Did RBI just hint that Indian corporates have reached Ponzi stage of finance?

ARTS RAJAN
The Reserve Bank of India(RBI) releases the Financial Stability Report twice a year. The second report for this year was released yesterday (i.e. December 23, 2015). Buried in this report is a very interesting box titled In Search of Some Old Wisdom. In this box, the RBI has resurrected the economist Hyman Minsky. Minsky has been rediscovered by the financial world in the years that have followed the financial crisis which started with the investment bank Lehman Brothers going bust in September 2008.

So what does the RBI say in this box? “When current wisdom does not offer solutions to extant problems, old wisdom can sometimes be helpful. For instance, the global financial crisis compelled us to take a look at the Minsky’s financial stability hypothesis which posited the debt accumulation by non-government sector as the key to economic crisis.”

And what is Minsky’s financial stability hypothesis? Actually Minsky put forward the financial instability hypothesis and not the financial stability hypothesis as the RBI points out. I know I am nit-picking here but one expects the country’s central bank to get the name of an economic theory right. I guess given that the name of the report is the Financial Stability Report, someone mixed the words “stability” and “instability”.

The basic premise of this hypothesis is that when times are good, there is a greater appe­tite for risk and banks are willing to extend riskier loans than usual. Businessmen and entrepreneurs want to expand their businesses, which leads to increased investment and corporate profits.

Initially, banks only lend to businesses that are expected to gen­erate enough cash to repay their loans. But as time progresses, the competition between lenders increases and caution is thrown to winds. Money is doled out left, right, and centre and normally it doesn’t end well.

This is the basic premise of the financial instability hypothesis. In this column I will explain that the Indian corporates have reached what Minsky called the Ponzi stage of finance.  Minsky essentially theorised that there are three stages of borrowings. The RBI’s box in the Financial Stability Report explains these three stages. Nevertheless, a better explanation can be found in L Randall Wray’s new book, Why Minsky Matters—An Introduction to the Work of a Maverick Economist.

As Wray writes: “Minsky developed a famous classification for fragility of financing positions. The safest is called “hedge” finance (note that this term is not related to so-called hedge funds). In a hedge position, expected income is sufficient to make all payments as they come due, including both interest and principal.” Hence, in the hedge position the company taking on loans is making enough money to pay interest on the debt as well as repay it.

What is the second stage? As Wray writes: “A “speculative” position is one in which expected income is sufficient to make interest payments, but principal must be rolled over. It is “speculative” in the sense that income must increase, continued access to refinancing must be expected, or an asset must be sold to cover principal payments.”

Hence, in a speculative position, a company is making enough money to keep paying interest on the loan that it has taken on, but it has no money to repay the principal amount of the loan. In order to repay the principal, the income of the company has to go up. Or banks need to agree to refinance the loan i.e. give a fresh loan so that the current loan can be repaid. The third option is for the company to start selling its assets in order to repay the principal amount of the loan.

And what is the third stage? As Wray writes: “Finally, a “Ponzi” position (named after a famous fraudster, Charles Ponzi, who ran a pyramid scheme—much like Bernie Madoff’s more recent fraud”) is one in which even interest payments cannot be met, so that the debtor must borrow to pay interest (the outstanding loan balance grows by the interest due).”

Hence, in the Ponzi position, the company is not making enough money to be able to pay the interest that is due on its loans. In order to pay the interest, it has to take on more loans. This is why Minsky called it a Ponzi position.

Charles Ponzi was a fraudster who ran a financial scheme in Boston, United States, in 1919. He promised to double the investors’ money in 90 days. This was later shortened to 45 days. There was no business model in place to generate returns. All Ponzi did was to take money from new investors and handed it over to old investors whose investments had to be redeemed. His game got over once the money leaving the scheme became higher than the money being invested in it.

Along similar lines once companies are not in a position to pay interest on their loans they need to borrow more. This new money coming in helps them repay the loans as well as pay interest on it. And until they can keep borrowing more they can keep paying interest and repaying their loans. Hence, the entire situation is akin to a Ponzi scheme.

By now, dear reader, you must be wondering, why have I been rambling on about a single box in the RBI’s Financial Stability Report and an economist called Hyman Minsky.

In RBI’s Financial Stability Report the box stands on its own. But is the RBI dropping hints here? Of course, you don’t expect the central bank of a country to directly say that a large section of its corporates have reached the Ponzi stage of finance. And there are many others operating in the speculative stage of finance. Even without the RBI saying it directly, there is enough evidence to establish the same.

In the report RBI points out that as on September 30, 2015, the bad loans (gross non-performing advances) of banks were at 5.1% of total advances of scheduled commercial banks operating in India. The number was at 4.6% as on March 31, 2015. This is a huge jump of 50 basis points in a period of just six months.

The restructured loans of banks fell to 6.2% of total advances from 6.4% in March 2015.  A restructured loan is a loan on which the interest rate charged by the bank to the borrower has been lowered. Or the borrower has been given more time to repay the loan i.e. the tenure of the loan has been increased. In both cases the bank has to bear a loss.

The stressed loans of banks, obtained by adding the bad loans and the restructured loans, came in at 11.3% of total advances. They were at 11.1% in March 2015.
The numbers for the government owned public sector banks were much worse. The stressed loans of public sector banks stood at 14.1%. In March 2015, this number was at 13.2%. This is a significant jump in a period of just six months. The stressed loans of private sector banks stood at a very low 4.6% of total advances.

Let’s look at the stressed loans of public sector banks over a period of time. In March 2011, the number was at 6.6% of total advances. By March 2012, it had jumped to 8.8% of total advances. Now it is at 14.1%.

What is happening here? Banks are clearly kicking the can down the road by restructuring more loans, because many corporates are clearly not in a position to repay their bank loans. Why do I say that? As the Mid-Year Economic Review published by the Ministry of Finance last week points out: “Corporate balance sheets remain highly stressed. According to analysis done by Credit Suisse, for non – financial corporate sector (based on ~ 11000 companies in the CMIE database as of FY2014 and projections done for FY2015 based on a sample of 3700 companies), the number of companies whose interest cover is less than 1 has not declined significantly (this number was 1003 in September 2014 and is 994 in September 2015 quarter).”

Interest coverage ratio is essentially obtained by dividing the earnings before interest and taxes(operating profit) of a company during a given period, by the interest that it needs to pay on the loans that it has taken on.

In the Indian case, a significant section of the corporates have an interest coverage ratio of less than 1. This means that they are not earning enough to even pay the interest on their outstanding loans.

Further, the weighted average interest coverage ratio of all companies in the sample as on September 2015 was at 2.3. It was at 2.5 in September 2014. As the Mid-Year Economic Review points out: “Research indicates that an interest cover of below 2.5 for larger companies and below 4 for smaller companies is considered below investment grade.”

What this means that many corporates now are not in a position to even pay interest on their loans. They need newer loans to repay interest on their loans. They have reached the Ponzi stage of finance, as Minsky had decreed. Still others are in the speculative stage.

The RBI Financial Stability Report again hints at this without stating it directly. As the report points out: “Bank credit to the industrial sector accounts for a major share of their overall credit portfolio as well as stressed loans. This aspect of asset quality is related to the issue of increasing leverage of Indian corporates. While capital expenditure (capex) in the private sector is a desirable proposition for a fast growing economy like India, it is observed that the capex which had gone up sharply has been coming down despite rising debt. During this period, profitability and as a consequence, the debt-servicing capacity of companies has, seen a decline. These trends may be indicative of halted projects, rising debt levels per unit of capex, overall rise in debt burden with poor recoveries on resources employed.”

What the central bank does not say is that rising debt without a rising capital expenditure may also be indicative of the fact that newer loans are being taken on in order to pay off older loans as well as pay interest on the outstanding loans. The public sector banks are issuing newer loans because if they don’t corporates will start defaulting and the total amount of bad loans will go up even further.

In such a scenario, the public sector banks have also been helping corporates by restructuring more and more loans. By doing this they are essentially postponing the problem. A restructured loan is not a bad loan. Further, around 40% of restructured loans between 2011 and 2014 have turned into bad loans.

All this hints towards a large section of Indian corporates operating in what Minsky referred to as a Ponzi stage of finance. Many corporates are also in the speculative stage. And given that, it’s not going to end well.

(Vivek Kaul is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. He tweets @kaul_vivek)

The column originally appeared on SwarajyaMag on December 24, 2015

Banks having a bad time, as King of Good Times celebrates his sixtieth birthday

vijay-mallya1
A few days back sections of the media reported that Vijay Mallya, a part-time businessman and a full-time defaulter of bank loans, had celebrated his sixtieth birthday by throwing a huge party at the Kingfisher Villa in Candolim, Goa.

As the Mumbai Mirror reported: “International pop icon Enrique Iglesias belted out his 2014 chartbuster ‘Bailando’ (Dancing) hours after Sonu Nigam completed a nonstop two-hour session with ‘Tum jiyo hazaron saal, saal ke din ho pachaas hazaar’.”

This is while banks wait to recover thousands of crore of loans that Mallya has defaulted on, in his quest to own and run an airline.

While Mallya and other industrialists continue to have a good time, the bad loans of banks continue piling up. The Mid-Year Economic Analysis released by the ministry of finance last week points out towards the same. As it points out: “Gross Non Performing Assets (NPAs) of scheduled commercial banks, especially Public Sector Banks (PSBs) have shown an increase during recent years.

The total bad loans (gross non-performing assets) of scheduled commercial banks increased to 5.14 % of total advances as on September 30, 2015. The number had stood at 4.6% of total advances, as on March 31, 2015. This means a jump of 54 basis points in a period of just six months. One basis point is one hundredth of a percentage.

The situation is much worse in public sector banks.  The total bad loans of public sector banks stood at 6.21% of total advances as of September 30, 2015. This number had stood at 5.43% as on March 31, 2015. This is a huge jump of 78 basis points, within a short period of six months. The number had been at 4.72% as on March 31, 2014. This tells us very clearly that the bad loans situation of public sector banks has clearly worsened.

In fact, we get the real picture if we look at the stressed assets of public sector banks. The stressed asset number is obtained by adding the bad loans and the restructured assets of a bank. A restructured asset is an asset on which the interest rate charged by the bank to the borrower has been lowered. Or the borrower has been given more time to repay the loan i.e. the tenure of the loan has been increased. In both cases the bank has to bear a loss.

The stressed assets of the public sector banks as on September 30, 2015, stood at 14.2% of the total advances. Hence, for every Rs 100 of loans given by public sector banks, Rs 14.2 are currently in dodgy territory. In March 2015, the stressed assets ratio was at 13.15%. This is a significant jump of 105 basis points. In fact, if we look at older data there are other inferences that we can draw.

In March 2011, the number was at 6.6%. In March 2012, the number grew to 8.8%. And now it stands at 14.2%. What does this tell us? It tells us very clearly that banks are increasingly restructuring more and more of their loans and pushing up the stressed asset ratio in the process. And that is not a good thing. The banks are essentially kicking the can down the road in the hope of avoiding to have to recognise bad loans as of now.

In a research note published earlier this year, Crisil Research estimates that 40% of the loans restructured during 2011-2014 have become bad loans. Morgan Stanley estimates that 65% of restructured loans will turn bad in the time to come. What this tells us very clearly tells us that a major portion of stressed assets are essentially restructured loans which haven’t been recognised as bad loans.

This clearly tells us that the balance sheets of public sector banks continue to remain stressed. Data from the Indian Banks’ Association shows that the public sector banks own a total of 77.4% of assets of the total banking system. This means they dominate the system. And if their balance sheets are in a bad shape it is but natural that they will go slow on giving ‘new’ loans. As the latest RBI Annual Report points out: “Private sector banks with lower NPA ratios, posted higher credit growth …At the aggregate level, the NPA ratio and credit growth exhibited a statistically significant negative correlation of 0.8, based on quarterly data since 2010-11.”
As the accompanying chart clearly points out the loan growth of private sector banks which have a lower amount of stressed assets has been much faster than that of public sector banks.
Source: RBI Annual Report

Also, it is worth asking here why are public sector banks continuing to pile up bad loans. The answer might perhaps lie in the fact that the interest paying capacity and the principal repaying capacity of corporates who have taken on these loans continues to remain weak. As the Mid-Year Economic Review points out: “Corporate balance sheets remain highly stressed. According to analysis done by Credit Suisse, for non – financial corporate sector (based on ~ 11000 companies in the CMIE database as of FY2014 and projections done for FY2015 based on a sample of 3700 companies), the number of companies whose interest cover is less than 1 has not declined significantly (this number was 1003 in September 2014 and is 994 in September 2015 quarter).”

Interest coverage ratio is arrived at by dividing the operating profit (earnings before interest and taxes) of a company by the total amount of interest that a company needs to pay on what it has borrowed during a given period. An interest coverage ratio of less than one, as is the case with many companies in the Credit Suisse sample, essentially means that the companies are not making enough money to even be able to pay interest on their borrowings.

Further, “the weighted average interest cover ratio has declined from 2.5 in September 2014 to 2.3 in September 2015 (research indicates that an interest cover of below 2.5 for larger companies and below 4 for smaller companies is considered below investment grade).

Given this, it is not surprising that bad loans of banks continue to pile up, while guys like Mallya continue to have a “good time”.

Postscript: I will be taking a break from writing The Daily Reckoning for the next few days. Will see you again in the new year. Here is wishing you a Merry Christmas and a very Happy New Year.

The column originally appeared on The Daily Reckoning on December 24, 2015

What bankrupt Indian business groups can learn from Genghis Khan

genghis khan
Over the last few years, Credit Suisse has brought out an interesting series of reports titled the “House of Debt”. The latest version of the report was released last week.

The report tracks the total debt of 10 Indian business groups which have taken on around 12% of total loans of the Indian banking system. These groups are Adani Group, Essar Group, GVK Group, GMR Group, Lanco Group, Vedanta Group, Reliance ADAG Group, JSW Group, Videocon Group and Jaypee Group.
Analysts Ashish Gupta, Kush Shah and Prashant Kumar make several important points in this report. Here are a few of them:

a) The loans given to these business groups amount to 12% of total bank loans. Further, they amount to 27% of the corporate loans made by banks. In the last eight years the loans of these 10 business groups have gone up seven times. This pace of rise has slowed down in the last couple of years and in 2014-2015, the increase was 5%.

b) The interest coverage ratio of these business groups was at 0.8 in 2014-2015, down from 0.9 in 2013-2014. The interest coverage ratio essentially points to the ability of a company to keep servicing its debt by paying interest on it. The ratio is calculated by dividing a company’s earnings before interest and taxes (or operating profit) during a given period by the total interest it has to pay on its outstanding debt, during the same period.

Typically, companies need to have an interest coverage ratio of at least 1.5, to be considered in healthy financial territory. In this case the ratio is just 0.8. An interest coverage ratio of less than one means that the company is not earning enough to keep paying interest on its outstanding debt. Hence, on the whole, these groups are not earning enough to pay the interest on their debt.

The trouble with any average number is that it does not give us the complete picture. The interest coverage ratios of several groups are well below the average.

The GMR group is at 0.2. The GVK group is at 0. The Lanco Group is at 0.2. The Videocon group is at minus 0.3. And the Jaypee Group is at 0.6.

These business groups are in a very bad situation when it comes to the ability to keep servicing their debt.

c) The interest coverage ratio is at abysmal levels despite a large amount of interest being capitalised, as can be seen from the accompanying table.

As the Credit Suisse analysts point out: “while interest coverage is less than 1, a large amount of interest (15-170% of P&L interest) is being capitalised.”
The Accounting Standard 16 states thatborrowing costs that are directly attributable to the acquisition, construction or production of a qualifying asset should be capitalised as part of the cost of that asset.” It further defines a qualifying asset as “an asset that necessarily takes a substantial period of time to get ready for its intended use or sale.”

What this tells us is that the real interest coverage ratios of these business groups are worse than they seem.

d) Given that the interest coverage ratios of these firms are in such a mess, it is not surprising that they are already defaulting on their debts. As the Credit Suisse analysts point out: “Rating agencies have now assigned the default “D” rating to ~5-65% of debt for these groups. For Jaypee Group, almost two-thirds of the group debt is now in the default category including standalone parent company debt. Other groups have also seen multiple defaults at the SPV level for power and road projects.” (As can be seen from the accompanying table)

In fact, the auditors have also highlighted these defaults in the annual reports of these companies. As the Credit Suisse analysts point out: “According to their auditors report, eight of the ten ‘House of Debt’ groups were in default last year. Total debt with these companies in default was at US$53 bn (~48% of total debt with the groups) of which US$37 bn were reported to be in default for 0-90 days by the auditors.” These are not small numbers by any stretch of imagination.

e) Over the last few years, the business groups have tried to repair their balance sheets by selling assets in order to repay their debts. This hasn’t helped much given that in certain cases, the assets that they have had to sell, essentially brought in the money.

Take the case of Jaypee Group. The group has sold assets and these sales are expected to   bring in Rs 22,000 crore. The trouble is that these assets contributed 59% of its operating profit (earnings before interest and taxes) during 2014-2015.

Further, “a large number of projects especially from power and road sectors have seen delays in completion which has led to cost overruns. Some of the projects now have reported cost overruns of 20-70%.

What makes the situation trickier is the fact that “some of the companies have 5-50% of long-term debt (~US$15 bn) maturing within the next year and would need refinancing. Also, 5-37% of their debt is short term (~US$20 bn) that needs to be rolled over.”

What this tells us very clearly that all this talk about general corporate revival needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. A major section of the corporates the infrastructure sector continues to battle the high debt that they had taken on during the go-go years between 2004 and 2011 and are now not in a position to even pay interest on this debt.

Also, it is worth mentioning here that owners of a bankrupt company have no real incentive in acting in the best interests of the company. This is a point that Nobel Prize winning economists George Akerlof and Robert Shiller make in their book Phishing for Phools – The Economics of Manipulation and Deception.

As they write: “If the owners of a solvent firm pay themselves a dollar out of the firm, they diminish the amount they can distribute to themselves tomorrow by that dollar plus its earnings.” Hence, owners of a solvent firm have some incentive to not take out money from it. But that is not the case with the owners of an insolvent or a bankrupt firm.

As the economists write: “In contrast, if the owners of a bankrupt firm take an extra dollar out of their firm, they will sacrifice literally nothing tomorrow.”

And why is that? “Because the bankrupt firm is already exhausting all of its assets, paying all those Peters and Pauls [read banks in the Indian case]. Since there will be nothing left over for the owners, they have the same economic incentives as Genghis Khan’s army, as it marched across Asia: what they do not take today, they will never see tomorrow. Their incentive is to loot.”

Look at what happened to the banks in case of Vijay Mallya and all the money he had borrowed. This also explains why many Indian firms become sick but no Indian industrialist ever becomes bankrupt.

Long story short – banks will continue to have a tough time ahead.

The column originally appeared on The Daily Reckoning on Oct 27, 2015