Has RBI Lost Control of Monetary Policy?

On August 31, 2020, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), published an innocuously titled press release RBI Announces Measures to Foster Orderly Market Conditions. The third paragraph and the fourth line of the release said this: “The recent appreciation of the rupee is working towards containing imported inflationary pressures [emphasis added].”

What did this line mean? Take a look at the following chart. As of June 18, one dollar was worth Rs 76.55. By August 31, one dollar was worth Rs 73.13. The rupee had gained value or appreciated against the dollar.


Rupee Up, Dollar Down

 
Source: Yahoo Finance.

What has this got to do with inflation? When the value of the rupee appreciates against the dollar, the imports become cheaper.

Let’s say the price of a product being imported into India is $10. If the dollar is worth Rs 76, it costs Rs 760. If the dollar is worth Rs 73, it costs Rs 730. Hence, if the rupee appreciates, imports become cheaper and in the process the inflation (or the rate of price rise) that we import from abroad, comes down as well.

The trouble is that if imports become cheaper, things become difficult for the home-grown products. Hence, an appreciating rupee goes against the government’s pet idea of atmanirbhartha or producing goods locally.

Given that the current dispensation at the RBI is more or less in line with what the government wants, this move to allow the rupee to appreciate, so that it reduces imported inflation, is even more surprising. (On a different note, I am all for consumers getting to buy things cheaper than in the past. The point of all economic activity, at the end of the day, is consumption. But most people don’t think like that).

Also, RBI’s Monetary Policy Report released in April, suggests that the impact of the appreciation of rupee on inflation is at best marginal: “An appreciation of the Indian Rupee by 5 per cent could moderate inflation by around 20 basis points.” One basis point is one hundredth of a percentage.

The trilemma

So what’s happening here? The RBI has basically hit the trilemma, something which it can’t admit to. Trilemma is a concept which was originally expounded by the Canadian economist Robert Mundell. Basically, a central bank cannot have free international movement of capital, a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy, all at the same time. It can only choose two out of these three objectives. Monetary policy refers to the process of setting of interest rates in an economy, carried out by the central bank of the country.

Of course, this is economic theory and in practice things are slightly different. The more a central bank allows free international movement of capital (i.e. money) and has a tendency to continuously intervene in the foreign exchange market and not allow free movement in the price of the local currency against the dollar, the lesser control it has over its monetary policy.

Let’s try and understand this through an example. Let’s consider the central bank of a country which allows for a reasonable movement of capital. At the same time, it wants to ensure that the value of its currency against the US dollar doesn’t move much.

This is to ensure that its exporters don’t face much volatility on the exchange rate front. Over and above this, the central bank does not want its currency to appreciate because that would hurt the exporters and make them less competitive.

In this scenario, let’s say the central bank sets interest rates at a higher rate than the rates in the United States and other parts of the world. What will happen is given that reasonably free movement of capital is allowed money from other parts of the world will come flooding in to cash in on the higher interest.

When the foreign capital comes into the country in the form of dollars and other currencies, it will have to be converted into the local currency. This will lead to the demand of the local currency going up and the local currency will appreciate against the dollar. Of course, when this happens, the value of the local currency will no longer remain fixed against the US dollar.

This is where the trilemma comes to the fore. If the country wants monetary independence and free movement of capital, it cannot have a fixed exchange rate. If it wants a fixed exchange rate then it has to set interest rates around the interest rate set by the Federal Reserve, so that it doesn’t attract capital because of a higher interest rate. In the process, it loses control of monetary policy.

In the Indian case, in the recent past, the RBI has tried to pursue all the three objectives, reasonably free movement of capital, a currency (the rupee) which doesn’t appreciate against the dollar and an independent monetary policy.

The repo rate, or the rate at which the RBI lends to banks, was cut from 5.15% to 4%, in the aftermath of the covid-pandemic. The RBI has also flooded the financial system with money by buying government bonds.

Between February 24 and April 23, the RBI lent a lot of money to banks through long-term repo operations, targeted long-term repo operations and targeted long-term repo operations 2.0. These schemes have essentially lent money to banks at the repo rate for the long term. On February 24, the RBI lent Rs 25,021 crore to banks for a period of 365 days at the prevailing repo rate of 5.15%. The repo rate is the interest at which RBI lends to banks, typically for the short-term.

After this, the RBI has lent around Rs 2.13 lakh crore for a period of around three years at the prevailing repo rate. Around Rs 1 lakh crore out of this was lent at 5.15%. In late March, the RBI cut the repo rate by 75 basis points to 4.4%. The remaining Rs 1.13 lakh crore has been lent at this rate. The idea here was to encourage to lend money to banks at a low interest rate and then encourage them to lend further, under certain conditions. There has been more bond buying over and above this.

The idea was to drive down interest rates to lower levels, so that companies borrow and expand, people borrow and consume. In the process, the economy starts to recover. Also, with the government borrowing more this year, lower interest rates would help it as well.

Along with this, the reasonably free movement of capital that India allows has continued. The RBI has also intervened in the currency markets trying to ensure that the rupee doesn’t appreciate against the dollar.

What’s happening here? In the aftermath of covid, Western central banks have gone on a money printing spree, some to drive down interest rates and to get businesses to expand and people to consume, and some others to finance the expenditure of their government. Take the case of the Federal Reserve of the United States. Between February end and early June, it printed a close to $3 trillion and expanded its balance sheet by three-fourths in the process.

To cut a long story short, interest rates have been driven down globally and there is a lot of money going around looking for some extra return. Some of this money has been coming to the Indian stock market.

In 2020-21, the current financial year, the foreign institutional investors (FIIs) have net invested $7.62 billion in the Indian stock and bond market. A good amount of this, $6.66 billion, came in August, when FII investment turned into a deluge. Of course, there were months like April and May, when the FIIs net sold. Between June and August, the FIIs net invested $10.54 billion in the Indian stock and bond markets.

The foreign direct investment (FDI) coming into India between April and July stood at $5.86 billion, with $4.01 billion coming just in July. The outward FDI (Indians investing abroad) in the first four months, stood at $3.17 billion. This means that the net FDI number (foreign investments made by Indians deducted from investments in India by foreigners) has been in positive territory. Net-net dollars have come into India on the FDI front.

Over and above this, the net receipts from services (i.e. services exports minus services imports) stood at around $28 billion between April and July.

Other than this, the demand for dollars, from within India, has come down. The import of crude oil and petroleum products between April and August 2020 has fallen by 53.7% to $26.02 billion. This has been both on account of fall in price of oil as well as lower consumption. In fact, on the whole, the goods exports have fallen at a lesser pace than goods imports, again implying a reduced demand for dollars within India.

Internal remittances, the money sent by Indians working abroad back to India, must have definitely fallen this year (I say must because the data for this isn’t currently available). Nevertheless, at the same time, outward remittances, everything from money spent on health, education and travel, has also come down, given that barely anyone is travelling abroad.

What does this basically mean? It means more dollars are coming into India than leaving India. When dollars come into India they need to be converted into rupees. This increases the demand for rupees and the rupee then appreciates against the dollar. This, as I have explained above, hurts atmanirbharta, domestic producers of goods and exporters, all at once.

Preventing the appreciation of the rupee

To prevent the rupee from appreciating against the dollar, the RBI buys dollars by selling rupees. In fact, that is precisely what the RBI has done between April and July this year. It has net purchased $29 billion, the highest in this period in the last five years. The August press release suggests that the RBI stopped trying to defend the rupee from appreciating sometime during the month or at least didn’t try as hard as it did in the past.

If we look at the foreign currency assets of the RBI they have barely moved between August 28 (three days before the press release) and September 18 (the latest data available), barely increasing from $498.36 billion to $501.46 billion. This tells us that the RBI isn’t really intervening much in the foreign exchange market in the recent past. But that might also be because of the fact that in September (up to September 29), the FIIs have net sold stocks and bonds worth just $4 million. Net net, FIIs didn’t bring any dollars into India in September.

By buying dollars, the RBI releases rupees into the Indian financial system and thus increases the money supply. In the normal scheme of things, the RBI can sterilise this by selling bonds and sucking out this money. But that would have gone against the easy money policy that the Indian central bank has been running through this financial year.

The excess liquidity (or the money that the banks deposit with the RBI) in the financial system suggests that the RBI hasn’t really been sterilising the rupees it has put into the system to prevent the appreciation of the rupee. On the whole, the bond buying by the RBI in order to release money into the financial system, has been in the positive territory. The following chart plots this excess liquidity in the system.

Easy Money


Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.

 

The excess liquidity in the system, money which banks had no use for and parked with the RBI, even crossed Rs 6 lakh crore in early May. It has since fallen but is still at a very high Rs 2.72 lakh crore.

So, what does all this mean?

The inflation between April and August, as measured by the consumer price index, has been at 6.63%. The inflation in August was at 6.69%. As per the RBI’s agreement with the government the inflation should be 4% within a band of +/- 2%.

This means that the current inflation is way beyond range. A major reason for this is high food inflation which between April and August has been at 9.58%. The food inflation in August was at 9.05%.

If we look at the core inflation (which leaves out food, fuel and light), it is at 5.16%. If we add fuel inflation to this (thanks to the government increasing the excise duty on petrol and diesel), the inflation is higher.

Where does this leave the RBI? All the liquidity in the financial system hasn’t led to even higher inflation primarily because there has been an economic collapse and people are not spending money as fast as they were in the past.

Food inflation has primarily been on account of supply chains breaking down thanks to the spread of the covid-pandemic. The trouble is that covid is now spreading across rural India. As Crisil Research put it in a recent report: “Of all the districts with 1,000+ cases, almost half were rural as on August 31, up from 20% in June.” This basically means that the supply chain issues when it comes to movement of food are likely to stay, during the second half of the year as well.

Food on its own makes up for 39.06% of the overall index and 47.25% of the index in rural India. As the Report of the Expert Committee to Revise and Strengthen the Monetary Policy Framework (better known as the Urjit Patel Committee) said:

“High inflation in food and energy items is generally reflected in elevated inflation expectations. With a lag, this gets manifested in the inflation of other items, particularly services. Shocks to food inflation and fuel inflation also have a much larger and more persistent impact on inflation expectations than shocks to non-food non-fuel inflation.”

An IMF Working Paper titled Food Inflation in India: The Role for Monetary Policy suggests the same thing: “Food inflation [feeds] quickly into wages and core inflation.” This is something that the country saw in the five-year period before 2014, when food inflation seeped into overall inflation.

What this means is that if covid continues to spread through rural India and food supply chains continue to remain broken, food inflation will persist and this will seep through into overall inflation, which is anyway on the high side.

In this situation what will the RBI do in the months to come? As mentioned earlier, all the money that the RBI has pumped into the Indian financial system hasn’t led to an even higher inflation simply because the consumer demand has collapsed. But as the economy continues to open up and the demand picks up, there is bound to be some amount of excess money chasing the same amount of goods and services, leading to higher inflation.

In this scenario what will the RBI do to prevent the appreciation of the rupee against the dollar, especially if foreign capital continues to come to India and the demand for the rupee continues to remain high?

As mentioned earlier, if the RBI buys dollars and sells rupees to prevent appreciation, it will continue to add to money supply. Interestingly, the money supply (as measured by M3 or broad money) has been growing at a pace greater than 12% (year on year) since June. This kind of rise in money supply was previously seen only before 2014, a high inflation era.

If RBI keeps trying to intervene in the foreign exchange market to prevent the appreciation of the rupee against the dollar, it will keep adding to the money supply and that creates the risk of even higher inflation. To counter this risk of higher inflation, the RBI will need to raise the repo rate or the interest rate at which it lends to banks.

This goes against what the Indian economy or for that matter any economy, needs, when it is going through an economic contraction. This in a way suggests that the RBI has lost control over the monetary policy. In fact, even if the monetary policy committee (MPC) of the RBI, whenever it meets next, keeps the repo rate constant, it suggests a lack of control over monetary policy. This also explains why the RBI hasn’t made any inflation projections since February this year.

Of course, the RBI has the option of sterilising the extra rupees it releases into the financial system by buying dollars coming into India. In order to sterilise the extra rupees being released into the financial system, the RBI needs to sell government bonds. The RBI needs to pay a certain rate of interest on these bonds. These bonds are a liability for the RBI.

As far as assets of the RBI go, a significant portion is invested in bonds issued by the American and other Western governments and the International Monetary Fund. These assets pay a much lower rate of interest than the interest that the RBI needs to pay on bonds it sells to sterilise excess rupees in the financial system. This is referred to as the quasi fiscal cost and needs to be kept in mind.

The second problem with sterilisation is that it might lead to a situation where interest rates might go up, creating further problems. As an RBI research paper titled Forex Market Operations and Liquidity Management published in August 2018 points out:

“For example, when a central bank undertakes open market sale of government securities to absorb the surplus liquidity as a part of the sterilised intervention strategy, it could harden sovereign yields, which, in turn, could attract further debt inflows driven by higher interest rate differentials.”

What does this mean in simple English? When the RBI sells government bonds to carry out sterilisation, it sucks out excess rupees from the market. This might lead to interest rates going up. If interest rates go up more foreign money will come into India looking to earn that higher interest rate. And this will create the same problem all over again, with the demand for rupee going up and the RBI having to intervene in the foreign exchange market.

Any increase in interest rates will not go down well with the government which will end up borrowing a lot of money this year, thanks to a collapse in tax revenues. Take a look at the following chart which plots the 10-year government bond yield from the beginning of 2020. The 10-year government bond-yield is the return an investor can expect per year, if they continue owning the bond until maturity.

Down and then slightly up

Source: https://in.investing.com/rates-bonds/india-10-year-bond-yield-historical-data

Thanks to all the easy money created by the RBI there has been excess money in the Indian financial system, since the beginning of this year. This has helped drive down bond yields from around 6.5% at the beginning of the year to a low of 5.76% in July and to around 6.04% currently. Hence, the Indian government has been able to borrow at a lower rate thanks to the excess liquidity created by the RBI and it wouldn’t want that to change. Also, the yields have been rising gradually since July, making sterilising even more difficult.

If the RBI keeps intervening it creates the risk of increasing money supply and that leading to the risk of even higher inflation. A high inflation in a poor country is never a good idea. If the RBI does not intervene that leads to the rupee appreciating and in the process creating problems for the domestic industry as well as the atmabnirbhar strategy. The exporters suffer as well.

What’s the RBI’s best strategy here? It can pray that foreign inflows slow down for a while, like they have in September. But that was basically the FIIs reacting to the Indian economy contracting by nearly a fourth between April to June. This data point was published on August 31. Also, as the economy keeps opening up more and more, imports and other spending pick up, the demand for the dollar will go up as well. All this will help the RBI. Nevertheless, if Western central banks unleash even more money printing, then all this will go for a toss.

The RBI ended up in this position by abandoning its main goal of managing price inflation. The agreement between the government and the RBI states clearly that “the objective of monetary policy is to primarily maintain price stability [emphasis added], while keeping in mind the objective of growth.”

Instead of managing inflation, the RBI chose its role as the debt manager of the government to outshine everything. This led to all the excess liquidity in the system so that interest rates were driven down and the government could borrow at lower interest rates. The Times of India reports on October 1, 2020: “The weighted cost of borrowing [for the government] during the first half was 5.8%, the lowest in 15 years.”

While the government has borrowed more, the overall non-food credit given by banks has shrunk between March 27 and September 11, from Rs 103.2 lakh crore to Rs 101.6 lakh crore. The banks lend money to the Food Corporation of India and other state procurement agencies to primarily buy rice and wheat (and some oilseeds and pulses in the recent past) directly from the farmers. Once this credit is subtracted from overall credit of banks what remains is non-food credit.

What this tells us is that despite lower interest rates overall lending by banks has shrunk. This might primarily be because of people and firms prepaying loans as well as a general slowdown in loan disbursal. Of course, the fall in interest rates has hurt savers and nobody seems to be talking about them.

To conclude, the RBI abandoned its main goal and is now stuck because of that. As economists Raghuram Rajan and Eswar Prasad wrote in a 2008 article : “The central bank is also held responsible, in political and public circles, for a stable exchange rate. The RBI has gamely taken on this additional objective but with essentially one instrument, the interest rate, at its disposal, it performs a high-wire balancing act.”

By trying to do too many things at the same time, RBI ends up being neither here nor there. As Rajan and Prasad put it: “What is wrong with this? Simple that by trying to do too many things at once, the RBI risks doing none of them well.” This was a mistake the RBI used to make pre-2015, before the agreement with the government was signed. It has gone back to making the same mistake again.

As Rajan wrote in the 2008 Report of the Committee on Financial Sector Reforms“The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) can best serve the cause of growth by focusing on controlling inflation.”

But that’s not to be, given that politicians, bureaucrats and even economists, expect monetary policy to perform miracles it really can’t.

I would like to thank Chintan Patel for research assistance. 

 

Are Acche Din Here for Onion Farmers and Consumers?

Yesterday (September 22, 2020), the Rajya Sabha passed the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Bill, 2020. The Lok Sabha had passed the Bill a week back on September 15. The passage of this Bill essentially dropped cereals, pulses, oilseeds, edible oils, potatoes and onions, from the definition of essential commodities.

The government may regulate the supply of food items only under extraordinary circumstances like war, famine, extraordinary price rise and a natural calamity of grave nature.

In this piece we will concentrate on what this change means in the context of onions.

India grows 10% of the world’s onions. It is the second largest producer of onions in the world, after China. In 2019-20, the total onion production across the country stood at 251.46 lakh tonnes. But despite being the second largest producer in the world, the price fluctuations of onions within the country are huge.

In fact, on more than a few occasions in the past, the price of onions has crossed Rs 100 per kg, causing a lot of pain across households, with the onion being an important ingredient in different kinds of food all across the country. Elections have been lost on the price of onions going up, making it a politically sensitive vegetable.

Take a look at the following chart, which basically plots the inflation of onions as measured by the consumer price index. Inflation is the rate of price rise.

Up and Down


Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.

(The curve is broken towards the end because data for a couple of months wasn’t available due to the covid-pandemic).

The inflation of onions is all over the place. It just tells us how volatile onion prices are at the consumer level. It’s not just the consumers who face this volatility, even the farmers face volatility in the price they get for the onions that they grow.

All over the place

Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.

The above chart shows the volatility of onion prices at the wholesale level. And the way the curve goes up and down, tells us that onion prices move around quite a lot, even at the wholesale level.

What does this mean for the consumer and the farmer? The onion consumer doesn’t get to buy onions at a consistent price, the prices go up and down, quite a lot. On the other hand, the onion farmer doesn’t get to sell onions at a consistent price. There is always a chance that when the farmer goes out to sell the onions he has grown, there is a price crash. In that sense, growing onions for a living becomes a very risky profession.

The question is why are onion prices so volatile? This is where things get interesting. Take a look at the following chart (I know, I am throwing a lot charts at you, dear reader, but these are simple straightforward charts.) The chart plots the wholesale prices of onions through the months, over the years.

Rise in wholesale onion prices

Source: http://ficci.in/spdocument/23156/FICCI’s-paper-on-Onion-Crisis.pdf

What does the chart tell us? It tells us that the wholesale onion price start rising around May and they keep rising till around August-September. This is where the entire problem lies, both for consumers as well as farmers.

Why is that the case? The onion has three harvesting seasons; the Rabi season (March-May), the Kharif season (October-December) and late Kharif season (January-March). Close to 60% of the onion production happens during the Rabi season.

Also, the onions produced during the Rabi season are most amenable to storage. The supply of fresh onions hitting the market between May to September is simply not enough to meet the demand. Given this, a part of demand has to be met through stocks of Rabi onions maintained by traders and wholesalers.

When the supply from the Rabi season starts to run out, the price of onions tends to rise. If there are any rains it makes the situation worse. The rains not only destroy the early Kharif crop which starts hitting the market in late September-early October, but they also destroy the Rabi crop that has been stored.

In fact, this is precisely what has happened in 2019 as well as 2020. As the Economic Survey for 2019-20 points out: “Due to heavy rains in August-September, 2019, the kharif crop of onions was adversely affected leading to lower market arrivals and upward pressure on onion prices. This kharif crop usually caters to the demand during the period from October to December till fresh produce from late kharif crop comes in the market.” Something similar has happened this year as well, with rains destroying the onion crop in Karnataka.

Hence, as an economist would put it, there is a structural problem at the heart of the onion trade in India. The government notices this only when there is a price rise and the media starts splashing it. Hence, there is always a knee-jerk reaction.

The government has a fixed way of reacting. It either invokes the Essential Commodities Act (ECA), 1955, or bans exports of onions (and if not that, it makes exports unviable by increasing the minimum export price).

Last year, on September 29, stocks limits under the ECA were imposed. Retail traders could stock up to 100 quintals of onions and wholesale traders could stock up to 500 quintals. (One quintal = 100 kgs. This was later reduced to 20 quintals and 250 quintals, respectively).

The idea here being that as soon as stock limits are imposed anyone who has onions stocked beyond the limit will have to sell them in the open market and that will push down wholesale prices and in the process retail prices (at least, that is what the government hopes).

This year on September 14, onion exports were banned under the Section 3 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992. The trigger was the more than doubling in the average price of onion arriving at India’s biggest onion market at Lasalgaon near Nashik, between end of March and September 14.

The modal price of onion as of March 30 was Rs 1,301 per quintal. By September 14, the modal price had jumped to Rs 2,801 per quintal. After the export ban on September 14, on September 15 the wholesale onion prices crashed to Rs 1,901 per quintal. Obviously, this did not go down well with the onion farmers.

The third option that the government resorts to is the import onions. This does not bring immediate consumer relief because imports carried out through government institutions take time. Even after onions have been imported, there is trouble is storing, distributing and selling them, because government institutions involved in this process, really don’t have the expertise for it. Also, in the past, the taste of imported onions hasn’t really gone down well with the Indian consumers.

So, what’s the way out of this mess? Let’s take a look at this pointwise.

1) The ECA is a remanent of an era when India had genuine food shortage. The idea was to restrict activities of some agents who were indulging in black marketing and hoarding at that point of time.

As a July 2018 report titled Review of Agricultural Policies in India published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, points out: “Orders issued by the centre or the states regulate the production, storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of a commodity.”

While, we do have our share of problems with some food products where the price volatility is very high (pulses and onions in particular), the days of food shortage are long gone. Also, over the years, the fact that ECA exists has undermined investments in India’s agricultural supply chain infrastructure.

As the Economic Survey of 2019-20 points out:

“ECA interferes with this mechanism by disincentivising investments in warehousing and storage facilities due to frequent and unpredictable imposition of stock limits. As stockholding limits apply to the entire agriculture supply chain, including wholesalers, food processing industries and retail food chains, the Act does not distinguish between firms that genuinely need to hold stocks owing to the nature of their operations, and firms that might speculatively hoard stocks.”

This fear of stock holding limits essentially leads to entrepreneurs staying away from creating supply chain infrastructure.

2) The lack of storage facilities adds to the price volatility of onions. As per a report titled A Report on the study of Onion Value Chain, published by the College of Agricultural Banking, Reserve Bank of India, 20-25% of onion production is lost due to post-harvest damages. This is because of the lack of storage infrastructure.

As the report points out:

“Nearly, 60% of the onion produced in Maharashtra during Rabi/ summer is available for storage i.e. 27 lakh tonnes out of total 45 lakh tonnes. The storage capacity created in the state through different government schemes is 8 lakh tonnes. These are scientifically built onion storage structures. Farmers store 5 lakh tonnes of onion in traditionally built local storage structures. Thus the total storage capacity in the state is 13 lakh tonnes.”

What this means that as of 2018, there was a need to create onion storage structures of additional 14 lakh tonnes, just in Maharashtra. Both the ECA and the lack of bank finance come in the way.

3) The ECA also leads to a situation where traders aren’t able to store enough and this creates problems. Let’s take a look at what happened last year. The ECA was invoked in end September. The onion inflation in the coming months just went through the roof (you can take a look at the inflation charts earlier). The stock limits basically ensured that traders couldn’t store onions beyond a point.

As the Economic Survey pointed out:

“Most of the kharif crop, which itself was lower, would have had to be offloaded in the market in October itself [thanks to the stock limits under the ECA]. Absent government intervention through ECA, traders would store a part of their produce to ensure smooth availability of a product at stable prices throughout the year.”

Of course, this does not mean that onion prices wouldn’t have gone up post September. They still might have gone up because of the lower kharif production, but the prices would have risen in a smoother way.

4) The government also resorts to export bans or increases the minimum export price of onions (where you can still export as long as the customer at the other end is ready to pay the higher price). The idea as mentioned earlier is to increase the supply in the domestic market.

In 2018-19, India exported around 22 lakh tonnes of the onions it produced. This was worth around $500 million. The total onion production during the year had stood at 228.2 lakh tonnes. Hence, less than 10% of the onion produced was exported. Also, the value of onion exports isn’t very big in the overall scheme of things.

As per a FICCI document, India’s export policy towards onions was changed 14 times between 2014 and 2019. This does no good to India’s image globally on the export policy front. It makes us look terribly unreliable.

Also, while prices in the Lasalgaon market fell on September 15, a day after the export ban, they have risen since then, and on September 23, the modal price of onion stood at Rs 3,600 per tonne. So much for the policy benefiting the consumer.

So where does all this leave us? The government has removed onions from the list of essential commodities in the hope that it leads to the development of storage infrastructure.

As Minister of State for Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution Danve Raosaheb Dadarao told the Rajya Sabha:

“The stock limit conditions imposed through the law were hindering investment in the agriculture infrastructure… The move will boost investment in the agriculture sector and will also create more storage capacities to reduce post-harvest loss of crops.”

The move is also expected to increase the income of farmers.

The question is will this work out in the way the government is projecting it to be? Let’s look at this pointwise.

1) While, the government has removed onion from the list of essential commodities, its export continues to be banned. So, what kind of signal is being sent out to anyone who is interested in building agriculture infrastructure, including onion storage?

2) Even though onion is no longer a part of essential commodities, the government can still intervene, under extraordinary circumstances like war, famine, extraordinary price rise and a natural calamity of grave nature.

How is extraordinary price rise defined as?

“Any action on imposing stock limit shall be based on price rise and an order for regulating stock limit of any agricultural produce may be issued under this Act only if there is— (i) hundred per cent increase in the retail price of horticultural produce; or (ii) fifty per cent, increase in the retail price of non-perishable agricultural foodstuffs, over the price prevailing immediately preceding twelve months, or average retail price of last five years, whichever is lower.”

In the last three years, retail onion inflation has been more than 100% in eight months. Clearly, there is a good chance of high onion inflation in the time to come, given that any onion storage infrastructure isn’t going to be built overnight. Will the government intervene? Or will it sit tight and let the end-consumer pay?

The larger point here is that what the government does on this front in the time to come will determine how many entrepreneurs get interested in building agricultural infrastructure.

Just because onion is out of the essential commodities list doesn’t mean that the government cannot intervene. Any prospective entrepreneurs will like to see more evidence on this front.

3) There is great fear (as has been the case with the two main Farm Bills) of big business taking over. The question is if private enterprise is not allowed to operate in this sector, then what’s the way out? The government doesn’t have the money or the wherewithal to do much here. Central planning has been failure the world over and that it is a failure here as well, isn’t surprising.

Big business has built a lot of things since 1991, which most of us use and enjoy. Of course, along the way there has been crony capitalism as well. And that’s the fear here in the minds of people as well. (I don’t have a clear answer for this and I am saying so).

To conclude, taking onion out of the essential commodities list is just the first step. Many other things need to be done before the consumer can pay the right price and the farmer can get the right price.

In an ideal world, these are things that should have started in May 2014, when Narendra Modi was elected the prime minister for the first time. It would have been best to carry out small experiments in states and see how they go, before a nationwide plan was unleashed. There is always a gap between theory and practice and it’s best to correct that gap at a smaller level.

I would like to thank Chintan Patel for research assistance.

CONFLATION (Contraction + Inflation) is Here. And It Will Stay This Year.

The British politician Ian Macleod is said to have first used the word stagflation in a 1965 speech he gave to the Parliament, where he said:

We now have the worst of both worlds—not just inflation on the one side or stagnation on the other, but both of them together. We have a sort of “stagflation” situation. And history, in modern terms, is indeed being made.”

The words stagnation and inflation came together to create the new word stagflation. The economic growth in United Kingdom in 1965 was 2.1%, falling to 1.6% in 1966. Consumer prices inflation during the year was at 4.8%. While, this might not sound much, it was the highest in more than half a decade. Inflation in United Kingdom would touch a high of 24.2% a decade later in 1975.

Hence, stagflation became a term which referred to a situation of slow economic growth or stagnation and high inflation.

Many economists and analysts are asking if India has entered a stagflationary scenario now, just like the British had in the mid 1960s. The consumer prices inflation for August 2020 was at 6.7%. The consumer prices inflation for April to August in the current financial year has been at 6.6%, higher than the Reserve Bank of India’s comfort range of 2-6%.

What is worrying is the food inflation level. Food inflation in August was 9.1%, whereas food inflation during this financial year has been at 9.6%. Within this, the inflation in the price of vegetables was at 10.9%, oil and fats at 11.8%, pulses at 18.2% and that of egg, fish and meat at 15%.

At the same time, the Indian economy as measured by its gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 23.9% during April to June 2020, in comparison to a year earlier. Things are expected to slightly improve during the period July to September 2020, but the Indian economy will contract in comparison to last year.

Hence, during the first six months of 2020-21, India will see the economy contracting and high inflation. Stagflation doesn’t quite represent this scenario, for the simple reason that stagnation represents slow economic growth and not an economic contraction as big as the one India is seeing.

As Macleod put it in the 1960s: “History, in modern terms, is indeed being made.” What was true in the 1960s Britain is also true about the 2020 India.

Given this, it’s time to coin a new word to represent this particular situation of economic contraction plus inflation and call it CONFLATION (I considered Contraflation as well but somehow Conflation just sounded better and the word anyway means the merging of ideas, so, works that way as well).

What does this conflation really mean in the overall scheme of things for India for the remaining part of the year? Let’s take a look at it pointwise.

1) A high inflation, especially food inflation, during a time when incomes are contracting is going to hurt the economy badly. People are having to pay more for food while their incomes are contracting. This means that spending on non-food items is going to come down. This will impact overall consumer demand right through the remaining part of the year. It is estimated that poor households allocate up to 50% of their expenditure towards food. So, conflation will hurt.

Lower consumer demand also leads to a fall in investments simply because there is no point in corporates expanding production, when people aren’t buying things like they used to. This again will negatively impact the economy. (A contraction in investments has been negatively impacting the economy for close to a decade now).

2) High food inflation has primarily been on account of supply-chains from rural to urban India, breaking down. This means that the farmers are not the ones benefitting from the high food prices. Basically, the traders, as usual, are cashing in on the shortage.

This can be gauged from the fact that food inflation as measured by the consumer price index during the year has stood at 9.6%.

Food inflation as measured by the wholesale price index has stood at 3.1%. This clearly tells us who is benefitting from food inflation. It’s clearly not the farmers. If farmers need to benefit, the terms of trade need to shift in their favour, something that hasn’t happened in many years.

3) Some economists have been of the view that food prices will slowdown in the second half of the year, thanks to a bumper agricultural output. Anagha Deodhar of ICICI Securities writes: “We expect vegetable and pulses inflation to start moderating from September 2020 and October 2020 respectively due to base effect. These two items together account for almost one-fifth of food basket and hence meaningful decline in their inflation rates could keep a lid on headline inflation as well.”

While this is true, what this view does not take into account is the fact that covid is now spreading to rural areas. As Crisil Research put it in a recent report: “Of all the districts with 1,000+ cases, almost half were rural as on August 31, up from 20% in June.” This basically means that the supply chain issues when it comes to movement of food are likely to stay, during the second half of the year as well.

Also, the spread of the pandemic could impact the harvesting and the marketing of agricultural products. Hence, overall agricultural production may not grow along expected lines. Given this, food inflation may not fall as much as it is expected to and might continue to remain elevated. Again, a sign of conflation hurting the economy.

4) The medical facilities in rural India are nowhere as good as the ones in urban India (This is not to say that medical facilities in urban India are excellent). The spread of covid pandemic will mean that people will have to spend money treating the disease.

This will lead to the cutting down on spending towards other items. Also, more importantly, the spread of the pandemic will even have an impact on the spending of people who haven’t been affected by it. People will save more for the rainy day. So, conflation will continue to hurt the Indian economy.

5) Another factor that needs to be taken into account is the fact that the money supply* has gone up by more than 11.7% consecutively for the last four months. This hasn’t happened since 2014. What this tells us is that the Reserve Bank of India is really pumping in money into the financial system. If all this money keeps floating around in the months to come, then there is a real danger of this leading to a further rise in prices. (A piece on how the RBI has botched up the monetary policy remains due).

6) But all this remains valid only for 2020-21. Come 2021-22, and India will be back in growth territory again and hence, conflation will be out of the picture. This, as I had explained in an earlier piece, will primarily be because of the base effect.

Basically, the GDP figure in 2020-21 will turn out to be so terrible that it will make the GDP growth in 2021-22, look fantastic. But this won’t mean much because only in 2022-23 are we likely to go past the GDP figure of 2019-20. This means the Indian economy is likely to go back by two years and that will be the cost of conflation.

To conclude, the Indian economy will contract during the second half of the financial year. There is a slim chance of growth being flat for the period January to March 2021. Inflation, even though it might come down a little, is likely to remain high due to the spread of the covid pandemic. Hence, India will see conflation through 2020-21.

* Money supply as measured by M3.

An Appreciating Rupee and Atmnirbharta Don’t Go Together

One dollar was worth around Rs 77.6 in mid-April. Since then, the rupee has appreciated against the dollar and now one dollar is worth around Rs 73.5.

In a press release on August 31, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) explained the mystery of the appreciating rupee by saying: “the recent appreciation of the rupee is working towards containing imported inflationary pressures.

Before analysing this statement, it is important to understand what it means. India’s imports are consumption oriented and not capital goods oriented. This can be gauged from the fact that non-oil, non-gold and non-silver imports, a very good indicator of consumer demand, moved from 55.8% of the total imports in 2011-12 to 69.7% in 2016-17. In 2019-20, these imports at 65.9% of total imports.

What this also tells us is that Indians prefer to buy imported goods than what is produced in India, wherever there was a choice. Their revealed preference is very clear on this front.

In this scenario, when the rupee appreciates against the dollar, the cost of imports comes down. Let’s say a product is imported for $10. At one dollar being worth Rs 77.6, it costs Rs 776. At one dollar being worth Rs 73.5, it costs Rs 735. There is a clear fall in price as the rupee appreciates. This helps control inflation or the overall rate of price rise.

As the RBI pointed out in its monetary policy report released in April earlier this year: “An appreciation of the INR by 5 per cent could moderate inflation by around 20 basis points.” One basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage.

An appreciating rupee is basically an indicator of excessive dollar inflows into India. When these dollars come into India, they need to be converted into rupees. This pushes up the demand for rupees, leading to the rupee appreciating.

One way of preventing this is the RBI buying the dollars that are coming in by selling rupees, in order to ensure that there are enough rupees in the system and in the process, the rupee doesn’t appreciate against the dollar or at least appreciates at a gradual pace. The RBI is not doing this or to put it more specifically isn’t doing as much of this as it was in the past.

This, as the RBI has explained is being done to control imported inflation.

The inflation as measured by the consumer price index, between April and July this year, was at 6.7%. Core inflation which ignores food, fuel and light items, was at 5.1%, with non-core inflation being at 8.6%. The high non-core inflation was on account of food inflation being at 9.8% between April and July. RBI has no control over food inflation.

Also, food inflation has been primarily on account of supply chains breaking down on account of the spread of the covid-pandemic. So, is the RBI getting too desperate, is a question well-worth asking here.

An appreciating rupee benefits imports and importers. This in a scenario where the government of the day has been talking about India becoming atmnirbhar or promoting self-reliance. In order to promote this, higher-tariffs on imports, like a higher customs duty on specific-imports, has been the way to go.

As the late Arun Jaitely said in the 2018-19 budget speech: “In this budget, I am making a calibrated departure from the underlying policy in the last two decades, wherein the trend largely was to reduce the customs duty.” This has been the policy stance of the government over the last few years.

But all this gets undone if the rupee is allowed to appreciate against the dollar. It makes imports cheaper and domestic producers will find it even more difficult to compete against the imports. Hence, this goes against the entire idea of atmnirbharta or encouraging domestic producers. It also goes against the idea of getting foreign companies to produce within India. If the rupee keeps appreciating they might just like the idea of importing most of the inputs and then assembling the end product in India.

This is quite weird, given that since Shaktikanta Das took over as the governor of the RBI, India’s central bank has more or less acted on the instructions of the government, rarely having a mind of its own. That makes me wonder what is really happening here?

Having said that, this is good news for the Indian consumer. As David Boaz writes in The Libertarian Mind: “The point of economic activity is consumption. We produce in order to consume… For each participant in international trade, the goal is to acquire consumption goods as cheaply as possible.”

So, is the RBI really batting for the Indian consumer in the aftermath of the economy being hit by the covid-pandemic? Or is there something more to the entire thing? On that your guess is as good as mine.

The ‘GULZAR’ Principle of Investing for Regular Income and Safe Returns

Summary: There is no real way of earning a regular and a safe income that is enough to meet the monthly expenses.

The headline was a clickbait. But now that I have your attention, let me explain the logic behind it.

The title song of the 1979 Hindi film Gol Maal was written by the lyricist Gulzar (Honestly, calling him just a lyricist is doing his talent a great disservice. Other than being a lyricist, he has written screenplays and dialogues for a huge number of Hindi films. He is a poet and a short story writer. He is also a translator of repute. Oh, and he has also directed a whole host of Hindi movies as well as a few TV serials along the way. Also, for the millennials, Hrishikesh Mukherjee made Gol Maal, much before Rohit Shetty started using the title for everything he could possibly think of).

Now getting back to the point I was trying to make. In the title song of Gol Maal there is a line which goes: “paisa kamane ke liye bhi paisa chahiye,” essentially meaning, in order to earn money, you first need money. And that is what I am going to write about today.

In the twenty months, as the economy has gone downhill, people have been getting in touch with me on email and the social media, with a very basic financial query. The numbers were small first but post-covid this has turned into a deluge. The question being asked is how a reasonable monthly income can be generated from savings, without taking any risk, in a safe way.

The answer to this question has become very important as people have lost their jobs or seen their salaries being slashed and incomes falling. What does not help is the fact that the post-tax return from bank fixed deposits are now largely in the range of 4-5%. The inflation as measured by the consumer price index is close to 7%.

Before I try answering this question, it is important to understand why interest rates on bank fixed deposits have fallen. The simple answer to this lies in the fact that there is too much money floating around in the financial system, with the banks not knowing possibly what to do with it.

Between March 27 and July 31, a period of little over four months, the non-food credit given by banks has contracted by Rs 1.32 lakh crore or around 1.3%. The banks give loans to the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and other state procurement agencies to primarily buy rice and wheat directly from the farmers at the minimum support price declared by the government. Once these loans are deducted from the overall loans given by banks, what remains is non-food credit.

What does non-food credit contracting tells us? It tells us on the whole borrowers have been repaying loans and at the same time not taking on enough new loans. It also tells us that banks are reluctant to lend. Further, as we shall see, there has been a huge surge in fixed deposits with banks, as people have increased their savings in the aftermath of the spread of the covid-19 pandemic. Banks will take time to lend all this money out.

Between March 27 and July 31, the total deposits of banks have gone up by Rs 5.95 lakh crore or 4.4%. In an environment, where the non-food credit of banks has contracted whereas deposits have jumped big-time, it is but natural that interest rates on fixed deposits have fallen. In fact, the weighted average term deposit interest rate or simply put average fixed deposit interest rate has fallen from 6.45% in February to 6% in June, the latest data available. Now that we are in August, the interest rates may have possibly fallen even more.

In fact, there is nothing new about interest rates on fixed deposits falling, this has been going on for close to eight years now. Having said that, interest rates shouldn’t be looked at in isolation, it is important to compare them with the prevailing rate of inflation. Take a look at the following chart. It plots the average interest rate on fixed deposits during the course of a year, along with inflation as measured by the consumer price index. The difference between the two is referred to as the real rate of return on fixed deposits.

Interest v/s Inflation


Source: Reserve Bank of India.

What does the above chart tell us? Between 2014-15 and 2018-19, there was a healthy difference between the average interest paid on fixed deposits and inflation. (Of course, this is without taking tax on fixed deposit interest into account, else, the difference would have been lower).

These were the years when first Dr Raghuram Rajan and then Dr Urjit Patel were at the helm at the Reserve Bank of India. In 2019-20, the real return on fixed deposits narrowed to 1.6%. Shaktikanta Das took over as RBI Governor in December 2018.

Let’s take a look at the real return on fixed deposits month wise since December 2018, the month when Das took over as RBI Governor. The real return on fixed deposits as explained earlier is the average interest rate on fixed deposits minus the prevailing rate of inflation.

Crash in real returns


Source: Author calculations on data from the Reserve Bank of India.

This chart is as clear as anything can get. The real rate of return on fixed deposits has simply collapsed since end of 2018. This has happened as the interest rate on fixed deposits has fallen and inflation has gone up.

The interest rate on fixed deposits has fallen primarily because the rate of loan growth for banks has crashed over this period. This we can see from the following chart.

Loan growth crash


Source: Reserve Bank of India.

The above chart clearly tells us that the loan growth of banks has crashed since December 2018. In fact, for the week ended July 31, it stood at just 5.4%. Given this, the Indian economy was slowing down even before covid-19 pandemic struck.

Hence, as economic growth has slowed down, the loan growth of banks has slowed down and this has led to fixed deposit interest rates coming down as well. The point being that in economics everything is linked.

Of course, there is more to this than just the economy slowing down. Since February,  like the rest of the central banks, the RBI has printed and pumped money into the financial system to drive down interest rates, in the hope of getting businesses and people to borrow more.

Also, with collapse in tax revenues, the government will have to borrow more this year, in order to keep its expenditure going. Hence, it likes the idea of borrowing more at lower interest rates. The RBI goes along with this because among other things it also acts as the debt manager of the government.

The problem is that India’s economic crisis has grown worse since the covid pandemic hit the world, leading to a lot of individuals losing their jobs or facing salary cuts. Small businesses have been majorly hit and incomes have come down dramatically.

In this environment, people are now looking to generate some sort of a regular income from their savings. Of course, most them want to do this in a risk free way. As one gentleman recently asked me: “I am currently not employed after having worked in the corporate sector for 10 years. My request to you is to honestly guide me on how and where to invest to earn steady income especially when the fixed deposit interest rates have fallen so low.”

The first thing I can clearly say is that the gentleman believes that there is a solution to his problem. He believes that it is possible to generate a good steady income despite fixed deposit interest rates having fallen.

I see this belief among many people. My guess is, it stems from the fact that way too many personal finance publications believe in offering solutions to everything. I mean, why will a reader read you, if at the end of it you say something like there aren’t really any solutions to this problem that you might have. At least, that’s how their thinking operates. Also, they need advertisers. And advertisers love solutions to everything, even when none really exist.

In June 2020, the average rate of interest on a fixed deposit was 6%. Once we take income tax into account, the rate of return would be much lower. Of course, there are banks out there which are offering a rate of interest of 7% or more. Nevertheless, these banks are perceived to be among the riskier ones. So, the question is are you willing to take on more risk, for a 1-1.5% higher return? If yes, then these investments are for you.

While, we live in an era where no bank is going to go bust, they can and have been put under a moratorium or periods under which only a limited amount of money can be withdrawn from them. And money that can’t be spent when it is needed, is essentially useless. Hence, if you do end up putting money in a bank which offers a 1-1.5% higher return, do remember not to put all your money into it.

There are corporate fixed deposits which offer a slightly higher return but again they don’t have the same safety as a bank does.

If you are senior citizen, you can look at the Senior Citizens Savings Scheme. But that comes with the pain of dealing with the post office.

Debt mutual funds as many people have found out over the last one year, come with their own share of risks. They were marketed to be as safe as fixed deposits, but they weren’t anywhere close. Also, irrespective of what financial planners and wealth managers might say, debt mutual funds are fairly complicated products, which I am sure most people selling them don’t understand. And that’s why they are able to sell them in the first place.

A lot of individuals in the last few months have turned towards investing in stocks. The logic is that the stock market has rallied from its March low. On March 23, the BSE Sensex, India’s premier stock market index was at 25,981 points. Yesterday, August 26, it closed at 39,074 points, a jump of over 50% in a period of a little over five months. This rally has been driven by a few stocks and if you had invested in the right stocks, you would have ended up with good gains by now.

While, one can’t question this logic, but what one needs to remember is that on January 12, the Sensex was at 41,965 points. From there to March 23, it fell by 38% in a little over two months. The point being the stock market can fall as fast or even faster than it can rise. Also, do remember this basic point that a 50% fall can wipe off a 100% gain. (A 38% fall would have written off a 61% gain).

Hence, the larger point here as I mentioned in this piece I wrote a few days back is, just because an investor takes a higher risk by investing in stocks, it doesn’t mean he will always end up with higher returns, precisely the reason the word ‘risk’ is used in the first place. And by the way, the 10-year return on stocks (including dividends) is less than 9% per year.

So, the question is what should a person looking for a regular and safe income, actually do? As helpless as it might sound, there aren’t many options going around beyond the humble fixed deposit, especially for people who aren’t senior citizens. The trouble is the fixed deposit interest rates are at very low levels.

If you need to generate a monthly income of Rs 20,000 at 6% per year, this needs an investment of Rs 40 lakh.

The moral of the story here being that if you want to generate a regular safe income which is enough to meet your monthly needs, you need to invest more money. Or as Gulzar wrote in Gol Maal: “paisa kamane ke liye bhi paisa chahiye.” I would like to call this the Gulzar principle of investing for a regular income and safe returns.

Also, there are corollaries to this. These are very difficult times. Hence, there is a good chance of individuals ending up in a situation where they might have to spend their savings (rather than just the return on savings) to keep meeting expenditure.

Let’s take the example of a middle-class household with monthly expenses of Rs 50,000. In order to generate this income through a fixed deposit, an investment of Rs 1 crore is needed. Of course, the chances of a middle-class household with expenses of Rs 50,000 per month having savings of a crore, are rather minimal. In this scenario, they will have to resort to spending their savings. Given this, as I keep saying, the return of capital is much more important now than the return on capital.

In the short run, the only way to generate a good regular and safe income is find a job or any other source of income by selling the skills that one has (Like I write. I can do that for a media house or do it individually). In the long run, the next time you see interest rates of 8-9% available on fixed deposits or any other safe investment, invest in these assets and lock in the high returns for as long as possible.

While, this might not sound much like a solution but that is the long and the short of it.