Cash Transfer of Subsidies is the Right Way Forward

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In his book Naked Economics—Undressing the Dismal Science, the American author Charles Wheelan recounts a very interesting story about his visit to Cuba. Cuba, as you know, dear reader, has been under a communist regime for a very long time.

As Wheelan writes: “Because the visit was licensed by the U.S. government, each member of the delegation was allowed to bring back $100 worth of Cuban merchandise, including cigars. Having been raised in the era of discount stores, we all set out looking for the best price on Cohibas [a premium Cigar brand] so that we could get the most bang for our $100 allowance. After several fruitless hours, we discovered the whole point of communism: The price of cigar was the same everywhere. There is no competition between stores because there is no profit as we know it. Every store sells cigars—and everything else for that matter—at whatever price Fidel Castro (or his brother Raul) tells them to.”

Wheelan had basically experienced in Cuba what we in India call the public distribution system. Further, he had managed to find cigars everywhere he went though at the same price. What this tells us is that the public distribution system in Cuba did work, at least when it came to cigars. In India, it does not.

The government runs the public distribution system through around five lakh fair priced shops also known as ration shops. Unlike Cuba, these shops are very leaky. And food grains and kerosene that are sold through these shops do not reach the intended beneficiaries and find its way into the open market. The fair price shop owners benefit in this process.

As per the Economic Survey which was released last month, 54% of the wheat and 15% of the rice that is distributed through the public distribution system does not reach the intended beneficiaries. Along similar lines, 48% of sugar is siphoned off as well (as per last financial year’s Economic Survey). When it comes to kerosene, nearly 46% is siphoned off. 24% of domestic cooking gas and 40% of fertilizer is also siphoned off.

This means that the government of India loses a lot of money every year. As the economist Kaushik Das writes in An Economist in the Real World: “The problem arises from the fact that in India the food subsidy is handed to poor households via the ration shops. The government delivers subsidised grain to the store owner and the owner is then instructed to hand this over at the prescribed price to Below Poverty Line (BPL) households and to some other categories of vulnerable households.”

The assumption is that the shop owners will honestly pass on the grains and kerosene to those it’s meant for. As Basu writes: “If store owners were perfectly honest, this would work fine. But if they are not, then it is easy to see that many of them will give in to the temptation of making some easy money by selling off some of this subsidised grain in the open market where the price is higher, and turning away some of the deserving poor households or adulterating the grain that is to be sold to those households…A large share of the wheat meant to reach the poor never does because it is pilfered or sold on the open market en route.”

So what is the way out of this? One way is better policing. Nevertheless, as Basu writes: “It is easy to respond to this by asking for better policing. But we have to be realistic. Trying to police such a large system by creating another layer of police and bureaucracy will come with its own problems of corruption and bureaucracy.”

A better solution for this mess is to handover the subsidy directly to the poor households instead of going through the fair price shop owner. How can this be done? This can be carried out through the Aadhaar card linked to a savings bank account.

The penetration of Aadhaar cards has gone up at a very rapid pace all across India. As the Economic Survey points out: “The current government has built on the previous government’s support for the Aadhaar program: 210 million Aadhaar cards were created in 2015, at an astonishing rate of over 4 million cards per week. 975 million individuals now hold an Aadhaar card – over 75 percent of the population and nearly 95 per cent of the adult population…Aadhaar penetration is high across states. Nearly one-third of all states have coverage rates greater than 90 percent; and only in 4 states—Nagaland (48.9), Mizoram (38.0), Meghalaya (2.9) and Assam (2.4)—is penetration less than 50 per cent.

These cards now need to be linked to savings bank accounts. This will ensure that instead of handing over subsidised grains to the intended beneficiary through the fair price shop route, the government can simply transfer money into his Aadhaar linked bank account. This money can then be used to buy the food grains from any shop instead of just the shops which come under the public distribution system.

This will create competition among shops and ensure that the poor get access to the food grains that they are entitled to. It will also ensure that the leakage of food grains will come down dramatically.

As the Economic Survey points out: “After identifying beneficiaries, the government must transfer money to them. Every beneficiary needs a bank account and the government needs their account numbers. This constraint has been significantly eased by the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana, under whose auspices nearly 120 million accounts were created in the last year alone—at a blistering, record-setting pace of over 3 lakh accounts per day.”

The trouble is that despite this blistering pace, the savings account penetration continues to remain low across large parts of the country. As the Economic Survey points out: “Despite Jan Dhan’s record-breaking feats, basic savings account penetration in most states is still relatively low – 46 per cent on average and above 75 per cent in only 2 states (Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh).”

The sooner this is corrected, the faster the government can move to putting cash directly in the accounts of people instead of trying to distribute food grains through a leaky public distribution system.

To conclude, on March 11, 2016, the government moved one step closer to cash transfer of subsidies. The Lok Sabha passed the Aadhaar Bill. Given that the Bill was introduced as a money bill, the government doesn’t have to get the Bill passed through Rajya Sabha.

The column originally appeared on Vivek Kaul’s Diary on March 14, 2016

Middle class exit is quietly on

 

 

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It is very well known that only a small portion of India’s population pays income tax whereas everyone over eighteen is allowed to vote.

As per the annual report of the ministry of finance for 2014, the total number of assesses in 2013-2014 had stood at 4.7 crore. These includes individuals, families, trusts as well corporates. What this clearly tells us is that not many Indians pay income tax in an individual capacity. The number could be as low as 3% of the population.

One explanation for this is that India is a poor country, and in a poor country it is but logical that many people won’t pay income tax. Having said that 3% is too low a number. This is something that the latest Economic Survey which released on February 26, 2016.

As the Survey points out: “For the level of democracy, India’s ratio of taxpayers to voting age population is significantly less than that of comparable countries. This implies that while at present about 4 per cent of citizens who vote pay taxes, the percentage should be about 23.”

So around one-sixth of those who should be paying income tax are actually paying it. There are multiple implications of the same. The government doesn’t earn as much as it could. This means that the government has to borrow more to pay for its expenditure. And every extra rupee that the government borrows, means that there is one rupee less available for the private sector to borrow. This pushes up the costs of borrowing for the private sector, which in effect impacts their expansion plans.

It also means that a lot of black money is being generated. This black money finds its way into real estate and gold, where it is the easiest to hide. Black money going into real estate has driven up prices too extremely high levels all around the country, making it difficult for people who want to buy a home to live in, to be able to buy one.

But there is another problem—a small section of the population gets squeezed for income tax. The logic here is that the government takes from those who have money through taxation and hands it over to those who don’t, in various ways. A good example of this in the non-tax context was a policy that was followed in the state of West Bengal.

As economist Kaushik Basu writes in An Economist in the Real World: “To ensure that rural people get good education, West Bengal made it compulsory for teachers, including the best, to serve a term in rural areas.”

What did this do? As Basu points out: “It changed the catchment of “best” teachers, since many talented people preferred not to become teachers or, if they were already teachers, they preferred to move out to other places, where they would not be rotated.”

A similar sort of thing happens when a small section of population is squeezed for taxes. As the Economic Survey points out: “If the state’s role is predominantly redistribution, the middle class will seek – in Professor Albert Hirschman’s famous terminology – to exit from the state. They will avoid or minimise paying taxes; they will cocoon themselves in gated communities; they will use diesel generators to obtain power; they will go to private hospitals and send their children to private education institutions.”

This phenomenon is clearly visible in Bengaluru and other metropolitan cities all across the country. As the Economic Survey points out: “All these pathologies are evident in India. By reducing the pressure on the state, middle class exit will shrink it, eroding its legitimacy further, leading to more exit and so on. A state that prioritises or over-emphasises redistribution without providing basic public goods [roads, electricity, water and so on], risks unleashing this vicious spiral.”

Like was the case with the teachers of West Bengal, the Indian middle class exit is quietly on.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He can be reached at [email protected])

The column originally appeared in the Bangalore Mirror on March 9, 2016

How Black Money Helps Indian Banks Finance Real Estate

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Black money or money which has been earned and on which tax has not been paid, is a common phenomenon in India. The fact that only around 3-4% Indians pay income tax explains this. This hurts the government given that it is not able to raise as much tax as it could, if everybody or a substantial portion of Indians paid income tax. It also means that the government has to borrow more in order to meet its expenses, and this pushes up interest rates.

It is also not fair on those Indians, typically the salaried class, who have no option but to pay income tax. What has also happened over the years is that instead of trying to expand the tax base, various governments have tried to milk those who pay tax, for more and more tax.

But not everyone is hurt because of black money. In fact, in case of home loans, banks and housing finance companies benefit because of black money. As Kaushik Basu, current chief economist at World Bank and former chief economic adviser to the ministry of finance, writes in his new book An Economist in the Real World – The Art of Policymaking in India: “A lot of the buying and selling of homes in India occurs with a part of the transaction being made in cash with no record kept of this in order not to leave a trail of evidence.”

Basu then goes on to explain how this benefits banks and housing finance companies issuing home loans. As he writes: “You want to buy a house valued at Rs 100 from the private market. The chances are the seller will tell you that he will not take the full Rs 100 paid in cheque, but will ask for a part, maybe Rs 50 or Rs 60, in cheque with the rest paid in cash with no evidence of this payment. The latter is called a black money payment.”

And how does this help? As Basu writes: “This helps the seller not to have to pay a large capital gains tax. Even many buyers want to pay partly in cash and to show the value of the house to be less than it actually is in order to avoid having to pay too much property tax.”

In fact, what Basu misses out on is the fact that in many cases buyers also have black money and they need to put this to use. And real estate is the best place to put it use given the totally opaque way in which the sector operates.

The black money payment essentially helps banks because the risk they take on in giving out the home loan, essentially comes down. How? “Since mortgage loans [i.e. home loans] can only be taken on the “declared” part of the house price, a house valued at Rs 100 would typically be bought with a mortgage of less than Rs 50. This means that when house prices [fall], unless the price drops [are] extraordinarily large, banks [will] not have a balance sheet problem,” writes Basu. In simple English what this means is that unless home prices fall dramatically, the value of the home (which is a collateral for the bank) will continue to be greater than the home loan outstanding.

He further philosophises that “Economics is not a moral subject”. “Often what is patently corrupt, like the pervasive use of black money can turn out to be a bulwark against a crisis.” In fact, Basu feels that the black money payments ensured that Indian banks did not have their own version of the subprime home loan crisis that hit the United States in 2008-2009.

Let’s understand this phenomenon in a little more detail. The December 2015 investor presentation of HDFC, the largest home finance company in the country, points out that the average home loan that it gives out is Rs 25 lakh. The average loan to value of a home stands at 65%. This means that the average price of a home financed by HDFC stands at around Rs 38.5 lakh (Rs 25 lakh divided by 0.65). The borrower/buyer makes an average down-payment of Rs 13.5 lakh(Rs 38.5 lakh minus Rs 25 lakh).

Over and above this there is a black payment to be made as well. It is very difficult to estimate the average amount of black money that gets paid every time a home loan is taken on to buy a home. Let’s assume that a black money payment of Rs 11.5 lakh is made. This means the real price of the home works out to Rs 50 lakh(Rs 38.5 lakh plus Rs 11.5 lakh).

Against this, HDFC lends Rs 25 lakh. Hence, the real average loan to home market value ratio stands at around 50%. This also when we assume that black money forms around 23% of the total value of the transaction (Rs 11.5 lakh divided by Rs 50 lakh). Black money payments in large parts of the country, especially in the northern part, can be considerably larger than this.

Hence, what this clearly tells us is that banks and housing finance companies end up lending half or less than half of the market value of the homes they are financing through home loans. And this makes it a very safe deal. Home prices need to fall by more than 50% for the value of the home to be lower than the home loan outstanding.

What also helps is the fact that home loans in India are recourse loans. This means that in case a borrower decides to default on the home loan by simply walking away from it, the lender can go beyond seizing the collateral (i.e., the house) to recover what is due to him. He can seize the other assets of the borrower, be it another house, investments, or money lying in a bank account, to recover his loan.

This along with black money payments explains why home loans are such good business for banks and housing finance companies. In case of HDFC, the non-performing loans formed around 0.54% of the individual home-loan portfolio. In fact, even when loans go bad, the institution is able to recover a major part of what is due and this explains why “total loan write-offs since inception [for HDFC]  is less than 4 basis points of cumulative disbursements.” One basis point is one hundredth of a percentage.

In case of State Bank of India, another big home-loan lender, the non-performing loans formed around 1.02% of overall retail loans. The bank does not give a separate non-performing loans number for home loans.

The column originally appeared in the Vivek Kaul Diary on March 2, 2016

Economic Survey: There Is A Very Compelling Case For India To Move To Cash Transfer Of Subsidies

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Price subsidies have been a very important part of the Indian government’s plan of trying to bring down poverty in the country. This entails selling commodities like rice, wheat and kerosene, at a price significantly lower than the market price through the public distribution system.

But the question is, do these subsidies work? The Economic Survey for 2014-2015 had said that: “Prima facie, price subsidies do not appear to have had a transformative effect on the living standards of the poor, though they have helped poor households weather inflation and price volatility.”

What are the basic problems with these subsidies? Subsidies are regressive. This basically means that the rich households tend to benefit more from them than the poor for whom the subsidies are meant.

Take the case of cooking gas which the oil marketing companies sell at a loss and are in turn compensated by the government. It turns out that the poorest 50% of the households consume only 25% of the cooking gas.

Further, subsidies don’t reach those who they are meant for. Around 46% of kerosene which has to be distributed through the public distribution system(PDS) is lost as a leakage. This basically means that the kerosene is siphoned off by those running the shops that constitute the PDS and the government functionaries involved. It is then sold in the open market.

This story plays out across other commodities distributed through the PDS as well. Nearly 54% of the wheat meant to be distributed through PDS is lost as a leakage. Around 48% of the sugar and 15% of rice meant to be distributed through the public distribution system is lost as a leakage.

Fertilisers also face a similar leakage problem. As the Economic Survey of 2015-2016 released a few hours back points out: “The government budgeted Rs 73,000 crore—about 0.5 per cent of GDP—on fertiliser subsidies in 2015-16. Nearly 70 percent of this amount was allocated to urea, the most commonly used fertiliser, making it the largest subsidy after food.”

Subsidised urea has three kinds of leakages. As the Survey points out: “(i) 24 per cent is spent on inefficient urea producers (ii) of the remaining,4 1 per cent is diverted to non-agricultural uses and abroad; (ii) of the remaining, 24 per cent is consumed by larger—presumably richer—farmers.”

These are huge leakages which cost the government a lot of money. So what can be done about this? As the Economic Survey points out: “Cash transfers can directly improve the economic lives of India’s poor, and raise economic efficiency by reducing leakages and market distortions.”

The current model of distribution of subsidies is essentially very leaky. This has led to a situation where only 35% or Rs 17,500 crore of the total urea subsidy of Rs 50,300 crore reaches the small and marginal farmers, the intended beneficiaries.

It is estimated that 75% subsidy on agricultural urea has essentially managed to create a thriving black market in the Bangladesh and Nepal. As the Economic Survey points out: “Comparing urea allocation data with estimates of actual use from the Cost of Cultivation Survey 2012-13, we estimate that 41 per cent of urea is diverted to industry or smuggled across borders.”

Further, there is a huge black market for urea within India as well. “It is estimated that about 51 per cent of Indian farmers buy urea at above-MRP. In the three eastern states bordering Bangladesh, 100 per cent of farmers had to buy urea at above MRP in the black market. Similarly, in Uttar Pradesh, which borders Nepal, 67 per cent of farmers had to buy urea in the black market at above the stipulated MRP,” the Survey points out.
The simple answer to prevent this leakage would have been better policing. Nevertheless, as World Bank chief economist Kaushik Basu writes in An Economist in the Real World—The Art of Policymaking in India: “Trying to police such a large system by creating another layer of police and bureaucracy will come with its own problems of corruption and bureaucracy.” It also leads to the proverbial question of who will police the police?

The answer lies in coming up with a better design in order to deliver food grains, fertiliser and kerosene to the poor. Essentially, the role of the PDS shop owner needs to be cut down. The Economic Survey for 2014-2015 as well as the Economic Survey for 2015-2016 talk about direct cash transfers to beneficiaries of these subsidised commodities, instead of distributing them through the PDS.

Instead of distributing food grains, fertiliser and kerosene through the PDS shops, the intended beneficiaries need to be given money through cash transfers and be allowed to buy commodities from wherever they want to.

As the Survey for 2014-2015 pointed out: “Recent experimental evidence documents that unconditional cash transfers – if targeted well – can boost household consumption and asset ownership and reduce food security problems for the ultra poor.”

In fact, Basu explains this in some detail in his book through the concept of food coupons, which are again nothing but cash transfers. He envisages a system where the poor get food coupons or cash transfers and they then use that money to buy kerosene, fertiliser and food grains from any shop instead of just the PDS shop in their neighbourhood.

As he writes: “Note that since the stores get full price from the poor and, more importantly, the same price from the poor and the rich, they will have little incentive to turn away the poor away. Further, the incentive to adulterate will also be greatly reduced since the poor will have the right to go to any store with their coupons [or cash for that matter].”

This means that the PDS shops are also likely to sell good stuff, instead of trying to adulterate the commodities. Further, the siphoning of the food grains, fertiliser and kerosene will also come down.

The fear here is that the poor will use their coupons or cash for something else. But that risk is anyway there in the current system as well. The poor can sell the grain or the kerosene that they get and do something else with that money.

Also, as Basu puts it: “If they choose not to take the benefit in the form of food and buy something else, it is not nearly so counterproductive as the benefit going to owners of PDS stores as often happens in the current system.” The chances of that money being spent and benefitting the economy are higher.

For this system to work the government needs to be able to link the Aadhaar number to an active bank account, in which it can transfer money. As of January 2016, around 970 million Indians have Aadhaar numbers. In fact, linking Aadhaar numbers to bank accounts has worked very well in case of subsidised cooking gas cylinders where black marketing has come down. “The use of Aadhaar has made black marketing harder, and LPG leakages have reduced by about 24 per cent with limited exclusion of genuine beneficiaries.”

As the Survey points out:A number of states, like Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, with high Aadhaar penetration and POS devices in rural areas might be good candidates to start pilots based on this model.” 
Let’s hope this happens on a larger scale than it currently is, sooner rather than later.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

The column originally appeared on Huffington Post India on February 26, 2016

Here’s One Thing Modi Govt Should Do in Its Remaining Budgets

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The annual budget of the Narendra Modi government will be presented by the finance minister Arun Jaitley on February 29, the last day of this month.

Given this, it is a season where everyone has been advising Jaitley on how to go about the entire thing. Some economists have said that the government should increase the public investment, in order to get the economy growing at a faster pace. Others have said that it is important that the government maintain the fiscal deficit target that it has set for itself and not spend more in the process of increasing public investment. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends.

Regular readers of the Diary will know that I am in the government trying to maintain its fiscal deficit camp. Having said that I am not against the government ramping up public investment as long as it can find the money to do so without increasing the fiscal deficit and borrowing more in the process.

As World Bank chief economist Kaushik Basu writes in his new book An Economist in the Real World—The Art of Policymaking in India: A fiscal stimulus is like an antibiotic. It is very effective when used for a short period of time. But if used repeatedly and over long stretches of time, the side effects tend to outstrip the benefits. In India’s case a large deficit is likely to fuel the inflation rate.”

Given this, it is very important as to how the government goes about increasing public investment. As Basu writes: “Choices have to be made very carefully. The first task to which more effort needs to be directed is raising tax revenue.”

Take a look at the accompanying table. Between 2010-11 and this financial year, the taxes as a proportion of gross domestic product have more or less been similar, and have varied within a narrow range. Interestingly, the taxes as a proportion of GDP have fallen since 2007-08.

 

YearDirect taxes as a % of GDPIndirect taxes as a % of GDPTaxes as a % of GDP
2004-054.15.269.36
2005-064.475.49.87
2006-075.365.6210.98
2007-086.265.611.86
2008-095.934.7910.72
2009-105.833.769.59
2010-115.724.410.12
2011-125.594.4310.02
2012-135.594.7510.34
2013-145.634.3710
2014-155.634.319.94
2015-165.664.5810.24
Source: Reserve Bank of IndiaAverage10.25

 

One possible explanation for this lies in the fact that both the stock market as well as real estate prices rallied between 2002-03 and 2007-08. This meant that investors would have made a lot of capital gains, on which they would have paid capital gains tax. This would have pushed the total amount of income tax collected by the government.

In 2001-02, the direct taxes amounted to around 2.94% of the GDP. By 2007-08, they had jumped up to 6.26% of the GDP. Another possible explanation for this lies in the fact that the salaried class got very good increments during the period. Also, the wealth effect was at play as well. With stock prices and real estate prices going up, people felt wealthy and in the process indulged in greater consumption. This led to the collection of higher indirect taxes. The collection of indirect taxes fell dramatically after 2007-08. In 2009-10, indirect taxes collected were at 3.76% of the GDP.

Since 2010-11, the collection of direct as well as indirect taxes as a proportion of GDP has been more or less flat. What this means is that the same set of people are essentially financing the Indian government and there seems to have been no effort made to expand the tax base. As Basu puts it: “Not only is India’s tax-to-GDP ratio low, it went down over the last seven years. Global comparison suggests that India can do much better.”

How does India fair in comparison to other countries when it comes to the tax to GDP ratio? A study titled Tax Revenue Mobilisation In Developing Countries: Issues and Challenges points out: “In comparative perspective, developing countries raise substantially less revenue than advanced economies. The ratio of tax to GDP in low-income countries is between 10% and 20% whereas for OECD economies [or developed economies] it is in the range of 30- 40%.”

What this clearly tells us is that India is at the lower end of the spectrum when it comes to collecting taxes and hence, there is tremendous scope to improve. As Basu puts it: “India should aim to reach a tax revenue-to-GDP ratio of 15 percent within two or three years, and then set an even higher target of, for instance, 20 percent over the medium term.

This does not mean that the government has to raise tax rates. As Basu writes: “This can be done almost entirely through plugging of loopholes and prevention of tax evasion, and the implementation of a more rational tax code, without having to raise taxes.”

Interestingly, along with the budget every year, the government releases the statement of revenue foregone. As the statement released with the last budget pointed out: “The aggregate revenue impact of incentives available in respect of direct and indirect taxes (levied by the Central Government) is Rs 5,49,984.1 crore for 2013-14 and is projected to be Rs 5,89,285.2 crore for 2014-15.” The point being if the tax laws did not have a significant number of exemptions, the government would have collected more tax.

As the statement further points out: “The estimates and projections are intended to indicate the potential revenue gain that would be realised by removing exemptions, deductions, weighted deductions and similar measures.”

Hence, there is a lot to gain for the government if it goes about plugging these loopholes. But then that would mean side-lining corporate lobbies and big business, which finance political parties. Can the Modi government afford to do that?

On that your guess is as good as mine!

The column was originally published in Vivek Kaul’s Diary on February 25, 2016