Will Rajan fight inflation, leave rupee to market?

ARTS RAJAN
Vivek Kaul
Milton Friedman was the most famous economist of the second half of the twentieth century. He believed that inflation is a monetary phenomenon. As he wrote in Money Mischief – Episodes in Monetary History: “The recognition that substantial inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon is only the beginning of an understanding of the cause and cure of inflation.”
This line of thinking has influenced many economists over the years ‘particularly’ those who work and teach at the University of Chicago, where Friedman was based for 31 years between 1946 and 1977.
Raghuram Rajan, who teaches at the University of Chicago and is scheduled to takeover as the next governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), is one such economist. In fact Rajan has clearly pointed out in his earlier writings that RBI should simply concentrate on managing inflation.
As Rajan wrote in a 2008 article (along with Eswar Prasad) “The RBI already has a medium-term inflation objective of 5 per cent…But the central bank is also held responsible, in political and public circles, for a stable exchange rate. The RBI has gamely taken on this additional objective but with essentially one instrument, the interest rate, at its disposal, it performs a high-wire balancing act.”
And given this the RBI ends up being neither here nor there. As Rajan put it “What is wrong with this? Simple that by trying to do too many things at once, the RBI risks doing none of them well.”
Hence, Rajan felt that the RBI should ‘just’focus on controlling inflation. As he wrote in the 2008
Report of the Committee on Financial Sector Reforms “The RBI can best serve the cause of growth by focusing on controlling inflation and intervening in currency markets only to limit excessive volatility…an exchange rate that reflects fundamentals tends not to move sharply, and serves the cause of stability.”
The trouble is that the RBI has moved on from a single minded focus on inflation, since the days of Bimal Jalan and tends to follow what experts refer to as the ‘multiple indicator approach’. The central bank now looks at a range of indicators from inflation to capital flows and even the exchange rate. Though at times the objectives the RBI is trying to achieve, are at odds.
This is what is happening currently. The RBI is trying to control inflation, accelerate economic growth and stabilise the value of the rupee, all at the same time. Something which is not possible. Rajan understands this well enough. “The RBI’s objective could be restated as low inflation, and growth consistent with the economy’s potential. They amount to essentially the same thing! But it would let the RBI off the hook for targeting the exchange rate. And that is the key point,” Rajan wrote in the 2008 article cited earlier.
Rajan’s writing suggests that he believes in letting the currency finding its right value. This puts him at odds with the current RBI policy of defending the rupee at around 60-61 to a dollar. If he allows the rupee to fall and find its right value against the dollar, it would make him terribly unpopular with the political class. Also, do nothing might be a good theoretical strategy, but an RBI governor needs to be seen doing something to defend the rupee.
A weaker rupee would mean higher oil prices for one. These higher prices would have to be passed onto the consumers in the form of higher price of petrol, diesel, cooking gas etc. With the Lok Sabha elections due in mid 2014, this would be politically disastrous for the Congress led UPA.
Also it is worth remembering that there is not much a central bank governor can do about high consumer price inflation in India, given that most of it has come about from increased government expenditure, which more than doubled(gone up by 133%) to Rs 16,65,297 crore between 2007-2008 and 2013-2014. In fact, inflation might only go up once the food security scheme is on full swing.
In short, a tough test lies ahead for Raghuram Rajan. But given his impeccable credentials he might just be the best man for the job. As Turkish-American economist Dani Rodrik put it“
In Rajan, India gets a superb economist as its central bank governor.”
Rajan himself realises the challenges he has to face and the fact that there are no “magic wands” to cure India’s economic problems. He also realises the limited power of a central banker. As he wrote in an October 2012 column for Project Syndicate “Central bankers nowadays enjoy the popularity of rock stars, and deservedly so…But they must be able to admit when they are out of bullets. After all, the transformation from hero to zero can be swift.”
The article originally appeared in the Daily News and Analysis on August 8,2013
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He can be reached at [email protected])
 

Why Indian businesses don't create enough jobs

jobsVivek Kaul
Neelkanth Mishra, the India Equity Strategist for Credit Suisse, has written a very interesting column in today’s edition (August 6,2013) of The Indian Express. In this column Mishra writes “It shocks most people to hear that India had 42 million enterprises in 2005, but that’s what the Economic Census found. This is when, even as late as 2012, India had less than a million companies.”
What this means is that the average business in India is very small in size. “In 2005, each enterprise on average employed a shockingly low 2.4 people. Almost 40 per cent of the enterprises were in trade (retail, wholesale, or repair of motor vehicles), with average employment of 1.7 people! Truly mom & pop, father & son, and one-man enterprises (the statisticians have a better name for them: “Own Account Enterprises”). Even in manufacturing, which is 20 per cent of all enterprises, the average employment is merely three,” writes Mishra.
Given this small size of Indian businesses, the salaried class still forms a small proportion of the population. As
the Report on Employment and Unemployment Survey 2011-2012 “In the rural areas, 11.1 per cent households are estimated to be having regular/wage salary earning as major source of income. In the urban areas, 42.3 per cent households are estimated to be having regular wage/salary earnings as major source of income.”
The report also found that “50.8 per cent or majority of the households are found to be having self employment as the major source of income.” Not surprising, given that small firms cannot create jobs and thus people have to fend for themselves.
These numbers need to be read along with the numbers and arguments provided by economists Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya in their book
India’s Tryst with Destiny – Debunking Myths that Undermine Progress and Addressing New Challenges. As they write “The number of workers in all private-sector establishments with ten or more workers rose from 7.7 million in 1990-91 to just 9.8 million in 2007-2008. Employment in private-sector manufacturing establishments of ten workers or more, however, rose from 4.5 million to only 5 million over the same period. This small change has taken place against the backdrop of a much larger number of more than 10 million workers joining the workforce every year.”
What all these numbers clearly tell us is that Indian businesses have not been able to create enough jobs. And this explains to a large extent why 50.8 per cent of households are self employed.
A major reason for the lack of creation of jobs is the fact that an average Indian business was and continues to be very small. As Bhagwati and Panagariya write “employment in India is heavily concentrated in the small enterprises. While the large enterprises have some presence, the medium size enterprises are entirely missing.”
Research and data prove this point even more conclusively. “An astonishing 84 per cent of the workers in all manufacturing in India were employed in firms with forty-nine or less workers in 2005. Large firms, defined as those employing 200 or more workers, accounted for only 10.5 percent of manufacturing workforce. In contrast, small- and large-scale firms employed 25 and 52 per cent of the workers respectively in China in the same year,” write Bhagwati and Panagariya.
What is true about manufacturing as a whole is also true about apparels in particular,which is highly a labour intensive sector. 92.4% of the workers in this sector work with small firms which have forty-nine or less workers. Now compare this to China where large and medium firms make up around 87.7% of the employment in the apparel sector.
This leads to poor performance on the export front as well. “The near absence of medium and large firms in apparel, especially when compared with China, is clearly linked to the poor performance of this sector. The inability to massively capture the export markets in this major sector with comparative advantage is linked to the poor performance of labour-intensive manufacturing and, therefore manufacturing in general. The ultimate reason why growth has not been as inclusive in India as in South Korea,Taiwan and China remains the absence of large-scale firms in labour-intensive sectors in India,” write Bhagwati and Panagariya.
This lack of inclusive growth comes from the tendency of Indian businesses to remain small. Since businesses continue to remain small they do not generate as many jobs as they could. Ultimately, maximum jobs in any economy are created when small firms graduate to becoming medium firms and then finally large firms.
This really hasn’t happened in the labour-intensive manufacturing sector in India. The labour intensive sectors of manufacturing accounted for around 12.94% of the gross value added in the organised manufacturing in 1990-1991. This number rose to 15.9% in 2000-01 and then fell back to 12.91% in 2003-04. “And, in all likelihood,this share has further declined since 2003-04. In fact, some of the fastest growing industries between 2003-04 and 2010-11have been automobiles, two- and three-wheelers, petroleum refining, engineering goods, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, finance and software. All these sectors are either capital intensive or skilled-labour intensive,” write the authors.
A major reason behind businesses in labour intensive sectors continuing to remain small are the labour laws. Labour comes under the Concurrent list of the Indian constitution, meaning both the state government as well as the central government can formulate laws in this area. “The ministry of labour lists as many as fifty-two independent Central government Acts in the area of labour. According to Amit Mitra(the finance minister of West Bengal and a former business lobbyist), there exist another 150 state-level laws in India. This count places the total number of labour laws in India at approximately 200. Compounding the confusion created by this multitude of laws is the fact that they are not entirely consistent with one another, leading a wit to remark that you cannot implement Indian labour laws 100 per cent without violating 20 per cent of them,” write Bhagwati and Panagariya.
And the presence of these ‘burdensome’ labour laws explains to a large extent why entrepreneurs in labour intensive sectors like apparel, where labour costs account for 80 per cent of the total costs, choose to remain small. As Bhagwati and Panagariya write “As the firm size rises from six regular workers towards 100, at no point between these two thresholds is the saving in manufacturing costs sufficiently large to pay for the extra cost of satisfying the laws”.
The authors recount an interesting story told to them by economist Ajay Shah. Shah, it seems asked a leading Indian industrialist about why he did not enter the apparel sector, given that he was already making yarn and cloth. “The industrialist replied that with the low profit margins in apparel, this would be worth while only if he operated on the scale of 100,000 workers. But this would not be practical in view of India’s restrictive labour laws”.
There is a problem and there is a solution. But every time there is some talk about labour reforms being reformed, political parties (almost every one of which has a labour union) start protesting. But what they don’t realise is that by protesting they essentially ensure that firms in labour intensive sectors continue to remain small. And that means creation of fewer ‘new’ jobs.
The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on August 7, 2013 

(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek) 

RBI is behaving like a football goalkeeper

RBI-Logo_8
 
Vivek Kaul
A former well respected governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) once told me that in a “moment of crisis the central bank can’t be seen to be doing nothing” even if “do nothing” might be the best strategy to follow.
This might well be the spur behind the RBI’s recent defence of the rupee. It started its defence when the currency first closed in on the 60 per dollar mark, by selling dollars.
But selling dollars couldn’t go on indefinitely. India’s foreign exchange reserves are around $280 billion – equal to around six-and-a-half months’ imports. Such low levels of forex reserves haven’t been seen since the 1990s.
Then the central bank tried to squeeze out rupee liquidity by severely limiting the amount of money that banks could borrow from it at the repo rate, or the rate at which the RBI lends to banks, now at 7.25%.
Banks are now allowed to borrow only up to 0.5% of their deposits at the repo rate. Beyond that, they need to borrow at the marginal standing facility rate, which is at 10.25%. That’s 300 basis points (one basis point equals one hundredth of a percentage) higher than the repo rate.
This has started to push up interest rates in general.
Banks are also supposed to maintain an average cash reserve ratio of 99% with the RBI on a daily basis, against the earlier requirement of 70%.
The RBI had hoped that all these moves would squeeze rupee liquidity out of the market and help it gain value against the dollar.
But nothing of that sort happened. On Tuesday, the rupee lost further value to hit an all-time low of 61.80 to the dollar intraday, before recovering to close at 60.81, again, with RBI intervention.
Several economists have now come around to the view that the rupee will continue to lose value against the dollar. Rajeev Malik of CLSA, for one, sees the rupee hitting 65-70 to the dollar by next year.
Given this, the RBI’s intervention might at best postpone the inevitable.
But the central bank can’t stop trying, can it?
Albert Edwards of Societe Generale has a very interesting analogy explaining this. As he pointed out in a report earlier this year. “When there are problems, our instinct is not just to stand there but to do something… When a goalkeeper tries to save a penalty, he almost invariably dives either to the right or the left. He will stay in the centre only 6.3% of the time. However, the penalty taker is just as likely (28.7% of the time) to blast the ball straight in front of him as to hit it to the right or left. Thus goalkeepers, to play the percentages, should stay where they are about a third of the time. They would make more saves.”
But they rarely do that. “Because it is more embarrassing to stand there and watch the ball hit the back of the net than to do something (such as dive to the right) and watch the ball hit the back of the net,” wrote Edwards.
The RBI is like a football goalkeeper right now. It can’t just stand pat.

The article originally appeared in the Daily News and Analysis dated August 7, 2013
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

What to expect from Raghuram Rajan as RBI governor

ARTS RAJANVivek Kaul
Even the worst governments make some right decisions. The appointment of Raghuram Govind Rajan as the next governor of the Reserve Bank of India(RBI) is one of the few correct decisions that the Congress led United Progressive Alliance(UPA) government has made in the last few years. Rajan, an alumnus of IIT Delhi, IIM Ahmedabad and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is currently the Chief Economic Advisor of the government of India.
Rajan was the Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund(IMF) between October 2003 and December 2006. In 2003, he also won the first Fischer Black Prize, which is awarded to the most promising economist under the age of 40, by the American Finance Association. He is also a Professor of Finance at the Chicago University’s Booth School of Business.
So what can we expect from Rajan as the RBI governor? In order to understand we first need to understand what are Rajan’s views on various factors impacting the Indian economy right now, and which he will have to deal with as the governor of the RBI.
Rajan is a firm believer in the fact that high government spending in doling out various subsidies has been a major cause behind India’s high inflation. This clearly comes out in the Economic Survey for the year 2012-2013, which he was in-charge of as the Chief Economic Advisor.
A part of the summary to the first chapter 
State of the Economy and Prospects reads “With the subsidies bill, particularly that of petroleum products, increasing, the danger that fiscal targets would be breached substantially became very real in the current year. The situation warranted urgent steps to reduce government spending so as to contain inflation.”
This is something that he reiterated in a recent column as well, where he wrote “India needs less consumption and higher savings. The government has taken a first step by tightening its own budget and spending less, especially on distortionary subsidies.”
The RBI under D Subbarao has been very critical of the high government expenditure distorting the Indian economy. Rajan’s thinking on that front doesn’t seem to be much different from that of his predecessor.
Also Rajan firmly believes that Indian households need stronger incentives in the form of lower inflation to increase financial savings, which have been declining for a while. As the recent RBI
financial stability report  points out “Financial savings of households…have declined from 11.6 per cent of GDP to 8 per cent of GDP over the corresponding period (i.e. between 2007-08 to 2011-12.”
Financial savings are essentially in the form of bank deposits, life insurance, pension and provision funds, shares and debentures etc. In fact between 2010-2011 and 2011-2012, the household financial savings fell by a massive Rs 90,000 crore. This has largely been on account of high inflation. Savings have been diverted into real estate and gold in the hope of earnings returns higher than the prevailing inflation.
Also people have been saving lesser as their expenditure has gone up due to high inflation. And the financial savings will only go up, if inflation comes down, pushing up the real returns on bank fixed deposits.
“Households also need stronger incentives to increase financial savings. New fixed-income instruments, such as inflation-indexed bonds, will help. So will lower inflation, which raises real returns on bank deposits. Lower government spending, together with tight monetary policy, are contributing to greater price stability,” wrote Rajan in his column.
Given this, the focus of the RBI on controlling ‘inflation’ which continues to be close to double digits (consumer price inflation was at 9.87% in the month of June, 2013) is likely to continue under Rajan as well. Hence, the repo rate, which is the rate at which RBI lends to banks, is unlikely to come down dramatically any time soon.
Lower inflation leading to higher savings will also help in bringing down the high current account, deficit feels Rajan. During the period of twelve months ending December 31, 2012, the current account deficit of India had stood at $93 billion. In absolute terms this was only second to the United States.
The current account deficit(CAD) is the difference between total value of imports and the sum of the total value of its exports and net foreign remittances. Since imports are higher than exports and foreign remittances, the country is spending more than saving.
As Rajan told the India Brand Equity Foundation in an interview “CAD essentially reflects the fact that you are spending more than you are saving. That’s technically the definition of the CAD, which means that you need to borrow from abroad to finance your investment. Ideally, the way you would reduce your current account deficit is by saving more, which means consuming less, buying fewer goods from abroad and importing less. Or, the other way is by investing less, because that would allow you to bridge the CAD. Now we don’t want to invest less. We have enormous investment needs. So ideally, what we want to do is save more.”
And to achieve this “the first way is for the government to cut its under-saving or its deficit and that is part of what we are doing” “The second way is when the public decides to save more rather than spend. We need to encourage financial saving,” Rajan said in the interview.
Given this, Rajan has never been a great fan of subsidies and he looks at them as a
short term necessity. In an interview I did with him after the release of his book Fault Lines – How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, for the Daily News and Analysis(DNA), I had asked him whether India could afford to be a welfare state, to which he had replied “Not at the level that politicians want it to. For example, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), if appropriately done, is a short term insurance fix and reduces some of the pressure on the system, which is not a bad thing. But if it comes in the way of the creation of long term capabilities, and if we think NREGS is the answer to the problem of rural stagnation, we have a problem. It’s a short-term necessity in some areas. But the longer term fix has to be to open up the rural areas, connect them, education, capacity building, that is the key.
This commitment came out in the Economic Survey as well. “
The crucial lesson that emerges from the fiscal outcome in 2011-12 and 2012-13 is that in times of heightened uncertainties, there is need for continued risk assessment through close monitoring and for taking appropriate measures for achieving better fiscal marksmanship. Open ended commitments such as uncapped subsidies are particularly problematic for fiscal credibility because they expose fiscal marksmanship to the vagaries of prices,” the Survey authored under the guidance of Rajan pointed out.
So what this clearly tells us that Rajan is clearly not
a jhollawallah. The last thing this country needs at this point of time is an RBI governor who is a jhollawallah.
Another important issue that Rajan will have to tackle is the rapidly depreciating rupee against the dollar. RBI’s attempts to control the value of the rupee against the dollar haven’t had much of an impact in the recent past. On this Rajan has an interesting view. As he said in an interview to the television channel ET Now “When we have capital either coming in or flowing out, sometimes it is very costly standing in the way. We would rather wait till our actions have the most impact. It would wait till the moment of maximum advantage and then use all the firepower that it has to pushback.”
What this means is that under Rajan the RBI won’t try to defend the rupee all the time. Given this, the rupee might even be allowed to fall further. What Rajan does on this front will become clear in the months to come, but this will be his biggest immediate challenge.
Another factor working in Rajan’s favour is that this is clearly not Rajan’s last job. He is still not 50.
Also, he has a job at the University of Chicago, which he can always go back to.
Given this, it is unlikely that he will make any compromises to help the politicians who have appointed him and is likely to make decisions that are best suited for the Indian economy, rather than help him win brownie points with politicians.
For anyone who has any doubts on this front it is worth repeating something that happened in 2005. Every year the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, one of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks in the United States, organises a symposium at Jackson Hole in the state of Wyoming.
The conference of 2005 was to be the last conference attended by Alan 
Greenspan, the then Chairman of the Federal Reserve of United States, the American central bank.
Hence, the theme for the conference was the legacy of the 
Greenspan era. Rajan was attending the conference and presenting a paper titled “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?
Those were the days when the United States was in the midst of a huge real estate bubble. The prevailing economic view was that the US had entered an era of unmatched economic prosperity and Alan Greenspan was largely responsible for it.
In a sense the conference was supposed to be a farewell for Greenspan and people were meant to say nice things about him. And that’s what almost every economist who attended the conference did, except for Rajan.
In his speech Rajan said that the era of easy money would get over soon and would not last forever as the conventional wisdom expected it to.
The bottom line is that banks are certainly not any less risky than the past despite their better capitalization, and may well be riskier. Moreover, banks now bear only the tip of the iceberg of financial sector risks…the interbank market could freeze up, and one could well have a full-blown financial crisis,” said Rajan.
In the last paragraph of his speech Rajan said it is at such times that “excesses typically build up. One source of concern is housing prices that are at elevated levels around the globe.” 
Rajan’s speech did not go down well with people at the conference. This is not what they wanted to hear. He was essentially saying that the Greenspan era was hardly what it was being made out to be.
Given this, 
Rajan came in for heavy criticism. As he recounts in his book Fault Lines – How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy: “Forecasting at that time did not require tremendous prescience: all I did was connect the dots… I did not, however, foresee the reaction from the normally polite conference audience. I exaggerate only a bit when I say I felt like an early Christian who had wandered into a convention of half-starved lions. As I walked away from the podium after being roundly criticized by a number of luminaries (with a few notable exceptions), I felt some unease. It was not caused by the criticism itself…Rather it was because the critics seemed to be ignoring what going on before their eyes.” 
The criticism notwithstanding Rajan turned out right in the end. And what was interesting that he called it as he saw it. India needs the same honesty from Rajan, as and when he takes over as the next RBI governor.
The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on August 6, 2013
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek) 

Why govt's surprise theory on rupee collapse doesn't hold

rupeeVivek Kaul
‘Comatose’ is a word that can be used to best describe the nine year rule of the Congress led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, when it comes to economic reforms.
The only exception to this is the period of the last two months in which the government has taken some measures to open up the Indian economy a little more to the outsiders. At the same time steps have also been taken to allow Indian companies to borrow more freely abroad.
Today’s edition of the Business Standard reports that the finance ministry might “ease norms for (companies) raising funds through an external commercial borrowing(ECB)”. In early July, the Reserve Bank of India had allowed the non banking finance companies(NBFCs) to borrow money through ECBs under the automatic route to finance the import of infrastructure equipment which would be leased to infrastructure projects. Earlier this could happen only through the approval route.
On July 16, the government had announced that it would allow more foreign direct investment (FDI) into 13 sectors of the Indian economy. This included 100% FDI being allowed in the telecom sector.
All this so called ‘reform’ is being sold under the garb of the government having been unprepared for the crash of the rupee against the dollar. 
As finance minister P Chidambaram said on August 1, 2013 “the rupee depreciation of June, July was quite unexpected.”
Between January and May 2013, the rupee moved in the range of 54-55 against the dollar. After that it started dramatically losing value and 
currently stands at close to 61 to a dollar. To ensure that the rupee doesn’t fall any further against the dollar, the government has been taking steps to ensure that more dollars come into India and thus boost the value of the rupee against the dollar.
The depreciation of the rupee had caught the government by surprise but now its doing everything it can to arrest its fall. Or so we are being told.
But the surprise theory doesn’t really hold. Anand Tandon, the CEO of JRG Securities makes a very interesting point in the 
Wealth Insight magazine for August 2013. “In 2010, the ministry of commerce put out a strategy plan and a paper. The paper was titled “Strategy for doubling exports in the next three years”. In it, the ministry assumed that near term trend growth of exports and imports would continue. Based on this, it forecast that India would have a negative merchandise trade balance of $210 billion by 2013. This proved remarkably accurate (the actual figure is $196 billion).”
What Tandon is saying here is 
that in 2010 a paper was put out by the ministry of commerce which estimated that in three years time by 2013, the trade deficit (i.e. the difference between imports and exports) would be at $210 billion (actually $210.5 billion to be very precise).
When the imports are significantly greater than the exports, what it means is that the country is not earning enough dollars through exports to pay for the imports. In this situation the demand for dollars is greater than the supply, and hence the dollar gains in value against the local currency, which happened to be the rupee in this case.
Also the method used to make this forecast wasn’t rocket science at all. As the report points out “An attempt has been made to forecast the merchandise trade; trends over the next three years, based on the Compound Annual Average Growth Rate (CAGR) during 2002-03 to 2009-10.”
Basically, the authors of the report looked at the average growth rate during the eight year period between 2002 and 2010, and used that to make projections (projections were based on a CAGR of 19.05% for exports and 24.63% for imports) of imports and exports in the years to come.
Given that the report was put out in 2010, so the entire theory about the government being ‘surprised’ and being caught on the wrong foot doesn’t really hold. The high trade deficit is the basic reason behind the rupee losing value rapidly against the dollar.
As Tandon puts it “It is noteworthy that the likely pressure on the rupee was identified as a problem over three years ago, and the current blame attributed to the US Fed action is only perhaps a trigger for the inevitable.”
The question that crops up here is why did the rupee start losing value rapidly against the dollar towards the end of May 2013, and not any time before it? As far as the trade deficit goes, the situation was not very different in January 2013, than it was in May 2013.
While India was not earning enough dollars through exports, dollars kept coming in through other routes. Foreign investors brought money into India to invest in stocks and bonds. Indian companies borrowed abroad in dollars and brought that money back into India. Non Resident Indians(NRIs) also deposited money with Indian banks to at significantly higher interest rates than what they could earn in Western countries.
Things started to change on May 22, 2013, when Ben Bernanke, 
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve of United States, the American central bank, made a testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, of the US Congress. In this testimony Bernanke said that “a long period of low interest rates has costs and risks. For example, even as low interest rates have helped create jobs and supported the prices of homes and other assets, savers who rely on interest income from savings accounts or government bonds are receiving very low returns. Another cost, one that we take very seriously, is the possibility that very low interest rates, if maintained too long, could undermine financial stability.”
This was interpreted by the market as a hint from Bernanke that the days of the Federal Reserve maintaining low interest rates in order to ensure that people borrowed and spent, would soon be over. Bernanke made the same point in a more direct manner when he addressed the press after the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting on June 19, 2013.
International investors had borrowed money at low interest rates prevailing in the United States, and invested that money all over the world, including in Indian bonds, where they could earn higher returns. But after Bernanke’s clarification came in, the return on Indian bonds wasn’t good enough to compensate for the higher interest rate in the United States.
So investors started selling out of Indian bonds in late May 2013. When they sold these bonds they were paid in rupees. They sold these rupees to buy dollars and this led to a rapid depreciation of the rupee.
As mentioned earlier since India’s imports are significantly higher than its exports, there was a shortage of dollars. And once foreign investors started selling out, it only added to that shortage. Hence, the American Federal Reserve just provided the trigger for the rupee crash. It could have very well been something else.
What has added to the pain is the fact that NRI deposits worth nearly $49 billion mature on or before March 31, 2014. With the rupee depreciating against the dollar, the perception of currency risk is high and thus NRIs are likely to repatriate these deposits rather than renew them. This will mean a demand for dollars and thus further pressure on the rupee. Nearly $21 billion of ECBs raised by companies need to be repaid before March 31, 2014. So NRI deposits and ECBs which were a source of dollars earlier will now add to the dollar drain from India.
The solution to India’s dollar problem has been encouraging companies to borrow abroad and opening up or allowing higher FDI in various sectors. The trouble with encouraging companies to borrow abroad is that someday the loan will have to be returned and it would mean a demand for dollars shooting up at that point of time. So in that way, it just postpones the problem rather than solving it.
Allowing FDI in more and more sectors has been the government big mantra in trying to shore up the rupee against the dollar. As Tandon puts it “Of late, it is rare to hear any pronouncements from the finance ministry without it being focussed on foreign direct investment(FDI). Ignoring the findings of the commerce ministry…North Block(where the finance ministry is based) continues to believe that is needed is to remove the pressure on the rupee is to raise FDI limits across various sectors.”
The trouble here is that the foreigners will come with their dollars into India when they want to, not when we want them to. In this situation, the long term solution to India’s dollar problem is to encourage exports. And for that to happen, the ‘weak’ physical infrastructure first needs to be set right.
As the commerce ministry 2010 report pointed out “Infrastructure bottlenecks remain the single most important constraint for achieving accelerated growth of Indian exports.”
The report made estimates of India’s infrastructure gaps on the transport front. For ports it estimated that “in 2014 there will be a shortage of 598 million metric tonnes of cargo handling.”
As far as roads are concerned it estimated that in order to adequately handle export-import cargo, “the ideal length of 4 lanes highway should be 112635 kms and that of 6 lanes 6758 kms by 2014.” This implies a projected gap of “4437 kms for 6 lanes and 66320 kms for 4 lanes highways.”
For Railways “there would be a gap in railway infrastructure of 746 million tons of cargo handling in the year 2014.” And as far as airports are concerned, “poor infrastructure to handle cargo at the airports needs to be addressed to reduce the dwell time of cargo handling and to increase the overall handling of exports cargo,” the report said. “As per the international benchmarks, dwell time for exports is 12 hours, while for imports it is 24 hours as against 3-5 days at Indian airports.”
This is what is required to set the rupee right. Of course, all this is not going to happen anytime soon. And hence, more pain lies ahead.
The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on August 5,  2013

(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)