Why high dal prices are not enough to increase production

Toor_Dal_Tur_dal

In response to yesterday’s column a reader on the social media concluded that it is obvious that farmers should grow tur dal which is priced at Rs 200 per kg, in comparison to sugar which is selling at a much lower price. He further said that businesses which tend to enjoy pricing power tend to do well.

Only if it were as simple as that. This is the classic, interest rate cut will lead to increased consumption, kind of economic theory—it doesn’t always work. In fact, in order to encourage farmers to plant more dal (pulses) the government in early November announced a significant increase in the minimum support price of gram and masur dal.

The minimum support price of gram was increased by Rs 250 to Rs 3425 per quintal (i.e. 100 kgs). The minimum support price of masur was increased by Rs 250 to Rs 3325 per quintal. Over and above this, a bonus of Rs 75 per quintal has also been announced.

Does this increase in minimum support price and a bonus to top it, mean that farmers will now automatically plant more dal in the rabi season, which is currently on. The government clearly thinks so. As the press release announcing the increase in minimum support prices (MSPs) pointed out: “The higher MSPs would increase investment and production through assured remunerative prices to farmers.”

In a world of lower interest rates leading to increased consumption kind of economics, this would have made perfect sense. The trouble is do farmers know about the government offering a minimum support price on dal? The Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP), a part of the ministry of agriculture, suggests otherwise.

As the report titled Price Policy for Kharif Crops—The Marketing Season of 2015-2016 points out: “Two most important procurement agencies of the Government of India namely Food Corporation of India (FCI) and National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Limited (Nafed) were set up with the main objectives of procuring notified commodities at MSP, if and when the market prices go below MSP. These agencies have been in the existence for over 50 years and 30 years respectively. Yet, the benefits of MSP bypass a large section of farmers, rendering the pricing policy and procurement operations ineffective. As per Situation Assessment Survey (NSS 70th Round), only 2.57 million households were benefitted directly from procurement of paddy during 2012. The procurement of oilseeds and pulses is far worse.”

So the question is do the farmers know about these price signals being sent out by the government? And the answer is no. In fact, as can be seen from the accompanying table in 2014-2015, the Nafed barely picked up any tur, moong or urad dal.

Table: Procurement of Pulses by Nafed.

Nafed picked up 1543 tonnes of tur dal in 2014-2015. The total production of tur dal in 2014-2015 was around 2.78 million tonnes. The total production in 2013-2014 had stood at 3.34 million tonnes. What this tells us is that unlike rice and wheat, the government agencies are picking up very little of dal directly from the farmers at the minimum support price.

The fact that the government picks up rice and wheat and does not pick up dal has distorted the entire production process of dal. What does not help is that the average farmer has faced losses.

As a recent news-report in The Economic Times points out: “According to an analysis done by the scientists of the Mahatma Phule Krishi Vidyapeeth (Agricultural University), Rahuri, farmers who grew tur in 2014, suffered losses of 12.7 per cent.”

The news-report then goes on to suggest that most farmers had to sell the tur dal they had produced at below MSP in 2013 and 2012. And this explains why the production of tur dal fell from 3.34 million tonnes in 2013-2014 to 2.78 million tonnes in 2014-2015. What this also tells us is that high prices are not leading to increased gains for farmers, and it is the middle men who are gaining the most.

 

Imports are not a solution because the global market for dal is very thin. As the report titled Price Policy for Rabi Crops—The Marketing Season of 2016-2017 points out: “As per Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the total global production of pulses was 72.3 million tonnes in 2013, out of which about 19% is traded. India is the largest producer of pulses in the world with a share of 24.3 percent…India is the largest importer with a share of 27.3%.”

In fact, India’s import of pulses has gone up dramatically from 13.4 lakh tonnes in 2004-2005 to around 45.7 lakh tonnes in 2014-2015. Further any more jumps in imports will only lead to an increase in prices of dal. So what is the way out?

The farmers first and foremost need to be aware that there is something known as a minimum support price. As the report titled Price Policy for Kharif Crops—The Marketing Season of 2015-2016 points out: “This calls for giving wide publicity about MSP and procurement agencies on radios, television and vernacular languages in popular local dailies, at least 15 days before the start of procurement operations so as to reach farmers far and wide.”

Second, given that state agencies are procuring rice and wheat, they need to procure dal as well, in order to balance things out.  As the report titled Price Policy for Kharif Crops—The Marketing Season of 2015-2016 points out: “A pertinent question arises as to why farmers are not wholeheartedly diversifying towards oilseeds and pulses. Based on CACP’s interaction with a wide spectrum of farmers and also based on field visits, it emerged that farmers need a backup plan in the form of reasonably strong procurement machinery to be put in place to fall back upon when the prices fall below minimum support price.”

As the press release announcing an increase in the minimum support price of Rabi crops pointed out: “The Cabinet also directed that in order to strengthen the procurement mechanism for pulses and oilseeds, Food Corporation of India (FCI) will be the Central Nodal Agency for procurement of pulses and oilseeds.”

Let’s see how much impact this move has. In an ideal world, the market should do its own thing, but in this case government intervention seems to be the best way out, at least in the short-term.

(The column originally appeared on The Daily Reckoning on Dec 1, 2015)

Monsoon starts weak: What will be its impact on agriculture?

monsoon
It has been widely reported that there is a possibility of a bad monsoon this year.
Data released by the India Meteorological Department (IMD) suggests that “the rainfall activity was deficient/scanty over the country”. In fact, “for the country as a whole, cumulative rainfall during this year’s monsoon has so far upto 18 June been 45% below the Long Period Average (LPA)”, the IMD data suggests.
This has had an impact on the sowing of summer crops.
Data released by the ministry of agriculture shows that the sowing of kharif crops,which are typically sown around this time of the year for harvesting after the rains (ie, September-October), has come down majorly in comparison to last year.
Last year the farmers had sowed rice over an area of 16.4 lakh hectares by June 21, 2013. This year it has dropped by more than half to 7.59 lakh hectares. The planting of oil seeds has dropped by a whopping 84.9% to 1.23 lakh hectares. Pulses have also fallen from 3.74 lakh hectares to 2.6 lakh hectares this year. The planting of sugarcane continues to remain more or less stable at 43.92 lakh hectares. Nearly 55% of the cropped area in India is dependant on rains.
It is still early days for the monsoon and the situation might improve in the days to come and that will lead to more sowing. A bad monsoon doesn’t necessarily mean that agricultural productivity will fall and will lead to a lower production of
kharif crops. Why is that the case? As Chetan Ahya and Upasana Chachra of Morgan Stanley write in a recent report titled El Nino Impact on India’s Farm Output “In 2009, even with a 22% deficient rainfall trend, agriculture output did not decline on a year on year basis then.”
This means the agricultural output in 2009 was not lower than that in 2008, even though the monsoon was 22% lower than normal. The IMD expects the monsoon this year to be 7% lower than normal. Given this, the agricultural productivity should not be impacted much.
As Ahya and Chachra explain “while North Western India is likely to face the largest shortfall, it is also the most irrigated region and currently has full reservoir levels. Even in 2009, the impact on the region’s food production was minimal. Hence, North West India (comprising Punjab, Haryana and Western UP), which produces most of the Kharif season (summer crop) rice, should see a near normal crop.”
What this means is that rice production is unlikely to drop. What also helps is the fact that the Food Corporation of India(FCI) as on June 1, 2014,
had a rice stock of 20.6 million tonnes. The government recently decided to unload around 5 million tonnes of this stock on to the open market in order to control inflation. Even after that a stock of 15.6 million tonnes of rice still remains.
Over and above this, the FCI will buy more rice in the coming months. Hence, unless the government ends up buying much more rice than it needs (as it has in the past) to run its various programmes, the price of rice should remain stable. By buying much more rice than it needs the government in the past ensured that a lesser amount of rice landed up in the open market and that led to a rapid rise in its price.
Further, the Modi government also needs to ensure that it does not raise the minimum support price of rice at the same rate as the Congress led UPA government had done in the past.Every year the government of India sets a minimum support price for rice and wheat. At this price, it buys rice and wheat from farmers, through the FCI and other state government agencies.
In 2005-2006, the MSP for common paddy(rice) was Rs 570 per quintal. By 2013-2014 this had shot up to Rs 1310 per quintal, an increase in price of around 11% per year. In comparison, between 1998-1999 and 2005-2006, the MSP of rice had increased at the rate of 3.8% per year.
If these steps are taken the price of rice will remain stable.
But what about the other kharif crops? Oil seeds and pulses are largely grown in south and central India. The irrigation facilities in this region are no so well developed as Punjab and Haryana. Also, the reservoir levels in these areas are a concern. “Consequently, price pressures for these items [i.e. pulses and oil seeds] may build up. India may potentially need to import pulses to meet the shortfall in production,” write Ahya and Chachra. The scenario on the oil seeds front is looking particularly weak given that sowing has fallen by 84.9% in comparison to last year. This after central India has received 52% lower rainfall than normal until now. The number in case of south India stands at 27%.
“The overall farm output growth is unlikely to contract”, feel the Morgan Stanley analysts, even though things could get difficult on the pulses and the oil seeds front. But the real worry is the drought psychology setting in. As T N Ninan writes
in a column in the Business Standard “A drought does not reduce agricultural output with the frequency of an earlier age. In fact, the agricultural sector managed to show marginal growth in both the last two difficult years – helped by the spread of irrigation and other drought-proofing measures.”
Hence even with a bad monsoon, a water shortage is unlikely. “For all one knows, cereal production may increase yet again. The real danger is of drought psychology setting in and sending prices skyward, as has already happened with onions and potatoes,” writes Ninan.
And that is something that Modi government will have to tackle through better communication.

 The column originally appeared on www.firstbiz.com on June 23, 2014

(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He can be reached at [email protected]

Monsoon starts weak: What will be its impact on agriculture?

monsoon
It has been widely reported that there is a possibility of a bad monsoon this year.
Data released by the India Meteorological Department (IMD) suggests that “the rainfall activity was deficient/scanty over the country”. In fact, “for the country as a whole, cumulative rainfall during this year’s monsoon has so far upto 18 June been 45% below the Long Period Average (LPA)”, the IMD data suggests.
This has had an impact on the sowing of summer crops.
Data released by the ministry of agriculture shows that the sowing of kharif crops,which are typically sown around this time of the year for harvesting after the rains (ie, September-October), has come down majorly in comparison to last year.
Last year the farmers had sowed rice over an area of 16.4 lakh hectares by June 21, 2013. This year it has dropped by more than half to 7.59 lakh hectares. The planting of oil seeds has dropped by a whopping 84.9% to 1.23 lakh hectares. Pulses have also fallen from 3.74 lakh hectares to 2.6 lakh hectares this year. The planting of sugarcane continues to remain more or less stable at 43.92 lakh hectares. Nearly 55% of the cropped area in India is dependant on rains.
It is still early days for the monsoon and the situation might improve in the days to come and that will lead to more sowing. A bad monsoon doesn’t necessarily mean that agricultural productivity will fall and will lead to a lower production of
kharif crops. Why is that the case? As Chetan Ahya and Upasana Chachra of Morgan Stanley write in a recent report titled El Nino Impact on India’s Farm Output “In 2009, even with a 22% deficient rainfall trend, agriculture output did not decline on a year on year basis then.”
This means the agricultural output in 2009 was not lower than that in 2008, even though the monsoon was 22% lower than normal. The IMD expects the monsoon this year to be 7% lower than normal. Given this, the agricultural productivity should not be impacted much.
As Ahya and Chachra explain “while North Western India is likely to face the largest shortfall, it is also the most irrigated region and currently has full reservoir levels. Even in 2009, the impact on the region’s food production was minimal. Hence, North West India (comprising Punjab, Haryana and Western UP), which produces most of the Kharif season (summer crop) rice, should see a near normal crop.”
What this means is that rice production is unlikely to drop. What also helps is the fact that the Food Corporation of India(FCI) as on June 1, 2014,
had a rice stock of 20.6 million tonnes. The government recently decided to unload around 5 million tonnes of this stock on to the open market in order to control inflation. Even after that a stock of 15.6 million tonnes of rice still remains.
Over and above this, the FCI will buy more rice in the coming months. Hence, unless the government ends up buying much more rice than it needs (as it has in the past) to run its various programmes, the price of rice should remain stable. By buying much more rice than it needs the government in the past ensured that a lesser amount of rice landed up in the open market and that led to a rapid rise in its price.
Further, the Modi government also needs to ensure that it does not raise the minimum support price of rice at the same rate as the Congress led UPA government had done in the past.Every year the government of India sets a minimum support price for rice and wheat. At this price, it buys rice and wheat from farmers, through the FCI and other state government agencies.
In 2005-2006, the MSP for common paddy(rice) was Rs 570 per quintal. By 2013-2014 this had shot up to Rs 1310 per quintal, an increase in price of around 11% per year. In comparison, between 1998-1999 and 2005-2006, the MSP of rice had increased at the rate of 3.8% per year.
If these steps are taken the price of rice will remain stable.
But what about the other kharif crops? Oil seeds and pulses are largely grown in south and central India. The irrigation facilities in this region are no so well developed as Punjab and Haryana. Also, the reservoir levels in these areas are a concern. “Consequently, price pressures for these items [i.e. pulses and oil seeds] may build up. India may potentially need to import pulses to meet the shortfall in production,” write Ahya and Chachra. The scenario on the oil seeds front is looking particularly weak given that sowing has fallen by 84.9% in comparison to last year. This after central India has received 52% lower rainfall than normal until now. The number in case of south India stands at 27%.
“The overall farm output growth is unlikely to contract”, feel the Morgan Stanley analysts, even though things could get difficult on the pulses and the oil seeds front. But the real worry is the drought psychology setting in. As T N Ninan writes
in a column in the Business Standard “A drought does not reduce agricultural output with the frequency of an earlier age. In fact, the agricultural sector managed to show marginal growth in both the last two difficult years – helped by the spread of irrigation and other drought-proofing measures.”
Hence even with a bad monsoon, a water shortage is unlikely. “For all one knows, cereal production may increase yet again. The real danger is of drought psychology setting in and sending prices skyward, as has already happened with onions and potatoes,” writes Ninan.
And that is something that Modi government will have to tackle through better communication.

 The column originally appeared on www.firstbiz.com on June 23, 2014

(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He can be reached at [email protected]

Right to food security will make things more difficult for salaried middle class

rot-in-the-fci-godowns
Vivek Kaul
There are no free lunches in life, though at times its not obvious who is footing the bill. Take the case of the right to food security bill which guarantees 80 crore Indians or two thirds of the population, subsidised rice, wheat and cereals.
The bill proposes to provide 5 kg of food grains to an individual every month at the rate of Rs 3 per kg of rice, Rs 2 per kg of wheat and Rs 1 per kg of cereals. The food minister KV Thomas expects that the extra burden on food subsidy will be about Rs 20,000 crore. Also 61.23 million tonnes of food grain would be needed.
Prima facie this is a very noble idea. But the question is who will be footing the bill for this? The answer is the tax paying salaried middle class. Allow me to explain.
In the financial year 2011-2012 (i.e. the period between April 1, 2011 and March 31,2012) the Indian government through the Food Corporation of India(FCI) and other agencies procured 63 million tonnes of grains (primarily rice and wheat).
If the right to food security bill is passed by the Parliament (as it is likely to be, why would any political party in their right sense oppose it?), the government will have to procure a greater amount of grains. The government estimates suggest that 61.23 million tonnes of food grain will be needed just to meet the requirements of the right to food security. There are other government food programmes running as well, and hence the 63 million tonnes of grain that the government currently procures may not be enough.
So the government will have to buy a greater amount of grain in the coming years. In order to do that it will have to keep offering a higher price. The government sets a minimum support price(MSP) for wheat and rice (and other agricultural commodities as well) every year and this has been going up over the last few years.
FCI and other state agencies acting on the government’s behalf buy grains produced by the farmer at the MSP. In the years to come the government is likely to buy more rice and wheat at a higher MSP. This means a lesser amount of rice and wheat will land up in the open market and thus push up prices. This argument does not work only if the amount of rice and wheat being produced goes up significantly and that cannot happen immediately in the short run.
Who does this hurt the most? The tax paying salaried middle class is the answer as they will have to pay more and more for the food that they buy.
There are other problems as well. 
The total storage capacity of FCI as on April 1, 2012, stood at 33.6 million tonnes. The Central Warehousing Corporation has 466 warehouses with a total capacity of 10.56 million tonnes. This brings the total storage capacity of the central government to a little over 44 million tonnes. Then there is the storage capacities of various state warehousing corporations which are also used to store grains. But even with that the government does not have enough storage capacity to store the amount of grain that it currently procures and will have to procure from the farmers in the years to come.
This means more grains will be dumped in the open and will rot as a result. As 
The Indian Express wrote in an editorial yesterday “The government will be required to procure more foodgrain at a huge cost, which would require pushing procurement prices even higher, creating storage facilities, and distributing the partly rotted foodgrain through a dysfunctional public distribution system.”
So more rotten food grain will be distributed in the years to come.
The major reasoning behind right to food security is that if subsidised food is offered to people, their nutrition will improve. This is not always the case. Abhijit Banerjee, professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology explains this
 through an example. “We carried out a nice experiment in China. We gave some people a voucher to buy cheap rice. Instead of buying rice lets say for Rs 10, they could buy it for Rs 2, using the vouchers. The presumption was that this would improve nutrition. This was done as an experiment and hence some people were randomly given vouchers and others were not. When people went back and looked at it, they were astounded. People with vouchers had were worse off in nutrition. They felt that now that they have the vouchers, they are rich and no longer need to eat rice. They could eat pork, shrimps etc. They went and bought pork and shrimps and as a result their net calories went down. This is perfectly rational. These people were waiting for pleasure.”
A similar thing might play out in India as well. The money people will save on buying subsidised rice/wheat, might get channelised onto other unhealthy alternatives. But then that’s an individual decision that people might make and hence needs to be left at that.
The broader point is there hasn’t been enough discussion/debate/trials to figure out the unintended consequences of the right to food bill. One unintended consequence that is visible straight away is the rise in prices of non cereal food.
The money people save on buying rice/wheat can get channelised into buying fruit, vegetable, pulses, fish, meat, eggs etc. But the production for this may not go up at the same pace leading to higher price. As 
The Indian Express points out “The production of fruit, vegetable, pulses, fish, meat and eggs will continue to stagnate, however, as more resources will need to be allocated to push up the production of foodgrain. Instead of land, labour, capital, fertilisers and infrastructure being devoted towards meeting the needs of the population as determined by households that choose what they wish to eat, the country will be diverting resources to producing what the state decides the population must consume.”
As the government offers higher MSPs on rice and wheat, the farmers are more likely to produce that than non cereal food. This for the simple reason that the MSP is set in advance and it gives the farmer a good idea of how much he should expect to earn when he sells his produce a few months later. The same is not true for something like pulses where the government does set an MSP, but does not have the required infrastructure for procurement.
The “nutrition” problem will also continue. As 
Howarth Bouis , director of HarvestPlus, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, pointed out in a recent interview to Mint “If you look at all the other food groups such as fruits, vegetables, lentils, and animal products other than milk, you will find a steady increase in prices over the past 40 years. So it has become more difficult for the poor to afford food that is dense in minerals and vitamins. That probably explains the poor nutritional outcomes .” The right to food security will ensure that the poor will find it even more difficult to buy non cereal food which is high on nutrition as it becomes more expensive.
The nutrient deficit of India will continue to remain unaddressed. The right to food security works with the assumption that most of India’s poor may not have access to even the most basic food. That is really not correct as the government’s own data shows. As 
The Mint points out in a recent news report “Apart from the extremely poor, who form a small fraction of the population, nearly everyone else can afford the rice and wheat they require… A February report of the National Sample Survey Office shows the proportion of people not getting two square meals a day dropped to about 1% in rural India and 0.4% in urban India in 2009-10. Interestingly, the average cereal consumption of families who reported that they went hungry in some months of the year (in the month preceding the survey) was roughly equal to the average cereal consumption of those who reported receiving adequate meals throughout the year. The stark difference across income-classes lies in the level of spending on non-cereal food items, the survey points out.”
So what India needs to eat is more of eggs, vegetables and fruits, and not rice and wheat, as the government seems to have decided to. “Most of the poor can afford as much of rice, or wheat, as they can eat. And if you look at consumption patterns of these items across income groups, it does not change very much. The huge difference between low-income and high-income groups is in the consumption of non-staple foods—fruits, vegetables and pulses. I think that’s what is limiting better nutrition, not just in India but in much of the developing world,” Bouis told Mint.
What all this means is that the right to food security will drive up food prices higher than what they already are. Hence, food inflation will continue to remain high, which in turn will push up consumer price inflation as well. The right to food security will not only hurt those it is intended to benefit, but it will also hurt the tax paying salaried middle class, as they will continue to face higher prices on food.
The passing of right to food also signals that the Congress led UPA government remains committed to higher expenditure, without really figuring out where the revenue to finance that expenditure is going to come from. In simple English that means the government is going to continue to borrow more. Banks will thus have a lower pool of savings to borrow from, which means higher interest rates and higher EMIs will continue. Now who does this hurt the most? The tax paying middle class again.
Estimates made by Global Financial Integrity suggest that between 2001 and 2010, nearly $123 billion of illicit financial flows went out of India. This means around $12 billion per year on an average. At current conversion rate of one dollar being worth around Rs 54, this is around Rs 65,000 crore per year. So Rs 65,000 crore of black money is leaving the country every year. The black money being generated within the country would be many times over.
Of course people who have this black money are better placed to bear inflation because they don’t pay tax. That is clearly not the case with the salaried middle class, who pay tax and also have to bear higher food inflation. The government should be looking at ways of taxing this black money.
Over and above this agricultural income in this country continues to remain untaxed. This is totally bizarre. As Andy Mukherjee of 
Reuters Breaking Views writes in a slightly different context “No government today can muster the political courage to tax the incomes of even very large farmers. But to keep the section of the economy that accounts for 60 percent of employment out of tax undermines the system’s legitimacy…It’s ironic that villagers should have political representation without taxation, while the urban middle class finds itself heavily taxed but politically alienated.”
Taxing agricultural income remains out of question. Meanwhile, the salaried tax paying middle class will continue to be screwed.

The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on March 20, 2013 
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)