Uber’s surge pricing shouldn’t just be about ‘good’ economics

uber

Vivek Kaul

The two most basic laws in economics are the law of demand and the law of supply. The law of demand basically states that all other factors being equal the price and the quantity demanded of any good or service are inversely proportional to each other. The law of supply states that an increase in price results in the increase of the quantity of the good or service supplied.

These two laws are the heart of the business model of Uber. The price of the taxi-service goes up when the demand is higher i.e. more people want to use Uber cabs in an area than the number of cabs available at that point of time. The company calls this “surge pricing”.

On the face of it this pricing practice sounds normal. It is often compared to airline ticket prices where the prices during weekends, summers, festivals and end/beginning of the year tend to be higher because the demand is higher. Along similar lines Uber prices go up when the demand is higher. Nevertheless, the comparison is not so straightforward.

When the demand is high, the price charged by Uber starts to go up. There have been cases when the price has gone up many times the normal price charged by the company. A December 2014 article in the Time magazine puts the highest multiple ever recorded at 50 times the normal price. This happened in Stockholm, Sweden.

When terrorists took over a café in Sydney in December 2014, the price went up four times its normal rate. A similar thing happened in Toronto, last month, during a massive subway disruption in the city.

The company has a standard explanation for this—the law of supply is at work. Travis Kalanick, the CEO of Uber explained it on his Facebook page once: “We do not own cars nor do we employ drivers…Higher prices are required in order to get cars on the road and keep them on the road during the busiest times. This maximizes the number of trips and minimizes the number of people stranded.”

How good is this argument? As Richard Thaler writes in Mishbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics: “You can’t just decide on the spur of the moment to become an Uber driver, and even existing drivers who are either at home relaxing or at work on another job have limited ability to jump in their cars and drive when a temporary surge is announced.”

Further, “one indication of the limits on the extent to which supply of drivers can respond quickly is the very fact that we have seen multiples as high as ten”, writes Thaler. If drivers were actually responding to surge pricing quickly that wouldn’t have been the case.

Research carried out by Nicholas Diakopoulos of the University of Maryland (which was published in the Washington Post) suggested that: “surge pricing doesn’t seem to bring more drivers out on the roads”. What it does instead is that pushes drivers already on the road towards areas with higher surge pricing.

Also, in most cities which have taxi-cabs people are used to paying a fixed rate. Uber is trying to challenge that notion. The trouble is that while it is doing that it ends up with a lot of bad PR, during tough situations(like terrorists entering a city, weather disasters, transport strikes/disruptions) when the surge pricing tends to kick in. While “surge pricing” follows economic theory, what the company needs to realise is that they are charging the consumer more, when he or she is in a spot of bother anyway.

So what should they do? Thaler has the answer: “This insensitivity to the norms of fairness could be particularly costly to the company…Why create enemies in order to increase profits a few days in a year?…I would suggest that they simply cap surges to something like a multiple of three times the usual fare.”
Now that sounds like a sensible thing to do.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

The column appeared in the Bangalore Mirror on July 8, 2015

Should a bad monsoon be such a big worry?

monsoon
The India Meteorological Department (IMD) puts out a weekly press release on the monsoon. As per the latest press release: “For the country as a whole, cumulative rainfall during this year’s monsoon has so far upto 01 July been 13% above the Long Period Average (LPA).” The nation’s weather forecaster uses rainfall data for the last 50 years to come up with the long period average.

Hence, the rainfall between June 1 and July 1, 2015, has been 13% above the 50 year average. This is surprising given that IMD has forecast a deficient monsoon this year. In early June it said that the monsoon will be 88% of the long-term average. The IMD also said that the probability of a deficient monsoon was as high as 66% The nation’s weather forecaster uses rainfall data for the last 50 years to define what is normal.

If the rainfall forecast for the year is between 96% and 104% of the 50 year average, then it is categorised as normal. A forecast of between 90% and 96% of the 50 year average is categorised as below-normal. And anything below 90% is categorised as deficient.

The monsoon season is still under progress, hence, whether IMD’s monsoon forecast turns out to be correct remains to be seen. The question that crops up here is-what is the past forecasting record of IMD like? The economists Kaushik Das and Taimur Baig of Deutsche Bank Research have written a report on this. The accompanying chart from Das and Baig’s research report makes for a very interesting reading.

 

Difference between IMD’s provisional forecast and actual rainfall outcome

Data Source:IMD, Deutsche Bank
As the economists point out: “The chart…shows the variance between the IMD’s provisional forecast (released in April each year) and the actual rainfall outcome during June- September. While IMD’s forecast record has improved since 2010, it becomes clear from the chart below, that the big misses have been more when actual rainfall has been deficient, rather than being excess. The forecast misses for the years 2002, 2004 and 2009 ” which were characterized by severe drought “are particularly striking.”” Time will tell which way the IMD prediction goes this year.

One of the economic worries that cropped out of a deficient monsoon being forecast was that the rural economy will grow at a much slower pace this year than the past. The logic for this is fairly straightforward.

Data from the World Bank shows that only 35.2% of agriculture land in India is irrigated. This means that the remaining land is dependent on rains. And when the monsoon is deficient, it leads to a lower production of agricultural crops.

A lower production of agricultural crops leads to lower income for a section of the farmer. This brings down the spending capability of the farmers, which in turn impacts economic growth in rural India.

Nevertheless, there is more to this argument. India Ratings and Research in an interesting new report conclude that rural income in India over the years has shifted away from agriculture. The accompanying table makes for a very interesting reading. As analysts Sunil Kumar Sinha and Devendra Kumar Pant point out: “A glance at NDP data over the years shows that the share of agriculture in rural NDP has consistently been declining. It declined to 38.9% in FY05 from 70.5% in FY71. Ind-Ra”s calculation shows that the share of agriculture in rural NDP declined further to 29.9% in FY13 considering the changes that Indian economy has witnessed since then.” NDP is essentially the net domestic product and is obtained by subtracting depreciation from the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP measures the economic output of the nation.

Share of Non-agriculture in Rural NDP more than 2/3rd

aInd-Ra projectionData Source:CSO, Ind-Ra
Now what does this mean in simple English? As Sinha and Pant write: “More than two-thirds of the rural income now is non-agricultural income.” The situation has more or less reversed from where it was at the start of the 1970s. Agricultural income made for 70.5% of rural income in 1970-71. Now it is around 29.9%.

What this further means is that the impact of monsoon on rural income has come down over the years. As Sinha and Pant point out: “higher growth of the industrial and services sector in rural areas over the years than of agriculture has increased the share of non-agriculture in rural NDP. This is not surprising because new industrial establishments are increasingly coming up in rural areas due to land/space constraints… industrial expansion in the country is contributing more to the rural economy than urban economy.”

What this clearly tells us is that the impact of monsoon on rural income and in the process rural consumption has been over rated over the years. While there is a link clearly, it is not as strong as it was in the past. And that is an important learning.

The column originally appeared on The Daily Reckoning on July 7, 2015

Grexit: Why Amartya Sen and Thomas Piketty are right about Germany

thomas piketty
The French economist Thomas Piketty whose bestselling book Capital in the Twenty First Century was published last year, in an interview to the German newspaper Die Zeit recently said: “What struck me while I was writing is that Germany is really the single best example of a country that, throughout its history, has never repaid its external debt. Neither after the First nor the Second World War.”

In the recent past, Germany has been insistent that Greece repay the money that it owes to the economic troika of the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund. As Piketty remarked: “When I hear the Germans say that they maintain a very moral stance about debt and strongly believe that debts must be repaid, then I think: what a huge joke! Germany is the country that has never repaid its debts. It has no standing to lecture other nations.”

In order to understand what Piketty meant we will have to go back nearly 100 years. At the end of the First World War in 1918, Germany had to compensate the victorious Allies (read Britain, France, and America primarily) for the losses it had inflicted on them.

At the reparations commission, the British delegation wanted Germany to pay $55 billion as compensation to the Allies. This was a huge number, given that the German gross domestic product (GDP) at that point of time stood at around $12 billion.

The Americans were fine with anything in the range of $10 to $12 billion and did not want anything more than $24 billion. The French did not put out a number of what they were expecting but they wanted a large reparation from Germany.

This was primarily because when the French had been in a similar situation in 1870 they had paid up Germany. After France had lost the Franco-Prussian War, Germany had asked France to pay 5 billion francs to make good the losses that it had faced during the course of the war. The French had rallied together and paid this money in a period of just two years.

Given this historical back­ground, they saw no reason why Germany should not be made to pay for the losses that France had suffered. The French assumed that like they had paid the Germans 50 years back, the Germans would also pay up. As Piketty put it in the interview: “However, it has frequently made other nations pay up, such as after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, when it demanded massive reparations from France and indeed received them.”
In May 1919, it was decided that Germany would pay the Allies an initial amount of $5 billion by May 1, 1921. The final reparation amount to be paid would be decided by a new Reparations Com­mission.

Finally, the total reparations amount that Germany would have to pay the allies was set at $12.5 billion, which was equal to the pre-war GDP of Germany. To repay this amount, Germany would have had to pay around $600–$800 million every year.

Germany was in a bad state financially and at the end of the war had a budget deficit that ran into 11,300 million marks (the German currency at that point of time). As the government did not earn enough revenue to meet its expenditure due to the high-reparation payments, it started to print money to finance pretty much everything else.

This finally led to the German hyperinflation of 1923. Inflation in Germany at its peak touched a 1,000 million per­cent. Interestingly, one view prevalent among economic histori­ans is that Germany engineered this hyperinflation to ensure that it did not have to pay the reparation amounts. The hope was that, with inflation at such high levels, the Allied countries would deal with Germany sympathetically when it came to deciding on repa­ration payments. And this is precisely what happened.

By the time the hyperinflation came to an end, the economy was in such a big mess that the repa­ration payments had slowed down to a trickle. And it so turned out that over the next few years more was paid to Germany in the form of various loans than it paid the Allies in reparations. After this, Germany regularly continued to default on the pay­ments and finally when Hitler came to power in 1933, he stopped these payments totally.
As mentioned earlier, after the hyperinflation of 1923, money had started to pour in from other nations into Germany. A substantial part of the preparation for the Second World War was financed through this money.

The Second World War started in 1939 and ended in 1945. Given the fact that Hitler had used foreign money to get the Second World War started, the directive at the end of the Second World was that nothing should be done to restore the German economy above the minimum lev­el required to ensure that there was no disease or unrest, which might endanger the lives of the occupying forces.

Eventually, the realization set in that an economic recovery in Europe was not possible without an economic recovery in Germany, the largest economy in Europe. The American Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, after having returned from Moscow in April 1947, was convinced that Europe was in a bad shape and needed help. This eventually led to the Marshall Plan. From 1948 to 1954, the United States gave $17 billion to 16 countries in Western Europe, including Germany, as a part of the Marshall Plan.

So what does all this history tell us? One is that Germany did not repay the debt that it owed to the Allied nations and hence, as Piketty said: “Germany is the country that has never repaid its debts. It has no standing to lecture other nations.”
But there is a bigger lesson here—that demanding austerity from Greece in order to be able to repay the debt isn’t exactly the answer. The German experience after the First World War precisely proves that.

The Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen, writes about the German experience after the First World War, in a recent column. As he writes: “Germany had lost the battle already, and the treaty was about what the defeated enemy would be required to do, including what it should have to pay to the victors. The terms…as Keynes saw it…included the imposition of an unrealistically huge burden of reparation on Germany – a task that Germany could not carry out without ruining its economy.”

And this is precisely what has happened in Greece over the last few years. The country now owes close to 240 billion euros to the economic troika. The austerity measures have had a highly negative impact on the Greek economy. As Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz recently wrote: “Of course, the economics behind the programme that the “troika” foisted on Greece five years ago has been abysmal resulting in a 25% decline in the country’s GDP. I can think of no depression, ever, that has been so deliberate and had such catastrophic consequences: Greece’s rate of youth unemployment, for example, now exceeds 60%.”
Amartya_Sen_NIH
This has essentially led to a situation where the total amount of debt with respect to the Greek gross domestic product (GDP) went up instead of going down. Currently the total debt to GDP ratio of Greece stands at a whopping 175%. And this number is likely to go up further in the days to come. In comparison the number was at 129% in 2009.

The only way Greece can perhaps be able to repay some of its external debt is if economic growth comes back. And that is not going to happen through more austerity. As Sen puts it: “Keynes ushered in the basic understanding that demand is important as a determinant of economic activity, and that expanding rather than cutting public expenditure may do a much better job of expanding employment and activity in an economy with unused capacity and idle labour. Austerity could do little, since a reduction of public expenditure adds to the inadequacy of private incomes and market demands, thereby tending to put even more people out of work.”

As economic history has shown more than once, whenever people in decision making positions forget what Keynes said, the world usually ends up in a bigger mess.

The article originally appeared on Firstpost on July 7, 2015

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

Greece votes an emphatic no in the Sunday referendum, what happens next?

euroVivek Kaul

The Greeks invented democracy and, let’s not forget, tragedy,” writes Chris Allbritton in The Daily Beast. And the fact that the country invented democracy had a very important role to play in it being accepted into the Eurozone in the first place. Eurozone is essentially a term used in order to refer to the countries using the euro as their currency.
As Neil Irwin writes in The Alchemist—Inside the Secret World of Central Bankers: “Greece…was where democracy was invented, the birthplace of the European idea, the original European empire.” But all that was in the past.
Greece voted an overwhelming 61.3% no in the referendum held yesterday, to decide on the following question:
““Should the proposal that was submitted by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund at the Eurogroup of 25 June 2015, which consists of two parts that together constitute their comprehensive proposal, be accepted? The first document is titled ‘Reforms for the completion of the Current Programme and beyond’ and the second ‘Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis.’’”
The referendum essentially asked Greeks to decide whether they were ready to suffer from more austerity measures, like the government cutting back on pensions, raising taxes etc., so that the it could be bailed out again by the economic troika of the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
To this, the Greeks have voted an emphatic no. The question is what happens next? Will this democratic decision of the Greeks turn out to be a tragic one in the days to come? ““Greece has just signed its own suicide note” – Mujitba Rahman, head of European analysis at the Eurasia Group risk consultancy, told the Financial Times.
But the reality of the situation is not as unidimensional as that. Allow me to explain.
The Greek banks are running out of money. As former US treasury secretary Lawrence Summers wrote on his blog: “The referendum is probably the second most important event of the week in Greece. However it turns out, Greek banks will run out of cash early in the week, probably on Monday [i.e. today].”
Currently, the Greek banks are shut. Cash withdrawals from ATMs are limited to 60 euros a day and are likely to be cut further. This can’t be a good scenario for ordinary Greek citizens. Further, it would be stupid to think that those who voted ‘no’ would have not realised that voting ‘no’ would mean trouble ahead. So to that extent people are ready to bear some amount of economic pain.
Also, an economy cannot function without currency. In fact, fearing precisely this scenario, the Greeks have been stocking up on food. As The Globe and Mail reports: “Already, some basic items such as medicines were running low as cash supplies ran short and payment systems ceased to exist. Many Greeks have been loading up on food staples for fear that supermarkets will be unable to buy products.”
The Greek government employees need to be paid on July 12. How will that payment be made? Governments in the past have resorted to issuing IOUs or scrips. The Greece government could do the same as well. The problem here is that the confidence in scrips issued by a bankrupt government wouldn’t be very high.
The Greek politicians believe that with a ‘no’ vote they are in a better negotiating position with the economic troika and other leaders in Europe.  As Panos Skourletis, the Greek labour minister said: “The government can go now with a very strong card to continue negotiations [with creditors].”
The reason for this is very straight forward—with a ‘no’ vote the fear that Greece will exit the euro is even higher.  And this is something that will strike at the very heart of the euro, given that it is ultimately a political idea, which hopes to bring the entire region closer through economic integration, with the hope of preventing any future wars in the years to come.
One of the first things that is likely to happen if Greece exits is that the country will redominate all its debt in its new currency, which is likely to be the drachma. Also this will set a precedence for other countries like Spain, Portugal and Italy. And this can’t be good for the entire idea of euro.
Further, though no German politician will publicly admit to it, but the euro has tremendously helped increase the German exports. In 1995, German exports made up for 22% of the gross domestic product (GDP). By 1999, this number had run up to 27.1%. In 2004, five years after the euro came into being, the German exports to GDP ratio stood at 35.5%. In 2008, the number reached 43.5%. As the impact of the financial crisis started to spread around the number fell to 37.8% in 2009. Nevertheless, the German exports to GDP ratio has recovered since then and in 2014 stood at 45.6%.
With the euro becoming the common currency across most of Europe, the exchange rate risk that businesses had to face while exporting goods and services was taken out of the equation totally. This has benefitted Germany the most, given the productivity of its business.
And will Germans want to get rid of this advantage by chucking out the Greeks and start a process which questions the entire idea of euro? As Niels Jensen writes in the Absolute Return Letter for July 2015 titled A Return to the Fundamentals? : “Germany…actually benefit[s] from the damage that Greece has done to the value of the euro. Poor domestic demand as a result of challenging demographics have made exports the most likely way to secure decent economic growth, and a relatively weak euro has been tremendously helpful in that respect. Imagine how much stronger the euro would have been if every member country had the fiscal discipline of Germany!”
The public posture maintained by the German leaders has been very aggressive. As Sigmar Gabriel, the deputy chancellor of Germany said: “With the rejection of the rules of the euro zone… negotiations about a programme worth billions are barely conceivable.”
There are a spate of meetings scheduled between European leaders today and tomorrow. And this is where some hard decisions will have to be made. If the politicians continue to believe in the idea of euro and the Eurozone, then they will have to treat Greece with kid gloves and not push for more austerity.
On July 20, 2015, Greece has to make a payment of 3.5 billion euros to the European Central Bank for a bond that is maturing. I guess things would have become much clearer in the Eurozone and Greece by then.
So, watch this space.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

The column originally appeared on Firstpost on July 6, 2015