee to Revise and Strengthen the Monetary Policy Framework set up by RBI had recommended that the Indian central bank should set an inflation target of 4%, with a band of +/- 2 per cent around it .
The committee had said “transition path to the target zone should be graduated to bringing down inflation from the current level of 10 per cent to 8 per cent over a period not exceeding the next 12 months and 6 per cent over a period not exceeding the next 24 month period before formally adopting the recommended target of 4 per cent inflation with a band of +/- 2 per cent.”
Once, these factors are taken into account, the latest inflation number of 5.52% as measured by the consumer price index, isn’t really low, even though it seems to be low in comparison to the very high inflation that had prevailed earlier. But as explained this is more because of anchoring and the contrast effect at work.
Also, as I had written earlier, more than anything people still haven’t come around to the idea of low inflation, given that inflationary expectations(or the expectations that consumers have of what future inflation is likely to be) continue to remain on the high side.
As per the
Reserve Bank of India’s Inflation Expectations Survey of Households: September – 2014, the inflationary expectations over the next three months and one year are at 14.6 percent and 16 percent. In March 2014, the numbers were at 12.9 percent and 15.3 percent. Hence, inflationary expectations have risen since the beginning of this financial year.
If inflationary expectations are to come down, then low inflation needs to be prevail for some time. Just a few months of low inflation is not enough. As RBI governor
Raghuram Rajan had said in a speech in February this year “ the best way for the central bank to generate growth in the long run is for it to bring down inflation…Put differently, in order to generate sustainable growth, we have to fight inflation first.”
Rajan is trying to do just that, and it’s best that Jaitley allows him to do that, instead of demanding a cut in interest rates every now and then.

The article appeared originally on www.equitymaster.com on Nov 21, 2014

With Kisan Vikas Patra 2.0 now invest your black money with the government

indian rupeesIf you can’t beat them, join them,” goes the old adage.
The government of India has done just that by relaunching the Kisan Vikas Patra (KVP). An investment in the newly launched KVP will double in 100 months. This means a return of 8.7% per year. It also comes with a lock-in of two and a half years.
There are no tax benefits, neither at the time of investment nor when the investment matures. Initially, the KVPs will be sold through post offices. But over a period of time the government plans to sell KVPs through some designated branches of public sector banks as well.
“The basic aim is to provide an investment opportunity to people who do not know where to invest and put their money into options like Ponzi schemes,”
the finance minister Arun Jaitley said at the relaunch of the scheme.
A ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investment scheme in which money is repaid to old investors by using money being brought in by new investors. The scheme runs as long as the money being redeemed by the old investors is lower than the money being brought in by the new investors. The moment this reverses, the scheme collapses.
In the recent past, the country has seen a whole host of Ponzi schemes like Sahara, Saradha, Rose Valley etc. But how will the KVP stop people from investing in Ponzi schemes?
A major reason why people invested in Ponzi schemes over the last few years lies in the fact that real returns (i.e. nominal return minus the rate of inflation) on fixed income investments (like fixed deposits, post office savings schemes etc.) was negative over the last few years.
Between 2008 and 2013, both consumer price inflation and food inflation were greater than 10%, for large periods of time. In this scenario, the returns on offer on fixed income investments were lower than the rate of inflation.
Given this, individuals had to look at other modes of investment, in order to protect the purchasing power of their accumulated wealth. A lot of this money found its way into real estate and gold, which delivered good returns for most of that period. And some of it also found its way into Ponzi schemes, which promised a slightly higher rate of return than fixed deposits and other fixed income investments.
Inflation has fallen over the last few months, and after many years, the real return on fixed income investments is in the positive territory. This is, as true for KVPs, as it is for fixed deposits offered by public sector banks.
Take the case of a fixed deposit of less than Rs 1 crore with a tenure of one year to less than five years, offered by the State Bank of India. Such a deposit pays an interest of 8.75% per year, which is as good as the return of 8.7% per year offered by KVPs.
Further, the fixed deposit doesn’t come with a lock-in, unlike KVPs which have a lock-in of two and a half years. Also, those who have dealt with post offices on a regular basis will know that dealing with (even) public sector banks is relatively easier than dealing with a post office.
So, there is no basic case for investing in a KVP. Also, for those investing for the long term, instruments like PPF which are not taxed on maturity, remain a considerably better bet. Those comfortable with investing in debt mutual funds are also likely to get higher after tax returns in the long term, once indexation(or inflation in simple terms) is taken into account while calculating capital gains.
And as far as not investing in Ponzi schemes is concerned, the returns offered on KVP are not high enough to stop people from investing in Ponzi schemes.
The government also wants to increase savings by getting people to invest in this scheme. As Jaitley said at the launch “Over the last two three years, when economic growth slowed, our savings rate declined…So it is very necessary to encourage people to increase domestic savings.”
The latest RBI annual report points out that “the household financial saving rate remained low during 2013-14, increasing only marginally to 7.2 per cent of GDP in 2013-14 from 7.1 per cent of GDP in 2012-13 and 7.0 per cent of GDP in 2011-12…the household financial saving rate [has] dipped sharply from 12 per cent in 2009-10.”
Household financial savings is essentially the money invested by individuals in fixed deposits, small savings scheme, mutual funds, shares, insurance etc. It has come down from 12% of the GDP in 2009-10 to 7.2% in 2013-14. A major reason for the fall has been the high inflation that has prevailed since 2008. The return on offer on KVPs is similar to other forms of fixed-income investments available in the market and there is no reason that it should lead to higher financial savings.
So that brings us to the question, why did the government launch KVPs then? Before we understand that, here are a few more features of the scheme. The KVPs as mentioned earlier come with a lock-in of two and a half years. They come in denominations of Rs 1000,Rs 5,000, Rs 10,000 and Rs 50,000 and there is no upper limit to the number of KVP certificates that can be bought. Hence, there is no limit to the amount of money that can be invested in the scheme.
As far as fulfilling know your customer requirements are concerned,
the gazette notifications states that the individual buying the KYC will have to provide proof of name and residence. No PAN card details will have to be provided.
And here comes the clincher—
the KVP will be a bearer instrument, which will not carry the name of the investor. Jaitley stated this at the event to relaunch the KVP. “So people with currency can invest in this,” Jaitley said. “This will be a bearer instrument just like currency and easy to encash,” he added.
So what does this really mean? There are some basic know your customer norms that need to be followed. But the KVP certificate will not carry any name on it, and that essentially makes it an anonymous instrument, once it has been issued.
With this move, the government is hoping that the KVPs will be used to launder black money. In fact, this was precisely the reason the scheme was discontinued in November 2011,
a recent report in the Business Standard points out.
Black money over the years has gone into gold and real estate, where it isn’t productive enough. If it finds its way into the coffers of the government, it can be used more productively, or so the government would like to believe.
It would also lead to higher financial savings and in the process lower interest rates. The government will benefit because it will be able to finance the fiscal deficit at lower interest rates. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends and is financed through borrowing.
The fact that the relaunched KVP is a bearer instrument, without the name of the investor and without any need to provide an identity proof, makes it ideal to invest black money in.
As R Jagannathan writes on Firstpost.com “Since it is a bearer certificate without limit, KVPs are likely to be more popular with the better off than just the poor…Rs 1 crore invested in KVPs of the face value of Rs 50,000 each will involve the creation of only 200 certificates. Not a very big pile and very portable for black money holders.” In fact, given the fact that it is a bearer instrument, KVPs can almost be used as a currency as well.
In the old days when the government wanted to access the black money in the country, it used to launch income tax amnesty schemes, where individuals could pay a one time tax on their accumulated black money and escape punishment. In its current form, the KVP looks more like a quasi-amnesty scheme. In fact, it is even better given that no tax needs to be paid on it.
It would have been a good idea to demand the PAN number from those investors who buy KVPs of Rs 1 lakh or more.
Nevertheless, the question is, should a government which has strong views on “black money” actually be launching a scheme, which makes it convenient for people to invest black money and that too with the government?

The article originally appeared on www.equitymaster.com on Nov 20, 2014

Raghuram Rajan won’t cut interest rates even in Hindi

ARTS RAJANAt a recent function, Raghuram Rajan, the governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), spoke in Hindi. The joke going around in the social media after that was that even in Hindi, Dr Rajan refused to cut the repo rate. Repo rate is the interest rate at which the RBI lends to banks. Nevertheless, four pieces of data that came out last week, will increase the pressure on Rajan to cut the repo rate. These four pieces of data are as follows:

  1. Inflation as measured by the consumer price index fell to 5.52% in October 2014. It was at 6.46 % in September 2014 and 10.17% in October 2013. 

  2. Inflation as measured by wholesale price index fell to 1.77%. It was at 2.38 % in September 2014 and 7.24% in October 2013. 

  3. The index of industrial production, which is a measure of the industrial activity within the country, grew by 2.5% in September 2014, in comparison to September 2013. The IIP for August 2014 was only 0.4% higher in comparison to August 2013. Interestingly, some economists believe that this marginal recovery in the IIP will not hold for October 2014. The reason for this lies in the fact that indicators of industrial activity like car sales, bank loan growth etc., have slowed down in October 2014. 

  4. The bank loan growth for a period of one year ending October 31, 2014, stood at 11.2%. This had stood at 16.4%, for the period of one year ending November 1, 2013. The loan growth year to date stands at 4.6%. It was at 7.6% last year.

These four data points have got the Delhi based economic experts and industry lobbyists brushing up their economic theory again. “It is time that the RBI started to cut interest rates,” we are being told. Chandrajit Banerjee, the director general of the Confederation of Indian Industries, a business lobby said “This provides sufficient room to the RBI to review its prolonged pause in policy rates and move towards policy easing in its forthcoming monetary policy especially as investment and consumption demand are yet to show visible signs of a pick-up.” This was a sentiment echoed by A Didar Singh as well. Singh is the secretary general of Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), which is another industry lobby. As he put it “The inflationary expectations are fairly tamed and we see no immediate upside risks with regard to prices. Given that, it is important to reiterate that demand remains subdued. The consumer durables segment reported negative growth for the fourth consecutive month in September. It is imperative that all levers are used to pep up demand.” The idea here is simple. If the RBI cuts the repo rate, banks will cut the interest rates they charge on their loans as well. If that were to happen, people would borrow and spend more, and businesses would borrow and invest more. And this will lead to faster economic growth. Economics 101. QED. Banerjee and Singh are not the only ones asking for an interest rate cut. Sometime back industrialist Anand Mahindra had said that “It might be time for the RBI to think of a rate cut…The need of the hour has changed and its time to start to look to support growth.” Sunil Mittal, chief of Bharti Airtelalso suggested the same when he told CNBC TV 18 that the finance minister Arun Jaitley “had spoken for the nation,” when had asked for an interest rate cut. In an interview to The Times of India in late October Jaitley had said “Currently, interest rates are a disincentive. Now that inflation seems to be stabilizing somewhat, the time seems to have come to moderate the interest rates.” While all this sounds good in theory, things are not as simple as the businessmen and the politicians are making it out to be. It is worth recounting here what Rajan had said in a speech in February 2014: “But what about industrialists who tell us to cut rates? I have yet to meet an industrialist who does not want lower rates, whatever the level of rates.” And what about the politicians? Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve of the United States, recounts in his book The Map and the Territory that in his more than 18 years as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, he did not receive a single request from the US Congress urging the Fed to tighten money supply and thus not run an easy money policy. In simple English, what Greenspan means is that the American politicians always wanted lower interest rates. The Indians ones aren’t much different on that front. Nonetheless, the question is will lower interest rates help in reviving consumption and investment? Let’s tackle the issues one by one. Let’s say an individual wants to buy a car. He borrows Rs 4 lakh to be repaid over a period of five years at a rate of interest of 10.5%. The EMI on this works out to Rs 8,598. Let’s say the RBI cuts the interest rate and as a result the interest rate on the car loan falls to 10%. The EMI now works out to Rs 8,499 or around Rs 100 lower. Now will an individual go out and buy a car because the EMI is Rs 100 lower? Even if interest rates fall by 200 basis points (one basis point is one hundredth of a percentage) to 8.5%, the EMI will come down by only around Rs 400. For two wheeler and consumer durables loans, the differences are even smaller. Hence, suggesting that lower interest rates lead to higher consumption isn’t really correct. The real estate experts think that cutting interest rates will help revive the sector. The basic problem with the real estate sector is that prices have gone totally out of whack and a cut in interest rates is not going to have any significant impact. What about corporate investment? As Rajan had asked in his speech “Will a lower policy interest rate today give him more incentive to invest? We at the RBI think not…We don’t believe the primary factor holding back investment today is high interest rates.” So what is holding back investment? The answers are provided in a recent report titled “Will a rate cut spur investments?Not really“, brought out by Crisil Research. As the report points out “Investment growth, particularly private corporate investment, plummeted in the fiscals 2013 and 2014, despite low real interest rates. During this time, the policy rate in real terms – repo rate minus retail inflation – has been negative, and real lending rates averaged 2.4%. This is significantly lower than the 7.4% seen in the pre-crisis years (2004-2008). Yet investment growth dropped to 0.3%, down from an average 16.2% seen in the pre-crisis years.” The accompanying chart makes for an interesting read. 

After 6 years, real repro rate (adjusted for CPI inflation) turns positive

Source: RBI, Central Statistical Office, CRISIL Research Note: Nominal repo rate at the fiscal year-end minus average CPI inflaction , F= Forecast

As Crisil Research points out “During fiscals 2013 and 2014, when investment growth slumped to 0.3% per year, the real repo rate was still minus 2.1%, while the real lending rate was only +2.8%. Only in June 2014, for the first time in six years, did the real repo rate turned mildly positive.” So companies were borrowing and investing at higher “real” interest rates earlier but they are not doing that now. Why is that the case? This is primarily because the expected rate of return on investments has fallen “because of high policy uncertainty, slowing domestic and external demand, and rising input costs driven by persistently elevated inflation.” “The rate of return on investments – as proxied by return on assets (RoA) of around 10,000 non-financial companies as per CMIE Prowess database – have fallen sharply to 2.8% in fiscal 2013 and 2014 from 5.9% in the pre-crisis years,” Crisil Research points out. Moral of the story: Corporates invest when it is profitable to invest, and not simply because interest rates are low. Indeed, the other factors that are likely to revive investment are in the hands of the government and not RBI. Hence, a cut in interest rates is neither going to revive consumer demand nor corporate investments. Having said that, high food inflation has been a big factor behind high inflation. And the RBI really cannot control that. Also, food inflation has come down considerably in the recent past. So why not just cut interest rates? Rajan explained it very well in his February speech where he said “They say the real problem is food inflation, how do you expect to bring it down through the policy rate? The simple answer to such critics is that core CPI inflation, which excludes food and energy, has also been very high, reflecting the high inflation in services. Bringing that down is centrally within the RBI’s ambit.” Further, food prices might start rising again. The government has forecast that the output of kharif crops will be much lower than last year and this might start pushing food prices upwards all over again. Also, recent data showsthat vegetable and cereal prices have started rising again because of the delayed monsoon. To conclude, despite falling inflation, the inflationary expectations (or the expectations that consumers have of what future inflation is likely to be) are on the higher side. As per the Reserve Bank of India’s Inflation Expectations Survey of Households: September – 2014, the inflationary expectations over the next three months and one year are at 14.6 percent and 16 percent. In March 2014, the numbers were at 12.9 percent and 15.3 percent. Hence, inflationary expectations have risen since the beginning of this financial year. And for inflationary expectations to come down, low inflation needs to stay for a considerable period of time. As Rajan said “A more important source of our influence today, therefore, is expectations. If people believe we are serious about inflation, and their expectations of inflation start coming down, inflation will also come down…Sooner or later, the public always understands what the central bank is doing, whether for the good or for the bad. And if the public starts expecting that inflation will stay low, the central bank can cut interest rates significantly, thus encouraging demand and growth.” If inflationary expectations are controlled only then will consumer demand revive and that in turn, will lead to revival of corporate investments as well. Given this, it would be surprising to see Rajan start cutting the repo rate any time soon. The article originally appeared on www.equitymaster.com on Nov 17, 2014

Vivek is a writer who has worked at senior positions with the Daily News and Analysis (DNA) and The Economic Times, in the past. He has just finished writing a trilogy on the history of money and the financial crisis. The series is titled Easy Money. His writing has also appeared in The Times of India, Business Standard, Business Today, The Hindu and The Hindu Business Line. 

Tackling black money

indian rupees

Vivek Kaul

One of the promises made by the Bhartiya Janata Party(BJP) before the sixteenth Lok Sabha elections was that it will get back all the black money that has left India over the years. This issue really caught the imagination of the voters. After coming to power, the party and its leaders have reiterated that they are still committed to getting back all the black money that has left the Indian shores.
Nevertheless this remains a difficult task given that the money is spread across tax havens all over the world. The economies of tax havens operate on all the money that is stored in their bank accounts, and so they wouldn’t be exactly be bending over their backs to hand over the money back to India. Also, the government needs to decide whether such an operation is feasible or are there better ways of looking at the situation like tackling the black money problem at home rather than trying to get back all the money that has left the Indian shores.
Before we get any further it is important to define what black money is. A ministry of finance white paper published in May 2012 suggests that “There is no uniform definition of black money in the literature or economic theory.” It then goes on to define black money as “ as assets or resources that have neither been reported to the public authorities at the time of their generation nor disclosed at any point of time during their possession.”
In simple English this is money which has been earned but not been declared as an income and hence, no tax has been paid on it. This is precisely how the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) had defined ‘black money’ in its 1985 report on Aspects of Black Economy. The NIPFP defined ‘black income’ as ‘the aggregates of incomes which are taxable but not reported to the tax authorities’.
Black money is generated from a variety of transactions including criminal activity. Nevertheless a major portion of black money is generated through legal activities. The ministry of finance white paper points out a number of reasons as to why people do not declare their entire income. “For example, a factory owner may under-report production on account of theft of electricity which in turn leads to evasion of taxes…Sometimes the procedural regulations can be such that complying with them may increase the probability of further scrutiny and thereby the incidence of the burden of compliance, creating a perverse incentive not to report at all and remain outside the reported and accounted proportion of the economy,” the report suggests.
Of course, this leads to under-declaration of income and lower tax collection by the government.
Further, sometimes culture and social practices also play a role “in deciding the preferences of citizens between tax compliance and black money generation.” In a country where not declaring income is a norm, generating black money may be totally acceptable. India fits this perfectly, with only 3.5 crore individuals out of a population of 120 crore paying taxes.
So, how does the country get rid of this menace? There are no easy answers to such a complex problem. Nevertheless, there has to be a starting point. The finance ministry white paper calls “for political consensus as well as patience and perseverance”.
The political consensus is the starting point. But are the Indian political parties really interested in weeding out black money? The answer is no. Allow me to elaborate.
A study carried out by the Centre for Media Studies sometime in March this year suggested that around Rs 30,000 crore would be spent during the 16th Lok Sabha elections which happened in April and May 2014. Of this amount the government of India would spend around Rs 7,000-8,000 crore, the study suggested. The remaining amount would be spent by candidates and their parties.
Candidates are allowed to spend Rs 70 lakh for fighting a Lok Sabha election in bigger states. For other states the amount varies from Rs 22 lakh to Rs 54 lakh. While officially candidates stay within this limit, unofficially they spend a lot more money, as news reports appearing around election time often point out. The question is where does this money come from? A major part of the Indian elections are financed through black money. Some of this money is essentially black money coming back to India from abroad, particularly from places like Dubai. This money is routed back through the hawala route.
Further, the money that politicians earn through corruption finds its way into real estate. Many real estate companies are essentially fronts for the ill-gotten wealth of politicians. Hence, are the politicians willing to disturb the status quo on this front? Are they willing to carry out reforms in the process of election campaign finance? Or it too lucrative an opportunity to let go of?
A serious effort of tackling black money problem will mean looking into real estate transactions, which generate a significant portion of black money in India. The finance minister Arun Jaitley recently talked about making Aadhar cards compulsory for real estate transactions. While that is a good move, there are certain underlying distortions that need to be set right in the real estate sector, which comprises of close to 11% of the Indian GDP.
The stamp duty to be paid on real estate transactions is close to 5% in many states. This leads to individuals under-declaring the value of the transaction when they are selling the real estate they own. Over and above this there are other transactions costs of searching for a property, registration, commissions to be paid etc. These small things are that need to be improved, if the “real estate” sector is to be made more transparent.
Further, when a fresh purchase is being made from a builder, he usually insists on a significant portion of the total deal value to be paid in cash. This is understandable given that builders are usually fronts for or in partnership with local politicians and politicians cannot be declaring their real incomes.
To conclude, if the black money menace has to be tackled in India, the politicians need to clean up their own acts first. Everything else is just noise.

The column originally appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle with a different headline on Nov 8, 2014

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

Mr Jaitley here is why Indians can’t buy a home to live in

Fostering Public Leadership - World Economic Forum - India Economic Summit 2010
Politicians and intellectuals who rarely venture out of their homes in Delhi, seem to have a table top theory to explain everything that is wrong with this country. A favourite theory doing the rounds these days is that India is not progressing because interest rates are too high. And given that, the Reserve Bank of India needs to cut interest rates. Once it does that people will buy homes, cars and what not, and high economic growth will return again. QED.
But is that really the case? Recent data released by the real estate research firm Liases Foras clearly shows that homes in Indian cities are terribly expensive.

Vivek1

The weighted average price of a flat in Mumbai is Rs 1.34 crore. For Bangalore this stands at Rs 88 lakh and for the National Capital Region at Rs 75 lakh. Nevertheless, this table does not tell us how bad the situation really is. In order to understand that we need to take the per capita income of these cities into account.

The state level economic surveys give out the per capita income of various cities. The only trouble here is that the latest numbers are not available. Hence, in order to account for that I have adjusted these incomes by assuming an average increase in per capita income of 10% per year. (Further, I couldn’t find the average income of Chennai, and hence haven’t taken it into account for making this calculation. Also, for the Mumbai Metropolitan Region I have used the average of the per capita incomes of Mumbai and Thane, respectively. For the National Capital Region, I have used the per capita income of Delhi, and hence the calculation is a little understated to that extent.)

The following table gives the per capita income of five cities in 2014-2015. In order to show how

high the real estate prices are we will basically divide the entries in the first table by the entries in the second table. Hence, we will end up calculating that how many years of current income is needed to buy a flat in a particular city. And the results are very interesting.
It takes 68 years of current income to buy a flat in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region. For Bangalore the number is at an even higher 81.5 years. This seems on the higher side. And there is a reason for it. I have used the per capita income of Bangalore division (which is what I could find in the

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Karnataka Economic Survey of 2013-2014). And Bangalore division includes not just Bangalore but also other places like Kolar, Shimoga, Tumkur etc., where per capita incomes are lower than that in Bangalore.
Even if we assume that per capita income in Bangalore is double the per capita income in Bangalore division, it will take around 40 years of current income to buy a home in Bangalore.
Of the five cities, Pune is the cheapest to buy a home in. But even there is takes close to 32 years of current annual income to buy a home.
Further, home prices continue to remain despite the fact that there is a huge inventory of unsold homes, as the following table from Liases Foras shows us.

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National Capital Region has an inventory of 83 months. What this means is that if the current number of unsold homes is to be sold, it would need nearly 83 months or around seven years for that to happen. One reason for the unsold inventory is that most builders are not interested in developing affordable homes. Everyone wants to cater only to the richer segment of the population.
Also, the tables clearly prove that high interest rates are really not why people are not buying homes. They are not buying homes because homes are very expensive. Fresh home loans can be got these days at anywhere between 10-11 percent. Assuming this interest rate where to fall in the days to come, how much difference would it make? Would people buy homes?
Let’s understand this through an example of an individual who wants to buy a home in Hyderabad. As mentioned earlier the average price of a home in Hyderabad is Rs 75 lakhs. The individual puts in a downpayment of Rs 15 lakh (20% of the value of the home) and takes a home loan of Rs 60 lakh at 10 percent to repaid over 20 years. On this the EMI would work out to around Rs 57,900.
If the interest rates were to fall to 9 percent, the EMI would fall to around Rs 54,000. So, would the individual now buy a home just because the EMI will be around Rs 4,000 per month lower? Unless, home prices fall and builders start concentrating a little more on affordable housing, lower EMIs are not going to help.
This is something that Jaitley and others of his ilk operating out of Delhi, need to realize. To conclude, if Jaitley, the quintessential dilli-wallah, had asked one of his IIT educated babus to do some basic number crunching, he wouldn’t be saying the silly thing that he did.

The article was originally published on Nov 6, 2014 on www.FirstBiz.com 

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek