Business Model

Mumbai Mirror Shutting Down and the Screwed Up Business Model of India Media

Alibaba mil gaya chaalis choron se – Anand Bakshi, Laxmikant-Pyarelal, Runa Laila, Aadesh Shrivastava and Mukul Anand, in Agneepath (1990).

There was a time when I bought and tried to read eight daily newspapers. Two things led to a change on this front. The first reason was very practical. Apartments in Mumbai are small and buying eight newspapers for six days a week (I took a break on Sundays), meant that the raddi accumulated very quickly and took up a lot of space.

The second reason was something I learnt from experience. Most news is just noise. Following noise helps if you are a news reporter because that is precisely your job. But if you are looking to understand the big picture and not miss the wood for the trees, as I was, it made sense to ignore most news that was published and train the mind to look at a few limited things which mattered. (Also, with the internet, one could always Google up the noise later, if the need arose).

This led to a massive cutdown in the newspaper buying habit. Also, around early 2007, I went fully digital, rarely buying physical copies. Hence, I have been reading e-papers now for close to fourteen years. Of course, unlike earlier, I seriously read only two newspapers (on most days) and sort of flip through a third one. And now one of the newspapers which I read seriously, Mumbai Mirror, is shutting down.

This development has made me take a look at the economics of the Indian media, newspapers and digital, in particular. TV news is an entirely different beast, which I do not understand well enough to be writing about. I will also look at the entire issue from the point of view of readers and try to explain why things have become very tricky.
Let’s take a look at the issue pointwise.

1) Indian newspapers, the way they have evolved over the years, have totally become advertisement driven. Depending on who you ask, you are likely to be told that the split between advertisement revenue and subscription revenue, is 80:20 or 90:10, for that matter.

The point being that the readers are not consumers for newspapers, but the product, which is sold to corporates who advertise. Now in a post-corona world, the advertisements in newspapers have come down. Mumbai Mirror used to have an edition of 36 pages on most days before the covid pandemic struck. After covid, the size of the edition barely went beyond 16-18 pages on most days.

Clearly, the newspaper hadn’t been getting enough advertisements, hence, the decision to shut it down. One can also speculate here that the sales of physical copies of newspapers have crashed post the pandemic and are nowhere near what they used to be (I mean newspapers in general here). That’s one reason to possibly explain the lack of advertisements in Mumbai Mirror.
Also, the main reason behind setting up Mumbai Mirror doesn’t exist anymore. The Times Group started the newspaper in 2005, to protect its prime brand, the Mumbai edition of The Times of India, from the Daily News and Analysis (DNA). The Mumbai edition of DNA was launched in July 2005. The other reason behind launching the Mumbai Mirror was to also protect Mumbai edition of The Times of India from The Hindustan Times, which launched a Mumbai edition in July 2005 as well.
DNA was shut down in October 2019, though the newspaper had been down in the dumps for close to a decade before that.

Given this, the Times Group, which looks at its publications not as news ventures but as products which solicit advertising, decided to cut down on its losses.

2) In the last couple of years, many media houses have put their epapers behind the paywall. Some media houses now offer only a certain number of articles per month free, beyond that the reader needs to subscribe (Honestly, there are very simple hacks available to get around this).

While, this might be a sensible thing to do, the chances of it working out quickly are very low. The Western newspapers which have been successful in raising a substantial portion of their revenues digitally, have been at it for almost two decades. Off the record conversations with a few higherups in the newspaper space tell me that digital doesn’t bring in much money currently.

Also, a lot of the digital strategy of the Indian news media is all over the place. Like in the recent past, almost everybody has launched podcasts, without having the most basic infrastructure in place. The recordings of many of these podcasts are absolutely terrible (There are podcasts out there whose production values are superb as well, but that is more an exception which proves the rule). Of course, very few of these podcasts, like most of the digital media, earn any money. They have been launched because everyone else has also done so.

3) One of the theories that has been propounded in the recent past is that the media will survive and report the news that it should, only if the readers pay for the news they consume. Right now most news consumption is free.  Honestly, I have subscribed to this theory as well at some point of time.

But now I am very sceptical of this argument. Let me offer a few reasons for the same. With corporate advertising taking a beating, the news media as a whole is now dependent on government advertising more than ever before. Revenues from the digital media cannot fill the gap because of the fall in corporate advertising.

Hence, the media as a whole needs to keep government(s) in good humour, so that the advertisements keep coming in. Also, other than this economic incentive, the other reason is simple political pressure and the fact that any government has a lot of nuisance value. The current central government thrives on projecting narratives which it wants to and for that it needs the so-called national media on its side. This will stop the media from covering news items like they should.

To cut a long story short, just because you, dear reader, have bought an annual digital subscription which cost Rs 1,000-2,500, it doesn’t mean that the news media will start reporting news the way they should. Propaganda and spin will continue to be the order of the day.

4) Another phenomenon being seen is the rise of paid-newsletters. Some newsletters have achieved some scale and a few thousand paid subscribers. This is often offered as an example of how people are willing to pay for stuff which is written and presented well. While this is a good development, one needs to take into account the fact that the paid-newsletters are extremely niche with a large focus on the private equity, venture capital space, stock market investors etc.

At best they look at business and corporate stories. This doesn’t fulfil the need for the media being the fourth pillar in a democracy. A few thousand people paying for some news they consume isn’t going to help either the Indian media or the Indian democracy in any way, for that matter.

5) Another recent phenomenon has been that of out of work journalists starting their own newsletters and charging for it. While I have no specific idea of how well these newsletters are doing, I can tell you from my own experience that the point about at least 10% of your social media followers will end up paying for the newsletter, is a lot of bunkum. If you can get even 10% of your social media following to click on what you write, you will be doing a decent job of it, forget paying for the content.

6) Also, with newspapers and websites going behind a paywall, WhatsApp forwards and false news, will gain greater legitimacy as people will have easy access to them than genuine news.

As Alan Rusbridger writes in Breaking News – The Remaking of Journalism and Why It Matters Now: “Bad information [is] everywhere: good information [is] increasingly for smaller elites. It [is] harder for good information to compete on equal terms with bad.”

It is very easy to put out bad information out there on the social media, after the fixed cost of a mobile phone or a cheap laptop and an internet connection has been met. The marginal cost after the fixed cost has been met, is almost zero. Politicians and political parties will continue to thrive on this.

7) Where does all this leave news-media houses? A basic point that MBAs who run these organisations haven’t seem to have understood is that today’s reader doesn’t get his news from just one source like the old days, when most families subscribed to one newspaper or at best two newspapers and/or a weekly magazine.

Today’s reader likes to read from multiple sources, basically whatever he finds interesting enough and/or whatever gets shared with him on WhatsApp or social media. Media houses clearly haven’t caught up on this trend. They still want readers to make an upfront payment and commit to a subscription of at least one month.

It’s time that they started adopting micro-payments and pricing their digital stories for as low as five bucks and let people pay for it, if it interests them. Other than offering people choice, this will allow news media houses to tackle the subscription fatigue that will set in sooner rather than later.

It is important to remember here that news media is competing not just with other news media, it is also competing with over the top (OTT) media platforms like Hotstar, Amazon Prime, Netflix, SonLiv etc., for a share of the consumer’s wallet as well as his time and mind-space.

Other than Netflix, which is on the expensive side, the cost of subscribing to other OTTs is quite cheap. The news-media is competing with these OTT platforms as well.

7) Talking about competition, news media houses are now also competing with individual content creators, who have a strong presence on YouTube. Some of these content creators, who focus on delivering free as well as paywalled video content around the important news of the day and cut the clutter, have huge social media followings. Their business model rests around seeking donations from their followers. These donations can be as low as Rs 10. This makes another case for micropayments.

To conclude, common sense suggests that it will be easier to get people to pay for news digitally, if the amounts involved are small. As far as readers are concerned, there are no guarantees that they will get what they are looking for, even if they are ready to pay. One solution is to follow and support individuals like me who are trying to put out stuff they feel people should know about and which the mainstream media isn’t writing about. Nevertheless, the problem there is that there is only so much an individual can do and it is very difficult for individuals to be consistent day and day out.

Disclosure: I worked for the Daily News and Analysis (DNA) between October 2005 and September 2010. I also worked for the Times Group between October 2010 and March 2012.

 

Arindam Chaudhuri's business model is similar to other private institutes

arindam
Vivek Kaul
Today’s edition of The Economic Times has a very interesting story on the IIPM bossman Arindam C
haudhuri. Chaudhuri sits at the top of an empire of four companies which in 2010-2011 generated revenues of Rs 533 crore, on which there was an overall loss of Rs 5 lakh (but not all the companies were loss making) and an income tax of just Rs 5 crore was paid.
This is typically how most private education institutes in this country tend to operate. While there revenues are decently high, they typically tend to make a loss and pay very low income tax. And there is a clear method to the way they operate.
The money spinning machine at the heart of any education empire is the education institute where students come to study. The same is true in case of Chaudhuri. The education business remains a major revenue earner within the group. In 2010-2011 its total revenues stood at Rs 349 crore. On this it made a loss of Rs 2.3 crore.
Typically in most such cases the education institute doesn’t own any assets. To give you a simple example, the building in which the education institute operates out of might be owned by a private limited company. The private limited company will be in turned owned by the entrepreneur who also runs the education institute. Hence, the rent that is paid by the education institute is legally tunneled out and goes into the pocket of the entrepreneur.
As The Economic Times points out “For example, in 2010-11, the education arm paid Rs 37.6 crore to the consulting arm, Planman Consulting—Rs 31 crore for services received and Rs 6.6 crore as rent.” While it is not specified what this rent was for, it was a rent nonetheless. Planman Consulting is the consulting company of Arindam Chaudhuri. What is interesting is that the education arm was responsible for 84% of the total revenues of Rs 45.8 crore revenues earned by Planman. The company also earned a profit of Rs 7.8 crore whereas the education business made losses.
There are other legal ways of tunneling out money. The computers and other infrastructure in the education institute might also not be owned by the institute and may be on rent from a private limited company owned by the entrepreneur or by one of his close relatives. Or if the institute does own the computers, it buys them from a company owned by the entrepreneur.
Similarly insurance contracts that the education institute might enter into are also facilitated through an insurance broker close to the entrepreneur. Another legal way of tunneling out money is through advertisements. The advertisements that are placed in the media are done through an advertising agency owned by the entrepreneur or one of his relatives. The agency gets a cut on this.
Chaudhuri though has taken this trick to the next level by launching his own magazines and placing his own advertisements in them. As The Economic Times points out “The latest issue of The Sunday Indian had 44 edit pages and 19 ad pages (including 10 pages of group ads)….In 2008-09, the latest year for which financials were available for Planman Media, it earned revenues of Rs 41.4 crore. Of this, just Rs 1.6 crore came from magazine sales.” Interestingly claims are made that Chaudhuri’s magazines sell more than magazines like India Today and Outlook in the general segment and more than any other business magazine, in the business segment. So then why is Planman Media earning only Rs 1.6 crore through magazine sales? Also if magazine sales is not bringing in the moolah for Planman Media, what is? Advertisements from other group companies owned by Chaudhuri?
So moral of the story is this. Whenever the education institute spends money on anything there is a private limited company owned by the entrepreneur waiting to capture it. In fact, entrepreneurs further tunnel out money even from these private limited companies by giving themselves high salaries.
Chaudhuri is no exception to this. As The Economic Times points out “Chaudhuri and his wife, Rajita, who are executive directors in Planman Consulting, drew a total remuneration of Rs 6.96 crore from the company that year.” So Chaudhuri and his wife took away more than 15% of the Rs 45.8 crore revenue of Planman Consulting as a remuneration.
Entrepreneurs have other innovative ways of tunneling out money. They set up placement agencies. And these agencies get paid for placing students as well as appointing teachers at the education institute. Interestingly, some of the biggest private business schools in the country (including IIPM) tend to place their ‘unplaced’ students in one of the group companies. The idea is of course to show decent placements. Other than that it gives these students a little more time to find themselves a decent job. And once they do that on their own, the institute can always claim that they were placed by the institute.
Of course, if the student is unable to find a new job within a certain time period, he or she is asked to leave, given that by then a new batch of students is ready to be placed. The institutes can afford to do this because of the high fees that they charge for their courses. If some of it goes back to the student, it does not do them much harm. Its all a part of the game.
To get back to the main story, the question is why do education institutes do this? As The Economic Times points out “An accounting expert, speaking on the condition of anonymity, says it’s a common industry practice for the education arm to show losses and group companies that provide services to this company to earn profits. “Promoters adopt this to circumvent Indian regulation, which prohibits profitmaking companies in the education sector,” he says. “But firms that provide services to the company that runs the education business are not bound by it.”
This essentially ensures that the education entrepreneur surrounds the institute with a web of private limited companies and uses them legally to tunnel out the revenue being generated out of the fees that students pay the institute. Of course, everyone does not operate at the same scale and is not as successful as Arindam Chaudhuri is.
There is a scope for great debate here. Why cannot education be a profitable business? This specially in a country where education is in such a short supply. Ironically, private equity investors have been greater investors in coaching institutes which coach students to get into education institutes or sit for various board exams. But given that the education institutes are not supposed to be profitable in a normal way, these investors have stayed away.
And entrepreneurs who have entered the education business are more interested in making a quick buck, rather than building an infrastructure which provides quality education at a decent price over a long period of time. Typically big private money has stayed away from this sector. Those who have entered it are typically politicians, who are good at financial shenanigans and are looking to put their black money to some use.
The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on March 15,2013

(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek. He studied in a private business school. And also worked for one) 

Facebook is a corporate dictatorship.


When the whole world was going gaga about Facebook’s Initial Public Offering (IPO), there was one man who did not fall for all the hype, looked at the numbers of the company, asked some basic questions and concluded “they don’t know how they are going to make money.” Looks like, he was proved right in the end. The stock was sold at a price of $38 per share, and has fallen since then. Aswath Damodaran was the man who got it right. “In hindsight everybody will tell you that they were bearish on Facebook. Nobody will admit to buying the shares,” points out Damodaran. He is a Professor of Finance at the Stern School of Business at New York University where he teaches corporate finance and equity valuation. In some circles he is referred to as the “god of valuation”. In this interview he speaks to Vivek Kaul.
Excerpts:

Let us start with Facebook, you have been critical about their IPO pricing?
The trouble with Facebook is figuring out, first what business they are going to be in, because they haven’t figured it out themselves. How are they going to convert a billion users into revenues and income? And second, if they even manage to do it, how much those revenues will be, what will the margins etc. They don’t know how they are going to make money. Whether they are going sell advertising to these users? Whether they are going to sell products to these users? Services to these users? I think all they know right now is that they have a lot of users.
But if they have no idea of what to do with their users, how did they make the $4billion in sales that they did last year?
They are selling. 12% of that came from selling stuff for Zynga (The maker of popular games such as “FarmVille” and “CityVille,”). The remaining 88% did come from very subtle advertising. The question is that whether they can scale that up? Because right now it is kind of invisible. You can’t see it because it is relatively small. But if they want to generate the kind of revenues they want, you are going to see it on your Facebook page. And it is going to be very very clear that they are using what they know about you to pick those ads. And I am not sure people will be comfortable with that knowing that they are seeing not just your profile but your interactions. So they can see how old you are. What political party your support? What sports you like? It is all going to go. And that’s their selling point.
So it will be some sort of invasion of privacy?
It is not some sort of invasion of privacy. It is an invasion of privacy. The question is can they do that without people getting pissed off and saying I am leaving Facebook and going elsewhere. And that I think is the big unknown. Because let’s face it, they have not just a billion users, but they know more about these users than any other company on the face of this earth. If you want a company to find 35million people who fit a specific demographic characteristic, the place to go is Facebook. They can show it to you. The only question is that if you did advertise through Facebook to those 35million is this the kind of forum were they are inclined to click on an ad.
How does it compare with Google?
In case of Google it is a much more direct business model. It’s search. You click and that’s it, everybody could see what they were doing. Facebook is a much more subtle model. On Facebook you are talking to your friends, which is a private conversation between you and your friends, but when you see these intrusive ads on the side, you realize you are not just talking to your friends, you are talking to your friends and somebody at Facebook is monitoring you at the same time. That’s a very tricky challenge. So they have made the $4billion, but at the value (the market capitalization of the Facebook stock) they have they have to make $35billion. And that’s a very different game because that would mean a lot more ads on every page directly focused in on what the users are doing.
In face very frankly I didn’t realize there are ads on my Facebook page for a long time…
It is pretty subtle right now because they don’t have that much advertising. If you think of revenue of $4billion spread out across a billion users, you are going to see a very few ads because it is still on the sides. And sometimes it doesn’t even look like an ad. Right. It’s a Facebook friend with GM. You click on it and before you know it you are looking at GM’s product offerings. So it is very subtle right now. But it can’t stay subtle for them to make the kind of revenues they have to make to justify their price now. The kind of scary thing here is that Mark Zuckerberg has said that he wants to build a social enterprise and not a business enterprise.
What does he mean by that?
What he means by that is he built Facebook so that people could talk to each other. He didn’t want ads on it. For a long time he refused to take ads on Facebook until he was told that if you can’t take ads there is no other way to make money in this. So I am not sure how willing he is to go the distance because it is going to be a fight. It’s going to be a fight against not other social media companies but against the big players. The Googles and The New York Times of the world. This is a tough game to fight and you got be willing to act like a business and I am not sure is willing to yet.
You called the business model of Facebook, a Field of Dreams. Why is that?
Yeah. You ever seen that movie? Field of Dreams.
No.
In the movie Kevin Costner moves to the American Midwest and he is walking through this cornfield. And hears this voice and it says “if you build it he will come”. He being Shoeless Joe Jackson, a baseball player from a 100 years ago. On the faith that these old baseball players will show up, he builds this baseball field in the middle of Iowa and everybody asks him, why are you building this huge baseball field in the middle of nowhere? And he tells them, if I build it they will come. And that in a sense is what social media companies are doing right now. They are building this place where there are lots of users and they are telling people trust us if we build this, they will come. They being advertisers, product sellers, they will come. But in the Field of Dreams they did come but I am not sure in these companies that they will.
Talking about the current price of Facebook how do you see it? Yesterday is closed at around $33.(The interview was conducted on Thursday, May 24,2012) Has it fallen enough?
I think it fell enough in those two days that you are going to get a consolidation. The next run on them will tell how far they might go back. The low 30s are close enough to my intrinsic value that I wouldn’t call them massively overvalued. I think there is enough potential in the company. If it dropped to $15 then it’s pretty much a bargain. At $31-32 its pretty close to intrinsic value
The intrinsic value you calculated for Facebook was $29?
Yeah.
So why was the stock valued at such a high price of $38 per share when it was sold to the public?
It wasn’t valued. It was priced.
So why was it priced at such a high price?
Remember they weren’t pricing it on a blank slate. They could see transactions happening in the private share market where people were buying and selling Facebook shares. And there the prices were going at about $42-43. So they said if people are buying and selling at this price, these are real transactions.
What sort of stock market was this?
For the last two years Facebook has been on what’s called a private share market where people who owned shares of Facebook were allowed to trade.
So is it like over the counter?
Not even over the counter. They are actually beyond the counter. These are private companies that are not incorporated. So this is a completely unregulated share market. Like Goldman Sachs could sell shares. Players in this market are pretty big institutional investors they are not individual investors. Transactions here have particular merit because these are two informed investors transacting and they are coming to a price. And investment bankers saw that price and they said if they are paying $42, then we should be able to sell it at $38. And they also got onto the phone and they called institutional investors. They tried to gauge demand until Thursday evening (May 17,2012). And that’s why they set the price at 4 o’clock on Thursday because that’s how late they were pushing this off to make sure that there was enough demand.
Wasn’t this a throwback to the days of the dotcom bubble?
This is how all pricing is done in IPOs. IPOs are always priced they are never valued because essentially your job as an investment banker is to sell at that price. What was unusual here was that demand and supply that they gauged collapsed. They didn’t realize how thin the market was until one hour into the offering when they saw the price collapse. It started at $38, it went to $43, and then very quickly it kind of collapsed. My theory is when you price things you are building in market perceptions, what you think will happen etc. You are basing it in on momentum. That’s a very fragile thing. You don’t want mess with it. Even people who are buying based on pricing and momentum like to tell themselves that they are buying based on value. So they look for a good story and they don’t want to have their face rubbed at the fact that they are buying because everybody else is paying the price.
In case of Facebook it was quite the opposite…
If you look at what the investment banks and Facebook insiders did in the last week they almost rubbed the investors faces in this. They rubbed it in the sense that they kept hiking up the offering price, saying we know you are suckers. At the same time the insiders were selling the shares in the week leading up to the offering. If I had been the investment banker I would have spent the last week talking about the user base, and advertising because that would have given the momentum investors a crutch. I am purely buying it because of advertising revenues. Instead it was all about pricing. They made it very transparent that they were not valuing the company. It was all demand and supply. I have a feeling that if you point to midday on Friday (May 18,2012) and say that was the time when the momentum on social media companies, not just on Facebook, shifted. And if you look at what has happened since it is not just Facebook which has seen its price collapse. It’s Groupon. It’s LinkedIn. It’s the entire sector. And I wager that there are IPOs lined up to go to investment banks of social media companies, that are either being pulled right now or being dramatically repriced.
You have said in the past that Facebook has huge corporate governance issues. Can you elaborate on that?
It has got voting shares and non-voting shares. Zuckerberg has got the voting rights. It is also incorporated as a controlled corporation which basically means that you don’t have to follow the corporate governance rules (like the Sarbanes Oxley Act) that publically traded companies need to do. They can have insiders on the board.
Is that allowed?
If you are controlled corporation it is. And Facebook has been very open about that they are going to be a controlled corporation.
How does regulation allow for something like that?
As long as you make it public. If it is a controlled corporation investors have to make a judgement as to whether they care. In case of Facebook initially it looked like they didn’t care. Right from the beginning Facebook has been very open that they are not really going to be a publically traded company and that really they are a private business that wants the capital that public markets give them. But it is going to be Zuckerberg’s company.
So they won’t give out much information?
They might give out the information but you will have no say in what they do. So if they do an acquisition…
Did they overpay for Instagram?
They paid. I don’t know whether they overpaid. But the paid and there was no accountability. Zuckerberg basically decided to pay a billion (dollars) then he told the board that I have bought the company and I have paid a billion. This is not the way a company should be bought. A CEO shouldn’t be deciding what to pay overnight and you shouldn’t be telling the board of directors after you have bought a company that I just bought a company for a billion and I just want you to know.
This is like how mom and pop shops down the road operate…
It is a way a dictatorship operates. Facebook is a corporate dictatorship.
So who influenced Zuckerberg to do what he is doing?
Google set the framework that Facebook is using right now. The voting shares, non-voting shares. Sergey Brin and Larry Page are the models that Zuckerberg is using.
Can you elaborate on that?
Until Google came along, US companies generally did not have two classes of shares. Voting shares and nonvoting shares were for a long time banned by the New York Stock Exchange. So most companies didn’t even try. So if you look at Apple, you look at Microsoft they had only one class of shares. Google essentially did two things. They did their IPO through an auction rather than through investment banks. And secondly they decided to have voting and nonvoting shares. If institutional investors had risen at that point of time and said we are not buying these shares because we don’t have enough voting rights, then Google would have been forced to go back to drawing board and then come back. Institutional investors were okay with Google doing that. Once they opened that door every social media company you look at LinkedIn and Groupon, they follow what Google did.
So these shares are listed on NASDAQ?
Yes. NASDAQ allows for voting and nonvoting shares that is the part of the reason for listing on it. The New York Stock Exchange because it is in competition with NASDAQ has now also started relaxing, they want the money, they want the listings. So they will take Facebook even if it’s voting and nonvoting shares. So this will be a race to the bottom.
So the shares sold to the public were nonvoting shares?
They are low voting shares. The shares that Zuckerberg owns have 10 times the voting rights, which means he has 57% of voting rights with 35% of the shares. And he will always make sure that remains above 50%.
So he can go ahead and buy anything without requiring clearance from the board?
Google for instance recently issued new shares which have no voting right at all. So that is the third layer. You have ten voting rights shares. One voting rights shares. And no voting rights shares. Zuckerberg can go out and raise as much capital as he wants. If he issues no voting rights he will always have 57%. He going to lock in that voting percentage.
But how is something like this allowed in a developed market like the US?
I don’t think it should be banned. Let the investors decide for themselves. Lots of countries you have two classes of shares. Its par for the course. And you just price it in.
It’s just that it hasn’t happened in the US for a long time?
I think you will wake up one day and see I wish I had voting rights. But you chose to be a part of this game. I am not feeling sorry for the institutional investors in Google who are crying about the fact that Google does things they don’t like. You bought the stock you live with it.
(The interview was originally published in the Daily News and Analysis(DNA) on May 28,2012. http://www.dnaindia.com/money/interview_facebook-is-a-corporate-dictatorship_1694603)
(Interviewer Kaul is a writer and can be reached at [email protected])