Here’s how India’s government unwittingly aids the growth of ponzi schemes

J164133002Over the last few years a spate of Ponzi schemes have come to light. These include Sahara, Saradha Chit Fund, Rose Valley Hotels and Entertainment and most recently PACL. A Ponzi scheme is essentially a fraudulent investment scheme in which money brought in by new investors is used to redeem the payment that is due to existing investors.
The instrument in which the money collected is invested appears to be a genuine investment opportunity but at the same time it is obscure enough, to prevent any scrutiny by the investors. So PACL invested the money it collected in agricultural land. Rose Valley, Sahara and Saradha had different businesses in which this money collected was invested.
These Ponzi schemes managed to raise thousands of crore over the years. In a recent order against PACL, the Securities and Exchange Board of India(Sebi) estimated that the company had managed to collect close to Rs 50,000 crore from investors. Sahara is in the process of returning more than Rs 20,000 crore that it had managed to collect from investors, over the years.
The question is how do these schemes manage to collect such a large amount of money.
A June 2011, news-report in The Economic Times had estimated that PACL had managed to collect Rs 20,000 crore from investors at that point of time. This means that since then the company has managed to collect Rs 30,000 crore more from investors. An April 2013 report in the Mint quoting state officials had put the total amount of money collected by the Saradha at Rs 20,000 crore.
These Ponzi schemes have managed to collect a lot of money in an environment where the household financial savings in India have been falling. Household financial savings is essentially the money invested by individuals in fixed deposits, small savings scheme, mutual funds, shares, insurance etc.
The latest RBI annual report points out that “the household financial saving rate remained low during 2013-14, increasing only marginally to 7.2 per cent of GDP in 2013-14 from 7.1 per cent of GDP in 2012-13 and 7.0 per cent of GDP in 2011-12…the household financial saving rate [has] dipped sharply from 12 per cent in 2009-10.”
While the household financial savings have dipped, the money collected by Ponzi schemes has grown by leaps and bounds. What explains this dichotomy? Some experts have blamed the low penetration of banks as a reason behind the rapid spread of Ponzi schemes in the last few years.
K C Chakrabarty, former deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of India, in September 2013 had pointed out that only 40,000 out of the 6 lakh villages in India have a bank branch.
Hence, investors find it easier to invest their money with Ponzi schemes, which seem to have a better geographical presence than banks. While this sounds logical enough, the trouble with this reasoning is that the bank penetration in India has always been low. It clearly isn’t a recent phenomenon. So, why have so many Ponzi schemes come to light only in the last few years?
Another reason offered is that the rate of return promised by these Ponzi schemes is high and is fixed at the time the investor enters the scheme. This is an essential characteristic of almost all Ponzi schemes. Take the case of Rose Valley. The return on the various investment schemes run by the company varied from anywhere between 11.2% to 17.65%.
In case of PACL The Economic Times report referred to earlier pointed out that “If a customer puts down Rs 50,000 for a 500 square yard plot, he or she can expect to get back Rs 1,01,365 in six years, or Rs 1.85 lakh in 10 years.” This meant a return of 12.5% and 14% on investments.
An April 2013 report in the Business Standard pointed out that the fixed deposits of Saradha “promised to multiply the principal 1.5 times in two-and-a-half years, 2.5 times in 5 years and 4 times in 7 years.” This basically implied a return of 17.5-22%.
It is clear that returns promised by these Ponzi schemes have been significantly higher than the returns available on fixed income investments like fixed deposits, small savings schemes, provident funds etc., which ranged between 8-10%. Given this, it was the greed of the investors which drove them to these Ponzi schemes, and in the end they had to pay for it.
Again that would be a simplistic conclusion to draw. Rose Valley was paying 11.2% on one of its schemes. PACL was offering 12.5%. This returns weren’t very high in comparison to the returns on offer on other fixed income investments.
In fact, most Ponzi schemes tend to offer atrociously higher returns than this. Charles Ponzi on whom the scheme is named had offered to double investors’ money in 90 days. Or take the case of the Russian Ponzi scheme MMM, which came to India sometime back. Its sales pitch was that Rs 5000 could grow to Rs 3.4 crore in a period of twelve months. Speak Asia, a Ponzi scheme which made a huge splash across the Indian media a few years back, promised that an initial investment of Rs 11,000 would grow to Rs 52,000 at the end of an year. This meant a return of 373% in one year. Another Ponzi scheme Stock Guru, offered a return of 20% per month for a period of up to 6 months.
In comparison, the returns
offered by the likes of Rose Valley, Saradha, Sahara and PACL are very low indeed. But investors have still flocked to them. In fact, in its order against PACL, Sebi estimated that the company had close to 5.85 crore investors. So, the question is why are so many people investing money in such schemes?
The answer lies in the high inflation that has prevailed in the county since 2008. For most of this period the consumer price inflation and food inflation have been greater than 10%. In this scenario, the returns on offer on fixed income investments have been lower than the rate of inflation. Hence, people have had to look at other modes of investment, in order to protect the purchasing power of their accumulated wealth. A lot of this money found its way into real estate and gold. And some of it also found its way into Ponzi schemes. This is the “real” reason behind the explosion in the kind of money that has been raised by these Ponzi schemes.
But why is the rate of interest on offer on fixed income investments been lower than the rate of inflation? This is where things get really interesting. Take a look at the graph that follows. The
government of India since 2007-2008 has been able to raise money at a much lower rate of interest than the prevailing inflation. The red line which represent the estimated average cost of public debt(i.e. Interest paid on government borrowings) has been below the green line which represents the consumer price inflation, since around 2007-2008. 
cost of borrowing

How has the government managed to do this? The answer lies in the fact that India is a financially repressed nation. Currently banks need to invest Rs 22 out of every Rs 100 they raise as deposits in government bonds. This number was at higher levels earlier and has constantly been brought down. Over and above this Indian provident funds like the employee provident fund, the coal mines provident fund, the general provident fund etc. are not allowed to invest in equity. Hence, all the money collected by these funds ends up being invested in government bonds.
As the Report of the Expert Committee to Revise and Strengthen the Monetary Policy Framework points out “Large government market borrowing has been supported by regulatory prescriptions under which most financial institutions in India, including banks, are statutorily required to invest a certain portion of their specified liabilities in government securities and/or maintain a statutory liquidity ratio (SLR).”
This ensures that there is huge demand for government bonds and the government can get away by offering a low rate of interest on its bonds. “
The SLR prescription provides a captive market for government securities and helps to artificially suppress the cost of borrowing for the Government, dampening the transmission of interest rate changes across the term structure,” the Expert Committee report points out.
The rate of return on government bonds becomes the benchmark for all other kinds of loans and deposits. As can be seen from the graph above, the government has managed to raise loans at much lower than the rate of inflation since 2007-2008. And if the government can raise money at a rate of interest below the rate of inflation, banks can’t be far behind. Hence, the interest offered on fixed deposits by banks and other forms of fixed income investments has also been lower than the rate of inflation over the last few years.
This explains why so much money has founds its way into Ponzi schemes, even though the rate of return they have been offering is not very high in comparison to other forms of fixed income investment. To conclude, the government of India has had a significant role to play in the spread of Ponzi schemes.

A slightly different version of this article appeared on Quartz India on September 10, 2014

 

(Vivek Kaul is the author of Easy Money: Evolution of the Global Financial System to the Great Bubble Burst. He can be reached at [email protected])

How PACL ran a Rs 50,000 crore Ponzi scheme

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So another Ponzi scheme has been busted.
The Securities and Exchange Board of India(Sebi) in an order issued on August 23, 2014, banned Delhi based PACL, from collecting any more money from investors. Sebi also asked PACL to refund the money to investors over the next three months.
A Ponzi scheme is essentially a fraudulent investment scheme in which money brought in by new investors is used to redeem the payment that is due to existing investors. The instrument in which the money collected is invested appears to be a genuine investment opportunity but at the same time it is obscure enough, to prevent any scrutiny by the investors.
In case of PACL, the money collected was supposedly invested in “ agricultural land”.
As the Sebi order on the company written by Whole Time Member Prashant Saran points out “According to PACL, it mainly deals in the sale and purchase of agricultural land and development of the land…PACL’s business model is not limited to simple trading in barren agricultural land but to provide significant value addition to such low value barren land by developing it into productive agricultural land.”
This land bought by PACL after collecting money from the investors wasn’t handed over to them. As the Sebi order points out “PACL has also submitted that only symbolic possession of plots are handed over to the customers as fragmentation of land/ plot into smaller sizes may not be practical or permissible under the applicable revenue laws.”
The Sebi order goes on to inform that till March 31, 2012, Rs 44,736 crore was invested in PACL schemes. The company further informed Sebi that Rs 4,364.78 crore was collected by it between February 26, 2013 and June 15, 2014. Hence, the total amount collected amounts to a whopping Rs 49,100 crore. “This figure could have been even more if PACL would have provided the details of the funds mobilized during the period of April 01, 2012 to February 25, 2013,” the Sebi order points out.
The order goes on to note that “from the available records, it is also noted that since inception till 2012, PACL has allotted land to about 1.22 crore customers.” PACL also informed Sebi that the company has more than 4.63 crore customers to whom land hasn’t been allotted. Hence, “the total number of the customer of PACL comes to around 5.85 crore.”
To summarize, the company has close to 5.85 crore customers who have invested around Rs 50,000 crore with it. This is the basic back story of PACL, which has been put together brilliantly by Saran in the Sebi order. So what are the holes in this story?
First and foremost if the company has Rs 50,000 crore invested with it, it must have used that money to buy “agricultural land” worth a similar value. But the Sebi order clearly points out that PACL hasn’t done so. “The company has only lands worth Rs 11,706.96 crore [i.e. agricultural lands (Rs 7,322.11 crores) and commercial lands (Rs 4,384.84 crores)] out of which it has not only to satisfy the claim of 4.63 crore customers who have deposited Rs 29,420 crore with it but also to satisfy 1.22 crore customers to whom the land has been allotted but sale deeds have not been executed.”
PACL claims to have more land but hasn’t been able to share those details with Sebi “In view of the above, the proposal does not appear to be serious and reasonable,” writes Saran of Sebi. This throws up several questions? If the company has land worth Rs 11,706.96 crore only, where is the remaining money that it has raised from its customers? Why hasn’t it been invested?
Further, how does it plan to repay the customers at the end of the tenure of their investment? The customers have been promised a certain rate of return. And that return can be paid only when the land which PACL claims to invest in grows in value. But without the company investing money in land, that isn’t going to happen.
Also, at the end of the tenure of his investment, the investor either has the option of taking land or money. Saran of Sebi had asked PACL to provide him a sample of 500 customers. From this sample, 421 customers had taken their money back. The question is how were these customers repaid if the money being raised is not being invested totally?
In fact, in a news report published in The Economic Times in June 2011
PACL director S Bhattacharya had said that “about 80% of customers opt to take the money at the end of the plan term instead of the plot of land they supposedly paid for.” So the remaining 20% must be taking on the land, they had originally invested in, is a fair conclusion that one can draw. But as the Sebi order also points out “Not a single applicant out of the 500 samples selected has registered a sale deed of the land he had proceeded to purchase in the first instance…These facts raise serious doubt the real estate business that PACL claims to carry out.”
In fact, the situation gets even more intriguing when one considers the total number of investors in the scheme. As summarised earlier nearly 5.85 crore investors have invested around Rs 50,000 crore in the scheme. But interestingly Bhattacharya had told The Economic Times in 2011 that the “
the company has no more than 50 lakh customers”. So how did the number go from 50 lakh to 5.85 crore in just over three years? Or like Sahara, PACL does not really know how many customers does it really have?
All these lacunae lead Saran to conclude that “the lack of maintenance of proper records/ data is a clear indication that the activities of PACL are in the nature of ponzi scheme.” Hence, like most Ponzi schemes which run for a while, the company over the years has managed to build in the minds of its customers some sort of a façade of a business model, where they make money by buying and selling agricultural land.
But the available data does not lead to that conclusion. What the company seems to have been doing is to take money from new investors and hand it over to the investors whose investment had been maturing. That was all it did. It did not have a business model. It was an out and out Ponzi scheme.

The article originally appeared on www.Firstbiz.com on August 26, 2014.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)