Arun Jaitley

Jaitley again asks for interest rate cuts, needs lessons in basic economics

Fostering Public Leadership - World Economic Forum - India Economic Summit 2010Vivek Kaul

It is fashionable in Delhi circles these days to ask for an an interest rate cut at a drop of a hat. The finance minister Arun Jaitley like his predecessor P Chidambaram likes to remind the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) now and then that the time is just right for a rate cut.
In an interview to The Times of India late last week Jaitley said “”Currently, interest rates are a disincentive. Now that inflation seems to be stabilizing somewhat, the time seems to have come to moderate the interest rates.”
Before Jaitley, the senior columnist Prem Shankar Jha became the newest interest-rate-wallah on the block and in a column in The Times of India held the RBI responsible for India’s slow economic growth over the last few years. As he wrote“[The] Indian economy is not on the road to recovery. The reason is the sustained high interest rate regime of the past four years. Industry has been begging for cuts in the cost of borrowing since March 2011… On August 5, RBI governor Raghuram Rajan surprised the country by announcing that he would not lower interest rates, because at 8% consumer price inflation was still too high.”
I guess Jha must have been among the few people surprised by Rajan’s decision given that among those who follow the workings of the Indian central bank closely, almost no one had expected Rajan to cut interest rates.
The premise on which interest-rate-wallahs work is that at lower interest rates people will borrow and spend more, which will lead to economic growth. But the entire premise that low interest rates will lead to a pick up in consumption and hence, higher economic growth, doesn’t really hold. (As I have explained here). Jaitley believes that “expansion in real estate will take place significantly only if the interest rates come down a little.”
This is what the real estate companies also like to believe. But the basic point is that people are not buying homes because home prices have risen way above what they can afford. As I have explained in the past, for an average Mumbaikar it currently takes around 34 years annual income to buy a home to live in. This is true for other cities as well, though the situation maybe a little better than that in Mumbai. So even a major cut in interest rates is not going to lead people buying homes to live in unless real estate prices fall. This is something that Arun Jaitley as the finance minister of this country needs to understand.
Having said that, those looking to move their black money around will always look at investing in real estate and for them the interest rates really don’t matter.
The other big reason offered is that companies can borrow at lower rates of interest. The idea being that lower interest rates might encourage companies to borrow and expand. Again it needs to be realized that companies don’t always decide to expand just because money is available at low interest rates, especially in difficult times as these.
Factors like ease of doing business and consumer demand play an important role. As I have explained in the past, due to many years of high inflation consumer demand in India continues to remain subdued. And unless it starts to pick up, there is no real reason for companies to expand.
Also, it is worth remembering here that a some of the major business groups in India have already borrowed a lot of money and are having tough time paying interest on the debt they already have. Hence, where is the question of borrowing more?
The bigger question that interest-rate-wallahs tend to ignore is how much control does the RBI really have over interest rates that banks pay their depositors and in turn charge their borrowers? Over the last few weeks, banks have cut interest rates on their fixed deposits. The list includes State Bank of India, Punjab National Bank and Central Bank of India. (You can read about here, here and here). The Indus Ind Bank also cut the interest it pays on its savings account to 4.5% from the earlier 5.5% for a daily balance of up to Rs 1 lakh, starting September 1, 2014.
All these cuts in interest rates have happened despite the RBI maintaining the repo rate at 8%. Repo rate is the interest rate at which the RBI lends to banks. So what has changed that has allowed these banks to cut the interest rates at which they borrow?
Let’s look at some numbers. As on October 3, 2014, over a period of one year, the loans given by banks rose by 9.87%. During the same period the deposits raised by banks rose by 11.54%. How was the situation one year back? As on October 4, 2013, over a period of one year, the loans given by banks had risen by 15.18%. During the same period the deposits had grown by 12.9%.
Hence, the rate of loan growth for banks has fallen much faster than the rate at which their deposit growth has fallen. Given this, it is not surprising that banks are cutting fixed deposit rates, given that their rate of loan growth is falling at a much faster rate.
As Henry Hazlitt writes in Economics in One Lesson “Just as the supply and demand for any other commodity are equalized by price, so the supply of demand for capital are equalized by interest rates. The interest rate is merely a special name for the price of loaned capital. It is a price like any other.”
As Hazlitt further points out “If money is kept…in…banks…the banks are eager to lend and invest it. They cannot afford to have idle funds.”
Hence, given that the rate of loan growth is much slower than the rate of deposit growth, it is not surprising that banks are cutting interest rates on their fixed deposits. Given this, the impact that RBI’s repo rate has on interest rates is at best limited. It is more of a broad indicator from the RBI on which way it thinks interest rates are headed.
Further, it also needs to be remembered that financial savings in India have fallen dramatically over the last few years. The latest RBI annual report points out that “the household financial saving rate remained low during 2013-14, increasing only marginally to 7.2 per cent of GDP in 2013-14 from 7.1 per cent of GDP in 2012-13 and 7.0 per cent of GDP in 2011-12…the household financial saving rate [has] dipped sharply from 12 per cent in 2009-10.”
Household financial savings is essentially the money invested by individuals in fixed deposits, small savings scheme, mutual funds, shares, insurance etc. It has come down from 12% of the GDP in 2009-10 to 7.2% in 2013-14. A major reason for the fall has been the high inflation that has prevailed since 2008.
The rate of return on offer on fixed income investments(like fixed deposits, post office savings schemes and various government run provident funds) has been lower than the rate of inflation. This led to people moving their money into investments like gold and real estate, where they expected to earn more. Hence, the money coming into fixed deposits slowed down leading to a situation where banks could not cut interest rates., given that their loan growth continued to be strong.
What also did not help was the fact that the borrowing requirements of the government of India kept growing over the years.
The RBI was not responsible for any of this. The only way to bring down interest rates is by ensuring that inflation continues to remain low in the months and the years to come. If this happens, then money flowing into fixed deposits will improve and that, in turn, will help banks to first cut interest rates they offer on their deposits and then on their loans.
The government needs to play an important part in the efforts to bring down inflation. In fact, it has been working on that front. In a recent research report analysts Abhay Laijawala and Abhishek Saraf of Deutsche Bank Market Research write that the “the government is firmly ‘walking the talk’ on fiscal consolidation” through a spate of “recent administrative moves on curbing food inflation (such as fast liquidation of surplus foodstock, modest single-digit hike in MSPs, an effort to eliminate fruits and vegetables from ambit of APMC etc.)”
This is very important given that once inflation remains low for an extended period of time, only then will inflationary expectations (or the expectations that consumers have of what future inflation is likely to be) be reined in. And consumer demand is likely to pick up after this.
The Reserve Bank of India’s Inflation Expectations Survey of Households: September – 2014 which was a survey of 4,933 urban households across 16 cities, and which captures the inflation expectations for the next three-month and the next one-year period. The median inflation expectations over the next three months and one year are at 14.6 percent and 16 percent. In March 2014, the numbers were at 12.9 percent and 15.3 percent. Hence, inflationary expectations have risen since the beginning of this financial year.
To conclude, RBI seems to have become everyone’s favourite punching bag even though its impact on setting interest rates is rather limited. It is time that interest-rate-wallhas like Jaitley and Jha come to terms with this.

This an updated version of a column that appeared on Oct 22, 2014. You can read the original column here

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

Deregulating diesel prices: A good decision that will be tested when oil prices rise again

light-diesel-oil-250x250

Vivek Kaul

The government on Saturday announced the decision to deregulate diesel prices. “Henceforth—like petrol—the price of diesel will be linked to the market,” the finance minister Arun Jaitley said after a cabinet meeting. “Whatever the cost involved, that is what consumer will have to pay,” he added.
After this decision the price of diesel was reduced by around Rs 3.50 per litre (the cut would vary all around India given the different rates of taxes in different states). This was the first cut in the price of diesel since January 2009.
The proposal to allow oil marketing companies to decide the price of diesel was first made in 1997, when Inder Kumar Gujral was the prime minister. The price of petrol and diesel were finally deregulated in April 2002, under the regime of Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
But this decision was over turned in late 2004, around the time oil prices had touched $50 per barrel. In November 2004, Mani Shankar Aiyar, the then Petroleum Minister said “since January 1, 2004, government was dictating even petrol and diesel prices… We have been far more honest in saying the government will control prices of cooking and auto fuels.”
This led to the oil marketing companies having to sell oil products at a price at which they incurred under-recoveries. The government compensated a part of these under-recoveries. And due to this the government expenditure and in turn, the fiscal deficit went up. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends.
In the last two financial years (i.e. 2012-2013 and 2013-2014) the total petroleum subsidy (subsidy for diesel, cooking gas and kerosene) amounted to Rs 1,82,359.9 crore. As an article in The Wall Street Journal points out “Around half of that was for diesel. Before diesel prices were freed, economists estimated that a $1 per barrel rise in the global price of oil would increase India’s subsidy bill by around $1 billion a year.”
As government expenditure in order to pay for the under-recoveries of the oil marketing companies went up over the years, so did its borrowing. When the government borrows more, it crowds out the other borrowers i.e. it leaves lesser on the table for the private borrowers to borrow. This, in turn, pushes up interest rates, as the other borrowers now need to compete harder.
The high interest rate scenario that has prevailed in India over the last five-six years has been because of this increased government borrowing. If diesel prices had continued to be deregulated this wouldn’t have happened.
Other than the high interest rates, there were several other things that happened. But before we get into that let’s see what the economist Henry Hazlitt writes in Economics in One Lesson “We cannot hold the price of any commodity below its market level without in time bringing about two consequences. The first is to increase the demand for that commodity. Because the commodity is cheaper, people are tempted to buy, and can afford to buy, more of it…In addition to this production of that commodity is discouraged. Profit margins are reduced or wiped out. The marginal producers are driven out of business.”
The demand for diesel went up in the form of people buying more and more passenger cars that ran on diesel, given the substantial difference between the price of petrol and diesel. This led to the government of India indirectly subsidising car owners over the last few years. Hence, rich consumers ended up consuming more than their fair share of diesel.
As Hazlitt writes in this context: “Unless a subsidized commodity is completely rationed, it is those with the most purchasing power than can buy most of it. This means that they are being subsidized more than those with less purchasing power…What is forgotten is that subsidies are paid for by someone, and that no method has been discovered by which the community gets something for nothing.”
The move to dismantle diesel price deregulation also drove private marketers of oil (Reliance, Essar etc) out of business, as suggested by what Hazlitt had to say on the issue. The government owned oil marketing companies (Indian Oil, Bharat Petroleum, Hindustan Petroleum) were compensated by the government and the upstream oil companies (like ONGC, Oil India Ltd) for selling diesel at a lower price. There was no such compensation for the private oil marketers and hence, they had to shut down their business.
Once all these factors are taken into account the decision to deregulate diesel prices is a brilliant one even though it took a long time to come. Nevertheless, it will not lead to any major immediate benefits for the government. Since Narendra Modi took over as the prime minister of the country, the oil price has fallen dramatically.
As per the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, the international crude oil price of Indian Basket as on October 17, 2014, stood at $ 85.06 per barrel. This price had stood at $108.05 per barrel on May 26, 2014, the day Modi took over as the prime minister.
Interestingly, during April to June 2014, the first quarter of this financial year, the under-recoveries of oil marketing companies on the sale of diesel, cooking gas and kerosene were at Rs 9,037 crore. This is much lower in comparison to the huge under-recoveries that these companies suffered over the last few years.
Also, since January 2013, the price of diesel has been raised by 50 paisa every month. This has led to the under-recoveries of oil marketing companies coming down significantly. Interestingly, for the fortnight starting October 16, 2014, the over-recovery on diesel stood at Rs 3.56 per litre. And that explains why the government was able to cut the price of diesel by around Rs 3.50 per litre.
What this tells us clearly is that there will be no immediate benefit on the fiscal front of diesel price deregulation to the government. Further, the real benefit of this reform will kick in only once oil prices start to rise. And it is at that point of time, the government of the day will have to resist any temptation to start controlling diesel prices, as has been the case in the past.
If it resists this temptation, the upstream oil companies (ONGC, Oil India) will also benefit because the government will not strip them of their profits to pay off the under-recoveries of the oil marketing companies. This explains why the share price of ONGC is up by more than 5% today.
Nevertheless, one immediate benefit of the diesel price cut will be a slightly lower inflation. On the flip side, this also means that if and when oil prices start to go up, the inflation will start reflecting a higher price of diesel more quickly than was the case in the past.
Another benefit of the deregulation will be that private marketers can now look to get back into the business. This is good news for the Indian consumer as it will mean more competition, which may lead to better services. In fact, one huge problem with the products sold by the public sector oil marketing companies is adulteration. Given the cheap price of kerosene, there is lot of adulteration of petrol and diesel. Private marketers can make in roads into the market by providing pure petrol and diesel, and hope to attract the attention of the consumer.
To conclude, there are a few immediate benefits of diesel price deregulation, but the real challenge and the benefit for the government will only come, once oil prices start to go up again.

The article originally appeared on www.FirstBiz.com on Oct 20, 2014

(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek) 

RBI keeps repo rate at 8%: Lower interest rates are not a solution to slow economic growth

ARTS RAJANVivek Kaul

Ramachandra Guha in a wonderful essay titled An Anthropologist Among Marxists writes about what he calls a “possibly, apocryphal anecdote.” As he writes “When Indira Gandhi was assassinated, her ashes were sent to different cities to allow public homage. When her ashes lay lay in Calcutta’s Government House they were visited one evening by the state’s finance minister. In the previous year this man had delivered no less than two hundred and sixty-two speeches on the discrimination against West Bengal in the release of funds from the central treasury. As the minister came out of the Government House, he was asked how he felt when confronting the mortal remains of his most resolute political opponent. He replied in character: Centre Kom Diye Che (the centre has again given us less than our rightful share).”
In another essay titled Political Leadership Guha writes “Jyoti Basu’s government, it was said, began every discussion on federalism with the words, “Centre kom diye che.”
The communists who ruled West Bengal for more than three decades liked to blame all the problems of the state on the central government, which they felt did not give the state a fair share of the funds.
Dear Reader, if you are wondering why am I talking about West Bengal and its politics in a piece which has the term “interest-rates” in the headline, allow me to explain. Over the last few years, everyone from politicians to businessmen to bankers have called for interest rates to be cut as a solution for reviving economic growth in India. The assumption is that at lower interest rates people will borrow and spend more and that will lead to economic growth.
In that sense, these individuals are not very different from the communist politicians of West Bengal for whom “Centre kom diye che” was an explanation for all the problems of the state. Along similar lines, individuals calling for a cut in interest rates seem to believe that higher interest rates are a major reason for the slowdown in economic growth, and a cut can really get people borrowing and spending all over again.
The former finance minister P Chidambaram was a major propagator of this belief. His successor Arun Jaitley has carried of where Chidambaram left. Other than the politicians, bankers have also regularly asked the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to cut interest rates.
Today with the RBI deciding to keep the repo rate unchanged at 8% in the fourth bi-monthly monetary policy, the interest-rate-wallahs will be at it again. Repo rate is the rate at which the RBI lends to banks.
The RBI had its reasons for not changing the repo rate. As it pointed out in a statement “Since June, headline inflation has ebbed…The most heartening feature has been the steady decline in inflation excluding food and fuel…to a new low. With international crude prices softening and relative stability in the foreign exchange market, some upside risks to inflation are receding. Yet, there are risks from food price shocks as the full effects of the monsoon’s passage unfold, and from geo-political developments that could materialise rapidly.”
Nevertheless, over the next few days you will see bankers, real estate company owners, industry lobbies and possibly even the finance minister Jaitley, wondering why the RBI did not cut the repo rate, to get lending going again.
The most recent occasion when the interest-rate-wallahs came out in the open was when the bankers asked the RBI to cut the repo rate, after the growth in bank loans fell to a five year. As on September 5, 2014, the one year growth in bank loans stood at 9.7%. During the same time last year the number was at a significantly higher 17.9%.
The belief as explained earlier is that at lower interest rates people will borrow more. But as the American baseball coach Yogi Berra once famously said “In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is.”
Lower interest rates do not always lead to more borrowing and revival of economic growth. An excellent example of this is what has happened in the aftermath of the financial crisis that broke out in September 2008. Western central banks brought down interest rates to very low levels in the hope that people will borrow and spend more, and help revive economic growth. But that did not happen. All it did was lead to many stock market bubbles all over the world.
Closer to home let’s take a look at car sales. The sales have revived from May 2014, after having continuously fallen for nine months. In August 2014, car sales grew by 15.16%, in comparison to the same period last year. This has happened without much change in interest rates. Why is that the case? Let’s try and understand this through a simple example. Let’s assume that an individual takes a car loan of Rs 4 lakh to be repaid over a period of five years at an interest rate of 10.5%. The EMI on this loan works out to around Rs 8,598.
Let’s say that interest rates were to come down by a massive 100 basis points (one basis point is one hundredth of a percentage)to 9.5%, all at once. At this interest rate, the EMI would work out to around Rs 8,401 or around Rs 200 lower than the earlier EMI. Now how many people will go and buy a car just because the EMI is now lower by Rs 200?
Anyone who has the ability to repay an EMI of Rs 8,401 can also repay an EMI of Rs 8,598. Hence, what people look at while taking on a loan is their ability to service the EMI. This involves at looking at factors like job prospects, the prospects of the company the individual works for and some idea of how he expects the broader economy to do. A major reason for the revival in car sales has been the election of Narendra Modi as the prime minister of India.
People have bought his election slogan “acche din aane waale hain” and hence, have taken on car loans and bought cars because for now they believe that their future will be better than their past. Interest rates have had no role to play in the revival of car sales.
Let’s consider real estate next. Here again the belief is that if interest rates are cut people will borrow and buy homes. This logic again doesn’t really hold. Home prices are now way beyond what an average Indian can afford. Let’s consider the city of Mumbai.  A July 2014 report in The Times of India quotes Pankaj Kapoor of property research firm Liases Foras as saying “In Mumbai, the average cost of a flat is Rs 1.2 crore.”
An estimate made by Forbes puts the average income of a Mumbaikar at $5900 or around Rs 3.54 lakh (assuming $1 = Rs 60) per year. This means it would need nearly 34 years of annual income (Rs 1.2 crore divided Rs 3.54 lakh) for an average Mumbaikar to buy a home in this city currently. What this tells us very broadly that homes in Mumbai are very expensive. Similar calculations done for other parts of the country are most likely to show similar results.
Hence, the point is that homes in most parts of the country are now much more expensive than what most Indians can afford. Given this, lower EMIs because of lower interest rates aren’t going to help much. The real estate market has priced itself out.
This was the demand side of things. Now let’s look at what the economists call the supply side. Investments made by corporates have fallen rapidly over the last few years. As Sanjeev Sanyal of Deutsche Bank Market Research writes in a research report titled India 2020: The Road to East Asia and dated September 2014, “Gross Fixed Investment by the private corporate sector dropped from a peak of 14.3% of GDP in 2007-08 to 8.5% of GDP in 2012-13 (and likely even lower in 2013-14) with investments in machinery and equipment being particularly hit.”
The interest-rate-wallahs would like us to believe that this fall in investment has primarily been because of the high interest rates that have prevailed over the last few years. Nevertheless is that really the case? As Rahul Anand and Volodymyr Tulin write in an IMF Working Paper dated March 2014 and titled Disentangling India’s Investment Slowdown “Our results suggest that real interest rates account for only one quarter of the explained investment downturn. However, we find that standard macro-financial variables (interest rates, external demand, relative prices, global financial market volatility and others) do not fully explain the recent investment slump. Finally, using the new measure of economic policy uncertainty, the results suggest that heightened uncertainty and deteriorating business confidence have played a key role in the recent investment slowdown.”
Hence, if the current government really wants to get corporate investment going it needs to bring in a lot of much delayed structural reform. Also, it is worth remembering here that a some of the major business groups in India have already borrowed a lot of money and are having tough time paying interest on the debt they already have. Hence, where is the question of borrowing more?
Further, it also needs to be remembered that financial savings in India have fallen dramatically over the last few years. The latest RBI annual report points out that “the household financial saving rate remained low during 2013-14, increasing only marginally to 7.2 per cent of GDP in 2013-14 from 7.1 per cent of GDP in 2012-13 and 7.0 per cent of GDP in 2011-12…the household financial saving rate [has] dipped sharply from 12 per cent in 2009-10.”
Household financial savings is essentially the money invested by individuals in fixed deposits, small savings scheme, mutual funds, shares, insurance etc. The household financial savings were at 12% of the GDP in 2009-10. Since then, they have fallen dramatically to 7.2% in 2013-14. A major reason for the fall has been the high inflation that has prevailed since 2008.
The rate of return on offer on fixed income investments(like fixed deposits, post office savings schemes and various government run provident funds) has been lower than the rate of inflation. This has led to people moving their money into investments like gold and real estate, where they expected to earn more. If the household financial savings number has to go up the rate of interest on offer on fixed income investments needs to be higher than the rate of inflation. Only recently has the consumer price inflation fallen to levels below the rate of return available on fixed income investments. This situation has to be allowed to persist if the financial savings of India are to increase.
To conclude, calling for lower interest rates on almost every occasion is not a solution to anything. It is time the interest-rate-wallahs understand this.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

100 days of Modi govt: It’s been ekdum thanda on the economic front

narendra_modiVivek Kaul

In an essay titled Political Leadership (The Oxford Companion to Politics in India edited by Niraja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta) historian Ramachandra Guha writes about the various styles of political rhetoric: “The modern idiom is often expressed through a rhetoric of hope—the offer of a better and fuller life, whether expressed in material terms or otherwise. The traditional idiom, on the other hand, privileges a rhetoric of fear—warning the members of a caste, or religion, or region, that they would be swamped by their enemies if they do not bind together.”
Indian politics, over the last seven decades since independence, has largely been fought on what Guha calls the traditional idiom of fear. Given this, Narendra Modi’s campaign in the run up to and during the 16th Lok Sabha elections came as a breath of fresh air. Modi campaigned around the idiom of hope. “Acche din aane waale hain,” was the line that he tried to sell to the voters of this country. And voters bought it lock, stock and barrel, giving an absolute majority to the Modi led Bhartiya Janata Party(BJP). This was the first time that a single party other than the Congress got an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha.
Once the majority was in place, the hope among analysts, economists and everybody who had some sort of an opinion on Modi and his politics, was that he would push big bang economic reforms, like the kind that had happened in 1991, when the Indian economy was thrown open to the world. Nevertheless, nearly 100 days since the Modi government assumed power on May 26, 2014, nothing of that sort seems to have happened. This is not to say that no economic reform has happened. The government allowed 100% foreign direct investment(FDI) in several areas in the railways sector. It notified that the FDI limit in the defence sector would be increased to 49% from the current 26%, through the approval route. At the same time it has cleared the FDI limit in the insurance sector to be increased to 49% from the current 26%. Further, land acquisition laws put in place by the Congress led UPA government are set to undergo a transformation.
But other than the “proposed” change in land acquisition laws these are not big bang reforms exactly. This is minor tinkering at best. The union budget presented by Arun Jaitley lacked a vision of what the Modi government plans on the economic and the financial front over the next five years. Also, it continued with the unrealistic estimates of both revenues and expenditure made by the previous finance minister P Chidambaram.
Given this, it is highly unlikely that the fiscal deficit number projected by Arun Jaitley and his team is a realistic one. In that sense Jaitley has continued the process of projecting lower expenditure and higher revenue, started by Chidambaram.
Also, like Chidambaram, Jaitley has started to suggest that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) should start to cut interest rates. But as I explain here, there is very little that the RBI can do to cut interest rates. Interest rates will only come down once the government starts to manage its fiscal defict, borrower lesser and leave more money on the table for everyone else to borrow. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends. The government spends it through borrowing money.
Over and above this, there has been almost no talk about what the government plans to do on the Goods and Services Tax(GST) and the Direct Taxes Code (DTC) front. These are two big bang economic whose implementation has been pending over the last few years.
In his independence day speech Modi announced that his government was doing away with the Planning Commission. There is no doubt that it was an institution that had outlived its utility, nevertheless, with what and how does the government plan to replace it. More than two weeks after the independence day speech, there is almost no clarity on this front. As economist Bibek Debroy, wrote a recent column in The Economic Times “We are in end-August. In 2014-15, what happens to the (central assistance) money disbursed to states through the Planning Commission? Will that be released in December 2014 to be spent by March 2015?”
Oil prices have been falling for a while now. Given this, it was widely expected that the government would use this lucky streak to move towards market determined price for diesel and do away with some of the “under-recoveries” that the Oil Marketing Companies have to face everytime they sell diesel, cooking gas and kerosene. It was also expected that the cooking price would be raised by an equal amount every month and the “under-recoveries” on it would be done away with over a period of time. But nothing of that sort has happened.
Also, no moves have been made to sort out the food subsidy mess that the country finds itself in. A recent new report pointed out “Food corporation of India has informed the food ministry that dues on the food subsidy have piled up to Rs 50,000 crore at the end of 2013-14 over the last three-to-four years as it has not been allocated enough funds.” This is something that needs to be sorted out immediately.
A possible explanation for economic reforms being put on the back-burner being bandied around by Modi sympathizers has been that economic reforms will start streaming in after the Maharashtra elections are done with. The government does not want to make any publicly unpopular decisions before the Maharashtra elections are over. The thing is that state assembly elections will keep happening all the time. After there Maharashtra there is Bihar in 2015. And by the time the state assembly elections are over, the next Lok Sabha elections will be upon us. The government, like most other governments in the past, is likely to get into the election mode by 2017, two years before the next Lok Sabha elections are due. So, when will it actually get around to implementing any big-bang economic reforms is a question worth asking? Given this, the explanation does not really make much sense.
If the government is serious about economic reforms, the best time to do it is now. These are the early days for the government and it still has a lot of leeway to push through these reforms. An excuse offered here is that the Modi government does not have a majority in the Rajya Sabha and hence, legislation required to push through these reforms can get stuck there. This is indeed true, but then the government also has the option to call a joint session of Parliament and pushing through these reforms.
To conclude, it is worth pointing out what Guha writes about being the bane of almost all the governments in India over the last 25 years, before the Modi government came to power: “[The] deepening of Indian democracy has come at a cost, namely that there is now no political leader who can really think of or act for the country as a whole. When a single party was dominant at the Centre, it was possible to design long range policies; now, when the government is constituted by a coalition of a dozen or more parties, each representing a specific sectarian interest—these based variously on caste, language, region, or religion—its policies are determinedly short-term, aimed at placating or satisfying one or other of those interests.”
Modi doesn’t have to go through all this. His government has absolute majority on its own and it can use this opportunity to push through economic reforms, which will be beneficial for India in the days and years to come.
The article originally appeared on www.FirstBiz.com on September 1, 2014
(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

Borrow less, don’t blame RBI: Time Jaitley stops doing a Chidu on us

Fostering Public Leadership - World Economic Forum - India Economic Summit 2010Vivek Kaul

A favourite pastime of former finance minister P Chidambaram other than telling us that the Indian economic growth was about to bounce back, was to ask the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to cut interest rates.
The new finance minister Arun Jaitley has carried on from where Chidambaram left. On August 10, Jaitley had nudged the RBI to cut interest rates after taking various factors into account.

The thing with most politicians is that either they do not understand how a market operates or they pretend otherwise. Jaitley and Chidambaram, I assume would fall into the latter category. Allow me to explain.
The latest RBI annual report points out that “the household financial saving rate remained low during 2013-14, increasing only marginally to 7.2 per cent of GDP in 2013-14 from 7.1 per cent of GDP in 2012-13 and 7.0 per cent of GDP in 2011-12…the household financial saving rate [has] dipped sharply from 12 per cent in 2009-10.”
Household financial savings is essentially the money invested by individuals in fixed deposits, small savings scheme, mutual funds, shares, insurance etc. The household financial savings were at 12% of the GDP in 2009-10. Since then, they have fallen dramatically to 7.2% in 2013-14. A major reason for the fall has been the high inflation that has prevailed since 2008.
This has had two impacts. One is that expenses of people have consistently gone up, leading to lower savings. Further, of the money that was saved a higher proportion was directed towards physical savings like gold and real estate. This was done because the rate of return available on financial savings was much lower than the rate of return on gold as well as real estate. The average savings in physical assets between 2005-06 and 2007-08 stood at 11.4% of the GDP. This shot up to 14.8% in 2012-13(the data for 2013-14 is not available).
What has not helped is the fact that over the last few years the fiscal deficit of the government shot up dramatically, as its expenditure shot up at a much faster rate, in comparison its income. Fiscal deficit of the government is the difference between what it earns and what it spends. This increase in fiscal deficit was financed through increased borrowing.
In fact, buried in the second chapter of the Economic Survey of 2013-2014 is a very interesting data point. In 2012-2013, the household financial savings amounted to 7.1% of the GDP. The government borrowing stood at 7% of the GDP. A similar comparison for 2013-2014 is not available yet. Nevertheless, it would be safe to assume that it won’t be materially different from the 2012-2013 comparison.
The conclusion that one can draw from this is that entire household financial savings were used up to fund the fiscal deficit. This is also reflected in the following table from the Economic Survey.
average cost of borrowing
As the government borrowed more and more, eating up into the household financial savings, the cost of its borrowing also went up. In 2009-10, the average cost of borrowing stood at 7.5%. By 2013-2014, this number had shot up to 8.3%.
Lending to the government is the safest form of lending. Hence, the rate of interest that the government pays on its borrowing becomes the benchmark for all other kind of loans. Also, with greater borrowing, it left a lower amount of money available for others outside the government to borrow. As the Economic Survey pointed out “In recent years, with a decline in the savings rate and an enlarged fiscal deficit, the external capital from outside the firm, available to the private sector has declined.”
So, with the government paying a higher rate of interest on its debt, and not enough money going around for others (which included banks) to borrow, it isn’t surprising that you and I had higher EMIs to pay.
To cut a long story short, if interest rates need to come down, the government needs to borrow less. If the government has to borrow less, it needs to spend less or try and increase its income. If this happens, there will be more money going around for everyone else to borrow, and will lead to a fall in interest rates.
Unless these things happen, any call by the finance minister asking the RBI to cut interest rates needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. The RBI may decide to humour the finance minister and go ahead and cut the repo rate (the rate at which it lends to banks). Nevertheless, any material fall in interest rates will happen only once the government is able to make serious efforts towards curtailing the fiscal deficit.
And the next time you hear Jaitley asking the RBI to cut interest rates, remember, he is trying to do a Chidambaram on us.

The article originally appeared on www.Firstbiz.com on August 23, 2014