Tag: Manmohan Singh | Page 2

15 September, 2014

What Vinod Rai's book proves: History will not be kind to Manmohan Singh

Vivek Kaul

In January 2014, towards the end of his second term, Manmohan Singh spoke to the media for the third time in a decade. On this occasion he said “I honestly believe that history will be kinder to me than the contemporary media.”
While speaking to the media Singh also said “I feel somewhat sad, because I was the one who insisted that spectrum allocation should be transparent, it should be fair, it should be equitable. I was the one who insisted that coal blocks should be allocated on the basis of auctions. These facts are forgotten.”
If that was the case then why did the allocation of 2G(second generation) telecom licenses and coal blocks end up in a mess? This Singh did not elaborate on during the course of his interaction with the media in January, earlier this year. Neither has he chosen to elaborate on these points since then.
Vinod Rai, the former Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), analyses both these issues and the role Singh played in them, threadbare, in his new book Not Just an Accountant—The Diary of the Nation’s Conscience Keeper. In this piece we shall look at the mess that the issuance of 2G telecom licenses ended up in and leave the discussion on what came to be called coalgate, for sometime later this week.
Rai in his book through a series of documented evidence shows how Singh was fully aware of what was going on, but still chose to not to do anything about it. Instead, he even went to the extent of distancing himself from the decisions made by the communications minister A Raja.
As Rai writes “You [Manmohan Singh] engaged in a routine and ‘distanced’ handling of the entire allocation process, in spite of the fact that the then communications minister A Raja, had indicated to you, in writing, the action he proposed to take. Insistence on the process being fair could have prevented the course of events during which canons of financial propriety were overlooked, unleashing what probably is the biggest scam in the history of Independent India.”
Before we get into the details of what probably led Rai to make such a strong statement, we need to take a brief look at how the Indian telecom sector evolved from the 1990s.
The telecom sector was opened up to the private players in a phased manner after the announcement of the National Telecom Policy (NTP) in 1994. Licenses were initially allotted to private companies in 1995, through the competitive bidding route. These licenses allowed private companies to launch mobile phone telephony in India.
The policy was revised in 1999 and existing mobile phone operators were allowed to migrate to a revenue sharing regime with the government. “The upfront payment was an entry fee, with the annual license fee to be paid separately. The entry fee was fixed on the basis of the highest bid received in the 2001 auction of licenses. It was Rs 1,651 crore for pan-India licenses,” writes Rai. The then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee constituted a group of ministers on telecom in September 2003. The recommendations of this group were added to the National Telecom Policy of 1999. The existing system of issuing licenses were replaced by an automatic authorization regime.
A Raja took over as the communications minister in May 2007. He decided to continue with the first-come-first served(FCFS) policy for allocation of licenses to telecom companies. On September 25, 2007, a press release was issued and applications were invited for telecom licenses. The last date was set to October 1, 2007, a week later.
In total 575 applications for 22 service areas were received by the communications ministry. This led to the ministry of communications writing to the law ministry and sought its opinion on how to deal with the situation of so many applicants. The law ministry suggested that the issue be referred to the empowered group of ministers(eGOM). Raja did not like this suggestion and on November 1, 2007, wrote a letter to Manmohan Singh.
In this letter Raja complained that the suggestion of the law ministry “is totally out of context”. He then went on to coolly inform the prime minister that he had decided to advance the cut off date for licenses to September 25,2007, the date on which the press release was issued for the allocation of licenses, instead of October 1, 2007.
Raja further told Singh that “the procedure for processing the remaining applications will be decided at a later date, if any spectrum is left available after processing the applications received up to September 25, 2007.”
The rules of the game were changed after it had started. Singh responded immediately on the same day. In his letter, Singh seemed to be concerned over the fact that a large number of applications for new licenses had been received. Given the fact that the spectrum was limited, it would not be possible to give spectrum to all of them, even over the next few years, Singh wrote. He further pointed out that the National Telecom Policy of 1999 had specifically stated that the new licenses be issued subject to the availability of spectrum.
In this scenario, Singh suggested that the communications ministry consider the introduction of a transparent methodology of auction, wherever it was legally and technically feasible. This needed to be done in order to ensure that spectrum was used efficiently.
Also, the entry fee for these licenses was the same as in 2001, i.e. Rs 1,651 crore. Hence, Singh suggested that the entry fee be revised. This was a logical suggestion to make given that six years had passed since 2001 and if not anything at least inflation had to be taken into account.
Raja responded within hours of receiving this letter from Singh. He ruled out an auction stating that “the issue of auction of spectrum was considered by TRAI[the telecom regulator] and the telecom commission and was not recommended as the existing license holders..have got it without any spectrum charge.” Raja went on to add that the holding an auction would thus be “unfair, discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious”.
Meanwhile, Kamal Nath, wrote to Singh on November 3, 2007, and suggested that a group of ministers should be asked to comprehensively study all the issues facing the telecom sector. Raja responded to this on November 15, and said that the Indian telecom industry was doing very well and was adding seven million new customers every month. The shares of the telecom companies listed on the stock market were also doing very well. And given these reasons the suggestion of Kamal Nath of setting up a group of ministers was again “out of context,” as had been the case with the law ministry earlier.
Singh responded on November 21, by sending what former CAG Rai calls a “template response”. In this letter Singh acknowledged that he had received Raja’s recent letter on the recent developments in the telecom sector. Raja wrote to the prime minister again on December 26, 2007. Singh again responded with the same templated response on January 3,2008.
All that has been discussed till now raises a series of questions. As Rai writes “[Manmohan Singh] failed to direct his minister[i.e. A Raja] to follow his advice…Why under what compulsion, did the prime minister allow Raja to have his way, which permitted a finite national resource [i.e. the telecom spectrum] to be gifted at throwaway price to private companies—private companies that, going by the minister’s own admission, were ‘enjoying the best results […] which was also reflected in their increasing share prices?”
Also, why was the entry price fixed at Rs 1,651 crore, which was a price set way back in 2001. As mentioned earlier this price should have at least taken inflation into account. The telecom market had also expanded since 2001. The National Telecom Policy of 1999 had set a teledensity target of providing 15 telephone connections per 100 of population. The teledensity in 2001 had stood at 3.58. In September 2007, a teledensity of 18.22 had been reached. “Was this data not available with the government..to counter Raja’s consistent and constant refrain?” asks Rai.
Further, even if increasing teledensity was the main goal, given that the spectrum is finite, didn’t it call for a “balance between revenue generation and achieving social objectives?” In fact, the tenth plan document clearly mentions this, when it comes to spectrum allocation: “pricing needs to be based on relative demand and supply over space and time in a dynamic manner, [with] opportunity cost to reflect relative scarcity of the resource in a given situation.”
Also, why was the cut-off date for the last date to receive applications arbitrarily advanced from October 1, 2007 to September 25,2007? As Rai writes “Though Raja clearly indicated this to the prime minister in his letter of 2 November 2007, the PMO chose not to object. Why it chose not to, remains unclear.”
Interestingly, thirteen applicants seem to have known of this change in date, in advance. How else do you explain the fact that certain applicants appeared with demand drafts amounting to thousands of crore, which had been issued even before the press release inviting applications for telecom licenses was put out on September 25, 2007.
Then there is the question of first-come-first served. It essentially means those who applied for a license first, would be given a license first. But that wasn’t the case. “One would be surprised to learn that even this procedure, which was repeatedly reiterated to the prime minister by Raja, was given the go-by, and all applications submitted between March 26 and 25 September 2007 were considered together,” writes Rai.
Pulok Chatterjee, a bureaucrat known to be close to the Gandhi family, was an additional secretary in the prime minister’s office at that point of time. In a note that was presented to prime minister Singh on January 6, 2008, Chatterjee concluded that “ideally in a situation where the spectrum is scarce it should be auctioned”. But by that time the licenses had already been issued.
Joint secretary Vini Mahajan recorded that the prime minister wanted Chaterjee’s note to be only “informally shared within the Dept”. She further noted that the prime minister “does not want a formal communication and wants PMO to be at arm’s length.” As Rai asks “How can the office of the prime minister distance itself from such major decisions? Arm’s length from the action of his own government?”
Also, it needs to be noted here that Raja suggested that TRAI was against auction of telecom spectrum. This is untrue. In August 2007, the telecom regulator had clearly stated that: “In today’s dynamism and unprecedented growth of telecom sector, the entry fee determined in 2001 is also not the realistic price of obtaining a license. Perhaps it needs to be reassessed by a market mechanism.”
The companies which got these licenses cheap, cashed in on it almost immediately. “In case of Unitech, which had no previous experience in the telecom business, Telenor, a Norwegian company, agreed to acquire 67.25 per cent stake for Rs 6,120 crore. Tata Teleservices sold 27.31 per cent stake to NTT Docomo at a value of Rs 12,924 crore. Even Swan Telecom sold 44.73 per cent stake to Etisalat International at Rs 3,217 crore. Is that not clearly indicative of the value the market attached to the 2G spectrum license. Even a cursory back-of-the-envelope calculation will indicate that licenses which could have fetched between Rs 8,000 to Rs 9,000 crore were priced at Rs 1,658,” writes Rai.
On February 2, 2012, the Supreme Court cancelled all the licenses that had been issued by A Raja.
On a slightly different note, Rai also points out it was a ruling party MP (Rai does not give out his name in the book) who seems to have first suggested that losses that the government faced from giving out licenses cheaply, needed to be calculated.
As Rai puts it “He [i.e. the MP] went on to reiterate that it was obvious how much the government of India could have secured by transparent bidding and asserted that even a section officer in the government would be able to make this computation.” In a recent interview Rai revealed that the name of the MP was KS Rao, who has since quit the Congress protesting against the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh and joined the BJP.
Rai writes that this was one of the reasons why the CAG decided to compute a loss figure arising out of the 2G telecom licenses being issued cheaply. As he writes “Now if an MP, and of the ruling party, makes such a strong assertion, obviously the audit department has to take cognizance of that parameter for computation.”
The CAG used various methods to compute a loss figure and arrived at a four numbers ranging from Rs 57,666 crore to Rs 1,76,645 crore. All this could have been avoided only if Singh had chosen to respond differently and instead said to Raja that “I have received your letter…Please do not precipitate any action till we or the GoM[group of ministers] have discussed this.”
To conclude, on an earlier occasion I had written that if he wants history to treat him kindly, Singh needs to write his autobiography and put forward his side of the story as well. Whether he does that or not, remains to be seen. But Vinod Rai’s thoroughly researched book makes me now believe that whatever Singh might do, history will not be kind to him, his hopes notwithstanding.
The article appeared originally on www.Firstpost.com on Sep 15, 2014

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

26 August, 2014

From India Inc to UPA: Manmohan Singh is not the only one to be blamed for Coalgate

Vivek Kaul

In it’s judgement yesterday, the Supreme Court came down heavily on the central government on how it went about giving away “coal blocks” free to private and public sector companies between 1993 and 2011. The central government during the period gave away 195 coal block with geological reserves amounting to 44.8 billion tonnes.
The decision to give away “coal blocks” was taken through a screening committee. The Supreme Court in its judgement clearly says that “no objective criteria for evaluation of comparative merits” of companies to which these coal blocks were allocated, was followed by the Screening Committee. And hence it declared all the coal blocks that were given away for free as “illegal”.
As the Supreme Court puts it in its judgement “The entire exercise of allocation through Screening Committee route…appears to suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and not following any objective criteria in determining as to who is to be selected or who is not to be selected. There is no evaluation of merit and no inter se comparison of the applicants. No chart of evaluation was prepared. The determination of the Screening Committee is apparently subjective as the minutes of the Screening Committee meetings do not show that selection was made after proper assessment. The project preparedness, track record etc., of the applicant company were not objectively kept in view.”
These are basic steps that need to be followed in case of allocation of any project. The Supreme Court judgement goes on to point out several examples where the exercise of allotting coal blocks through the Screening Committee seems to be arbitrary.
In fact, former coal secretary P C Parakh (who took over as coal secretary in the second week of March 2004) writes in Crusader or Conspirator—Coalgate and Other Truths that as the number of applicants for coal blocks kept growing beyond a point being objective about the allotment was simply not possible.
As he writes “by the time I took charge of the ministry, the number of applicants for each block had increased considerably although still in single digits. I found a number of applicants fulfilling the criteria specified for allocation of each block on offer. This made objective selection extremely difficult.”
He further writes “According to CAG’s report, 108 applications were received for Rampia and Dip Side of Rampia Block [names of two coal blocks]. I found it difficult to make an objective selection when the number of applicants was in single digits. How could the Screening Committee take objective decisions when the number of applicants per block had run into three digits?”
Also, it is worth remembering here that all coal blocks were not the same. Coal could be mined at a cost of Rs 300 per tonne in a good open cost mine. On the other hand it could cost as high as Rs 2000 per tonne in an underground mine. The quality of coal would also vary. Hence there was an “enormous scope for favouritism and corruption” when allocating the block.
In fact, Parakh goes on to list several reasons on why giving away coal blocks free for captive mining by companies just did not make sense. By giving away coal blocks for free, companies which had no experience in coal mining were getting into a totally unrelated field. The government had no way of monitoring whether the captive mine was being used for captive use. Or was the company, which had got the coal block, selling the coal it was producing in the open market and thus “promoting corruption and black money”. Further, the system of allocation of coal blocks for free was discriminatory. It offered a huge premium to companies which managed to get a free coal block, in comparison to ones that did not.
Given these reasons, in August 2004, Parakh proposed to Manmohan Singh (who had taken over as coal minister after Shibu Soren resigned) that the allocation of coal blocks should be done through competitive bidding. In fact, even before Manmohan Singh had taken over as coal minister from Soren, Parekh had called for open house discussion of the stakeholders in June 2004. This included the business lobbies FICCI, CII and Assocham. Several other ministries whose companies had applied for coal blocks were invited. So were private companies.
Parakh writes that most of the invitees were not in favour of competitive bidding for coal blocks. As he writes “not many participants were enthusiastic about open bidding. Their main argument was that the cost of coal to be mined would go up if coal blocks were auctioned.” This is an argument still made every time someone suggests that the government should auction natural resources and not give them away for free.
Assuming that business men bidding for coal blocks (if such a process were to be introduced) would drive up the price of coal to astronomical levels is suggesting that they are stupid. As Parakh writes “Participants at open auctions are hard-headed businessmen with an acute sense of profitability. They do not make irrationally high bids. The price at which coal from CIL[Coal India Ltd] was available would automatically put a cap on the bid amount.”
The industry ultimately resisted open bidding simply because until then they had been getting coal blocks for free. And if something is available for free why pay for it. “To an extent, it was a reflection of corporate India’s aversion to transparency,” writes Parakh.
Nevertheless, Manmohan Singh approved allocation of coal blocks through competitive bidding on August 20, 2004. Immediately, the protests started. Letters started pouring in from MPs opposing the competitive bidding process.
Among those who opposed the process was Naveen Jindal, “who had considerable interests in coal mining”. In a television interview Jindal argued that all over the world mining properties are given away for free. The government then earns money through royalty and taxes. Parakh explains why this is bunkum: “I am not aware of any country where fully explored mining properties are given free. What are being given away free are virgin areas with minimal geological information where large amounts of money has to be sunk as risk capital in carrying out exploration, which may or may not result in a commercially minable discovery.”
Parakh writes that Dasari Narayana Rao, the Telgu film director, who was then the minister of state for coal, also tried his best to scuttle the move. He was helped in this by Shibu Soren, who was also coal minister for a brief period. Finally, after several ups and downs the proposal of open bidding for coal blocks did not see the light of day.
Parakh concedes that there was no political will in pushing through a transparent process for allocation of coal blocks. Manmohan Singh had his hands tied to some extent due to the compromises that a coalition government has to make. But if he could push through the Indo-US nuclear deal despite the opposition and open up FDI in retail, he could have also pushed through the opening up of the coal sector, which he did not. Given that and the fact that he was the leader of the Congress led UPA government, when the most free coal blocks were given out, the ultimate responsibility for the current mess in the coal sector, lies with him. But the blame cannot completely lie with him, as
we have seen earlier in this article.
Also, the government told the Supreme Court during the course of proceedings that “the auction of coal blocks could not have been possible when the power generation and, consequently, coal mining sectors were first opened up to private participants as the private sector needed to be encouraged at that time to come forward and invest. Allocation of coal blocks through competitive bidding in such a scenario would have been impractical and unrealistic.”
By the same logic telecom companies should have got the spectrum for free, which they did not, when mobile telephony was first introduced in the mid 1990s. As Parakh writes “Had we opened up coal mining to private sector for commercial mining, along with power sector, in the early 1990s, we would by now have at least half a dozen large coal mining companies in the private sector. This is what happened in the telecom sector.”
What we have instead is a huge coal shortage. In 2014-2015, India’s coal demand is expected to rise to 787 million tonnes. The supply is around 200 million tonnes lower. And this is something that cannot be solved overnight.

The article was published on August 26, 2014 on www.Firstbiz.com

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

28 May, 2014

In defence of Smriti Irani: Why Madhu and Maken are wrong

Vivek Kaul

So Smriti Irani cannot make for a good human resources development minister because she is not a graduate.
Or so we have been told by the likes of Madhu Kishwar and Ajay Maken.
In short, people who have degrees make for better politicians is the conclusion being drawn. But is that really the case?
Let’s take the case of a certain Lalu Prasad Yadav, who was the defacto Chief Minister of Bihar for more than 15 years. Lalu has a Bachelor of Laws and a Master in Political Science. How did his degrees make any difference?
During his rule Bihar went from bad to worse. In fact, when Lalu was questioned about the lack of development in the state, he was very open about admitting that development did not lead to votes.
Such was Lalu’s lack of belief in development that even money allocated to the state government by the Central government remained unspent. As Santhosh Mathew and Mick Moore write in a research paper titled State Incapacity by Design: Understanding the Bihar Story, “Despite the poverty of the state, the governments led by Lalu Prasad signally failed to spend the money actually available to them: ‘…Bihar has the country’s lowest utilisation rate for centrally funded programs, and it is estimated that the state forfeited one-fifth of central plan assistance during 1997–2000.’”
Interestingly, between 1997 and 2005, Rs 9,600 crore was allocated by the Ministry of Rural Development to Bihar. Around Rs 2,200 crore was not drawn. Of the amount that was drawn only 64% was spent.
During Lalu’s rule Bihar went from bad to worse and a whole generation lost out on progress. But yes, Lalu had two degrees.
Let’s take an even better example of former prime minister Dr Manmohan Singh, a PhD from the University of Oxford. Now compare his degree to the mess that we have ended up with under him. Interestingly, most of our politicians who have a degree, tend to have a degree in law. How does that help in anything other than running the law ministry or the ministry of corporate affairs or other similar ministries? And that is assuming that having studied law, the politician understands its intricacies (not every lawyer has the same command on the subject like Arun Jaitley does).
If we take this argument further, what it means is that to become a minister an individual should be an expert in that particular area. So, a finance minister should either be an economist or a finance professional. Arun Jaitley is neither. A defence minister should have experience in the area of defence. So, doesn’t that make General V K Singh an excellent choice for being the defence minister?
Further, in order to get an individual with the right experience or a degree to head a ministry, one would be looking at technocrats all the time. So, then why bother about electing MPs at all?
This would mean moving onto a more American form of government where the President is elected by the people and is allowed to choose his team, a lot of whom are technocrats who have the required experience.
Given this, insisting that a minister have a degree, doesn’t make much sense in the present system of government that we have.
That’s the general part of the argument. Then there is also the specific part regarding Smriti Irani and Congress’ criticism of her lack of a degree. To her credit Irani is a successful professional, who has risen on her own, in a very competitive television industry.
Also, what one needs as a minister is the ability to administer. Whether she has that or not, we will come to know in the time to come.
The Congress party is in no position to criticize her. One of their foremost leaders Rajiv Gandhi, never completed any degree after leaving the Doon School. He was the prime minister of the country. His mother Indira, never completed her degree at Oxford. Their current leader Sonia Gandhi’s educational qualifications are also nothing to write home about. So, they really are not in a position to criticise Irani. It’s like the pot calling the kettle black.
To make a totally different comparison, all the Ivy League MBAs, PhDs in Maths and Physics who worked on the Wall Street, created a major part of the financial crises that the world is currently going through.
To conclude, there is not much of a link between having a degree and having the ability to govern. Look at the mess Kapil Sibal, who held the human resources development ministry between May 2009 and October 2012, made in the education sector. He had got his LLM degree from the Harvard Law School.

The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on May 28, 2014

(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

19 May, 2014

The wilful blindness of Manmohan Singh

Vivek Kaul

The stock market crash of October 1929 started the Great Depression in the United States, from where it spread to large parts of the world. Some of the best books on the Great Depression, which are still being read, started to appear only 25 years later.
My favourite book the Great Depression is The Great Crash 1929, written by John Kenneth Galbraith. The book was first published in 1954, twenty five years after the Depression started. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, which dealt with the Great Depression in considerable detail, came out only in 1963. This book set the agenda for how central banks around the world reacted to recessions.
In fact, books on the Great Depression are still being written. A recent favourite of mine is Lords of Finance—1929, The Great Depression, and The Bankers Who Broke the World, written by Liaquat Ahamed, which was published in 2009. It won many awards including the Pulitzer Prize for history. What is true about the Great Depression is also true about Mahatma Gandhi. Some of the best biographies on the Mahatma, like Gandhi Before India, have appeared in recent times.
Dear reader, before you start wondering why am I talking about the Great Depression and Gandhi, in a column which is supposedly on Manmohan Singh, allow me to explain. The point I am trying to make here is that the best history is usually written many years after something has happened. The gap is probably necessary to allow historians to iron out the noise. Also, over the years new sources of information appear, which were not available in the first place. For one, documents get declassified. At the same time, letters that the men and women being profiled wrote, appear in the public domain and so on.
Hence, the defining history on Manmohan Singh’s years as the Prime Minister of India will most probably be written a few decades from now. Having said that, it is easy to predict that historians won’t project Singh in a good light.
The story that one usually hears about Singh is that he was an honest man heading a dishonest and a corrupt government. While his ministers may have made money being corrupt, he never did. This is a very simplistic explanation of the entire scenario.
A major reason why Manmohan Singh survived as the Prime Minister of India for a full decade was because he was ‘wilfuly blind’ to a lot of nefarious activities happening around him. Wilful Blindess is a legal concept that was first applied in the British courts in 1861.
As Margaret Heffernan writes in Wilful Blindness- Why we ignore the obvious at our peril“A judge in Regina v. Sleep ruled that an accused could not be convicted for possession of government property unless the jury found that he either knew the goods came from government stores or had ‘wilfully shut his eyes to the fact’…Over time, a lot of other phrases came into play – deliberate or wilful ignorance, conscious avoidance and deliberate indifference. What they have all in common is the idea that there is an opportunity for knowledge and a responsibility to be informed, but it is shirked.”
Manmohan Singh’s decade long tenure as the Prime Minister needs to be viewed through the lens of wilful blindness. He was wilfully blind to A Raja running the telecom industry for his own benefit. Singh was also wilfully blind to the coalgate scam where coal mines were given away free to both public sector and private sector companies. In fact, he was the coal minister when a large number of mines were given away free.
In fact, as Heffernan writes “the law does not care why you remain ignorant, only that you do.” Also, on some occasions the wilful blindness comes from that “we focus so intently on the order that we are blind to everything else.” Singh was so focussed on following the orders of Sonia Gandhi, who was the actual head of the government, that he chose to remain ‘wilfully blind’ to all that was happening around him.
Interestingly, when Enron went bust in the early 2000s, Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay, the CEO and Chairman of Enron, pleaded that they just did not know what was going on in the company and hence, could not be held responsible for it.
Judge Lake who was hearing the case invoked the concept of wilful blindness. As he instructed the jury: “You may find that a defendant had knowledge of a fact if you find that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. Knowledge can be inferred if the defendant deliberately blinded himself to the existence of a fact.”
The phrase to be marked in the above statement is “closed his eyes”. The only way Singh could not have known about what was happening around him was if he had closed his eyes to it.
“Magicians never reveal their secrets,” writes Scottish writer Ian Rankin in his latest crime thriller Saints of the Shadow Bible. Singh was no magician. If he wants history to treat him a little better than it actually might end up doing, it is best that he spends his years in retirement writing his memoirs of the ten years he spent as India’s Prime Minister, like Winston Churchill did.
Churchill in the years after the Second World War wrote his version of history of the Second World War and even won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1953. Singh needs to do the same. That way history might also consider his point of view.

The article originally appeared in the June 2014 issue of Mutual Fund Insight

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He can be reached at [email protected])

28 September, 2013

Is Rahul Gandhi a hit and run politician?

Vivek Kaul
Rahul Gandhi is angry again. Yesterday, he barged into a press conference being addressed by Congress general secretary Ajay Maken and announced that the ordinance passed by the Union Cabinet to protect convicted legislators from complete disqualification as “complete nonsense”.
The Supreme Court had ruled on July 10, that an MP or an MLA, if convicted by a court in a criminal offence with a jail sentence of two years or more, would be immediately disqualified. On September 24, the Union Cabinet cleared the the Representation of the People (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 2013 to negate the Supreme Court ruling.
This ordinance allows convicted MPs and MLAs to continue in office to the condition that their appeal is admitted by a higher court within a period of 90 days and their conviction is stayed.
Rahul Gandhi felt that this was incorrect and said “I’ll tell you what my opinion on the ordinance is. It’s complete nonsense. It should be torn up and thrown away. That is my personal opinion.”
“I am interested in what the Congress is doing and what our government is doing. That is why what our government has done as far as this ordinance is concerned is wrong,” he went on to add, embarrassing the Prime Minister and his cabinet of ministers, which had cleared the ordinance only a few days back, in the process.
A lot of analysis has happened since yesterday afternoon, when the Gandhi family scion said what he did. Some people have suggested that “Rahul has his heart in the right place”. Some others have said “what is wrong with calling rubbish, rubbish”. A television anchor known for his loud and aggressive ways called it the “victory of the people”. And still some others have asked the obvious question “how could the government have cleared the ordinance without the consent of Rahul or his mother Sonia Gandhi?”
On the whole, Rahul’s decision to call the ordinance “nonsense” and something that should be “torn and thrown away” is being projected as a surprise. While nobody could have predicted what Rahul Gandhi did yesterday, at the same time this can’t be termed as a surprise.
Rahul Gandhi over the last few years has made a habit of raking up issues to embarrass the government and his party, by saying something controversial and then disappearing. In July 2008, Rahul visited the house of Kalavati Bandurkar, in the village Jalka in the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra. Her husband had committed suicide in December 2005, hit by crop failure and debt. He left her with a debt of Rs 1 lakh. After visiting her, Rahul highlighted her plight in Parliament and then quickly forgot about her. It was an embarrassment for the Congress Party given that it ruled the state of Maharashtra. Since bringing her into the limelight, Kalavati’s daughter and a son in law have also committed suicide.
In October 2008, while addressing girl students at a resort near Jim Corbett National Park, Rahul Gandhi referred to “politics” as a closed system in India. “If I had not come from my family, I wouldn’t be here. You can enter the system either through family or friends or money. Without family, friends or money, you cannot enter the system. My father was in politics. My grandmother and great grandfather were in politics. So, it was easy for me to enter politics. This is a problem. I am a symptom of this problem. I want to change it.,” he said. Where is the change? When was the last time the Congress party had an election for the post of its president? If the top post of the party is not democratic, how can the party be expected to be democratic?
On February 5, 2010, Rahul came to Mumbai and travelled in a local train both on the western line (From Andheri to Dadar) and the central line (from Dadar to Ghatkopar). A lot of song and dance was made about him defying the Shiv Sena, but nothing constructive came out of it. The local trains continue to burst to the seems.
On May 11, 2011, Rahul riding pillion on a bike managed to enter the Bhatta-Parsaul villages in Uttar Pradesh, giving the district administration a slip, and challenging the might of Mayawati, the then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh.
The villagers in Bhatta-Parsaul were protesting against the acquisition of land by the state government and the protests had turned violent. A few days later Rahul went to meet the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to appraise him of the situation.
After coming out of the meeting he told reporters “The issue here is a more fundamental one with regard to these villages in particular and a large number of villages in UP down the Agra highway, where state repression is being used, where people are being murdered…quite severe atrocities are taking place there….There is a set of 74 (mounds of) ashes there with dead bodies inside. Everybody in the village knows it. We can give you pictures. Women have been raped, people have been thrashed. Houses have been destroyed.” These were serious allegations, but nothing ever came out of them.
On August 26, 2011, Rahul gave a speech in favour of Lok Pal in the Lok Sabha, where he said “why not elevate the debate and fortify the Lok Pal by making it a Constitutional body accountable to Parliament like the Election Commission of India?” That was the last we heard of Lok Pal. Meanwhile, Anna Hazare, continues to threaten to go on another hunger strike if the bill is not passed by the Parliament soon.
More recently, on April 4, 2013, Rahul addressed the Confederation of Indian Industries. It was a 75 minute speech, and one of the things he recounted about was about a journey he made a few years back on the Lokmanya Tilak express from Gorakhpur to Mumbai (Lokmanya Tilak is a station in Mumbai at which many long distance trains coming from the Eastern part of the country terminate). “I spent a large part of the Thirty Six hour journey moving across the train and talking to travellers – youngsters, weary families, and migrants moving from the dust of Gorakhpur to the glitter of Mumbai. Took us Thirty Six hours. It is called an Express!”
Some time later in the speech he said: “I am a pilot. I learnt to fly in the United States, I came back. I wanted to convert my license. So I went to the DGCA and I asked what do I have to do. They gave me the curriculum, I opened the book. A large section in the book talks about how to drop mail from aero-planes. How many of you are getting your mail dropped from airplanes in the sky?…And it’s not only in pilot training, it’s everywhere. Look at our text books, open them out. Most of the stuff is not really relevant to what they are going to do.”
The things that Rahul said were not only an embarrassment for the current government. The fact that Indian Railways takes so much time or our education system is not up to the mark, has not happened overnight. The degeneration has happened over a period of time, meaning Rahul’s great-grandfather(Jawahar Lal Nehru), his grandmother (Indira Gandhi), his uncle (Sanjay Gandhi), his father(Rajiv Gandhi) and his mother(Sonia Gandhi), who have been de-facto heads of government at various points of time since India’s independence, are responsible for it.
But then we all know that? How does just pointing out the obvious help anybody? Where are the solutions? As The Economist wrote after Rahul’s CII speech “Gandhi could have spelled out two or three specific measures, ideally in some detail, that he would support—for example, getting an Indian-wide goods-and-services tax accepted; promoting investment in retail or other industries; or devising a means by which infrastructure could be built much quicker. If he were really brave, he might have set out thoughts on ending bureaucratic uncertainty over corruption, or on land reform.”
But all Rahul seems to do is hit and run. He says something on an issue, embarrasses his party, his government or his ancestors and moves on. Rahul Gandhi is not a serious politician. He is in politics because he cannot do anything else or is expected to continue the family tradition and keep the flag flying.
One can only speculate on the reasons for his lack of interest, given his reclusive nature. From his father and grandmother being assassinated to the fact that the future generations are no longer interested in what their forefathers built, be it business or politics.
I am more tempted to go with the latter reason. Rasheed Kidwai, makes this point in the new edition of his book 24 Akbar Road. As he writes “It is said that the conqueror Taimur the ‘Lame’ once spoke to the famous historian and sociologist Ibn Khuldun about the fate of dynasties. Khuldun said that the glory of a dynasty seldom lasted beyond four generations. The first generation inclined towards conquest; the second towards administration; the third, freed of the necessity to conquer or administer, was left with the pleasurable task of spending the wealth of its ancestors on cultural pursuits. Consequently, by the fourth generation, a dynasty had usually spent its wealth as well as human energy. Hence, the downfall of each dynasty is embedded in the very process of its rise. According to Khuldun, it was a natural phenomenon and could not be avoided.”
Hence, evolution is at work. As historian and author Ramachandra Guha told me in an interview I did for Firstpost in December 2012 “I think this dynasty is now on its last legs. Its charisma is fading with every generation. And Rahul Gandhi is completely mediocre.”
That to a large extent explains Rahul’s hit and run mentality and his reluctance to take a more active role in government. After his yesterday’s statement, the least that Rahul Gandhi can do is take on more responsibility either by advancing the Lok Sabha elections or becoming a part of the government in some form.
But neither of these things is going to happen because Rahul Gandhi has said what he wanted to and disappeared again. His attitude is best reflected in an interview he gave to the Tehalka magazine in September 2005, in which he is supposed to have remarked “I could have been prime minister at the age of twenty-five if I wanted to.”
The statement created an uproar. The Congress party immediately jumped to the defence of its princling. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, specifically mentioned that Rahul had not said ‘I could have been prime minister at the age of twenty-five if I wanted to’.
(Tehakla initially stood by its story but backed down later. “This seems to be a clear case of misunderstanding. Mr Gandhi thought he was having a casual chat whereas our reporter took it to be a proper interview,” the weekly said in a statement(The ‘edited’ casual chatcan still be read on Tehelka’s website)).
The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on September 28, 2013
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)