Stephen D King

SLR cut: A central banker shouldn't jump into bed with his finance minister

 ARTS RAJANVivek Kaul  

Since yesterday there has been a lot of analysis about the Raghuram Rajan led Reserve Bank of India (RBI) cutting the statutory liquidity ratio(SLR) from 23% to 22.5%. Earlier the banks had to maintain 23% of their deposits in government securities. Now they need to maintain only 22.5%, a cut of 50 basis points. One basis point amounts to one hundredth of a percentage.
This cut, the analysts have concluded will lead to bank giving out more loans. The Business Standard estimates that “the cut will free up about Rs 35,000 crore with banks which they can now lend.”
The newspaper does not explain how they arrived at that number. But an educated guess can be made. Currently, the aggregate deposits of scheduled commercial banks in India amounts to Rs 7,855,520 crore. The SLR ratio has been cut by 50 basis points or 0.5%. This amounts to around Rs 39,278 crore (0.5% of Rs Rs 7,855,520 crore) of the total deposits of banks. From this number, the ballpark number of Rs 35,000 crore seems to have been derived.
It is important to make things simple, but not simplistic. The assumption being made here is that now that banks need to invest a lesser amount in government securities, they will do so and prefer to lend more money instead.
But is that really the case? The latest numbers released by the RBI show that scheduled commercial banks had invested nearly 29.27% of their deposits in government securities. This when the SLR had stood at 23%. What does this tell us? It tells us that banks prefer to invest in government securities than lend money.
This is not a recent phenomenon. In late September 2007, when the economic scenario was significantly better than it is now, scheduled commercial banks had nearly 31% of their deposits invested in government securities. In mid May 2012, the number had stood at 30%.
Given this, even though banks are required to maintain only a certain portion of their money in government securities, they have maintained a significantly higher amount over the years. Whether this is lazy banking or the lack of good investment opportunities that only the banks can tell us.
In fact, it is interesting to see how things panned out after the RBI cut the SLR from 24% to 23% on July 31, 2012. As on July 28, 2012, the banks had invested nearly 30.6% of their deposits in government securities. Three days later, the RBI cut the SLR. A little over six months later in early February 2013, the government securities to deposit ratio stood at 30.4%. So, the banks did cut down on their exposure to government securities, but not significantly. In fact, as on July 26, 2013, nearly a year later, the government securities to deposits ratio stood at 30.8%. This was higher than the ratio before the SLR cut.
What this clearly tells us is that a cut in SLR does not necessarily mean that banks will invest less in government securities and lend that money instead.
The RBI of course understands this. If it really wanted to ensure that banks had more money to lend it would have cut the cash reserve ratio (CRR). CRR is the portion of their deposits that banks need to hold with the RBI. It currently stands at 4%.
The RBI does not pay any interest on the money that banks maintain with it to fulfil their CRR obligations. Hence, when the RBI cuts the CRR, banks have an incentive to lend the money that is freed up. The same scenario does not hold in case of an SLR cut because banks get paid interest on the money they invest in government securities.
So that brings us to the question, why did Rajan cut the SLR? My guess on this is that there was pressure on him from the Finance Ministry to show that RBI was serious about “economic growth” and do something that forced banks to lend more. And that something came in the form of an SLR cut. It was his way of telling the government, look you wanted me to do something, I did something. If banks are still not lending, what can I do about it?
In the monetary policy statement Rajan said that there were still “Upside risks” to inflation “in the form of a sub-normal/delayed monsoon on account of possible El Nino effects, geo-political tensions and their impact on fuel prices, and uncertainties surrounding the setting of administered prices.” What this tells us clearly is that Rajan is still not totally convinced that we have seen the last of the high inflation that has prevailed over the years.
What this further tells us is that Rajan continues to be his own man as he was in the past and is unlikely to be weighed in by pressure from the finance ministry. It is important to remember here what economist Stephen D. King writes in When the Money Runs Out “A central banker who jumps into bed with a finance minister too often ends up with a nasty dose of hyperinflation.”
Given this, it is important that Rajan stays as independent as he has been since taking over as the RBI governor in September 2013.

The article originally appeared on www.firstbiz.com on June 4, 2014

 (Vivek Kaul is a writer. He can be reached at [email protected])  

Try Again. Fail again. Fail better – Disaster formula of US Federal Reserve

Bernanke-BubbleVivek Kaul
“Now we know better. If we learn from experience, history need not repeat itself,” wrote economists George Akerlof and Paul Romer, in a research paper titled Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.
But that doesn’t seem to be the case with the Federal Reserve of United States, which seems to be making the same mistakes that led to the financial crisis in the first place. Take its decision to continue printing money, in order to revive the American economy.
In a press conference to explain the logic behind the decision, Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve of United States, said “we should be very reluctant to raise rates if inflation remains persistently below target, and that’s one of the reasons that I think we can be very patient in raising the federal funds rate since we have not seen any inflation pressure.”
The Federal Reserve of United States prints $85 billion every month. It puts this money into the financial system by buying bonds. With all this money going around interest rates continue to remain low. And at low interest rates the hope is that people will borrow and spend more money.
As people spend more money, a greater amount of money will chase the same number of goods, and this will lead to inflation. Once a reasonable amount of inflation or expectations of inflation set in, people will start altering their spending plans. They will buy things sooner rather than later, given that with inflation things will become more expensive in the days to come. This will help businesses and thus revive economic growth.
The Federal Reserve has an inflation target of 2%. Inflation remains well below this level. As Michael S. Derby writes in the Wall Street Journal “As of the most recent reading in July, the Fed’s favoured inflation gauge, the personal consumption expenditures price index, was up 1.4% from a year ago.”
So, given that inflation is lower than the Fed target, interest rates need to continue to be low, and hence, money printing needs to continue. That is what Bernanke was basically saying.
Inflation targeting has been a favourite policy of central banks all over the world. This strategy essentially involves a central bank estimating and projecting an inflation target and then using interest rates and other monetary tools to steer the economy towards the projected inflation target. The trouble here is that inflation-targeting by the Federal Reserve and other central banks around the world had led to the real estate bubble a few years back. The current financial crisis is the end result of that bubble.
Stephen D King, Group Chief Economist of HSBC makes this point When the Money Runs Out. As he writes “the pursuit of inflation-targetting…may have contributed to the West’s financial downfall.”
King writes about the United Kingdom to make his point. “Take, for example, inflation targeting in the UK. In the early years of the new millennium, inflation had a tendency to drop too low, thanks to the deflationary effects on manufactured goods prices of low-cost producers in China and elsewhere in the emerging world. To keep inflation close to target, the Bank of England loosened monetary policy with the intention of delivering higher ‘domestically generated’ inflation. In other words, credit conditions domestically became excessive loose…The inflation target was hit only by allowing domestic imbalances to arise: too much consumption, too much consumer indebtedness, too much leverage within the financial system and too little policy-making wisdom.”
What this means is that the Bank of England(as well as other central banks like the Federal Reserve) kept interest rates too low for too long because inflation was at very low levels. Low interest rates did not lead to inflation, with people borrowing and spending more, primarily because of low cost producers in China and other parts of the emerging world.
Niall Ferguson makes this point in The Ascent of Money – A Financial History of the World in the context of the United States. As he writes “Chinese imports kept down US inflation. Chinese savings kept down US interest rates. Chinese labour kept down US wage costs. As a result, it was remarkably cheap to borrow money and remarkably profitable to run a corporation.”
The same stood true for the United Kingdom and large parts of the Western World. With interest rates being low banks were falling over one another to lend money to anyone who was willing to borrow. And this gradually led to a fall in lending standards.
People who did not have the ability to repay were also being given loans. As King writes “With the UK financial system now awash with liquidity, lending increased rapidly both within the financial system and to other parts of the economy that, frankly, didn’t need any refreshing. In particular, the property sector boomed thanks to an abundance of credit and a gradual reduction in lending standards.” What followed was a big bubble, which finally burst and its aftermath is still being felt more than five years later.
As newsletter write Gary Dorsch writes in a recent column “Asset bubbles often arise when consumer prices are low, which is a problem for central banks who solely target inflation and thereby overlook the risks of bubbles, while appearing to be doing a good job.”
A lot of the money printed by the Federal Reserve over the last few years has landed up in all parts of the world, from the stock markets in the United States to the property market in Africa, and driven prices to very high levels. At low interest rates it has been easy for speculators to borrow and invest money, wherever they think they can make some returns.
Given this argument, it was believed that the Federal Reserve will go slow on money printing in the time to come and hence, allow interest rates to rise (This writer had also argued something along similar lines). But, alas, that doesn’t seem to be the case.
As Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe wrote in the BIS working paper titled Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus (the same paper that Dorsch talks about) “lowering rates or providing ample liquidity when problems materialise but not raising rates as imbalances build up, can be rather insidious in the longer run.”
Once these new round of bubbles start to burst, there will be more economic pain. The Irish author Samuel Beckett explained this tendency to not learn from one’s mistakes beautifully. As he wrote “Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try Again. Fail again. Fail better.”
The Federal Reserve seems to be working along those lines.
The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on September 20, 2013
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek) 

Yesterday, once more! Western central banks are fuelling real estate bubbles again

bubble


Vivek Kaul 

A major reason behind the financial crisis that started in late 2008 was the fact that the Western countries had built many more homes than were required to house their populations. Once the home prices started crashing what followed was an economic catastrophe from which the world is still trying to come out.
Ironically the solution that central banks came up with for mitigating the negative effects of the financial crisis was to get home prices up and running again. This was done by printing money and pumping it into the financial system and ensure that the interest rates remain at very low levels. The hope was that at low interest rates people will borrow money and buy homes. 
Initially people stayed away but gradually they seem to be getting back to borrowing and home prices in Western countries are up and running again. 
As Albert Edwards of Societe Generale writes in a report titled If UK Chancellor George Osborne is a moron, Fitch’s Charlene Chu is a heroine “Young people today haven’t got a chance of buying a house at a reasonable price, even with rock bottom interest rates. The Nationwide Building Society data shows that the average first time buyer in London is paying over 50% of their take home pay in mortgage payments – and that is when interest rates are close to zero!…The OECD has recently identified UK house prices as between 20-30% too high (depending on whether you compare prices with rents or incomes – link). To be sure the UK is nowhere near the most expensive, with some of the usual suspects such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand even worse.”
Home prices in the United States have also been rising steadily since the beginning of 2012. The S&P Case-Shiller 20-City Home Price Index has risen by 13.4% since the beginning of 2012. Even with this price rise, home prices in the United States are still 25% lower than the peak they achieved in April 2006. 
Real estate prices in Western countries should not be rising at such high rates. They have huge amounts of land to build all the homes that they need. Hence, real estate prices in a country like America, which is not really short of land have rarely risen at a very fast pace. Housing prices in America had remained flat for a large part of the 20th century. Prices rose on an average at the rate of 0.4% per year (adjusted for inflation) for the period between 1890 and 2004. In fact in many parts of the country the pries had actually gone down.
For smaller countries like the United Kingdom land may be an issue, but the population density is not very high. The United Kingdom has around 255 people living per square kilometre. In comparison, Japan has 337 people living per square kilometre and India has 367. So there is enough land going around given the population. 
But more than these reasons the biggest reason why home prices should not be rising at the rates that they are is simply because the home ownership rates in these countries are very high. In June 2004, at the peak of the real estate boom, 69.2% of US households owned their own homes, up from 64% in 1995. Home ownership in the United Kingdom peaked in 2001 at 69%. Since then home ownership rates have fallen. In the United States, it has fallen to around 65%. In the United Kingdom it is at 64%. 
Even with the falling home ownership rates a major part of the population in these countries owns the homes that they stay in. The falling home ownership rate in the aftermath of the financial crisis only means one thing and that is that there were many more homes built than required. And a lot of homes were bought not to live in, but for speculation. 
The governments and central banks are now trying to get the speculation going again. In the United States this is important because home equity loans were responsible for a lot of consumption. Home equity is the difference between the market price of a house and the home loan outstanding on it. Banks give a loan on this home equity. 
Charles R Morris writing in The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers, And the Great Credit Crash explains this phenomenon: “Consumer spending jumped from a 1990s average of about 67% of GDP to 72% of GDP in early 2007. As Martin Feldstein, a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, has pointed out, that increase was financed primarily by the withdrawal of $9 trillion in home equity.”
Feldstein’s study was carried out for the period between 1997 and 2006. A study carried out by Alan Greenspan estimated that in the 2000s, home equity withdrawals financed 3% of all personal consumption. But this was a low estimate. Home equity supplied more than 6% of the disposable personal income of Americans between 2000-2007, another study pointed out. In fact, by the first quarter of 2006, home equity extraction made up for nearly 10% of disposable personal income of Americans. 
And all this consumption in turn created economic growth. If home prices keep going up, more home equity will be created and people can borrow against that. Also as home prices go up, people feel wealthier and tend to spend more, which helps economic growth. 
Governments are trying to encourage banks to give out loans so that people can buy homes. George Osborne, the British chancellor of the exchequer (the Indian equivalent of the finance minister) has come up with a “help to buy” scheme. In this the government will guarantee up to 20% of the home loan to encourage lending to borrowers with small savings. As Edwards writes “This means that if a borrower defaults on a loan, the taxpayer will be liable for a proportion of the losses.”
Criticism for this scheme has come in from various fronts. Andrew Bridgen, senior economist for Fathom Consulting, a forecasting firm run by former Bank of England economists, said: “Help to Buy is a reckless scheme that uses public money to incentivise the banks to lend precisely to those individuals who should not be offered credit. Had we been asked to design a policy that would guarantee maximum damage to the UK’s long-term growth prospects and its fragile credit rating, this would be it.” (As Edwards quotes in his report)
This is precisely what happened in the United States as well in the run up to the financial crisis, wher
e the government nudged banks and other financial institutions to lend to people who were in no position to repay the loan.
Central banks can afford to keep interest rates low primarily because of the policy of inflation targeting that they follow. There mandate is to maintain the rate of inflation at a certain rate and do everything required for that. Increasing real estate prices do not get captured in the rate of consumer price inflation, which central banks tend to use for inflation targeting. 
In fact inflation targeting was one of the reasons behind the global real estate bubble of the 2000s. As Stephen D King writes in When Money Runs Out – The End of Western Affluence “Take, for example, inflation targeting in the UK. In the early years of the new millennium, inflation had a tendency to drop too low, thanks to the deflationary effects on manufactured goods prices of low-cost producers in China and elsewhere in the emerging world. To keep inflation close to target, the Bank of England loosened monetary policy with the intention of delivering higher ‘domestically generated’ inflation…The inflation target was hit only by allowing domestic imbalances to arise: too much consumption, too much consumer indebtedness, too much leverage within the financial system and too little policy-making wisdom.” 
The same thing seems to be happening right now. With inflation rates too low the central banks have been maintaining low interest rates, so that people consume more and that in turn hopefully creates some inflation. But that in turn means doing the same things that led to the financial crisis. 
Governments and central banks pushing up real estate prices does help in the short term and translates into some sort of economic growth. But it does have serious long term repercussions as we have seen over the last few years. As Edwards writes “What makes me genuinely really angry is that burdening our children with more debt (on top of their student loans) to buy ridiculously expensive houses is seen as a solution to the problem of excessively expensive housing…First time buyers need cheaper homes not greater availably of debt to inflate house prices even further. This is madness.”
To conclude, let me quote economist Robert J Shiller from The Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do about It “The idea that public policy should be aimed at…preventing a collapse in home prices from ever happening, is an error of the first magnitude. In the short run a sudden drop in home prices may indeed disrupt the economy, producing undesirable systemic effects. But, in the long run, the home-price drops are clearly a good thing.” 

The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on July 10, 2013
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek) 

 

Japan to India: Busting the biggest myth of investing in real estate

India-Real-Estate-MarketVivek Kaul 
Japan saw the mother of all real estate bubbles in the 1980s. Banks were falling over one another to give out loans and home and land prices reached astonishingly high levels. As Paul Krugman points out in The Return of Depression Economics “Land, never cheap in crowded Japan, had become incredibly expensive: according to a widely cited factoid, the land underneath the square mile of Tokyo’s Imperial Palace was worth more than the entire state of California.”
As prices kept going up, the Japanese started to believe that the real estate boom will carry on endlessly. In fact such was the confidence in the boom that Japanese banks and financial institutions started to offer 100 year home loans and people lapped it up.
As Stephen D. King, the chief economist at HSBC, writes in his new book When the Money Runs Out “ By the end of the 1980s, it was not unusual to find Japanese home buyers taking out 100 year mortgages (or home loans), happy, it seems, to pass the burden on to their children and even their grand children. Creditors, meanwhile, naturally assumed the next generation would repay even if, in some cases, the offspring were no more a twinkle in their parents’ eyes. Why worry? After all, land prices, it seemed, only went up.”
Things started to change in late 1989, once the Bank of Japan, the Japanese central bank, started to raise interest rates to deflate the bubble. Land prices started to come down and there has been very little recovery till date, more than two decades later. “Since the 1989 peak…land prices have fallen by 60 per cent,” writes King.
Every bull market has a theory behind it. Real estate bull markets whenever and wherever they happen, are typically built around one theory or myth. Economist Robert Shiller explains this myth in The Subprime Solution – How Today’s Financial Crisis Happened and What to Do about It. Huge increases in real estate prices are built around “the myth that, because of population growth and economic growth, and with limited land resources available, the price of real estate must inevitably trend strongly upward through time,” writes Shiller
And the belief in this myth gives people the confidence that real estate prices will continue to go up forever. In Japan this led to people taking on 100 year home loans, confident that there children and grandchildren will continue to repay the EMI because they would benefit in the form of significantly higher home prices.
A similar sort of confidence was seen during the American real estate bubble of the 2000s. In a survey of home buyers carried out in Los Angeles in 2005, the prevailing belief was that prices will keep growing at the rate of 22% every year over the next 10 years. This meant that a house which cost a million dollars in 2005 would cost around $7.3million by 2015. Such was the belief in the bubble.
India is no different on this count. A recent survey carried out by industry lobby Assocham found that “over 85 per cent of urban working class prefer to invest in real estate saying it is likely to fetch them guaranteed and higher returns.” 
This is clearly an impact of real estate prices having gone up over the last decade at a very fast rate. The confidence that real estate will continue to give high guaranteed returns comes with the belief in the myth that because population is going up, and there is only so much of land going around, real estate prices will continue to go up.
But this logic doesn’t really hold. When it comes to density of population, India is ranked 33rd among all the countries in the world with an average of 382 people per square kilometre. Japan is ranked 38th with 337 people living per square kilometre. So as far as scarcity of land is concerned, India and Japan are more or less similarly placed. And if real estate prices could fall in Japan, even with the so called scarcity of land, they can in India as well.
Economist Ajay Shah in a recent piece in The Economic Times did some good number crunching to bust what he called the large population-shortage of land argument. As he wrote “A little arithmetic shows this is not the case. If you place 1.2 billion people in four-person homes of 1000 square feet each, and two workers of the family into office/factory space of 400 square feet, this requires roughly 1% of India’s land area assuming an FSI(floor space index) of 1. There is absolutely no shortage of land to house the great Indian population.”
The interesting thing is that large population-shortage of land is a story that real estate investors need to tell themselves. Even speculators need a story to justify why they are buying what they are buying.
Real estate prices have now reached astonishingly high levels. As a recent report brought out real estate consultancy firm Knight Frank points out, 29% of the homes under construction in Mumbai are priced over Rs 1 crore. In Delhi the number is at 11%. Such higher prices has led to a drop in home purchases and increasing inventory. “The inventory level has almost doubled in the last three years. In the National Capital Region, the inventory level reached 31 months at the end of March 2013 against 15 months at the end of March 2010, while in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region the inventory level has jumped from 17 months to 40 months. In Hyderabad, it reached 49 months in March 2013 as compared to 23 months in March 2010, according to data by real estate research firm Liases Foras. Inventory denotes the number of months required to clear the stock at the existing absorption rate. An efficient market maintains an inventory of eight to ten months,” a news report in the Business Standard points out.
The point is all bubble market stories work till a certain point of time. But when prices get too high common sense starts to gradually come back. In a stock market bubble when the common sense comes back the correction is instant and fast, because the market is very liquid. The same is not true about real estate, because one cannot sell a home as fast as one can sell stocks.
Real estate companies in India haven’t started cutting prices in a direct manner as yet. But there are loads of schemes and discounts on offer for anyone who is still willing to buy. As the Business Standard news report quoted earlier points out “As many as 500 projects across India are offering some scheme or the other, in a bid to push sales in an otherwise slow market. According to Magicbricks.com, an online property portal, Mumbai has the maximum number of projects with schemes/discounts at around 88, followed by Delhi with 56 and Chennai and Pune with 33 each. Kolkata has 30 such offers, while Hyderabad has 18 and Bangalore has 16. On a pan India level, Magicbricks has about 274 projects with discounts offer.”
Of course the big question is when will the real price cuts start? They will have to happen, sooner rather than later.
The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on July 2, 2013
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)