Easy Money

The Old-New Investment Lessons from the Recent Stock Market Crash

bullfighting
It took the BSE Sensex, India’s premier stock market index, a period of nine months (from late April 2017 to late January 2018), to go from 30,000 points to higher than 36,000 points. This meant a return of more than 20% in a period of just nine months.

In an era when fixed deposits give a post-tax return of 5% per year, a return of 20% in less than a year, has to be fantastic. Of course, there are many listed stocks which have given more than 20 % returns, during the same period.

Between January 29 and February 6, 2018, the BSE Sensex has fallen by around 5.8% and wiped out one-third of the gain between April 2017 and January 2018. A week’s fall has wiped off one-third of the gain over a period of nine months.

When the stock market falls, a new set of investors learn, the same set of lessons all over again. What does this mean?

The price to earnings ratio of the BSE Sensex crossed 26 in late January 2018. This basically means that an investor was willing to pay Rs 26 for every one rupee of earning for the stocks that make up the Sensex.

Between April 2017 and January 2018, the price to earnings ratio of the Sensex had moved from 22.6 to 26.4. This meant that while the price of the stocks kept going up, the profit of the companies they represent, did not move at the same speed. Ultimately, the price of a stock is a reflection of the profit that a company is expected to make.

The price to earnings ratio of NSE Nifty touched 27 in late January 2018. The midcap stocks were going at a price to earnings ratio of 50. And the small caps had touched a price to earnings ratio of 120.

Such price to earnings ratios, or what the stock market likes to call valuation, were last seen in 2000 and 2008. With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that at both these points of time, the stock market was in a bubbly territory.

In fact, all the occasions when the price to earnings ratio of the stock market was greater than in the recent past, were either between January and March 2000, when the dotcom bubble and the Ketan Parekh stock market scam were at their peak, or between December 2007 and January 2008, when the stock market peaked, before the financial crisis which finally led to many Wall Street financial institutions going more or less bust, broke out.

Nevertheless, the stock market experts told us that this time is different because there was no bubble in the United States of the kind we saw in 2000 or that the financial crisis that broke out in 2008, was a thing of the past. Hence, there was no real reason for the stock market to fall. (Of course, to these experts, the lack of earnings growth did not matter).

The trouble is that when the markets are in bubbly territory, there typically is no reason for them to fall, until some reason comes along. The first reason came in the form of the finance minister Arun Jaitley, introducing a long-term capital gains tax of 10% on stocks and equity mutual funds. This tax will have to be paid on capital gains of more than Rs 1 lakh, starting from April 1, 2018.

Investors took some time to digest this, and the stock market fell by 2.3%, a day after the budget. If this wasn’t enough, the yield on the 10-year treasury bond of the American government came back into the focus.

This yield jumped by around 40 basis points to 2.85%, in a month’s time. This yield sets the benchmark interest rates for a lot of other borrowing that takes place. In the aftermath of the financial crisis that broke out in September 2008, the central banks of the Western world, led by the Federal Reserve of the United States, printed a lot of money to drive down interest rates.

This was done in the hope of people borrowing and spending money and the economies recovering. That did not happen to the extent it was expected. What happened instead was that large financial institutions borrowed money at low rates and invested them in stock markets all across the world. This phenomenon came to be known as the dollar carry trade.

All this money flowing in drove up stock prices. The problem is that as the 10-year treasury bond yield approaches 3 %, dollar carry trade will become unviable in many cases. Given this, many carry trade investors are now selling out of stock markets, including that of India.

The larger point here is that nobody exactly knows when the stock market will reverse. The way the market has behaved over the last few days, has proved that all over again.

The sellers are not selling out because the valuations are too high (they were too high even a month or two back). They are selling out because of an entirely different reason all together; investors are selling out because they are seeing other investors selling out. The herd mentality that guides investors to buy stocks when everyone else is, also forces them to sell when everyone else is.

Also, the stock market, when it falls can fall very quickly. The last generation of stock market investors learnt this when the BSE Sensex fell by close to 60 % between January 9, 2008 and October 27, 2008.

Is it time for this generation of stock market investors to learn the same lesson all over again? On that your guess is as good as mine.

Stay tuned!

The column originally appeared on Firstpost on Feb 6, 2018.

Trump’s Plan to Make America Great Again Will Fail Because of Dollar

In the early 16th century the Spaniards captured large parts of what is now known as South America. The area had large deposits of silver and gold. As I write in my book Easy Money: Evolution of Money from Robinson Crusoe to the First World War: “The precious metals were melted and made into ingots so that they could be easily transported to Spain. Between 1500 and 1540, nearly 1,500 kg of gold came to Spain every year on an average from the New World.” i

Gold wasn’t the only precious metal coming in. A lot of silver came in as well. As I write in Easy Money: “One of the biggest silver mines was found in Potosi, which is now in Bolivia, in 1545. Potosi is one of the highest cities in the world and is situated at a height of 4,090 m. Given the height it sits on, it took Spaniards sometime to get there. Here a mountain of silver of six miles around its base was discovered.ii The mountain or the rich hill, as it came to be called, generated nearly 45,000 tonnes of silver between 1556 and 1783. iii“

Most of this new found silver was shipped to Seville in Spain where the mint was. In the best years some 300 tonnes of silver came in from silver mines in various parts of South America.iv

Once the gold and silver started to land on their shores, the Spaniards became proficient at spending it rather than engaging themselves in productive activities. Easy money had spoiled them and they produced very little of their own. Once this happened everything had to be imported. Weapons came from the Dutch, woolens from the British, glassware from the Italians, and so on.v It also led to Spaniards buying goods like bangles, cheap glassware, and playing cards from foreigners for the sheer pleasure of buying them.

As Thomas Sowell writes in Wealth, Poverty and Politics: “The vast wealth pouring into Spain [in the form of gold and silver from South America]… allowed the Spanish elite to live in luxury and leisure, enjoying the products of other countries, purchased with the windfall gain of gold and silver. At one point, Spain’s imports were nearly twice as large as its exports, with the difference being covered by payments in gold and silver… It was a source of pride, however, that “all the world” served Spain, while Spain “serves nobody”.”

Dear Reader, you must be wondering, why have I chosen to point out all this history so many centuries later. The point I am trying to make is that there is an equivalent to what happened in Spain in the 16th century in this day and age. It is the United States of America.

Like Spain, the total amount of good and services that the United States imports is much more than what it exports. The ratio of the imports of the United States to its exports was around 1.23 in 2016. The difference between the imports and the exports stood at $503 billion. In fact, if we look at the imports and the exports of goods, the ratio comes to around 1.51.

The point being that like Spain, the United States imports much more than it exports. Spain had an unlimited access to money in the form of gold and silver mines of South America. This gold and silver over a period of time was mined and shipped to Spain and in turn used by Spaniards to buy stuff from other parts of the world.

What is the equivalent in case of the United States of America? The dollar. The US dollar is the international reserve currency. It is also the international trading currency. As George Gilder writes in The Scandal of Money-Why Wall Street Recovers But the Economy Never Does: “Today it [i.e. the dollar] handles more than 60 percent of world trade, denominates more than half the market capitalization of world stocks, and partakes in 87 percent of global currency trades.”

Spain had almost unlimited access to the gold and silver from South America. Along similar lines, the United States has unlimited access to the dollar. Other countries need to earn these dollars by exporting goods and services. The United States needs to simply print the dollars (or digitally create them these days) and hand it over for whatever it needs to pay for.

While the unlimited access to gold and silver was Spain’s easy money, the dollar is United States’ easy money. And given this, it isn’t surprising that like Spain, the United States imports much more than it exports. This basically means that the country consumes much more than it produces. Also, while the Spaniards had to face the risk of gold and silver ultimately running out, the United States does not face a similar risk because dollar is a fiat currency unlike gold, and can be created in unlimited amounts. As long as dollar remains the global reserve currency and trading currency, the United States can keep creating it out of thin air. Of course, the role of the United States in global politics will be to ensure that the dollar continues to remain the reserve and trading currency. Having the biggest defence budget and military in the world, will help.

The supply of silver in Spain peaked around 1600 and started to fall after that. But the spending habits of people did not change immediately, leading to Spain getting into debt to the foreigners. The government defaulted on its loans in 1557, 1575, 1607, 1627, and 1647.vi

One impact of access to the easy money in the form of gold and silver, was a huge drop in human capital in Spain. As Sowell writes: “What this meant economically was that other countries developed the human capital that produced what Spain consumed, without Spain’s having to develop its human capital… Even the maritime trade that brought products from other parts of Europe to Spain was largely in the hands of foreigners and European businessmen flocked to Spain to carry out economic functions there. The historical social consequence was that the Spanish culture’s disdain for commerce, industry and skilled labour would be a lasting economic handicap bequeathed to its descendants, not only in Spain itself but also in Latin America.”

So, what is human capital? Economist Gary Becker writes: “Economists regard expenditures on education, training, medical care, and so on as investments in human capital. They are called human capital because people cannot be separated from their knowledge, skills, health, or values in the way they can be separated from their financial and physical assets.”

What is happening on this front, in case of the United States? As Michael S Christian writes in a research paper titled Net Investment and Stocks of Human Capital in the United States, 1975-2013, published in January 2016: “The stock of human capital rose at an annual rate of 1.0 percent between 1977 and 2013, with population growth as the primary driver of human capital growth. Per capita human capital remained much the same over this period.”

So, over a period of more than 35 years, the per capita American human capital has remained the same. And this is clearly not a good sign.

Further, unlike Spain which ultimately ran out of gold and silver, given that there was only so much of it going around in South America, the United States does not face any such risks given that dollar is a fiat currency and can be printed or simply created digitally.

But like Spain, the access to this easy money will ensure that in the years to come, the United States will continue to import more than it exports. This will go against the new President Donald Trump’s plan to make America great again. His basic plan envisages increasing American exports and bringing down its imports. But as long as America has access to easy money in the form of the dollar, the chances of that happening are pretty low because it will always be easier to import stuff by paying in dollars that can be created from thin air, than manufacture it locally.

The column was originally published on Equitymaster on March 14, 2017

IVRCL is an Excellent Example of All That is Wrong with Many Indian Corporates

ivrcl

Last week, a portion of a flyover being built in an old part of Kolkata collapsed, killing 27 people. The flyover was being built by IVRCL.

The company reacted immediately to the tragedy. AGK Murthy, director (operations) of the company told The Hindu: “It is for the first time in the history of the company that such an incident has occurred. We are unable to comprehend at this stage what could have happened. It is beyond our thinking. It is like an act of god.”

An act of god is basically a legal term associated with events outside human control. Natural disasters like floods, earthquakes, cyclones etc., are a good example.

Hence, the question is can the collapse of the part of the flyover in Kolkata be called an act of god? The flyover clearly did not fall because of a natural disaster. Experts, who understand such things, are of the opinion that it was a design failure that caused the fall. Several experts told this to The Hindustan Times.

Also, much of the analysis on the issue in the media has missed out on the poor financials of IVRCL. The financial situation of the company has deteriorated considerably over the years. A few graphs that follow clearly show us that.

 

Let’s start with the debt to equity ratio of IVRCL. As can be seen from the above chart, the debt to equity ratio of the company has been on its way up from March 2007 onwards. In fact, as of March 31, 2015, the debt to equity ratio of the company stood at 12.1. Hence, the total debt of the company was more than 12 times its shareholders’ equity or networth.

What does this mean? This means that the borrowings of the company were more than 12 times its capital (or its own money or the skin in the game) in the business. The ratio is extremely high. In the normal scheme of things, lower the debt to equity ratio of a company, the better it is placed from a risk perspective. Its chances of being able to continue to pay the interest on the debt are higher.

The question to ask is how did the company reach this stage?

A simple explanation for this lies in the fact that the company borrowed big-time to expand. But this expansion did not generate an adequate amount of sales. Take a look at the following chart. The sales of the company have fallen over the years.

 

In fact, the total sales of the company have been falling over the last few years. On March 31, 2015, the total sales stood at Rs 3,927 crore or around half of where it stood as on March 31, 2012.

Now take a look at the following chart. The blue dots represent the sales of the company and the orange dots the total debt. As the debt of the company went up, the sales also went up, until they started falling.

Falling sales, led to a fall in the net profit of the company. This happened because the debt that the company had taken on still needed to be serviced. The interest on the debt had to be paid. As the interest of debt kept mounting up (the orange dots in the following chart), the net profit of the company kept falling (the blue dots in the following charts). In fact, the company has been loss making over the last few years. For the year ending March 31, 2015, the company made a loss of Rs 1,568 crore.

 

Further, the company continues to make losses. During the period April 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015, the company made losses of Rs 797 crore.

As the total borrowings of the company went up, its sales went down. The idea behind borrowing, should have been to expand the business of the company, so as to increase sales as well as profit. The increased sales would have then allowed the company to pay the higher interest on the debt. The higher profit would have added to the higher networth or shareholders’ equity.

The profit after paying dividend (if any) is retained by a company and is added to its networth or shareholders’ equity. Hence, as the profit of IVRCL would have gone up, its networth would have gone up as well. This would have kept the debt to equity ratio of the company under control as well.

But this is how things should have played out theoretically. The fact of the matter is that they did not. In fact, the losses made by the company over the last few years have been adjusted against the networth and the networth has come down dramatically during the period.

It also needs to be pointed out here that IVRCL, like many other companies, got carried away in the era of easy money that prevailed between 2002 and 2008, and ended up borrowing much more than it could perhaps be able to repay.

Take a look at the following graph which charts the rate of interest that IVRCL has paid on its debt over the years. The rate of interest that the company paid on its debt in the financial year ending March 31, 2006, stood at 4.85%. This low rate of interest encouraged the company to increase its borrowing at a rapid pace.

 

As on March 31, 2005, the total debt of the company had stood at Rs 336 crore. By March 31, 2012, this had jumped up nearly 18 times to Rs 6,005 crore. Like many other infrastructure companies, IVRCL also had tried to cash in on an era of easy money and is now paying for the same.

In fact, on this and other counts, many other corporates are facing a similar set of problems because of having borrowed too much during the go-go years.

It is worth asking here that how could a state government allow a company with a debt to equity ratio of 12:1 to continue building a flyover? Any company in such a scenario would be really tempted to compromise on quality, in order to ensure that it could push up its profits and if not that, at least limit its losses.

IVRCL has said that “all necessary processes and quality steps have been taken as per standard operating procedure”. This needs to properly investigated.

The column originally appeared on Vivek Kaul’s Diary on April 5, 2016

Bill Bonner: “It’s 100% impossible for the value of stocks to be divorced from the economy”

bill bonnerDear Reader,

This is a Special Edition of the Diary. In this I speak to Bill Bonner, whose books and columns I have admired reading tremendously over the years. He founded Agora Inc. in 1979. With his friend and colleague Addison Wiggin, he co-wrote the New York Times best-selling books Financial Reckoning Day and Empire of Debt. His other works include Mobs, Messiahs and Markets (with Lila Rajiva), Dice Have No Memory, and most recently, Hormegeddon: How Too Much of a Good Thing Leads to Disaster.

Even though Bill writes largely on finance and economics, his writing style is close to literary fiction, and that is precisely what makes it so enjoyable to read him.

In this interview we talk about how the world of finance and economics has changed over the last few years. And how does Bill read the world that we live in. This paragraph summarises everything: “I just didn’t think it [i.e. the financial crisis] will go on this long but that’s also one of the realities that things that you think can’t last, actually do last longer than you expect and they get worse than you expect and then after they have gotten much worse and lasted much longer than you expect then you begin to think well maybe I don’t understand something about it and maybe there is something going on here that can last and then of course it blows up and you were right all along and then at that time of course you are not anticipating it.”

This is the first part of the interview. The second part will appear tomorrow.

Happy Reading!
Vivek Kaul

 

I guess the last time we spoke would probably have been sometime in 2011-2012.  So how have things changed?

It was surprising to me that the authorities were more aggressive than I expected coming in with the QE1, QE2 and QE3 and then the twist. And those things as expected didn’t do anything for the economy.

In fact, it may have actually slowed down the real economy.  But they did wonders for the stock market and the financial industry so they are very very popular and well those things were essentially reducing the cost of credit, making easy money even easier.

So naturally, there is more and more debt and it just seems to be a phenomenon or fact of life that when you make debt cheap, when you make it cheaper than it should be, you get people borrowing money for things they shouldn’t be doing and too much capacity, too many speculations, too many gambles, too many business expansions that don’t really make any sense.

And what did that lead to?

So we saw the effect of that in the commodity market, particularly the oil market which has been really laid low by this combination of cheap money which made it possible for American drillers to get out there all over the place and drill for oil and some marginal producers in Canada and otherwise in Brazil and everywhere to come up to increase the supply of oil. Meanwhile the actual demand for oil was going down because the world economy was actually not in a growth mode at all.

So we have those kinds of things happening and that’s all happening since the last time we talked and the huge expansion and explosion and implosion of the oil market, implosion of the commodity market and explosion in world debt which has gone up about 57 trillion dollars since 2008. So these things were really much bigger than I anticipated.

I just didn’t think it will go on this long but you that’s also one of the realities that things that you think can’t last, actually do last longer than you expect and they get worse than you expect and then after they have gotten much worse and lasted much longer than you expect, then you begin to think well may be I don’t understand something about it and maybe there is something going on here that can last and then of course it blows up and you were right all along and then at that time of course you are not anticipating it.

So why hasn’t all this debt lead to economic growth? Why hasn’t cheaper money led to economic growth because you know this was one of the beliefs that central bankers had and their actions in the last seven- eight years have been built on the belief that we will flood the markets with money, we will have low interest rates, people will buy, companies will do well and economic growth will return. Why hasn’t this happened?

Why doesn’t that happen?  And the answer is hard. I don’t really know. There is a Swedish economist named Knut Wicksell and Knut Wicksell noticed, that whenever the cost of money was too low, he said there were two interest rates.

He said there was a natural rate which is to say the rate that money should cost in a real properly functioning market and then there is the actual rate and the actual rate is jigged up by the authorities in the banking industry. Whenever the actual rate is too low, people do not invest in the kinds of things that will increase real production.

He said what they do, and I never have really fully understood this, but he said what they do when money is too cheap, they tend to go for easy things. So the banks take the easy money which is too cheap and then they invest it in US Governments Securities, you know the 10-year treasury bonds and that way they get guaranteed return, a guaranteed positive carry.

What else did he say?

And then he says that when money is too cheap people make cheap investments, one because they don’t really know what is going on.  You know the cheap money distorts the whole picture.  The cost of money is the critical number in all of capitalism You have to know what it will cost you really to borrow money. And once you know what the money really costs then you should decide whether you should build a factory, whether you should invest in this, buy that.  

You don’t know until you know the real cost of money and by distorting the real cost of money as Wicksell points out what it does is it drives out everybody away from real investment where they don’t really know what they should be doing. They don’t want to invest real money in a project where the returns are uncertain and the value of money is uncertain and everything is uncertain. So they go for these cheap investments.  These easy investments such as US treasury bonds where they know they will get paid and so you get a big increase in these debt investments. Hence, just the quantity of debt goes up where everybody is just counting on being able to borrow cheap and lend a little less cheap in order to pocket the difference without any real risk.

Even though the economies as such haven’t recovered, the stock market and the real estate markets in parts of the world have done very very well.  So how do you explain that dichotomy? Has the link between economic growth and stock market returns broken down?

Oh! It has totally broken down. We have a chart that we use. We go back to 1971, where we believe something fundamental happened when they changed the US money system. Since 1971 what you see if you look at US GDP growth, it looks more or less normal.  I mean the growth rate was higher in the 70s and it gradually went down decade after decade, it got lower and lower.

But you are talking about going down from five to three to four to three to two and now probably about zero percent, but that growth is real…that’s the real economy…that’s Main Street…that’s where people work…that’s where they spend their money…that’s where they earn their money.

When you put that on to that chart, and you put a chart of what the value of America’s stocks and bonds are, then that chart just goes right up after about 1995.

Yes that’s what the chart shows…

And so there is something going on where the stocks and the value of assets is being cut off completely from the value of the real economy that supports them, which is impossible of course.

I mean it is impossible for that to continue because ultimately any asset is only valuable in as much as the economy gives it value.  It’s not valuable in itself.  If you have a blue jeans factory and you are producing five thousand pairs of blue jeans a day but that is not worth a penny unless you have got people who are willing to buy five thousand blue jeans a day and they can only do that if they are earning enough to buy five thousand blue jeans a day.

And you know that was Say’s principle which was that “Supply creates demand”, which is a funny thing. I mean it’s easy for people to misunderstand that.  But what it really means is that it’s only because you have an economy that produces wealth that people have the money to buy what you are making.

So there is no way, it’s absolutely hundred percent impossible for the value of stocks and bonds to be divorced from the value of the economy itself.  And what we have seen is a separation and we call it a divorce. But the two have been separated for a long time and my guess is that they are going to get back together.

In the book ‘The Age of Stagnation’ Satyajit Das makes a very interesting point about how lower interest rates have not led to increased consumption and he gives a very interesting reason for it. What he says is that when the return on fixed income investments comes down, people put their money in the stock market and when they do that the pressure on companies to keep increasing their earnings so that they can keep giving dividends increases.

You know people are looking at stocks as a mode of dividend [regular income] than a mode of capital gains because the money they used to earn through the fixed income investments has come down [dramatically].  So when there is pressure on companies to give dividends in a scenario where the sales are not really growing, they fire their employees. They [also] borrow money so that they can buy back their stocks and when they buy back their stocks the earnings per share goes up and the dividend per share [as there are fewer shares than before] also goes up.  So that is why even with cheap money, easy money and low interest rates, consumer buying hasn’t picked up and hasn’t translated into economic growth.  Does this makes sense?

Well I think it totally makes sense. I saw an example of that just in today’s press which unfortunately I can’t recall. The company announced simultaneously that it was laying off 10,000 employees and had a big [stock] buy-back program. 

I think it’s just a shift that in America has been widely described as the ‘financialization’ where the money goes from Main Street to Wall Street. You can see that shift very clearly, if you look at the salaries paid on the Main Street, which have gone nowhere for decades and the salaries paid on Wall Street which have gone straight up and you could also look at the profit share of the economy.

The whole of the financial industry earned about 10% of the US profits in 1980 and by 2007 it was 40%. This is wealth that is going from Main Street economy where people work, live, eat, earn their lives, earn their retirements to Wall Street where its speculation, gambling, investing of sorts.  And that change has transformed the entire economy and eventually that is what I keep saying—trees don’t grow to the sky. I feel this cannot go on forever and how much longer it can go on of course is a subject of great interest.  But I really don’t know.

You know you talked about Wall Street, do you think Wall Street in 2015 -2016 has gone back to the way things were in 2006, 2005 and 2007. Would you say that?

Oh yes! I would say that that’s generally the case.  You don’t want to pin point and you don’t want to be too tied to historical rhythms but it certainly looks that way.  We don’t have a housing bubble of the same sort now in America.

But there is a bubble…

There is a bubble in housing but it is not the same sort.  But the bigger bubbles in the US today are the bubbles in the student debt and auto debt.  We have a heck of an auto debt bubble and the corporate debt bubble that we didn’t have before.

Corporate debt is huge because all the money that has been used to buy back shares…

It is mind boggling to think that a corporation would borrow money to buy some shares and you wonder what business is this corporation in.

Is the student bubble has big as the housing bubble?

No. It’s not that big. The housing bubble was worth $4 trillion or something and this is $ 1 trillion.

Which is big anyway. $1 trillion is not small.

It’s huge, but it’s not the same kind of huge.  It’s an entirely different thing because the housing bubble was exposed to the value of the collateral.  In the housing bubble there is something there and eventually it was obvious that what was there was not worth what they thought it was because at the end of it the typical house costs something like twice as much as the typical family could afford.  So it didn’t take a genius to figure out that cannot go on for much longer and by the way salaries were not going up.  There was no way that a person was going to catch up to that.  But now what is the collateral on a student loan?  It’s nothing.

There is some intellectual capital…

This student loan is interesting because the collateral is essentially worthless.  They have done studies to show that if people borrow money, get educated they don’t earn more money and it’s a bit of a fraud.  Its money that a bank lends, secured by the government, goes to the student, goes to the education industry, which is just lobbying Congress for the whole thing to continue.

How big is the auto bubble?

The auto bubble is big but I don’t remember the numbers. And there is a huge transformation of the auto sales system where it is all directed.

So essentially what we can say here is that low interest rates have had some impact on the auto industry, I mean people have been buying cars.

Big effect yes and without those low interest rates there wouldn’t be these car sales and the car sales like employment have been held up by the central bankers and the economists as evidence that the economy is healthy.

Why they are buying cars is because the interest rates are held down.  This is the equivalent of those low interest loans in the housing industry in 2007.  Now they have the auto industry that has loans that stretch out. The average loan goes more than four years.  And yeah four years for cars is a long time.

To be continued…

The interview originally appeared in the Vivek Kaul’s Diary on February 4, 2016

“The toxic effects of policies have now created conditions for a new financial crisis”

satyajit dasDear Reader

This is the second part of the interview with economic commentator and globally best-selling author Satyajit Das.

Das is an internationally respected commentator on financial markets and economics He is credited with predicting the current financial crisis. He has also featured 2010 Oscar-winning documentary Inside Job.

I would like to state here that I actually understood how financial derivatives caused a major part of the current financial crisis only after reading Extreme Money authored by Das. Until then my understand was shaky.

His first general book Traders, Guns and Money is a master class on derivatives, given that Das’s technical tomes on financial derivatives running into thousands of pages, remain a standard reference on Wall Street.

In this interview I speak to Das around his new book The Age of Stagnation—Why Perpetual Growth is Unattainable and the Global Economy is in Peril. Like his earlier books this book is also a terrific read and a must for anyone who seriously wants to understand how things haven’t really changed in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and why the future continues to remain bleak.

This is the second part of a three-part interview. The concluding part will appear tomorrow.

Happy Reading!
Vivek Kaul

 

Do you see all the debt that has been accumulated by governments over the years, ever being repaid? How do you see this playing out?

Interestingly, total public and private debt in major economies increased not decreased since 2008. The Table below sets out the changes in debt levels in the global economy:

Global Stock of Debt Outstanding

(US$ Trillion, Constant 2013 Exchange Rates)

 200020072014Compound Annual

Growth Rate (%)

Type of Debt   2000–20072007-2014
Household1933408.5%2.8%
Corporate2638565.7%5.9%
Government2233585.8%9.3%
Financial2037459.4%2.9%
Total Debt871421997.3%5.3%
Total Debt (as % of GDP)246%269%286%  

Source: Richard Dobbs, Susan Lund, Jonathan Woetzel and Mina Mutafchieva (2015) Debt and (not much) deleveraging, McKinsey Global Institute: 2

Total debt has continued to grow at a slower rate than before the GFC but remains well above the corresponding rate of economic growth. Higher public borrowing has largely offset debt reductions by businesses and households.

Could you tell us a little more about that?

Between 2007 and 2014, the ratio of public sector debt to GDP in advanced economies increased by 35 percent of GDP, compared to an increase of 3 percent between 2000 and 2007. The increase in government debt reflected the effects of the GFC. It was designed to support the financial system. Government spending sought to boost demand and growth. The increase in debt predictably was highest in the worst affected countries, such as the UK, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.

Given slow growth, low inflation rates and the balance between tax revenues and expenditure and inflation rates, government debt to GDP ratios are forecast to rise for the foreseeable future in the US, Japan and many European countries. In many countries, government debt has reached levels which are unsustainable. It is unclear how these highly indebted economies will reduce the level of government debt.

Why do you say that?

Debt can only be reduced through strong economic growth. Many economies in the world today have debt-to-GDP ratios of 300 percent. If the average interest rate is 3 percent, then to meet interest payments the economy would need to grow at 9 percent (300 percent [debt] times 3 percent [interest rate]), an unlikely nominal rate of expansion.

The alternative is debt forgiveness, defaults or inflation. But all these steps, other than growth are not without consequences. Savings designed to finance future needs, such as retirement, are lost. This in turn results in additional claims on the state to cover the shortfall or reduce future expenditure which crimps economic activity. Significant write-downs on sovereign debt would trigger major crises for banks and pension funds. The resulting losses to savers would trigger a sharp contraction of economic activity. National governments would need to step in to inject capital into banks to maintain the payment and financial system’s integrity.

In One Lesson: The Shortest & Surest Way to Understand Basic Economics, Henry Hazlitt summarised the problem: “Everything we get, outside of the free gifts of nature, must in some way be paid for. The world is full of so-called economists who in turn are full of schemes for getting something for nothing. They tell us that the government can spend and spend without taxing at all; that it can continue to pile up debt without ever paying it off, because ‘we owe it to ourselves’.” It is useful to remember that.

One of the things you write is that the stock markets have decoupled from the real economy. Why do you say that?

Equity prices now do not correlate to fundamental economic factors, such as nominal gross domestic product or economic growth, or, sometimes, earnings.

Writing in the Financial Times, James W. Paulsen, chief investment strategist at Wells Capital Management, advised Investors not to be too concerned about slower earnings growth. Mr. Paulsen forecast a 2,600 target for the S&P 500, or an annualised five-year return in excess of 10 per cent, including dividends. He warned investors about “becoming too myopically focused on these mainstream issues lest [they] miss what could be the second confidence-driven bull market of the post-war era”. Given that shares represent claims on the earnings derived from the real economy, this is puzzling.

It indeed is…

Veteran Legg Mason fund manager Bill Miller once observed that: “The common view [is] that the weak stock market reflects a weakening economy. But we think the converse is more likely: the weak stock market is causing the economy to weaken”.  Equity analyst Laszlo Birinyi supported this view of causality: “The relationship between the stock market and the economy is tangential, not causal”. It is not clear why the equity market should drive the real economy, rather than the other way around.

There may be some possible explanations for the divergence between the real economy and equity prices. First, share values are increasingly affected by opaque accounting and what one observer termed the ‘expectations machine’; that is, manipulating and beating expectations rather than absolute performance criteria. Then there are higher levels of corporate activity such as share repurchases and mergers and acquisitions which affect values.

Second, equity markets have become instruments of economic policy, as policy makers try to increase asset values to generate higher consumption driven by the ‘wealth effect’. Monetary measures, such as zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing, distort equity prices. Dividend yields that are higher than bond interest rates now drive valuations. Future corporate earnings are discounted at artificially low rates.

Any other reasons?

Third, the increased role of high frequency trading (“HFT”) has changed equity markets. HFT constitutes up to 70% of trading volume in some markets. The average holding period of HFT trading is around 10 seconds. The investment horizon of portfolio investors has also shortened. In 1940, the average investment period was 7 years. In the 1960s, it was 5 years. In the 1980s, it fell to 2 years. Today, it is around 7 months. The shift from investing for the long run has fundamentally changed the nature of equities, with momentum trading a larger factor.

Fourth, the increasing effect of HFT has increased volatility and the risk of large short term price changes, such as that caused by the ‘flash crash’, discouraging some investors.

Fifth, alternative sources of risk capital, the high cost of a stock market listing, particularly increasing compliance costs, increased public disclosure and scrutiny of activities including management remuneration as well as a shift to different forms of business ownership, such as private equity, have changed the nature of equity market. New capital raisings are increasingly viewed with scepticism as private investors or insiders seek to realise accreted gains, subtly changing the function of the market.

Sixth, financialisation may facilitate market manipulation, whereby the corrosive impact of insider trading and market abuse erodes investor confidence.

Financial instruments, such as shares and their derivatives, are intended as claims on real businesses. Over time, trading in the claims themselves have become more rewarding, leading to a disproportionate increase in the level of financial rather than business activity.

You write: “politicians and central bankers gambled that growth and increased inflation would over time correct the problems”. But things did not turn out as they expected. What went wrong there?

Policy makers assumed that the Great Recession of 2007/8 was a cyclical downturn not a structural change. George Soros got it absolutely right: “[It] resembles other crises that have occurred since the end of the Second World War at intervals ranging from four to 10 years…there is a profound difference: the current crisis marks the end of an era of credit expansion based on the dollar as the international reserve currency. The periodic crises were part of a larger boom-bust process. The current crisis is the culmination of a super-boom that has lasted for more than 60 years.”

And what happened because of the mis-diagnosis?

Given the mis-diagnosis, policy maker reacted with their usual responses: fiscal stimulus and looser monetary policy (low rate and then QE). This was never going to work as the debt overhang meant private economic activity did not recover to pre-crisis levels. Low rates did not actually encourage borrowing and spending.

The GFC left a legacy of large debts, forcing households to reduce spending so as to repay borrowings, with low-income households reducing spending by twice as much as richer households. The debt overhang and caution about borrowing has reduced the impact of low interest rates. Households are unwilling or unable to increase debt. The fall in house prices in some countries, and the resulting decline in household wealth, has made borrowing difficult; lending against home equity has decreased. Banks have also tightened lending standards, in response to loan losses. These factors mean that a consumption-based economic recovery is unlikely without income redistribution to households with a higher propensity to spend, or finding a new source of demand. The lack of demand has resulted in weak investment, also slowing growth.

As result, the global economy is locked into a path of low growth and low inflation tending to disinflation or deflation. That would be fine if it were not for the high levels of debt which will spiral out of control in such conditions.

So what was really needed?

What was needed were major structural changes: dealing with the excessive debt, dealing with global imbalances, addressing the unfunded entitlements which affect public finances and rebalancing between the real and financial economy. Then, there were other issues like demographics, slowing productivity and innovation as well as the problems of inequality, environment and scarce resources. But no government has had the political courage to tackle these issues to the degree necessary.

So what they did was make a bad situation worse by increasing debt. The toxic effects of the policies have now created the conditions for a new financial crisis.

In essence, they tried to do the wrong things better rather than do the right things badly.

To be continued…

Disclosure: Satyajit Das wrote the foreword to my book Easy Money: Evolution of Money from Robinson Crusoe to the First World War

The interview originally appeared in the Vivek Kaul Diary on January 28, 2016