Vehicle Scrapping Policy is Half-Baked and More About Feeding a Constant Narrative

Late last week the central government announced the vehicle scrapping policy (VSP). As the Minister for Road Transport and Highways, Nitin Gadkari, put it in the Parliament, the aim of the VSP is to create “an eco-system for phasing out of unfit and polluting vehicles”.

So how will this be put into action? Using the public private partnership (PPP) model involving the state governments, private sector and the automobile companies, the central government plans to promote the setting up of automated fitness centres (AFCs). 

These AFCs will issue vehicle fitness certificates to private vehicles and commercial vehicles based on emission tests, braking, safety equipment among many other tests which are as per the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989.”

A commercial vehicle which is 15 years old and fails the vehicle fitness test will be declared an end of life vehicle and scrapped. Similarly, a private vehicle which is 20 years old and fails the vehicle fitness test will be declared to be an end of life vehicle and scrapped. Further, if owners don’t renew the registration certificate, their vehicle may be declared as an end of life vehicle and scrapped.

In order to disincentivise commercial vehicle owners who own vehicles which are 15 years old, from continuing to use them, even if they clear the vehicle fitness test, the fee for the fitness certificate and the fitness test will be set on the higher side. For private vehicle owners with vehicles which are 15 years old, the re-registration fee will be set on the higher side.

The point being that if you have a private vehicle which is 20 years old or perhaps even older, the government wants you to stop using the vehicle and buy a new one, irrespective of what state it is in. For commercial vehicles, the same logic applies for vehicles which are at least 15 years old.

And the expectation is this will lead to lower pollution, newer cars, safer pedestrians, more spending, more investment and more jobs. QED.

The minister expects additional investments of Rs 10,000 crore and 35,000 job opportunities to be created because of this.

It will also lead to banks and non-banking finance companies (NBFCs) giving out more loans. Of course, given that the auto industry and the auto-ancillary industry use a lot of contract workers, one could possibly argue that this could lead to more work opportunities for them as well. 

The question is how will things really play out? Let’s try and understand that in some detail.

Economics is basically the study of incentives and second order effects. The trouble is that politicians and policy makers don’t keep this in mind while designing policy, particularly the second order effects of what they are proposing.

Let’s try and understand this pointwise.

1) There are a total of 1.02 crore vehicles, both commercial and private, which fall under the defined category of older vehicles. Even if a small proportion of these vehicles are scrapped they will generate a huge amount of non-biodegradable waste.

What plans do we have to handle all this waste coming our way? As the press release announcing the policy pointed out: “Efforts are also being made to set up Integrated Scrapping Facilities across India.” Even while taking into account that this policy will be implemented over the next few years, this sounds too much like work in progress than definitive economic policy. One needs a lot more clarity on this front. 

2) As a way to get the scheme going, the government first plans to scrap its older vehicles. As the press release announcing the plan puts it: “It is being proposed that all vehicles of the Central Government, State Government, Municipal Corporation, Panchayats, State Transport Undertakings, Public Sector Undertakings and autonomous bodies with the Union and State Governments may be de-registered and scrapped after 15 years from the date of registration.” This is supposed to be implemented from April 1, 2022 onwards, or little over a year from now.

Why have this blanket policy at a time when governments, in particular state governments, are already short of money? Why not look at the fitness of vehicles and then decide? If at all, vehicles of the central government and the public sector enterprises tend to be decently maintained.

3) Also, the assumption here is that only older vehicles cause pollution. The manufacturing of newer vehicles needs electricity. Most electricity in India is generated by burning coal, which causes pollution. Steel goes into the making of vehicles. The process of making of steel, releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. That causes pollution as well. The same is true of plastic and pretty much everything else which goes into the making of vehicles. Hence, every new vehicle that is produced has a carbon footprint. 

Of course, all this pollution doesn’t show up in cities where most private vehicles are driven and tends to be well distributed across the country. But shouldn’t a policy that has lower pollution as one of its key points, take this basic factor into account as well? Further, we need to consider the fact that many older private vehicles are not constantly in use. 

4) As I have explained earlier, the government wants private and commercial vehicle owners to buy new cars. Of course, as and when this happens, the automobile companies are supposed to benefit. This explains why companies have come out in favour of this policy (or even otherwise, when do Indian businessmen ever disagree with the government). But this doesn’t take a very basic factor into account.

Whatever we might like to say about the new India and such things, we are a poor country at the end of the day. And covid has only made things even more difficult by pushing many more people into poverty, as health bills have mounted, incomes have crashed and small businesses have gone bust.

Hence, assuming that people will go out and buy new vehicles if the older vehicles are scrapped or because re-registration is made more expensive, is just looking at first order effects of policy, in the same way that economists tend to believe that lower interest rates always push up consumption. 

Private vehicle owners who are not heavy users of their vehicles, might just prefer to use Uber or Ola or even the metro infrastructure coming up across India’s major cities. (This reminds me of a time when the government kept telling us that slower automobile sales were primarily because of Uber and Ola).

Further, owners might financially not be in a position to buy a new vehicle. Already, the trucking industry has spoken up against the idea.

Also, even if owners buy a new vehicle, they might cut consumption on something else given that there is only so much money going around. Hence, net-net, the impact on the overall economy may not be much.

The trouble is that the costs of second order effects are not so obvious and straightforward, whereas the supposed benefits are easy to convey in a simplistic way. And politicians love stuff which they can convey in a simplistic way.

5) Kitna deti hai (how much does it give?), goes a Maruti advertisement, telling us that Indians are price conscious value for money consumers. And there is nothing wrong with this, given that an automobile is probably the second most expensive thing we buy during our lifetime. So, while the idea that old polluting vehicles need to be discarded is a noble one, what is in it for the consumer?

This is what the government is planning. a) The owner will be paid 4-6% of the showroom price of a new vehicle, when his old vehicle is scrapped. b) The state governments may be advised to offer a road- tax rebate of up to 25% for personal vehicles and up to 15% for commercial vehicles. c) The vehicle manufacturers are also advised to provide a discount of 5% on purchase of new vehicle against the scrapping certificate. d) The road transport minister has requested the finance minister and states to give a concession in goods and services tax (GST) on purchase of new vehicles.

There are too many ifs and buts in the above paragraph. As usual, the government seems to be in a hurry to announce and implement a policy. As I have said in the past a massive cut in GST on automobiles will encourage buying. What the government will lose out on per unit of sales, it is more than likely to make up for through volumes. 

One understands that the road transport minister cannot ensure all of this on his own, which is why it is important that the government spends some time in discussing and figuring out how to design and implement policy. Also, it is important to carry out small experiments in union territories, before announcing policies which need to be implemented across the length and the breadth of the country.

As Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah write In Service of the Republic

“The safe strategy in public policy is to incrementally evolve—making small moves, obtaining feedback from the empirical evidence, and refining policy work in response to evidence.”

But the trouble is that small moves involve a lot of time, effort and thinking, which is very difficult for a government which believes in constant action and constantly creating new narratives to keep people busy and happy. The narrative also feeds into the idea that the government is trying to do new things. 

6) Take a look at what happened to two-wheeler sales in 2019-20 (This is before covid struck). Sales fell by nearly 18% year on year to 17.42 million units, as the price went up due to various reasons. Hence, India is a very price sensitive market and the point is that there has to be a huge benefit involved in buying a new vehicle in a tough economic environment.

While the notion of pollution control is a noble one, it is not something which is going to get people to go out and buy new vehicles, unless it is very clear what is in it for them. Ultimately, if you want people at large to behave in a certain way, the right incentive should be on offer, something this half-baked policy, like the policy to encourage electric vehicles before it, lacks.

To conclude, one does wonder, what were they doing all these years, given that the policy has been on the anvil for a while now. 

Trump’s Trade Wars Aren’t Going to Make America Great Again

donald trump
Donald Trump’s campaign slogan while fighting the American presidential elections, was to ‘Make America Great Again’. On March 1, 2018, a little over a year after taking over as the 45th president of the United States, Trump announced a 25% tariff on steel and a 10% tariff on aluminium.

The question is, how does this fit into Trump’s plan to make America great again? Trump plans to drive up exports and drive down imports. By driving down imports through tariffs, the American consumer will be forced to buy stuff produced within the country. This will encourage domestic industry and in turn create jobs. By driving up exports, again domestic industry will be encouraged and this will create jobs. QED.

Now only if it was as simple as that. The trouble is that most politicians while making economic decisions look at only the first order effects of their decisions. In the current case this basically means that the steel tariff of 25%, will also allow the American domestic steel industry to compete.

As of now the American steel industry cannot compete simply because it cannot produce steel at a price at which steel can be imported into the United States. The tariff of 25% will make imported steel costlier and in the process allow American steel companies to compete. And this will create jobs. At least that is what Trump and his advisers who have helped him to arrive at this decision, hope for.

This is the first order effect of Trump’s decision which looks just at the impact of the tariff  on the American steel producers. As Henry Hazlitt writes in Economics in One Lesson: “Those who favour it [i.e. tariffs] think only of the interests of the producers immediately benefitted by the particular duties involved. They forget the interests of the consumers who are immediately injured by being forced to pay these duties.”

Hazlitt is talking about the first order effect of Trump’s decision which benefits American steel companies and the second order effect of Trump’s decision which hurts American companies consuming steel.

Steel (either imported or produced in America) is bought by other American companies. It is used as a major component while making buildings, tools, ships, automobiles, machines, appliances, and weapons. Other than weapons, the United States cannot do without the other things listed in the last sentence.

On second thought, given the American obsession with guns, neither can the country do without weapons.

Steel is also used as a major input into building physical infrastructure.

While the tariff on steel will make American steel producers viable, it will make steel more expensive for American steel consumers, as they will have to pay more for steel. This increase in cost will be passed on to the end consumers. So, everything from cars to appliances to homes will cost more. The end consumer only has so much money going around. Hence, he or she may not buy the stuff he has been planning to, due to higher prices. If he does so, his expenses will have to increase or he will have to balance his overall expenses, by cutting down on his other expenditure.

As Hazlitt writes: “The added amount which consumers pay for a tariff protected article leaves them just that much less with which to buy all other articles. There is no net gain to industry as a whole.” This is a very basic point which politicians encouraging any sort of protectionism don’t seem to get.

The tariffs will impact the overall sales of other American businesses, which might in turn fire people to maintain their profitability. It’s just that it is not possible to exactly quantify these job losses and loss of business.

As Hazlitt writes: “It would be impossible for even the cleverest statistician to know precisely what the incidence of the loss of other jobs had been—precisely how many men and women had been laid off from each particular industry, precisely how much business each particular industry had lost—because consumer had to pay more [for steel in this case].”

The news agency Reuters has a story on how 780 workers of the Novolipetsk Steel will lose their jobs. The company imports two million tonnes of steel slabs per year from its Russian parent company. It then rolls these slabs into sheets for various American companies, ranging from Home Depot to Harley Davidson to Caterpillar.

The customers of this steel company now need to be ready to accept a 25% increase in the price of steel. If they do, the company survives. If they don’t, then the company will have to start firing workers. This is the second order effect of a tariff, which is not very clear up front.

If these companies accept a 25% increase it will only be in a situation where they can’t source the steel they need from a cheaper source. Further, it will lead to a rise in the price of their end product, depending on what proportion steel forms of their total inputs.

Also, it is worth remembering here, that if America can impose tariffs on its imports, other countries can do the same on their imports, hurting American exports. In fact, this is precisely how things played out in the aftermath of the First World War, when America tried to protect its domestic industry through tariffs. In return, other countries imposed tariffs on their imports and this led to the start of the global trade war, hurting American exports.

Hence, driving down imports, while trying to drive up exports, is sort of contradictory. There are many other aspects to this, which we shall see in tomorrow’s column.

The Economist estimates that steel and aluminium accounted for around 2% of the total American imports of $2.4 trillion, last year. This formed around 0.2% of the American GDP. Given this, currently the level of protectionism unleashed by the American president is very small. But the level of rhetoric that Donald Trump has unleashed around the issue, it doesn’t seem that he is going to stop just at this. This also becomes clear from the fact that on March 6, 2018, Gary Cohn, the chief economic adviser of Trump, quit.

We will return to this discussion in tomorrow’s column.

The column originally appeared on Equitymaster on March 12, 2018.

Why Inflation Cannot Be a Growth Strategy

ARTS RAJAN

In the recent past it has been suggested that some amount of inflation cannot be bad in order to get economic growth going again. Hence, the Reserve Bank of India(RBI), should cut the repo rate in order to get the economic growth going.

Repo rate is the rate at which RBI lends to banks. The hope is that when the RBI cuts the repo rate, banks will also cut their lending rates. At lower rates both individual consumers as well as firms will borrow and spend more. And this will get economic growth going again. (As I have said in the past individual consumers are already borrowing at a record pace even at the so called high interest rates).

How does this work? As RBI governor Raghuram Rajan had explained in a February 2014 speech: “By raising interest rates, the RBI causes banks to raise rates and thus lowers demand; firms do not borrow as much to invest when rates are higher and individuals stop buying durable goods against credit and, instead, turn to save. Lower demand growth leads to a better match between demand and supply, and thus lower inflation for the goods being produced, but also lower growth.”

When RBI cuts the repo rate this trend reverses. As Rajan explained: “Relatedly, if lower rates generate higher demand and higher inflation, people may produce more believing that they are getting more revenues, not realizing that high inflation reduces what they can buy out of the revenues. Following the saying, “You can fool all the people some of the time”, bursts of inflation can generate growth for some time. Thus in the short run, the argument goes, higher inflation leads to higher growth.”

The trouble is that this inflation eventually catches up with growth. As Rajan said: “As the public gets used to the higher level of inflation, the only way to fool the public again is to generate yet higher inflation. The result is an inflationary spiral which creates tremendous costs for the public.”

Hence, it is important that inflation stays in control, if a country is looking for strong growth over a long period of time. (As I had explained in a column last week).

Inflation as per the consumer price index has started to go up again. For June 2016, the inflation was at 5.77 per cent. In comparison, the inflation in June 2015 was at 5.40 per cent. One reason for this jump has been food inflation. Food inflation in June 2016 was at 7.79 per cent. Within food, vegetables, pulses and sugar, saw an increase in price of 12.72 per cent, 28.28 per cent and 12.98 per cent, respectively. Spices went up by 8.13 per cent. Food items constitute 54.18 per cent of the consumer price index. Food inflation impacts poor the most given that a bulk of their income goes towards paying for food.

As is obvious, the jump in inflation as per consumer price index has been due to a rise in food inflation. The RBI cannot do anything about food prices through the repo rate, and hence, the RBI should cut the repo rate, or so goes the argument.

In the 2014 speech Rajan had explained this by saying: “I want to present one more issue that has many commentators exercised – they say the real problem is food inflation, how do you expect to bring it down through the policy rate? The simple answer to such critics is that core CPI inflation, which excludes food and energy, has also been very high, reflecting the high inflation in services. Bringing that down is centrally within the RBI’s ambit.

So RBI cannot control food inflation but it can control the prices of other items that make up the consumer price index, through its monetary policy. In fact, the RBI can control, what economists call the “second round effects”.

Economist Vijay Joshi explains this in his new book India’s Long Road—The Search for Prosperity: “What sparks inflation is quite different from what keeps it on the boil. Though a supply shock raises the price of, say, food or oil products, this leads to a persistent rise in the overall price level only if it spreads and gathers strength due to the pressure of aggregate demand. If the economy is ‘overheated’, the inflation impulse becomes too generalized. A wage-price spiral can then develop that is hard to break, especially if people begin to expect higher inflation and increase their wage and salary claims in order to protect their real incomes.”

And this is where monetary policy and the central bank come in. As Joshi writes: “To prevent these ‘second-round effects’, monetary policy has to keep excess demand and inflationary expectations under check.”

Hence, while the RBI cannot control food prices, its monetary policy can have an impact on other elements that constitute the consumer price index. And this explains why the core-inflation (prices of products other than food and fuel) in June 2016 cooled to down 4.5 per cent. It was at 4.7 per cent in May 2016. This, despite the fact that food inflation is close to 8 per cent.

In fact, Rajan explained this beautifully in a June 2016 speech where he said: “The reality is that while it is hard for us to control food demand, especially of essential foods, and only the government can influence food supply through effective management, we can control demand for other, more discretionary, items in the consumption basket through tighter monetary policy. To prevent sustained food inflation from becoming generalized inflation through higher wage increases, we have to reduce inflation in other items. Indeed, overall headline inflation may have stayed below 6 percent recently even in periods of high food inflation, precisely because other components of the CPI basket such as “clothing and footwear” are inflating more slowly.

Given that this is not such a straightforward point to understand, many people fall for the inflation is good for growth and that RBI cannot control inflation, arguments.

The column originally appeared in Vivek Kaul’s Diary on July 19, 2016