Post interim budget, the threat of a downgrade remains

standard and poor'sVivek Kaul
On February 28, 2013, the finance minister P Chidambaram, presented the budget for the financial year 2013-2014 (April 2013 to March 2014). In this, he projected a fiscal deficit of Rs 5,42,499 crore or 4.8% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends, expressed as a percentage of the GDP.
All through the year, Chidambaram maintained that come what may the government won’t cross the fiscal deficit of 4.8% of the GDP. In the end he stood by his promise, but only on paper. The fiscal deficit for 2013-2014 is now estimated to be at Rs 5,24,439 crore or 4.6% of the GDP.
It was important that the government did not cross the target of 4.8% of the GDP that it had set, given the threat of a downgrade from international rating agencies.
The rating agency Standard and Poor’s (S&P) currently rates India as BBB-. This is rating is the lowest rating in the investment grade. If India were to be downgraded, its rating would fall to BB or the first stage of the junk status.
This would mean that a lot of foreign investors would have to sell out of the Indian bond market as well as the Indian stock market,given that they are not allowed to invest in countries with a junk rating. This would lead to huge pressure on the rupee as foreign investors cashing out will convert their rupees into dollars.
In fact, in November 2013, S&P had maintained the “negative” outlook on India. This meant that there were chances of a downgrade, over the next 12 months. As the rating agency had said in a release “The central government’s budget balance[i.e. the fiscal deficit], however, tells only part of the Indian fiscal story. Using a broader measure of general government deficits, we project a 7.2% of GDP deficit for fiscal 2014, to which one should add 1-2 percentage points of GDP deficits for the unprofitable portions of the consolidated public sector, including state electricity boards and oil-marketing companies.”
Keeping this definition of fiscal deficit in mind, how has the finance minister P Chidambaram done? It is safe to say that the fiscal deficit of 4.6% of the GDP is at best a hogwash. In order to arrive at that number, the finance minister has under-budgeted for petroleum, food and fertilizer subsidies in a major way. Estimates suggest that payment of more than Rs 1,20,000 crore worth of subsidies has been postponed to the next year.
Take the case of petroleum subsidies. Chidambaram had budgeted Rs 65,000 crore towards it. The number has now been increased to Rs 85,480 crore. Of this amount, a substantial chunk has gone towards payments of petroleum subsidies that should have been paid in 2012-2013( April 2012 and March 2013) but were postponed to 2013-2014.
In fact, data released by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas in early February shows that the oil marketing companies have reported under-recoveries ofa total of Rs 1,00,632 crore during the first nine month of 2013-14 (April-December) on the sale of diesel, PDS Kerosene and cooking gas. Hence, the Rs 85,480 crore budgeted towards oil subsides is clearly not enough.
On the earnings side, Chidambaram has indulged in massive asset stripping to match his numbers. He has forced public sector banks, which are in a financially fragile state, to pay interim dividends of close to Rs 27,000 crore. ONGC and Oil India Ltd have been forced to pick up shares worth Rs 5,000 crore in the loss making Indian Oil Corporation, a company which no private investor wants to touch. And the government has also managed to get more than Rs 19,000 crore from Coal India, as dividend and dividend distribution tax.
Anyone who understands some basic accounting will tell you that using assets to pay for regular expenditure is never a great idea. Rating agencies like S&P obviously understand this. And that is why it had said in November 2013 that using broader measures, the fiscal deficit comes to greater than 7.2% of the GDP. In that sense, the deficit of the government is clearly greater than the 4.6% of the GDP that it has arrived at, once the accounting shenanigans are taken into account.
Given that, the threat of a downgrade remains. As S&P had said in November “we expect to review the rating on India after the next general elections when the new government has announced its policy agenda.” The agency plans to look at the fiscal policy of the next government as well, among other things. Given the mess the current fiscal policy is in, it will be very difficult for the next government to do much about it. The only way out is to slash government expenditure massively. And that is easier said than done.

 The article originally appeared in the Daily News and Analysis (DNA) dated February 18, 2014 
(Vivek Kaul is the author of Easy Money. He can be reached at [email protected]

Why Uncle Sam should also be suing itself, not just S&P

standard and poor'sVivek Kaul

The American government has filed a suit against the rating agency Standard And Poor’s (S&P) seeking $5 billion in damages. The suit filed by the Department of Justice alleges that the rating agency gave good ratings to bad mortgage securities to earn a handsome income.
In the United States a home loan is referred to as a mortgage.
Lets try and understand this in a little more detail. Starting in around 2002 American banks and other financial firms started giving out what came to be known as subprime home loans. The term ‘prime’ was used in reference to the best customers of the bank. And loans to such customers were prime loans.
In its strictest sense a subprime loan was defined as a loan given to an individual with a credit score below 620, who had no assets and was thus unlikely to qualify for a traditional home loan. A credit score was a number calculated on the basis of the borrower’s past record at paying bills and loans of all kinds, the length of his credit history, the kind of loans taken etc.
On the basis of the number the lender could get some sort of an idea of what sort of a risk he would enter into by lending to the borrower. That was the purported idea behind the credit score. In the normal scheme of things, a borrower categorised as “sub-prime” would not have got a loan.
But those were days when anybody and everyone got a loan. Banks did not keep subprime loans on their books. What they did was that they pooled these loans together and sold bonds against them. The interest paid on these bonds was lower than the interest the bank was charging on the home loan. The difference in interest was the money made by the bank. This process was referred to as securitisation.
The bonds were bought by investors of various kinds. When the borrowers of home loans paid interest on their loans that interest was pooled together and was used to pay interest to those investors who had bought these bonds. The same thing happened with the principal on the home loan that was repaid by the borrowers. It was pooled together and used to pay off the investors who had bought these bonds.
By doing this the bank did not maintain the risk of the home loan defaulting on its books. Also by securitising the subprime home loans the banks got back the money they had lent out as home loans immediately. This allowed them to give out fresh subprime home loans which they again securitised by issuing bonds and so the system worked. The difference in interest was the money made by the bank. The bank also charged a fee from investors for securitising bonds.
If the bank had kept the loan on their books for the entire duration of the home loan, as used to be the case earlier, they wouldn’t have been able to make fresh loans immediately. Also, they would have to carry the risk of default by the borrowers on the home loan on their books.
As far as investors were concerned they got to invest in a financial security which gave a better rate of return than government and most corporate bonds. But what made them really invest in the subprime bonds was the fact that they got very good ratings from rating agencies like S&P, Moody and Fitch. So here was a financial security which had a rating which was as good as the government bond or a corporate bond, but gave a higher rate of return.
What was ironical was that the subprime home loans bonds were given the best rating of AAA. Subprime loans were basically being given to people who would have not got loans in the normal scheme of things.
The lending terms had become so easy that home loans could be made to someone with No Income, No Jobs, or assets for that matter (or NINJA loans for short).
The lenders also introduced a loan where the borrower could simply get a loan by stating his or her income. The lenders wouldn’t make any effort to verify it. These loans came to be referred to as liar loans. In 2006, 40% of all subprime loans were liar loans.
Given this, the risk of default on subprime home loans was very very high. And loans with a very high chance of default couldn’t be rated AAA, which is what was happening.
But why were the rating agencies rating subprime bonds which were backed by subprime loans most likely to be defaulted on handing out AAA ratings? For this we have to go back in history.
In fact, a major reason why subprime bonds were able to get AAA rating was because of something that happened way back in 1970. This was the year when Penn Central, the biggest railway company (or what Americans call a railroad) in the United States, went bankrupt due to sustained losses in its passenger as well as freight operations. This was an event that credit rating agencies were not able to foresee.
Till this point of time the rating agencies ran a subscription based service. Hence what the rating agency thought about a particular new bond was not known to the world at large but only to those who had the subscription service of the rating agency.
In response to the crisis the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated that brokers holding onto bonds which were less than investment grade would be penalised. But this immediately raised the question that who would decide what ‘investment-grade’ was? So SEC created a new category of officially designated rating agencies. The rating firms Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, were designated to be the three officially designated rating agencies.
What the SEC was effectively saying was that what the rating agencies thought about a bond was too important to be restricted only to those who were willing to pay for their subscription service. Hence, every rating from then on was publicly available.
But the ratings agency was a business at the end of the day, they had to also make money. The question was who would pay them if their ratings were publicly available? So the SEC deemed that the company which was in the process of issuing a bond, should get itself rated from the rating agencies and pay them for it as well. 

This created a clear conflict of interest. The rating agencies could be easily played off against one another. And this is what happened during the entire subprime boom.
Banks and other financial institutions looking to rate their subprime bonds played off one rating agency against the other. If they did not get the AAA rating they were looking for their bonds they threatened to take their business elsewhere.
What did not help was the fact that the money the rating agencies made on rating subprime bonds was three times the money they made on rating other standard corporate bonds. This resulted in a lot of subprime bonds being rated AAA.
While the bonds may have been rated AAA, the basic point was forgotten. No bonds could be better than the home loans that were outstanding against them. And the fact of the matter was that the subprime home loans were the worst of the lot.
Given this, it doesn’t make any sense on part of the American government to blame only Standard & Poor’s for what happened. The other two officially designated rating agencies Moody’s and Fitch are equally to be blamed. And so is the American government (through SEC) for persisting with a regulation which allowed issuers of bonds i.e. banks and other financial firms to shop for a rating.

The article originally appeared on on February 7, 2013.
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He can be reached at [email protected])