Category: Congress | Page 5

11 July, 2014

No "acche din" for govt finances any time soon

Vivek Kaul

So what do the finance minister Arun Jaitley and the Hindi film industry have in common? They both love the number “Rs 100 crore”. The Hindi film industry cannot stop talking about the films that have done a business of Rs 100 crore or more. Jaitley, in his maiden budget speech, used the Rs 100 crore number 29 times, while making allocations to various government schemes.
This has led a lot of experts to comment that Jaitley has spread himself too thin. Whether that turns out to be the case, only time will tell. Nevertheless, in the budget speech, Jaitley, like finance ministers before him, did not talk about the single biggest expenditure of the government.
The single biggest expenditure of the government of India is debt servicing i.e. the interest that it pays on its debt and the money that it spends in repaying it. Governments all over the world, including the Indian government, spend much more than they earn. This difference is referred to as the fiscal deficit and is financed through borrowing. The money is borrowed for a certain period. During the period a certain amount of interest needs to be paid on it. And at the end of the period, the borrowed money needs to be repaid.
Over the years, the government has been spending more than it has earning. Given this, the fiscal deficit has shot up. In 2007-2008, the fiscal deficit of the Indian government had stood at Rs 1,26,912 crore or 2.6% of the GDP. This had shot up to Rs 5,15,990 crore or 5.7% of the GDP, by 2011-2012. The fiscal deficit projected for 2014-2015 stands at Rs 5,31,177 crore or 4.1% of the GDP.
This increase in fiscal deficit has been financed by a greater amount of borrowing. A greater borrowing has meant that the cost of debt servicing for the government has gone up over the years. In 2009-2010, the total debt servicing cost of the Indian government had stood Rs 2,94,857 crore. The fiscal deficit during the course of that year had stood at Rs 4,18,842 crore. Hence, the ratio of the debt servicing cost to the fiscal deficit worked out to 0.7.
By 2013-2014, the total debt servicing cost had shot up to Rs 5,43,267 crore. As the amount of money borrowed went up, so did the interest that needed to paid on it. And, so did the repayments. The fiscal deficit for the year stood at Rs 5,24,539 crore. Hence, the ratio of debt servicing cost to the fiscal deficit shot up to 1.04.
For the current financial year, the total debt servicing cost has been estimated to be at Rs 6,43,301 crore. Interestingly, in the interim budget presented by P Chidambaram in February earlier this year, the number had stood at Rs 6,74,184 crore. How has the number come down by more than Rs 30,000 crore, that Mr Jaitley did not explain. The fiscal deficit for the year has been projected at Rs 5,31,177 crore. Hence, the ratio of the total debt servicing cost to the fiscal deficit is now at 1.21.
What does this ratio tell us? It tells us that the entire borrowing(and a part of the income) of the government of India is being used to repay past borrowing and to pay interest on it. In simple everyday terms it means that I am using one credit card to pay off what is due on another credit card.
In such a scenario, it becomes very difficult for the government to spend money on other important areas. It also explains to a large extent why Jaitley made so many allocations of just Rs 100 crore. If he had the money, he would have probably preferred a higher amount of allocation. Of course, Mr Jaitley cannot be blamed for this mess which he has inherited from the Congress led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government.
So what is the way out of this financial hole? The revenue receipts of the government(i.e. the money that it earns through tax and non tax revenue) for the year 2007-2008 had stood at 10.2% of the GDP. For the year, 2014-2015, the revenue receipts are at 9.2% of the GDP.
What this tells us clearly is that the revenue receipts of the government have come down and need to go up. How can that be done? The Modi government has been gung ho about getting the black money of Indians stashed abroad back to India. But what about all the black money that is there in the country? Wouldn’t that be easier to recover? While the intention to get back all this black money from abroad is certainly noble, how practical is it? Also, if the idea is to recover black money then why discriminate between those who have managed to transfer the money abroad and those who haven’t.
The Modi government can borrow an idea or two from what happened in Greece. In order to recover black money, the Greek government used Google Earth to track those who have swimming pools and then cross indexed their address with the amount of tax they are paying. Ideas along similar lines which use information technology extensively in order to identify people who are not paying the correct amount of income tax, need to be come up with.
In the budget speech made in February 2013, the then finance minister P Chidambaram had estimated that India had only 42,800 people with a taxable income of Rs 1 crore or more. What this clearly tells us is that a lot of people are not paying income tax.
In a country where 27,000 luxury cars are sold every year, the number of individuals with a taxable income of Rs 1 crore has to be more than 42,800. These individuals, who include property dealers, doctors, chartered accountants etc., need to be made to pay their fair share of income tax.
Of course, any such move will not immediately lead to results. The way to do is to execute a few pilot projects in different parts of the country and identify the big defaulters and get them to pay the income tax. This should be extensively publicized as well, so as t ensure that other similar people start paying the right amount of income tax.

The piece originally appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle dated July 11, 2014 under a different headline.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of Easy Money: Evolution of the Global Financial System to the Great Bubble Burst. He can be reached at [email protected])

27 June, 2014

Modi govt is wrong, the hike in MSP of rice will lead to inflation

The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) has decided to increase the minimum support price (MSP) of rice by Rs 50 per quintal or 3.8% to Rs 1360, for this year. The MSP is the price at which the government buys rice from the farmers, through the Food Corporation of India(FCI) and other state government agencies.
The law minister Ravi Shankar Prasad was confident that this decision will not fuel inflation. As he told the media “I do not think rise in MSP is directly linked to inflation. We are taking several measures to control inflation”.
While the increase in MSP of 3.8% is lower than the average increase of 9% per year in the MSP of rice since 2007-2008, Prasad’s statement is wrong on several counts. As economist Surjit Bhalla put it in a November 2013 column in The Indian Express “For each 10 per cent rise in previous years’ procurement prices, there is a predicted 3.3 per cent increase in the current year CPI…When the government raises the MSP, the prices of factors of production involved in the production of MSP products — land and labour — also go up.”
Given this, even a 3.8% increase in the MSP of rice will translate into some inflation. Further, several states like Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Odisha, levy procurement taxes on the rice and wheat procured by the central government through FCI.
A recent article in The Financial Express estimates that these “purchase levies account for 10-14.5% of the minimum support price (MSP) announced by the Centre on rice and wheat procurement.” Hence, when the MSP of rice goes up, these levies which are a certain percentage of the MSP, also go up. This in turn pushes up the price of rice.
Also, it is worth remembering here that the FCI, directly and through state government affiliates, procures rice and wheat from farmers at the MSP set by the government. It buys all the rice and wheat that farmers bring to it, as long as it meets a certain quality. Farmers have a ready buyer, and one who keeps increasing the price.
This has led to a situation where the government of India has become the biggest hoarder of rice and wheat. A recent report in The Financial Express points out that “the Food Corporation of India (FCI) had rice stock of more than 28.2 million tonnes at the start of the month, which is more than the double the requirement under the strategic reserve norm.” Hence, it is not surprising that the price of rice in May 2014 rose by 12.75% in comparison to May 2013.
Earlier this month the government decided to sell around 5 million tonnes of rice in the open market. As and when this happens this will have some impact on the price of rice. But that effect will be negated with the government buying all the rice that lands up at its door and starts hoarding again in the months to come.
Take the case of last year when the MSP for rice was increased by 4.8% to Rs 1310 per kg. In October-November 2013, the inflation in the price of rice was at around 15%. The only possible explanation for this is the fact that the government bought much more rice than it needed to run its various programmes. Hence, a lesser amount of rice landed up in the open market and thus fuelled inflation.
Given these reasons, Ravi Shankar Prasad is wrong when he says that the decision to increase the MSP of rice will not fuel inflation. Having said that some amount of increase in the MSP of rice is necessary. The farmers also need to be paid more every year, given the high inflationary times that we live in. The only way for the government to ensure that it does not cause inflation is to buy the right amount of rice and wheat that it actually needs to run its various programmes and not more.
The article originally appeared on www.firstbiz.com on June 27, 2014

(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

26 June, 2014

It’s the politics, stupid. Why onion prices will continue to cross Rs 100 per kg

Vivek Kaul

A recent report in The Economic Times said that onion prices may touch Rs 100 per kg by October 2014. The report pointed out that “hailstorms and unseasonal rain in the past, along with the weak start of the monsoon season has created scarcity and strong inflationary pressures.” For the week between June 12-18, 2014, the rainfall had been 45% below the normal.
If this trend continues, chances are that vegetable prices in general and onion prices in particular may rise in the months to come because a lack of sufficient rainfall will lead to a fall in production. Nevertheless, vegetable prices have risen over the last few years, despite a steady increase in production.
A standard explanation for the inflation in vegetable prices over the last few years has been that the demand for vegetables has far exceeded their supply. Data provided by the National Horticultural Board tells us that India produced 129.07 million tonnes of vegetables in 2008-2009. This number had gone up to 170.2 million tonnes in 2013-2014.
This meant an absolute increase in production of around 32% over a period of five years or an increase at the rate of 4.67% per year. This is a reasonable rate of increase though not a fantastic one. During the same period the vegetable prices more than doubled. Given this, there might be some truth in the argument that demand for vegetables might have outstripped their supply.
But this is clearly not true at least in the case of onions. The onion production in the country has gone up at a rapid rate over the last few years. In 2007-2008, it stood at 9.14 million tonnes. This more than doubled to 19.3 million tonnes in 2013-2014.
Hence, Indian farmers are clearly producing enough onions. Also, it is safe to assume that demand for onions couldn’t have suddenly doubled over a period of five years. So, what explains the fact that onion prices have crossed Rs 100 per kg several times over the last few years and in the months to come the same scenario might play out again? The simple answer is hoarding. While most vegetables cannot be hoarded given that they rot quickly, onions last easily up to six months. This leads to their hoarding by traders in Nashik, Navi Mumbai and the Azadpur (in New Delhi) mandis.
As the report titled Competitive Assessment of Onion Markets in Indiawhich was commissioned by the Competition Commission of India points out “A few big traders having well connected networks with market intermediaries in other markets seem to play a major role in hoarding for expected high prices.”
These traders typically start hoarding onion in the post harvest season. By doing this they manage to tighten supply in the lean season. “The lean season also happens to coincide with start of major festivals and ceremonies like marriages in India. This clearly manifests itself during months of September to January, in which the supply from onion producing regions is minimal and festivals like Dasera, Dipawali, Eid, Chrismas and marriages and other ceremonies put higher pressure on the demand of onion,” the report points out.
It is not difficult for the government of the day to identify who these traders are. But most of these traders are close to political parties. Take the case of the traders operating at out Nasik and Navi Mumbai. These traders are known to be close to Sharad Pawar’s Nationalist Congress Party. Given this, it was not surprising that when Pawar was the agriculture minister he regularly made statements that drove up onion prices. (You can sample a couple of statements here and here)
Economist Devinder Sharma in a blog written in December 2013 points out “The Azadpur mandi traders association in Delhi is aligned to the ruling Congress party. In Punjab, on the other hand the traders associations predominantly back the ruling SAD-BJP combine.”
This explains to a large extent why politicians tend to look the other way when onion prices are rising, and they even go ahead and make insensitive statements. Take the case of Kapil Sibal, who when asked about the rise in onion price in September, 2013 had said “Ask the traders this? The government does not sell onions.”
Given this, it is not difficult for the government to control the price of onion, if it wants to. All it needs is a few basic steps. As the report commissioned by the Competition Commission of India points out “For these, measures such as cancelling license for a temporary period; putting fines and penalties, and monitoring closely the behaviours of traders for any intentional hoarding, could be taken.” Of these measures, monitoring the behaviour of traders for any intentional hoarding is the most important.
Having said that, the onion production may have seasonal variations and that may drive up the price of onion. But that still does not explain the astonishing rise to Rs 100 per kg several times over the last few years. As Shreekant Sambrani writes in the Business Standard “ A five per cent reduction in its supply supposedly causes a 50 per cent increase in its price. While its per capita availability trebled in the last decade (faster than the per capita income, which doubled), its price rose fourfold in the same period.” Hoarding is the only possible explanation.
Potato, is another vegetable, which like onions, doesn’t rot immediately, and hence can be hoarded. Potato production has grown at the rate of 6.2% per year between 2008-2009 to 2013-2014 to 46.4 million tonnes. Between 2012-2013 and 2013-2014, the production grew by only 2.3% but the prices over the last one year have shot up by more than 30%. Hoarding is a major reason for the same.
Given this, the government needs to ensure that the prices of onion and potato are decided on true market demand and supply, and not because of hoarding. The inflation that the people faced during the second term of the Congress led UPA government was a major reason why the Narendra Modi led BJP was elected to power.
Hence, it is important for Modi and his government to do all that they can do on the inflation front. If they don’t, there will be trouble ahead. As Sambrani puts it “Inflation is a two-edged sword. Hurt in the pocketbook, the aam aurat could start venting her wrath on the new government. Onions don’t respect ideology while bringing tears.”
The article originally appeared on www.firstbiz.com on June 26, 2014.

(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

23 June, 2014

The costly ticket to achche din

A few days back a friend complained on Facebook that since the Narendra Modi government had come to power, power cuts in his city had gone up dramatically, and he had not been able to sleep at all during the night. “So where are the acche din that had been promised?” he asked. To this someone cheekily replied that the promise was of acche din and not acchi raatein.
Narendra Modi and the Bhartiya Janata Party fought the Lok Sabha election on the plank of “acche din aane waale hain”. The slogan offered “hope” to the people of this country, in an environment where economic growth had been falling and inflation had been rising. It was for the first time that a political party was not treating the voter as a “victim”. The slogan struck a real chord with the Indian voter.
The success of the slogan has now led to a scenario where every tough economic decision that the Modi government makes is and will be viewed through the lens of the “acche din aane waale hain” slogan. Take the recent case of the decision to increase the railway passenger fares by 14.2 per cent and freight fares by 6.5 per cent.
The hike in railway passenger fares has been the steepest in 15 years and has been long overdue. Between 1999 and 2014, the passenger fares were increased only thrice, of which one hike was reversed. This has left very little money with the railways for any sort of modernisation and the upkeep of railway tracks. It has also led to a scenario were traveling has become increasingly unsafe, as can be made out from the spate of railway accidents over the last few years.
The trouble is that for too long Indian Railways has been used as a political tool and not a service which is economically viable on its own. One way to correct this is to index fares to the prevailing rate of inflation and increase prices on a regular basis, every year. So, if the inflation is 8 per cent during the course of the year, then fares can go up by 8 per cent at the beginning of the financial year, on April 1. If this practice were to be followed, the chances of railways being economically viable and safer are likely to go up. Also, it would rule out the chances of one-off increases in fares, which upset the monthly budget of people who use the railways to travel regularly.
In the short-term, this increase in fares is expected to add to inflation. There are other decisions that the government will have to make over the next few months which will add to inflation. Take the case of oil. The price of the Indian basket of crude oil stood at $111.94 per barrel on June 19, 2014. It averaged at $106.72 per barrel between May 29 and June 11, 2014.
The price of oil has gone up by close to 5 per cent in such a short period of time primarily because of a threat of war in Iraq. India imports 80 per cent of the oil it consumes. The government will have to pass on this increase in the price of oil to the end consumer. If it does not do that it will have to compensate the oil marketing companies for the “extra” under-recoveries they are likely to face on the sale of diesel, cooking gas and kerosene. This would lead to an increase in government expenditure and, hence, the fiscal deficit. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends.
The government is already very stretched on the fiscal deficit front with the last government leaving unpaid bills of more than Rs 1,00,000 crore. Hence, it will have to pass on the increase in the international price of oil to the end consumers. This will mean higher inflation and another jolt to the promise of acche din.
What makes the situation even more difficult is the fact that the monsoon is expected to be much lower than average this year. In fact, data from the India Meteorological Department shows that rainfall upto June 18 has been 45 per cent lower than normal. This number may improve in the days to come, given that it is still early days for the monsoon. It needs to be pointed out that a bad monsoon does not necessarily lead to a lower production of food. In 2009, even with a 22 per cent deficient rainfall, the agriculture production did not go down. The real problem is once the psychology of drought sets in, the prices of food products start to go up, even though their production may not be impacted.
One thing that the government can do to prevent inflation is to procure a lower amount of rice and wheat from farmers this year. As on June 1, 2014, the Food Corporation of India (FCI) had food grain stocks of 74.8 million tonnes, when it does not require more than 41-47 million tonnes. By buying less from the farmers, the government can ensure that more rice and wheat lands up in the open market, and helps prevent a price rise. The government also needs to ensure that it does not raise the minimum support price of rice and wheat at the rate that the Congress-led UPA government had done in the past. These moves are unlikely to go down well with the farmers, who have also been promised acche din.
It is important that Mr Modi borrows a leaf from Franklin Roosevelt, the President of the United States between 1933 and 1945. This was a difficult time for the US — the Great Depression was on. Between 1933 and 1944, Roosevelt made 30 fireside chats through the radio, explaining to Americans the tough decisions he was taking to get the economy back on track. Mr Modi and his government need to keep talking to the people and explain why they need to take some tough decisions over the next few months.

The article originally appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle on June 23, 2014
Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He can be reached at [email protected]

17 June, 2014

Government of India must stop hoarding food

Vivek Kaul

Food inflation has been an issue of huge concern over the last few years. In a recent report titled What a waste! Crisil Research points out that “food inflation has averaged 8.1% in the last decade, and over 10% in recent times.”
This when agricultural growth has been robust and our granaries continue to overflow. Agricultural growth over the last decade stood at 3.6% per year, in comparison to 2.9% per year, in the decade before that. Hence, the conventional argument that food inflation is a result of not enough supply in comparison to demand, doesn’t totally hold.
The Food Corporation of India (FCI) puts out a number indicating its food grains stock every month. As on June 1, 2014, the food grain stock, which includes rice, wheat, unmilled paddy and coarse grains, stood at 74.8 million tonnes. At the beginning of June 2008, the stock had stood at 36.4 million tonnes.
This indicates that the government through FCI has bought and hoarded more and more of rice and wheat produced in the country. In a May 2013 research report titled Buffer Stocking Policy in Wake of NFSB (National Food Security Bill) written by Ashok Gulati and Surbhi Jain of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices(CACP) it was estimated that anywhere between 41-47 million tonnes, would be a comfortable level of buffer stocks.
This would be enough to take care of the subsidised grain that needs to be distributed to implement the food security scheme. At the same time it would also take care of the strategic reserves that the government needs to maintain, to be ready for a drought or any other exigency.
The current level of food grains with the FCI is significantly more than 41-47 million tonnes. One impact of this is that the government spends money in buying the “extra grain” which it does not require. This adds to the government expenditure and in turn the fiscal deficit. The fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends. The CACP authors had estimated that an excess stock of 30-40 million tonnes would cost the government anywhere between Rs 70,000 to Rs 92,000 crore.
The main reason for this “extra procurement” is the fact that the Congress led UPA government kept increasing minimum support price(MSP) of food grains over the years, at a fast pace. In 2005-2006, the MSP for common paddy(rice) was Rs 570 per quintal. By 2013-2014 this had shot up to Rs 1310 per quintal, an increase in price of around 11% per year. In comparison, between 1998-1999 and 2005-2006, the MSP of rice had increased at the rate of 3.8% per year.
In case of wheat the MSP has gone up by 14% per year between 2005-2006 and 2013-2014. In comparison, between 1999-2000 and 2005-2006, the price had gone up by 4% per year.
In fact, the decision to increase the MSP was totally random. A report released by the Comptroller and Auditor General in May 2013 pointed out that “No specific norm was followed for fixing of the Minimum Support Price (MSP) over the cost of production. Resultantly, it was observed the margin of MSP fixed over the cost of production varied between 29 per cent and 66 per cent in case of wheat, and 14 per cent and 50 per cent in case of paddy during the period 2006-2007 to 2011-2012.”
Other than the government expenditure shooting up, the rapid increase in MSP has led to more and more food grains landing up with the government. The FCI does not have enough storage capacity for this grain. This is one reason why newspapers frequently carry pictures of food grains rotting, lying in the open. “Between 2005 and 2013, close to 1.94 lakh tonnes of food grain were wasted in India, as per FCI’s own admission in the Parliament,” the Crisil report points out. Rice formed 84% of the total damage.
Further, the excess procurement has also led to high inflation, as a lower amount of rice and wheat have landed up in the open market. The CAG report points out that in 2006-2007, 63.3 million tonnes of rice landed in the open market. By 2011-2012, this had fallen by a huge 23.6% to 48.3 million tonnes. The same is true about about wheat as well, though the drop is not as pronounced as it is in the case of rice. In 2006-2007, the total amount of wheat in the open market stood at 62.1 million tonnes. By 2011-2012, this had dropped to 61.4 million tonnes.
Also, with MSPs going up every year at a rapid rate, “the cropping pattern” the Crisil report points out “has been biased towards food grains like rice and wheat, and have led to excessive production”.
Given this, one way of bringing down food inflation is the government releasing stocks of rice and wheat into the open market. One problem here can be that the procurement is concentrated in a few states. In case of wheat these states are Punjab, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh. And in case of rice, these states are Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Punjab. Hence, stocks will have to be moved from these parts of the country to other parts. More than that the government needs to stop procuring more than what it needs to run its various programmes. This will be beneficial from the fiscal deficit front as well as help moderate inflation.
This becomes even more important given that the India Meteorological Department expects the monsoon to be below normal at 93 per cent of the long period average. In this scenario, the production of grains is expected to take a hit. If the government continues with excess procurement, less grains will land up in the open market and push prices further up.
Also, when it comes to production of food products like milk, milk products, egg, fish and meat, supply has been lagging demand. The production has risen only at the rate of 3-4% between 2009-2010 and 2012-2013, whereas the price has risen at the rate of 14-15%, the Crisil report points out. This needs to be addressed.
When it comes to fruits and vegetables, the Agricultural Product and Market Committee(APMC) Act was passed to help farmers. Instead, it has made them vulnerable to traders backed by political parties. The huge increase in price of onion last year, despite a small fall in production is an excellent example of the same. The trader cartels need to be broken down.
These steps need to be taken if food inflation has to be controlled in the time to come.

The article originally appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle on June 17, 2014

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He can be reached at [email protected])