Why Jairam Ramesh’s new book on land acquisition is a must read for Rahul Gandhi

Jairam_ramesh

Jairam Ramesh was the minister of rural development between July 2011 and May 2014. He was instrumental in getting the new land acquisition law drafted and passed in 2013. And now he has written a book documenting this experience.
The book is titled
Legislating for Justice—The Making of the 2013 Land Acquisition Law. Ramesh has co-authored this book along with Muhammad Ali Khan, who worked with Ramesh as an officer on special duty in the rural development ministry.
The book goes into great detail on why India needed a new land acquisition law. And given this, it is a must read for Rahul Gandhi, the vice-president of the Congress party, who has recently been ranting against the changes that the Narendra Modi government is trying to bring to the land acquisition law passed in 2013.
Before the 2013 land acquisition law was passed, land acquisition in India was governed by the Land Acquisition Act 1894—a law from the time when the British ruled India. And rather surprisingly it survived for close to 66 years after India achieved independence from the British in 1947.
The 1894 Act was loaded totally in favour of the government and made it very easy for the government to acquire land as and when it wanted to. This wasn’t surprising given that it was drafted in 1894, when the British ruled India and the rights of Indians were not really top of the British agenda. As Ramesh and Khan write: “The 1894 Act was a comparatively short legislation that left much to the discretion of the acquiring authorities.”
Take the case of the phrase “public purpose,” which is the basic reason why any government acquires (or at least should acquire) land from its citizens. It is very important to define the term properly. Nevertheless, as Ramesh and Khan write: “’Public Purpose’ which was the raison d’etre for any acquisition initiated was drafted in such wide terms that essentially any activity could be constituted as public purpose, as long as the Collector [of the district where the land was being acquired] felt it did…’Public Purpose’ became what ever the Government or acquiring authority defined it to include.”
In fact, in a 1984 amendment expanded the government’s ability to “acquire lands for a public purpose ‘or for a private company’”. Yes, you read that right. And which party was in power in 1984? The Congress party. This amendment allowed the government to acquire land from farmers at cheap rates and then sell it on to private companies at a significantly higher price.
The ‘Yamuna Expressway’ is a very good example of this, where the land was acquired by the Uttar Pradesh from farmers and then sold on to private parties at multiple times the price the farmers had been paid for it.
The 1894 Act also had an ‘urgency’ clause. As Ramesh and Khan write: “Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was used to forcibly disposes people of their land in a frequent and brutal fashion by suspending the requirement for due process…Section 5A…allowed for a hearing of objections to be made but put no responsibility on the Collector to take those claims into consideration.”
So people could complain, but it was up to the Collector whether he wanted to listen to them or not. Further, like was the case with the definition of public purpose, the definition of urgency was also left “to the authority carrying out the acquisition.”
This clause allowed the collector to “take possession of the land within fifteen days of giving notice”. He could take possession of a building within 48 hours of giving notice. “The Outer Ring Road Project of Hyderabad and the Expressway in Uttar Pradesh are both striking(and recent) examples of acquisitions where large tracts fell pray to the urgency clause,” write Ramesh and Khan.
Further, land acquisition displaced many people over the decades and most of them were not resettled and left to fend for themselves. “While there is no comprehensive record of how many individuals have actually been displaced by land acquisition post-independence, estimates put forth by credible studies find that close to 60 million individuals have been displaced since independence. Worse still, only about a third of these have actually seen some measure of resettlement and rehabilitation,” write Ramesh and Khan. Further, the studies that Ramesh and Khan refer to are more than a decade old. Hence, the number of displaced is likely to be higher than 60 million.
The question is who is to be blamed for this? The Congress party, which ruled the country in every decade after independence. Why did it take them more than 60 years to wake up to this and do something about it. The only possible explanation is that the Congress politicians ‘privately’ gained from the law as it was.
And given this, Rahul Gandhi’s recent holier than thou attitude on “land acquisition,” doesn’t cut any ice. The Congress party is responsible for the land acquisition mess that prevails in this country as of today.
Getting back to the land acquisition law of 2013, it is only fair to say that India needed a proper land acquisition law which wasn’t loaded totally in favour of the government. The trouble is now we have a law which makes land acquisition extremely complicated and next to impossible. A reading of Ramesh and Khan’s book makes that extremely clear.
In fact, the authors even write: “The law was drafted with the intention to discourage land acquisition. It was drafted so that land acquisition would become a route of last resort.”
For a country which has nearly 13 million people entering the workforce every year and which has aspirations of “making things,” a law which discourages acquisition of land really cannot hold. No country has
gone from being developing to being developed without the expansion and success of its manufacturing sector.
As Cambridge University economist Ha-Joon Chang writes in 
Bad Samaritans—The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations & the Threat to Global Prosperity: History has repeatedly shown that the single most important thing that distinguishes rich countries from poor ones is basically their higher capabilities in manufacturing, where productivity is generally higher, and more importantly, where productivity tends to grow faster than agriculture and services.”
And in the long run the ease of land acquisition remains an important input for the manufacturing sector to take off. It also remains a very important area if the physical infrastructure in this country needs to improve. Having said that, it does not mean that land should be taken over on a platter.
In fact, as the Economic Survey points out “land acquisition” was a top reason for 161 stalled government projects. The Survey also pointed out: “
India’s recent PPP[public-private partnership] experience has demonstrated that given weak institutions, the private sector taking on project implementation risks involves costs (delays in land acquisition, environmental clearances, and variability of input supplies, etc.).”
Hence, we need to take a middle path on land acquisition.

(The column appeared originally on Firstpost on May 26, 2015)

The black money recovery skills of IT dept are nothing to write home about


The finance minister Arun Jaitley spoke to income tax officials yesterday. News-reports suggest that
he told them: “You have the responsibility to recover every rupee which is due to the government…A tax is either payable or not payable, if it is not payable, then no attempt has to be made to recover it, but if it is payable, then there is no scope for any collateral consideration why it must not be recovered for the government.”

The statement goes totally against the data on the total amount of black money that the Income Tax department has managed to recover over the years. Black money is essentially money which has been earned but on which taxes have not been paid.
The ministry of finance 2012 white paper on black money defines black money as: “any income on which the taxes imposed by government or public authorities have not been paid.”

The wealth that has been accumulated in this way “may consist of income generated from legitimate activities or activities which are illegitimate per se, like smuggling, illicit trade in banned substances, counterfeit currency, arms trafficking, terrorism, and corruption,” the white paper goes on to suggest.

Of course this wealth that has been accumulated through tax evasion has “neither been reported to the public authorities at the time of their generation nor disclosed at any point of time during their possession.”

Getting back to Jaitley’s statement, the Annual Report of the ministry of finance throws up some interesting data in this regard. As the report for the last financial year points out: “During the financial year 2014-15 (upto 30.11.2014), 2068 (provisional) search warrants were executed leading to the seizure of assets worth Rs 538.23 Crore (provisional). During the financial year (upto 30.11.2014), 1174 surveys (provisional) were conducted which yielded a disclosure of undisclosed income of Rs 4673.11 Crore (provisional).”

Now how does this number compare to the total amount of black money within the country? Jaitley had told the Rajya Sabha that the previous government had asked three institutes, the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) and National Institute of Financial Management (NIFM), to make an estimate of the black money within India and that which had left the shores. “Reports received from these institutes are under examination of the government,” he had told the Rajya Sabha.

In fact, none of these reports are currently in the public domain. Nevertheless, The Hindu newspaper had accessed the NIPFP report in August 2014. The NIPFP puts the size of the black money economy at around 75% of the gross domestic product(GDP).

What this clearly tells us is that the black money recovered by the Income Tax department in comparison to the total size of the black money economy in the country is not even peanuts. Having said that, I don’t think it is fair to compare the two numbers given that the Income Tax department simply does not have enough resources (or incentives for that matter) to go after the massive amount of black money in this country.

Nevertheless, there is another comparison that can be made. How has the performance of the department been over the years, is a question worth asking. As the annual report of the ministry of finance for the year 2013-2014 points out: “During the financial year 2013-14 (upto December, 2013), 3069 (provisional) search warrants were executed leading to the seizure of assets worth Rs 559.04 Crore (provisional). During the financial year (upto December, 2013), 3263 surveys (provisional) were conducted which yielded a disclosure of undisclosed income of Rs 6968.82 Crore (provisional).”

So, the Income Tax department performed better when it came to seizing assets and identifying undisclosed income in 2013-2014 than it did in 2014-2015. In 2013-2014 it seized assets worth Rs 559.04 crore. In comparison it managed to seize assets worth only Rs 538.23 crore in 2014-2015. It identified a total undisclosed income of Rs 6989.82 crore in 2013-2014. This number fell to Rs 4673.11 crore in 2013-2014.
How was the performance of the Income Tax department in the years prior to these two financial years? The accompanying table shows that clearly:

 

inancial year

Seized assets (in Rs crore)

Undisclosed income (in Rs crore)

2014-2015

532.23

4,673.11

2013-2014

559.04

6,989.82

2012-2013

450.18

8,254.41

2011-2012

Data not available

Data not available

2010-2011

716.66

2,700.59

2009-2010

602.34

1,832.00

Source: Annual reports, ministry of finance

The above table makes for a very interesting read. The value of seized assets was significantly higher in the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011. The undisclosed income identified peaked in 2012-2013 and then fell dramatically. What this clearly tells us is that the record of the Income Tax department in going after black money over the last few years has been very weak.

One possible explanation for this is the fact that corruption in the second term of the United Progressive Alliance peaked, the Income Tax department stopped going after people with a serious amount of black money and i has still not managed to get out of it.

While we may keep thinking of reasons, what this data clearly tells us is that Jaitley was being overtly optimistic regarding the black money recovery skills of the Income Tax department. And that clearly is not good news for all the black money recovery plans that the government has.

The column originally appeared on The Daily Reckoning on May 26, 2015

India’s real estate market is being run by crooks

Vivek Kaul

The real estate sector remains down in the dumps. Nevertheless, insiders(the builders, the real estate consultants, the housing finance companies etc.) would like us to believe that “acche din” will be here for the sector pretty soon and hence, we should be investing in it.

In a recent report JLL India, a real estate consultant, pointed out that: “Many home buyers as well as investors have been speculating about the movement of residential property prices in Mumbai…The market’s readings indicate that that it will start moving up later this year. An average price appreciation of around 6% is expected by the end of Q4 2015. Mumbai’s residential property market will start seeing a lot of buying activity in around six months, with buyers taking advantage of prevailing market conditions to get good deals. The increased market activity is expected to continue next year too.”

What the report does not point out is the fact that the Mumbai Metropolitan Region has an unsold inventory of homes of close to 46 months or 192.27 million square feet. This data was released by Liases Foras, another real estate consultancy, sometime back. What it means is that if homes continues to sell at the current rate it would take around 46 months for the current stock to sell out. A healthy market maintains an inventory of eight to 12 months.

JLL India may have its own estimates of unsold inventory but they can’t be significantly different from that of Liases Foras. And if there is so much ready supply available, how can real estate prices go up?

This is just one example of research reports that real estate consultants keep coming up with where the conclusion is that “real estate prices will continue to go up”. For them it makes sense to do this simply because they make more money if the real estate sector is doing well, given that there are more deals to execute and more commission to be made in the process. And if the real estate sector is not doing well then they need to tell the world at large that it will start to do well, soon. These positive reports are splashed across the media, given that real estate companies are huge advertisers and a healthy real estate sector is a boon for the media.

The trouble is that the real estate sector in India has a huge information asymmetry, or something that the Nobel Prize winning economist George Akerlof referred to as a “market for lemons”. In a 1970 research paper titled The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Akerlof talked about four kinds of cars: “There are new cars and used cars. There are good cars and bad cars (which in America are known as “lemons”). A new car may be a good car or a lemon, and of course the same is true of used cars.”

Akerlof then went on to explain why trying to sell a lemon is very difficult. In an essay titled Writing the “The Market for ‘Lemons'”, Akerlof wrote: “I knew that a major reason as to why people preferred to purchase new cars rather than used cars was their suspicion of the motives of the sellers of used cars.” Long story short—a buyer will not buy without proof of the used car being in good shape and the seller did not have the proof.


And this led to the market for second-hand cars not working well. Tim Harford explains this phenomenon very well in his book The Undercover Economist: “Anyone who has ever tried to buy a second-hand car will appreciate that Akerlof was on to something. The market doesn’t work nearly as well as it should; second-hand cards tend to be cheap and of poor quality. Sellers with good cars want to hold out for a good price, but because they cannot prove that a good car is really a peach, they cannot get that price and prefer to keep the car for themselves. You might expect that the sellers would benefit from inside information, but in fact there are no winners: smart buyers simply don’t show up to play a rigged game.”

Hence, the market for second-hand cars has huge information asymmetry—one side has much more information(the seller) than the other(the buyer). And given that the market does not work well.
The real estate market in India is a tad like that. The insiders have all the information and there is no way to verify if the information they are putting out is correct. Take the case of something as simple as the prevailing price trend in a given locality.

There is no publicly available information. All you can do is ask the broker operating in that area and more often than not, he will tell you that “prices are on their way up”. If you are able to figure out a price, there is no way of figuring out whether there are deals happening at that price.

Hence, the system as it currently stands is totally rigged against the buyer. Even when the buyer buys an under-construction property there is no way of figuring out if the builder will deliver everything that he has promised at the time of the sale. There are regular cases of builders promising to build a swimming pool, taking money for it and then not building it. Then there are cases of parking lots being sold even though that is not allowed. In the recent past, builders have disappeared after taking on money and not completing the project.

As Nate Silver writes in The Signal and the Noise –The Art and the Science of Prediction: “In a market plagued by asymmetries of information, the quality of goods will decrease and the market will be dominated by crooked sellers and gullible and desperate buyers.” And that is precisely what is happening in India.

In fact, the real estate market in India currently is like the stock market used to be in the 80s and the 90s. India’s biggest exchange the Bombay Stock Exchange(BSE) was run by and for brokers. Other stock exchanges operating in different cities ran along similar lines. Small investors investing in the market were regularly taken for a ride.

The Securities Exchange Board of India was given statutory powers in 1992. And it took time to crack the whip. The National Stock Exchange started operations in November 1994 and gradually took away business from the broker dominated BSE. The BSE has been trying to play catchup since then.

The real estate business in India needs to be cleaned up along similar lines. The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Bill, 2013, envisages setting up of a real estate regulator in each state. The builders need to be registered with the regulator and at the same time disclose essential details about the projects. These provisions if and when implemented are likely to reduce the information asymmetry which plagues the sector. But till then “caveat-emptor” will continue to prevail.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)  

The column originally appeared on DailyO on May 25, 2015

Mr Chidambaram, please don’t fudge data to say that Manmohan was better than Modi

Former finance minister P Chidambaram did a smart thing before the last Lok Sabha elections—he decided not to contest. His son Karti Chidambaram contested instead of him, in the Sivaganga constituency in Tamil Nadu. The junior Chidambaram got around 1.04 lakh votes in a five cornered contest and lost his deposit, having not managed to secure more than one-sixth of the votes polled.

Unlike other Congress leaders, the senior Chidambaram has managed to keep himself partly busy, by writing a Sunday column for The Indian Express. In this column, the former finance minister, tries to tell us every week how the ten year rule of the Congress led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) had been good for the country and how the economy has been in trouble since the Narendra Modi government took over.

The latest column is along similar lines. In this column Chidambaram tries telling us that the Congress led UPA government had left the country in a good shape and the Narendra Modi government has screwed up things, since taking over in May last year.

As Chidambaram writes: “Let us look at the hard data that would be relevant to ‘development’ and ‘jobs’. There are more red lights than green. Yet the GDP(Gross Domestic Product) is estimated to have grown at 7.4 per cent in 2014-15, although the RBI has warned of a downward revision.”

Long story short—Chidambaram seems to believe that the GDP may not have grown by 7.4% between April 1, 2014 and March 31, 2015. And honestly, he may be right about it.

The ministry of statistics and programme implementation released the Gross Domestic Product(GDP) number for 2014-2015 on February 9, 2015. A new method was used to calculate the GDP and as per this method, the GDP growth in the financial year 2014-2015 would come in at 7.4%. This was significantly higher than the 5.5% growth that had been forecast by the Reserve Bank of India, earlier.

The trouble is that the real numbers don’t show this economic growth. Car sales grew by a minuscule 3.9% in 2014-2015. Exports contracted by 1.23%. The total indirect tax collections at Rs 5,46,479 crore were 12.5% lower than the original target of Rs 6,24,902 crore. When it comes lending by banks, it grew by 8.6% between March 21, 2014 and March 20, 2015. In comparison, it had grown by 14% between March 22, 2013 and March 21, 2014.

The Economic Survey released by the ministry of finance today towards the end of February 2015 stated: “The stock of stalled projects at the end of December 2014 stood at Rs 8.8 lakh crore or 7 per cent of GDP.” Further, corporate profitability was dull as well in the latter half of the financial year (October 2014 to March 2015).

It is worth remembering that the numbers highlighted above are real numbers, unlike the GDP which is a theoretical construct. The real numbers make it difficult to believe that the economy grew by 7.4% in 2014-2015. And given that Chidambaram is right in saying what he has in his column. Or so it seems.

The interesting bit comes next, where Chidambaram writes: “I predicted that the economy will revive in 2013-14. It did, and when the UPA passed on the baton to the NDA in May 2014, the GDP had recorded a growth rate of 6.9 per cent in 2013-14.”

So, Chidambaram is basically saying that in 2013-2014, when the Congress led UPA government was in power, all was well. The economy grew by 6.9% and the Congress led UPA passed on a healthy economy to the Narendra Modi government.

Now what is wrong with this argument? Several things. First, you don’t need a PhD in Economics (or an MBA from Harvard, which Chidambaram has), to tell you that 7.4% economic growth (which happened in 2014-2015) is higher than the 6.9% economic growth (which happened in 2013-2014).

Secondly, what Chidambaram does not tell us is that the 6.9% number is also a revised number, which has been calculated as per the new GDP method released by the ministry of statistics and programme implementation. The economic growth as per the old method had been at 5%.

So the point is that Chidambaram does not believe the 7.4% economic growth number as per the new model. But he believes the 6.9% economic growth number which is also as per the new model. And therein lies his double standard.

If he believes in the 6.9% number then he has to believe in the 7.4% number as well because the method involved in calculating them is the same. And that being the case, 7.4% is higher than 6.9%.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

The column originally appeared on Firstpost on May 25, 2015   

Why are more than 10 million homes vacant in India?


India-Real-Estate-Market

Dear Reader,

If you ever go to New Delhi, try taking a drive through the sub-city of Dwarka and you will see miles and miles of built homes with nobody living in them. You can see a similar sight in large parts of the National Capital Region (NCR) around New Delhi.
In fact, Anshuman Magazine, chairman and managing director of CBRE South Asia Pvt. Ltd., in a recent article pointed out that “around 12 million completed houses” are “lying vacant across urban India”.
A similar point is made by Akhilesh Tilotia in his book
The Making of India—Gamechanging Transitions, where he states that India has more homes than households. As he writes: “India’s households increased by 60 million to 247 million from 187 million between 2001-2011. Reflecting India’s higher ‘physical’ savings, the number of houses went up by 81 million to 331 million from 250 million. The urban increases is telling: 38 million new houses for 24 million new households.”
And despite this, there is a huge shortage of housing in urban India. As the latest Economic Survey, a document which is released every year a day before the annual budget of the government of India, points out: “At present urban housing shortage is 18.8 million units [i.e. homes].”
So what is happening here? Many of these homes have been bought as investments by people who have “extra” money to invest. A substantial portion (no one knows how much) of this is black money on which taxes haven’t been paid. Hence, homes have been bought but nobody is living in them.
Further, the dynamics of real estate sector in India have so evolved that builders like catering only to the richer segment of the population. Also, the price levels have now gone even beyond this section of the population.
But the shortage in housing is at the lower income levels. “95.6 per cent [of housing shortage] is in economically weaker sections (EWS) / low income group (LIG) segments,” the Economic Survey points out. Tilotia points out that: “70% of the urban housing shortage arises from the bottom four deciles of households whose ability to pay is severely constrained.” He estimates that unmet needs in India are at price points of Rs 0.5-Rs 1 million. The real estate companies due to various reasons are not interested in satisfying this unmet demand.
A recent research report by real estate rating and research firm Liases Foras points out that the average price of a home in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, as of March 31, 2015, was Rs 1.3 crore. The numbers for Bangalore and Delhi are Rs 86 lakh and Rs 74 lakh respectively. Given these high prices, it is not surprising that the housing demands of a large segment of population are going largely unmet.
Hence, it is not surprising that as per the 2011 Census, 13.7 million households in cities live in slums. The number of people living in these slums is around 65 million and forms around 17.4% of the urban population. As per the Census, Visakhapatnam with 44.1% of its population living in slums comes right at the top. Mumbai, with 41.3% of the population living in slums comes in third. Kolkata with 31.9% of its population living in slums is eight on the list.
Further, the number of people living in urban slums may be understated. This is primarily because the 2011 Census was carried out only in what are known as statutory towns. These are towns which have some sort of an elected local body.
A Times of India newsreport points out that India has a total of 7935 towns. Of this 4041 are statutory towns. The remaining do not have an elected local body. Nevertheless, they fulfil the criteria of being urban, and the Census classifies them as census towns. The census towns were not considered for counting slums. These towns have a total population of more than 5 crore and substantial part of that population is living in slums.
Further, other estimates put the slum population living in Indian cities at a much higher level. A
2012 newsreport quotes S. Parasuraman, director of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Mumbai as saying: “Nearly 60 percent of Mumbai’s slum population lives in 8 percent of land.” The Census number as mentioned earlier is at 41.3%. These differences apart, what this clearly tells us is that with so many people living in slums, India has a huge urban housing shortage.
So what is the way out of this? The government needs to start doing something about it sooner rather than later. Maybe it can learn a thing or two from the South Korean government, which in the late 1980s built around 2 million homes of which around 0.9 million were built around the capital city of Seoul, as Tilotia points out.
In order to do this, the government will have to first and foremost sort out the mess that currently surrounds the process of land acquisition. Further, these homes will have to be built on the periphery of cities, backed up by a good transportation system, so that people can travel to work. The outdated floor space index laws controlled by real estate lobbies (which are often fronts for politicians) will need a thorough re-look. These laws essentially deal with how much area can be built-up, given the size of the plot on which a building is being built. So, if the FSI allowed is 2, then on a plot of 1000 square metres, the building being built can’t have a built-up area of more than 2000 square metres.
If all this is not done there will be more trouble ahead, as more and more of Indian population moves to Indian cities, in the years to come. As the Economic Survey points out: “Nearly 30 per cent of the country’s population lives in cities and urban areas and this figure is projected to reach 50 per cent in 2030.”
What this means is that if affordable housing doesn’t become the order of the day, the slumification of India will continue. And that is not a happy thought.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

The column was originally published on BBC.com on May 21, 2015