Lessons from Nokia: Companies, unlike cockroaches, aren't great survivors

nokia-logoVivek Kaul

Cockroaches are great survivors. They can even survive a nuclear attack. As Dylan Grice, formerly with Soceite Generale and now the editor of the Edelweiss Journal wrote in a report titled Cockroaches for the long run! in November 2012 “Cockroaches may not be able to build nuclear bombs, but they can withstand the nuclear war. They survive.”
Grice also points out that the oldest cockroach fossil is nearly 350 million years old. “According to the record of the rocks, cockroaches first appeared just after the second of the earth’s five mass extinctions (defined as the loss of 75% of all species). In other words, that means they survived, the third, the fourth and fifth mass extinctions which followed,” writes Grice.
And there is no rocket science behind the ability of cockroaches to survive. They follow a very simple algorithm. As Grice writes “According to Richard Bookstaber, that algorithm is “singularly simple and seemingly suboptimal: it moves in the opposite direction of gusts of wind that must signal an approaching predator.” And that’s it.”
Such a simple straight forward strategy, along with their ability to go without air for 45 minutes, survive submerged underwater for half an hour, withstand 15 times more radiation than humans and eat almost anything, including the glue on the back of stamps, helps cockroaches survive.
Companies do not come with the same kind of flexibility. Neither are they good at avoiding trouble. And given that their turnover rate is pretty high. 
The average life span of a company listed on the S&P 500 index of leading American companies is around 15 years. This has come down dramatically from around 67 years in the 1920s.
Companies have a very high mortality rate. 
As an article in the Bloomberg Businessweek points out “The average life expectancy of a multinational corporation-Fortune 500 or its equivalent-is between 40 and 50 years. This figure is based on most surveys of corporate births and deaths.”
Companies are either acquired, merged, broken to pieces or simply shut down. Nokia, which till a few years back was the world’s leading mobile phone manufacturer, is now going through a phase of trying to stay relevant. It was announced yesterday that the mobile phone division of the Finnish company 
would be sold to Microsoft for $7.2 billion.
Nokia produced the first mobile phone in 1987, more than a quarter century back. It was the world’s largest vendor of mobile phones, until Samsung overtook it in 2012. Even now, Nokia makes nearly 15% of the world’s mobile phones. But it only has 3% share in the lucrative smart phone market, where the most of the mobile phone users seem to be moving towards.
So what went wrong with Nokia? It failed to see the rise of a new category of mobile phones i.e. the smart phone market. As marketing consultants Al and Laura Ries,write in 
War In the Boardroom, “The biggest mistake of logical management types is their failure to see the rise of a new category. They seem to believe that categories are firmly fixed and a new one seldom arises.”
Companies tend to remain obsessed in selling a product they are good at selling and thus fail to see the rise of a totally new category. Nokia fell victim to this as well.
The history of business is littered with many such examples. Sony invented the walkman but allowed Apple and others to walkway with the MP3 player market. RCA ,which was big radio manufacturer, had earlier allowed Sony to walkway with the pocket radio market. Southwest Airlines created an entirely new low cost airline market which gradually spread to all other parts of the world. Incumbents like Panam, Delta, Singapore Airlines and British Airways did not spot this opportunity. The 24 hour news market was spotted by CNN and not BBC as you would have expected to given the dominance they have had in the global news market.
So the question is why do incumbents which are doing particularly well fail to see the rise of a new category? The answer for this lies in what happened with Kodak, a company which was a global leader in film photography. As Mark Johnson writes in 
Seizing the White Space – Business Model Innovation for Growth and Renewal “In 1975, Kodak engineer, Steve Sasson invented the first camera, which captured low-resolution black-and-white images and transferred them to a TV. Perhaps fatally, he dubbed it “filmless photography” when he demonstrated the device for various leaders at the company.”
Sasson was told “that’s cute – but don’t tell anyone about it.” The reason for this reluctance was very simple. What Sasson had invented went against the existing business model of the company. Kodak at that point of time was the world’s largest producer of photo film. And any camera that did not use photo-film was obviously going to be detrimental to the interests of the company.
So Kodak ignored the segment. By the time it realised the importance of the segment other companies like Canon had already jumped in and become big players. Also by then brand Canon had come to be associated very strongly with the digital camera whereas Kodak continued to be associated with the old photo film.
The same thing happened to Sony as
well. The MP3 player was ultimately an extension of the Walkman and the Cdman market which the company had successfully captured. So what stopped them from capturing the MP3 player market as well? Over the years, other than being a full fledged electronics company, Sony had also morphed into a music company which had the rights to the songs of some of the biggest rock stars and pop stars. Hence, Sony supporting MP3 technology would mean that one of the biggest music companies in the world was supporting the free copying and distribution of music because that was what MP3 was all about.
And that of course wouldn’t work. This obsession with the current way of doing business stops companies from seeing the rise of a totally new category of doing business. Closer to home, Bharti Beetel is an excellent example. The company pioneered the sale of landline phones which had buttons. But it was so busy selling these phones that it failed to see the rise of the mobile phone market. And by the time the market took off brands like Nokia were firmly entrenched. This happened at the same time as Beetel’s sister concern, Bharti Airtel, became the largest mobile phone company in India.
Imagine the possibilities here. If Bharti Airtel during its heydays had sold a Bharti Beetel mobile phone along with every connection, a lot of money could have been made.
Another excellent example of this is Xerox. “Just think of Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center, which famously owned the technologies that helped catapult Apple (the graphical user interface, the mouse), Adobe (post script graphical technology) and 3Com (Ethernet technology) to success,” writes Johnson. But the company had an excellent product in the photo copy machine which was selling like hot cakes, and there was no need for it to concentrate on other products which would be viable some day in the future.
Nokia became a victim of this phenomenon as well where it completely ignored the rise of a new category. The company was busy selling its mobile phones and failed to see the rise of the smart phone market. Even though smart phones have been around for a while now its only in the last couple of years that they have really taken off. Hence, as long as the basic phones of Nokia were selling well, it had no real interest in thinking about the smart phone market.
By the time it woke up to the smart phone game, the likes of Galaxy (from Samsung) and iPhone (from Apple) had already captured the smart phone market. The company has been trying to play catchup in the smart phone market through its Lumia brand but has very little market share. 
As a Reuters report points out “Although Nokia also said in July it had shipped 7.4 million Lumia smart phones in the quarter, up 32 percent from Q1, it was fewer than the 8.1 million units analysts had anticipated. Nokia now boasts only around 15 percent of the handset market share, with an even smaller 3 percent share in smart phones.”
Blackberry is another such company. It was busy selling phones which had an excellent email application. Meanwhile, it failed to see the rise of the smart phone market like Nokia. It is now trying catchup but other companies have already captured the market. In the days to come, the chances of Blackberry being acquired by another company, like Nokia has been, are very high.
What the Nokia story tells us is that companies unlike cockroaches are not great survivors. As the Bloomberg Businessweek article quoted earlier points out “Even the big, solid companies, the pillars of the society we live in, seem to hold out for not much longer than an aver-age of 40 years. And that 40-year figure, short though it seems, represents the life expectancy of companies of a considerable size…A recent study by Ellen de Rooij of the Stratix Group in Amsterdam indicates that the average life expectancy of all firms, regardless of size, measured in Japan and much of Europe, is only 12.5 years.”
Nokia started operating in 1871 and was named after the Nokianvirta river. It spent more than a 100 years manufacturing everything from boots to cables to tyres. In 1987, the company made the first mobile phone. In 2013, the mobile phone division was sold to Microsoft. That’s a period of 26 years. Almost double the life expectancy of 12.5 years which prevails for companies in Europe. As per that parameter, Nokia survived long enough.

The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on September 4, 2013 

 (Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek) 

Why Flipkart’s Flyte is shutting down and Apple’s iTunes won’t

flipkart-flyte
Vivek Kaul 
Flipkart is shutting down its digital music store Flyte. The company announced this in an email to its customers on May 29, 2013. For music lovers, Flyte was a one stop shop for almost all kinds of music. From Runa Laila singing Bangla folk to Ilaiyaraaja’s soulful Tamil melodies from the 70s and the 80s. And of course it also had the most obscure Hindi film songs (This writer even managed to locate songs of a film called Shabash Daddy, made by Kishore Kumar, which has some really soulful songs sung by his son Amit Kumar). It did not just cater to connoisseurs. All the latest music was available as well.
At a price ranging from Rs 6 to Rs 15 per song, a lot of good music was available at one place. A winning proposition one would have thought. But things did not turn out as they would have been originally envisaged. And the digital music store is being shut down nearly 15 months after it was launched.
Several questions crop up here. Why did Flipkart shut down Flyte so quickly? How does Flyte compare to Apple iTunes which is more than a decade old and still going strong?
The quick answer is that Flipkart is shutting down Flyte because it was a loss making proposition. And it was a loss making proposition because Indians do not like to pay for their music anymore. Everyone wants to download music for free. Or buy pirated stuff which comes very cheap.
As Nikhil Pahwa writes on www.medianama.com “Flyte Music had struck deals for India based music downloads on web and app by paying music labels an aggregate minimum guarantee (MG) of around $1 million (Rs 5.5-6 crores) for the year, multiple sources told MediaNama. Given the advent of music streaming services like Gaana*, Saavn and Dhingana, where users could stream music for free, but more importantly, the prevalence of piracy, the number of users willing to pay for a-la-carte music was fairly limited. Revenues from song downloads were fairly low – not even 50% of the minimum guarantee amount (only around Rs 2-3 crore is what we heard).”
And if this wasn’t enough the revenues from this business were not growing as fast as from other businesses that Flipkart runs. “More importantly, revenues from Flyte Music grew in a linear manner, unlike Flipkart’s physical goods business, which was growing exponentially, month-on-month. Flyte, with low revenues and low growth,” writes Pahwa.
Then there were other issues. Many people now listen to music on their phones. And a lot of new phones came with songs inbuilt into them. 
As a report in The Times of India points out “A service like Flyte also faces challenge from companies like Nokia and Sony that allow people who buy their smartphones to download millions of songs for free or at very nominal cost. Though these songs can be played only on specific devices.”
So this was the quick answer to why Flipkart shut down Flyte. Now to answer the second question as to how does Flyte compare to Apple iTunes. Why has iTunes been a viable proposition and Flyte was not? The easy answer here is that Apple is a great company and whatever they do has to turn out to be successful. But this answer is basically unfair to Flipkart, which has literally changed the way Indians shop. We need to get into little more detail.
The need for Apple iTunes came up after Apple iPod was launched in Ocotober 2001. The iPod had two godfathers: the Sony Walkman and the Napster website.
As John Mullins and Randy Komisar write in 
Getting to Plan B – Breaking Through To a Better Business Model “For Apple, there were some analogues to light the way, starting with Sony’s Walkman… Further, some 26 million Napster users worldwide, sitting around in their jeans and t-shirts sharing their music files, made it clear that individual songs were just as much, if not more, appealing to music consumers than complete albums.”
Napster was a peer to peer website from which music could be downloaded for free. It soon ran into copyright infringement as music companies got their act together and sued Napster and it had to shutdown.
So the Apple iPod had a problem. Like Napster, it could also get into trouble if the music companies decided to sue it, for encouraging the proliferation of pirated music. As Mullins and Komisar write “Apple had officially entered the consumer electronics industry. But to complete the picture, Jobs (then Apple CEO Steve Jobs) needed a way to sell music as well. Let’s use Gillette as an analogue: Apple was already selling razors (the iPod), but Jobs wanted to sell the razor blades (music), too.”
And unlike Napster, Apple needed to do this legally. It needed to create some sort of a digital service, from which those who bought the iPod could download their music legally.
Jobs personally called individual artists… to persuade them to make their music available on the service. Apple was the first to negotiate and reach agreement with five record companies, allowing Apple to sell hundreds of thousands of songs from artists… In a revolutionary move Apple worked out a deal to sell (not rent) each song for 99 cents. Once they shelled out the cash, Apple’s customers could keep their songs indefinitely, share them on as many as three Macintosh computers, burn them to an unlimited number of CDs, and transfer them to any number of iPod portable music players,” write Mullins and Komistar.
The iTunes website launched in April 2003, caught the fancy of people, and on its first day, sold a million downloads. But it barely contributed to the revenues of Apple. On a standalone basis iTunes wasn’t probably worth the effort. As the authors write, “Of course, no one was really going to fill an iPod with thousands of songs at 99 cents each. Sure enough, by 2007, only about 3% of music on iPods was downloaded or copied from the iTunes music store. The rest was downloaded from other places and was therefore, unprotected and playable on any device. But Apple didn’t care.”
So on its own Apple iTunes did not probably make sense but Apple still persisted with it due to various other reasons. “The iTunes music store completed the user experience, and as long as the critical mass of people bought at least some of their music from iTunes site, Apple could keep itself out of trouble with the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). Shrewdly, Apple had turned the traditional “razor and razor blades model” on its head: Apple could make its money selling razors — the growing assortment of iPods — even if customers continued to steal most of the blades,” write Mullins and Komistar.
Cut to 2013, how do things look for iTunes now?. 
For the period of three months ending March 30, 2013, Apple posted a revenue of $43.6 billion. Of this nearly $4.1 billion or almost 9.4% came from iTunes and other software services. So the share of iTunes in the total revenue posted by Apple has gone up from 3% in 2007 to nearly 9.4% now. If we look at the period of three months ending March 30, 2012, Apple posted a revenue of $39.1 billion. Of this nearly $3.2 billion or around 8.2% of the revenue came from iTunes and other software services.
The contribution of iTunes in the overall Apple business has gone up in the decade since it was launched. What does this tell us? Well people are still listening to a lot of pirated music but a whole lot of people are buying music as well. This may be due to the convenience of finding different kinds of music at one place. Also while downloading from iTunes one is assured of the quality of the song and there are no risks that one might face on peer to peer networks or websites that let users download music for free. Or for the fact that people genuinely want to pay because if they don’t, how are those creating music expected to make a living. If people can pay for books, why can’t they pay for music as well?
Apple iTunes took nearly a decade to start making a substantial contribution to the total revenues of Apple. But during that period it supported the other business streams of Apple. And even though it may not have made sense for Apple to run the business on a standalone basis, it did save them a whole lot of trouble they could have otherwise faced from the music industry. Flipkart’s Flyte did not have the same kind of luck. Neither could it supported by the other divisions.
Also, all new concepts don’t catch on automatically. Some concepts take time to mature. And during that time need to be supported by the company. Of course, that is easier said than done. In case of Apple iTunes that had been possible, but in case of Flipkart’s Flyte it was not. Flyte had to be revenue spinner on its own and if not that at least show some growth potential, which it did not.
Having said that, if Flipkart had found some way of keeping Flyte going, it could have been a potential money spinner in the years to come. Because Flyte is an idea, whose time will come.
The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on May 31, 2013

(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)
 
 

‘Chance played a big role in the survival and success of Manchester United’


Paul Ormerod is the author of the bestselling The Death of Economics, Butterfly Economics and Why Most Things Fail. Most recently he has written Positive Linking – How Networks Can Revolutionise the World. “We are increasingly aware of the choices, decisions, behaviours and opinions of other people. Network effects – the fact that a person can and often does decide to change his or her behaviour simply on the basis of copying what others do – pervade the modern world,” writes Ormerod.In this interview he speaks to Vivek Kaul on why a small number of people can exercise a decisive influence on an eventual social or economic outcome, why copying others is a rational way to work in this world and why the football club Manchester United may have simply been lucky to get where they have.
What is positive linking?
It is basically the principle that ‘to him that hath, more shall be given’.  The fact, for example, that a particular brand of smart phone has been selected by one of your friends makes it more likely that you yourself will make the same choice.  It doesn’t mean that you will definitely make the same choice, but the more of your friends who have chosen the same phone, the more likely it is that you will. 
You suggest that a relatively small number of people can exercise a decisive influence on an eventual social or economic outcome. Could you explain that through examples?
This is one way in which positive linking can work.  It is by no means always the case that this the process by which people are influenced.  Often, the way in which behaviour spreads is through ‘friends of friends’ networks, in which no single person has a strong influence. Ideological or religious movements are ones in which a small number of people often exercise decisive influence.  Think, for example, of Hitler in Germany, or Osama bin Laden in our own times. But these ‘influentials’ can be found in other situations.  For example, Gene Stanley and colleagues at Boston University found that the distribution of the number of sexual partners across a sample of individuals essentially had this structure. Most people had relatively few, and a small number had very many indeed.   This latter group exercise a decisive influence on the spread of sexual diseases.
You write “we have inherently less control over situations in which network effects are important than we would like”. What is a network effect?
A network effect is a very important example of positive linking.  Network effects, the fact that a person can and often does decide to change his or her preferences simply on the basis of what others do, pervade the modern world. This concept is just as crucial for companies and markets as it is for people. In September 2008 Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, precipitating a crisis which almost led to a total collapse of the world economy and a repeat of the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was precisely because Lehman was connected via a network to other banks that made the situation so serious. Lehman’s failure could easily have led to a cascade of bankruptcies across the world financial network, first in those institutions to which Lehman owed money, then spreading wider and wider from these across the entire network.
Why does network effect lead to less control?
A key point about network effects is that there is inherent uncertainty about how far any given effect will spread.  We have some guidelines about what determines this. So, for example, if a person adopts a new product, and the people in his or her social circle are easily persuadable, it is likely that some of them will adopt it as well.  But if it is hard to get them to try new things, they will not.  In the former case, there is a chance that the product will get taken up on a large scale, in the latter it will not. But in any practical situation we simply cannot gather the incredibly detailed information which would be required in order to know for certain what the impact will be.  We need to know the exact structure of the relevant network, who influences whom.  And we need to know the degree of persuadeability of everyone in the network.  We can get approximations to these, but we cannot know them for certain.
What is preferential attachment ?
Preferential attachment describes a particular way in which a person might copy the choices which others have made.  Given a range of alternatives, he or she will choose between them with a probability equal to the proportion of times each alternative has been selected by others.  So you are more likely to select the most popular choice, simply because it is the most popular.
Could you elaborate on that?
The basic idea is straightforward. Suppose there are just three choices available to you, whatever these may be, and you are wondering which one to select yourself. One has been already chosen 6,000 times, one 3,000 and the final one just 1,000 times, making a total of 10,000 altogether. If we assume for purposes of illustration that the only rule of behaviour you are using when making your choice is that of preferential attachment, the rule says the following. You may actually choose any one of the three alternatives. But you are twice as likely to select the most popular rather than the second most popular, and six times as likely to choose this as the least popular.  You are paying no attention to the attributes, to the features of the three alternatives.
Any examples of this phenomenon?
Thetop three sites which are followed up on a Google search typically reflect exactly this pattern. The three of them get almost 100 per cent of the subsequent hits after the search, and the top one of them all gets 60 per cent of the total.
You say copying the best policy in this day and age. Why is that?
We are faced with a vast explosion of such information compared to the world of a century ago. We also have stupendously more products available to us from which to choose. Eric Beinhocker, formerly at McKinsey, considers the number of choices available to someone in New York alone: ‘The number of economic choices the average New Yorker has is staggering. The Wal-Mart near JFK Airport has over 100,000 different items in stock, there are over 200 television channels offered on cable TV, Barnes & Noble lists over 8 million titles, the local supermarket has 275 varieties of breakfast cereal, the typical department store offers 150 types of lipstick, and there are over 50,000 restaurants in New York City alone.’
That’s quite a lot…
He goes on to discuss stock-keeping units – SKUs – which are the level of brands, pack sizes and so on which retail firms themselves use in re-ordering and stocking their stores. So a particular brand of beer, say, might be available in a single tin, a single bottle, both in various sizes, or it might be offered in a pack of six or twelve. Each of these offers is an SKU. Beinhocker states, ‘The number of SKUs in the New Yorker’s economy is not precisely known, but using a variety of data sources, I very roughly estimate that it is on the order of tens of billions.’ Tens of billions!
So what does it tell us?
The customer has tens of billions of options to choose from. Compared to the world of 1900s the early twenty first century has seen a quantum leap in the number of choices available. And rather obviously the time taken to evaluate and choose rises with the number of choices. Many of the products available in the twenty-first century are highly sophisticated and are hard to evaluate even when information on their qualities is provide. Take the case of mobile tariffs that are available in the market. How many people can honestly say that they have any more than a rough idea of the maze of alternative tariffs which are available on these phones? The range and complexity of choice are so vast that the only way in which people can cope is by adopting behavioural rules which spectacularly reduce the scope of choices available to them. This is the key reason that ‘copying’ has become the rational way to behave, the rational way to make choices in the twenty first century. The word ‘copying’ is , I should stress being used as a shorthand description of the mode of behaviour in which your choice is influenced, altered, directly by the behaviour of others.
How much difference can the copying motive make to the outcome?
It can make a huge difference.  Duncan Watts, a professor at Columbia, ran some experiments in 2006 and published the results in Science, probably the world’s top scientific journal.  He set up an experiment where a student could listen to 48 songs, and download for free any which he or she wanted.  A number of students carried out this experiment.  The end result was that the most downloaded songs were about three times more popular then the least.  The experiment was repeated, with just one difference.  The student was told the number of previous downloads which each song had.  The impact was huge.  This time, the most popular songs were over 30 times more downloaded than the least popular.  A few songs got lots of downloads, most got very few. In addition, the connection between quality and success was very weak.  As Watts noted ‘The best songs rarely did poorly, and the worst rarely did well, but any other result was possible.’
You talk about economist Brian Arthur’s urn experiment. Could you tell our readers about it?? What is the practical significance of this experiment?
This seemingly abstract piece of work has great practical significance.  It is another way of illustrating why the Watts’ experiments have the outcomes which they do. Arthur’s initial work was on a highly abstract concept in non-linear probability theory, something called Polya urns. Imagine we have a very large urn containing an equal number of red and black balls. (The colours are immaterial.) A ball is chosen at random, and is replaced into the urn along with another ball of the same colour. The same process is repeatedly endlessly. Within this enormous urn, can we say anything about the eventual proportions of red and black balls which will emerge? They start off with a 50/50 split. Can we say how this split will evolve?
Can we?
Indeed we can. Arthur and his colleagues showed that as the process of choice and replacement unfolds, eventually the proportion of the two different colours will always – always – approach a split of 100/0. It will never quite get there, because at the start there are balls of each colour, but the urn will get closer and closer to containing balls all the same colour. The trouble is, we simply cannot say in advance whether this will be red or black. Arthur’s equations also show that the winner emerges at a very early stage of the whole process. Once one of the balls, by the random process of selection and replacement, gets ahead, it is very difficult to reverse.
So what is the practical implication of this?
Suppose a new technology emerges.  No one really knows how to evaluate the various products associated with it. The principle of copying seems entirely rational. Someone makes a choice. In the abstract model, this is the extraction at random of a ball from the urn. The fact that brand A has been chosen rather than brand B tilts ever so slightly the possibility that the next choice will also be A rather than B – this is the replacement rule in Arthur’s model. And so the process unfolds. In practice, of course, as one of the brands gains a lead over its rival, factors other than consumer copying will come into play and reinforce its dominance. There will be positive feedback, positive linking, so that success breeds further success. The more successful brand may be able to advertise more, for instance. Retailers will give more shelf space to it, and may even, in the splendid language of retailers, delist its rival, so that it becomes harder and harder to obtain. Technologies and offers which piggyback on the brands – think of apps and iPhones here – become increasingly designed to be compatible with the number-one brand.
You write “the most popular , the most successful, the biggest, does not stay there forever”.
Success is self-reinforcing, but it does not last forever.  Indeed, even as I write these words, the West’s press is full of speculation that Google may be about to go into decline. The most popular video on YouTube today is rarely the most popular tomorrow. The song which is at number 1 this week does not usually stay very long in this position. Over the entire period from 1952 to 2006, no fewer than 29,056 songs appeared in the Top 100 chart in the UK. Of these, 5,141 were in the chart for just a single week. Almost exactly a half stayed in for less than a month, so four weeks was the typical life span, as it were, of a song in the Top 100. In contrast, fifty-nine remained popular for more than six months. The typical life span at number 1 was just two weeks.
Any other example?
At the other extreme is the ranking of the world’s largest cities. Mike Batty, a distinguished spatial geographer at University College London, published an analysis of this in Nature in 2005. He begins his work with the largest US cities from 1790 to 2000. Over the 210-year period, 266 cities were at some stage in the top hundred. From 1840, when the number of cities first reached one hundred, only twenty-one remain in the top hundred of 2000. On average, it takes 105 years for 50 per cent of cities to appear or disappear from the top hundred, whilst the average change in rank order for a typical city in each ten-year period is seven ranks.
How important is the element of chance and randomness in any successful enterprise or outcome?
In a world where network effects, where positive linking exists, chance and randomness are important.  A lucky early break sets up positive feedback.  Once you or your product have been selected, it makes it more likely that you will be chosen again in future. It is easy to see now, for example, why Manchester United are so successful.  They possess global brand recognition and can attract massive sponsorship.  But this was not always the case.  Chance played a big role in their very survival, and in their subsequent success.
How was that?
Manchester United started life as essentially the works team of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway company, based in – and called – Newton Heath, then as now a poor district in the eastern part of the city.  Just over 100 years ago, Newton Heath were served with a winding-up order. A consortium of local businessmen paid what in today’s money is around £750,000 to rescue the club, and changed its name to Manchester United. Despite some fleeting success, the club languished. In 1931 they were effectively bankrupt again and were rescued even more cheaply than before: for some £400,000 in today’s money. Yet in 2011, the value of Manchester United is of the order of £1 billion!
And chance had a role to play in it?
Chance elements also played a role in United’s subsequent success. Just before the end of the Second World War, the club offered the position of manager to Matt Busby, a man who built not one, not two, but three extremely successful teams during the course of his career. But Busby’s appointment itself was to a considerable degree one of chance. Thirty miles to the west of Manchester lies its great rival, the city of Liverpool. The antipathy between Manchester United and Liverpool FC, the second most successful English team ever, is intense. No player has been transferred directly between the two since 1964. Yet Busby almost joined Liverpool, who had been courting him for some time. The clincher appears to have been that Busby was friendly with a member of the United board through their membership of the Manchester Catholic Sportsman’s Club.
The interview originally appeared in the Daily News and Analysis on October 29,2012. http://www.dnaindia.com/money/interview_chance-played-a-big-role-in-the-success-of-manchester-united_1757253
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He can be reached at [email protected])