George Soros Has Got a Backache Again and This Time It’s Because of China

george-soros-quantum-fund
George Soros has got some of the biggest macro calls right over the years. How does he do it? If you were to get around to reading all the books that Soros has written over the years, you will come to realise that he follows something known as the theory of reflexivity to get in and out of financial markets.

Nevertheless, his son Robert, offers another explanation for his success in Michael Kaufman’s Soros: The Life and Times of a Messianic Billionaire. As Robert puts it “My father will sit down and give you theories to explain why he does this or that. But I remember seeing it as a kid and thinking, Jesus Christ, at least half of this is bullshit, I mean, you know the reason he changes his position in the market or whatever is because his back starts killing him. It has nothing to do with reason. He literally goes into a spasm, and it’s his early warning sign.”

Soros himself has had his doubts about how he makes money. As he writes in The New Paradigm for Financial Markets – The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means: To what extent my financial success was due to my philosophy is a moot question because the salient feature of my theory is that it does not yield any firm predictions. Running a hedge fund involves the constant exercise of judgement in a risky environment, and that can be very stressful. I used to suffer from backaches and other psychosomatic ailments, and I received as many useful signals from my backaches as from my theory. Nevertheless, I attributed great importance to my philosophy and particularly my theory of reflexivity.”

And from the looks of it, seems like George Soros has had a few backaches of late. This time his worries are coming from China. Speaking at an economic forum in Sri Lanka, Soros recently said: “When I look at the financial markets there is a serious challenge which reminds me of the crisis we had in 2008…Unfortunately China has a major adjustment problem and it has a lot of choices and it can actually transfer to the rest of the world its own problems by devaluing its currency and that is what China is doing.”

Over the years, the Chinese yuan has been largely pegged against the American dollar. The People’s Bank of China, the Chinese central bank, has ensured that the value of the yuan has fluctuated in a fixed range around the dollar. This has been primarily done in order to take away the currency risk that the Chinese exporters may have otherwise faced.

In a world where so many things have changed in the aftermath of the financial crisis which started in September 2008, the value of the Chinese yuan against the dollar has been one of the few constants.

Over the last few months, the value of the Chinese yuan against the dollar has gradually been allowed to fall. In August 2015, the People’s Bank of China pushed the value of the dollar against the yuan, from 6.2 to around 6.37. In November 2015, one dollar was worth around 6.31 yuan. By the end of the year, one dollar was worth 6.48 yuan, with the yuan gradually depreciating against the dollar.

In the new year, the yuan has depreciated further against the dollar and one dollar is now worth around 6.58 yuan. So what is happening here? It is first important to understand how the People’s Bank of China has over the years maintained the value of the yuan against the dollar.

When Chinese exporters bring back dollars to China or when investors want to bring dollars into China, the Chinese central bank buys these dollars. They buy these dollars by selling yuan. This ensures that at any given point of time there is no scarcity of yuan and there are enough yuan in the market, in order to ensure that the value of the yuan is largely fixed against the dollar.

Where does the People’s Bank get the yuan from? It can simply create them out of thin air, by printing them or creating them digitally.

The situation has reversed in the recent past. Money is now leaving China. Hence, the total amount of dollars leaving China is now higher than the dollars entering it. And this has created a problem for the Chinese central bank. Between July and September 2015, the net capital outflows reached $221 billion. “[This] occurred for the sixth straight quarter and reached a new record of $221 billion,” wrote Jason Daw and Wei Yao of Societe Generale in a recent research note.

The fact that more dollars are now leaving China than entering it, changes the entire situation. When investors and others, decide to take their money out of China, what do they do? They sell their yuan and buy dollars. This pushes up the demand for dollars. In a normal foreign exchange market this would mean that the dollar would appreciate against the yuan, and the yuan would depreciate against the dollar.

But remember that the Chinese foreign exchange market is rigged. The People’s Bank of China likes to maintain a steady value of the yuan against the dollar. What does the Chinese central bank do when more dollars are leaving China? In order to ensure that there is no scarcity of dollars in the market, it buys yuan and sells dollars. This is exactly the opposite what it has been doing all these years, when more dollars where entering China than leaving it.

The trouble is that China cannot create dollars out of thin air, only the Federal Reserve of the United States can do that. China does not have an endless supply of dollars. The foreign exchange reserves of China as of December 2015 stood at $3.33 trillion. In December 2015, the foreign exchange reserves fell by $107.9 billion. They had fallen by $87.2 billion in November. In fact, between December 2014 and December 2015, the Chinese foreign exchange reserves have fallen by a huge $557 billion, in the process of defending the value of the yuan against the dollar.

While, China has the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, it is worth asking what portion of these reserves are liquid? The Chinese central bank has invested these reserves in financial securities all over the world. As of October 2015, $1.25 trillion was invested in US government treasuries.

The question is how quickly can these investments be sold in order to defend the value of the yuan against the dollar? As economist Ajay Shah wrote in a recent column in the Business Standard: “For a few months, reserves have declined by a bit less than $100 billion a month. We may think that, with $3 trillion of reserves, the authorities can handle this scale of outflow for 30 months. Things might be a bit worse. Questions are being raised about the liquidity of the reserves portfolio. There are only a few global asset classes where the Chinese government can easily dispose of $100 billion of assets per month. A lot of the reserves portfolio might not be in these liquid asset classes.”

Given this, China does not have an endless supply of dollars and cannot constantly keep defending the yuan against the dollar. This explains why it has gone slow in defending the yuan against the dollar, in the recent past, and allowed its currency to depreciate against the dollar.

The question is why is all this worrying the world at large, Soros included? A weaker Chinese yuan will make Chinese exports more competitive. This will mean a headache for other export oriented economies like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Germany, and so on. They will also have to push the value of their currencies down against the dollar. Hence, the global currency war which has been on a for a while, will continue. Further, a weaker yuan might lead to China exporting further deflation (lower prices) all over the world.

But what is more worrying is the fact that residents and non-residents are primarily the ones withdrawing their money out of China. The non-residents withdrew $82 billion during the period July to September 2015. The residents withdrew $67 billion, after having withdrawn $102 billion between March and June 2015.

When any economy is in trouble it is the locals who start to withdraw money first. This is clearly happening in China. And that has got the world worried. Also, China is a major consumer of commodities and any economic slowdown in China, will lead to a fall in commodity demand. This isn’t good news for many commodity exporting countries in particular and global economic growth in general.

The column originally appeared on the Vivek Kaul’s Diary on January 13, 2016

What George Soros must be thinking about the rupee

george-soros-quantum-fundVivek Kaul
George Soros likes to believe that he has managed to make all the money that he has, by following what he calls the theory of reflexivity. Not everyone believes this though.
His son Robert, offers another explanation for his success in Michael Kaufman’s 
Soros: The Life and Times of a Messianic Billionaire. As Robert puts it “My father will sit down and give you theories to explain why he does this or that. But I remember seeing it as a kid and thinking, Jesus Christ, at least half of this is bullshit, I mean, you know the reason he changes his position in the market or whatever is because his back starts killing him. It has nothing to do with reason. He literally goes into a spasm, and it’s his early warning sign.”
Soros himself has some doubts. As he writes in 
The New Paradigm for Financial Markets – The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means “To what extent my financial success was due to my philosophy is a moot question because the salient feature of my theory is that it does not yield any firm predictions. Running a hedge fund involves the constant exercise of judgement in a risky environment, and that can be very stressful. I used to suffer from backaches and other psychosomatic ailments, and I received as many useful signals from my backaches as from my theory. Nevertheless, I attributed great importance to my philosophy and particularly my theory of reflexivity.”
So what is the theory of reflexivity? As Soros writes “The crux of the theory of reflexivity is not so obvious, it asserts that market prices can influence the fundamentals. The illusion that markets manage to be always right is caused by their ability to affect the fundamentals that they are supposed to reflect…Buy and sell decisions are based on expectation about future prices, and future prices, in turn, are contingent on present buy and sell decisions.”
Now what does that mean in simple English? Let’s understand this in the context of the rupee which has depreciated rapidly against the dollar in the last few months.
The rupee largely fell because of our high current account deficit. The current account deficit is the difference between total value of imports and the sum of the total value of its exports and net foreign remittances. Simply put, our demand for dollars was more than their supply. The rupee was also adjusting for the high consumer price inflation that we have had for a long time now.
So the rupee falling against the dollar was a given. The fall in the value of the rupee was reflecting the economic fundamentals of India. Or as conventional economic theory goes, market prices reflect the fundamentals on most occasions.
The trouble is that rupee has had a free fall and this has led some economists to believe that it has fallen more than it should have to reflect India’s economic fundamentals. As Rohini Malkani, Prachi Mishra and Aman Mohunta 
write in The Economic Times “ However, with the rupee around 65-66 to a dollar, it has overshot its equilibrium value and is undervalued at current levels.”
Simply put, the value of the rupee against the dollar has fallen more than it should have to reflect India’s economic fundamentals. The trouble with this argument, like most arguments made by theoretical economists is that it tends towards ‘equilibrium’.
While the fall in the value of the rupee reflects India’s economic fundamentals, at the same time the fall in the value of the rupee also impacts India’s economic fundamentals. Malkani, Mishra and Mohuna do not take the second factor into account.
As the rupee falls, Indian oil companies need to pay more for the oil that they import. If the government chooses not to pass on the higher cost onto the end consumers ( as it has done in the past) this means that the oil companies need to be compensated for the “under-recoveries”.
This means a higher expenditure for the government. A higher expenditure in turn means a higher fiscal deficit. Fiscal deficit is defined as the difference between what a government earns and what it spends. This will lead to more borrowing by the government and will crowd out private sector borrowing (for banks as well as corporates) leading to higher interest rates. Higher interest rates will have slowdown economic growth further.
If the government chooses to pass on the increase in the cost of importing oil to the end consumer, it will lead to higher inflation. A higher inflation can’t be good for economic growth either. A weaker rupee will also make other important imports like fertilizer, coal, palm oil etc, costlier. This will have its own impact on economic growth as people will cut down on consumption to meet higher expenses.
India’s external debt as on March 31, 2013, stood at at $ 390 billion. Of this nearly 79% debt is non government debt. External commercial borrowings(ECBs) made by corporates form nearly 31% of the external debt. This is not surprising given that the Credit Suisse analysts point out that 40-70% of the loans of 10 big corporate groups that they studied for a recent research report, are foreign currency denominated.
With a weaker rupee, as these loans mature, corporates will need more rupees to buy dollars. And this will have a huge impact on their profit and loss accounts. Lower profits or losses are obviously not good news.
A weaker rupee also has an impact on Indian exports, given that India’s top exports like gems and jewellery, organic chemicals, vehicles, machinery and petroleum products, are all heavily import dependent. Hence, people in this business will have to pay more in rupee terms to import raw materials that they need to make their finished products. This will have an impact on the pricing of exports and explains to a large extent why a weaker rupee doesn’t necessarily always lead to higher exports.
What this means is that a fall in the value of the rupee will soon start impacting India’s economic fundamentals or perhaps it already has. And this in turn will mean a further fall in the value of the rupee. Swaminathan Aiyar explained it best 
in a recent column in The Economic Times “Many experts say the rupee has overshot and will come back. Really? Remember the same thing was said about the Indonesian rupiah when it depreciated from 2,500 to 3,000 to the dollar in 1997, but it eventually went all the way to 18,000. Estimates based on fundamentals quickly become meaningless because a crisis changes fundamentals hugely. The crashing rupee has already changed the economy’s fundamentals.”
Disclosure: The idea for this article came from Swaminathan Aiyar’s column Get ready for another Asian Financial Crisis in The Economic Times
The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on August 30, 2013
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)