Mr Jaitley, the New Black Money Scheme is Nothing but an Amnesty Scheme

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In the budget speech finance minister Arun Jaitley made on February 29, 2016, he proposed: “a limited period Compliance Window for domestic taxpayers to declare undisclosed income or income represented in the form of any asset and clear up their past tax transgressions by paying tax at 30%, and surcharge at 7.5% and penalty at 7.5%, which is a total of 45% of the undisclosed income.”

So, if you have black money, and are willing to pay 15% extra to the government, over and above the top tax rate, the laws of the land won’t apply to you. As Jaitley further said in his speech: “There will be no scrutiny or enquiry regarding income declared in these declarations under the Income Tax Act or the Wealth Tax Act and the declarants will have immunity from prosecution. Immunity from Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 is also proposed subject to certain conditions.”

In an interview to the national broadcaster Doordarshan, Jailtey later said: “It’s not a VDIS (Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme) and it is not an amnesty.” Like a good lawyer, he did not specify what the scheme really is.

So what does the word amnesty mean? I looked for and managed to find my fifteen-year-old The Compact Oxford Reference Dictionary. The dictionary lists out two meanings for the word amnesty. Here are the two meanings: a) an official pardon for people convicted of political offences. b) a period during which people admitting to particular offences are not prosecuted (the italics are mine).

As Jaitley said during his budget speech: “We plan to open the window under this Income Disclosure Scheme from 1st June to 30th September, 2016 with an option to pay amount due within two months of declaration.”

Hence, anyone admitting to having black money during this period and paying the tax, the surcharge and penalty on it, will not be prosecuted under the laws of the land and will have immunity. This is precisely the Oxford Reference Dictionary’s meaning for amnesty – a period during which people admitting to particular offences are not prosecuted. 

So, even if Mr Jaitley does not want to call the government’s black money amnesty scheme, an amnesty scheme, it is nothing but an amnesty scheme. If you are willing to declare your black money, pay 30% tax and 15% extra on it, the law of the land will not apply on you.

Now compare this to advance tax which needs to be paid by the non-salaried income tax payers several times during the course of a year. As per Section 234C of the Income Tax Act, if advance tax is not paid on time, a fine of 1% per month needs to be paid on the total amount of tax outstanding. Hence, the government is basically treating everyone who has black money and has not paid tax on it, a little worse than someone who has not paid advance tax for a year.

Also, it is interesting that this time around the government wants those who have black money to pay only 15% extra and get immunity. In May 2015, the Parliament had passed the Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets (Imposition of New Tax) Act. After the passage of this Act, the government offered a compliance window.

This window allowed those with undisclosed foreign assets and income(or foreign black money) to declare them, pay a tax of 30% and a penalty of 30%. The window was closed on September 30, 2015.

Taking advantage of the compliance window 638 declarants declared assets and income of Rs 4,147 crore in total. This meant that the government was able to collect around Rs 2,488 crore (60% of Rs 4,147 crore) as tax revenues.

For all the hype and hoopla that happened, the actual collection was basically very small. Did this failure lead to the government just asking for 15% extra this time around, instead of 30%, as was the case last year?

Further, is there a distinction being made between foreign black money and domestic black money? The domestic black money stays within the country and has some utility. It is spent on consumer goods and real estate. Hence, the money enters the domestic financial system and is income for many individuals.

So, even though tax is not paid on this money, it does have its utility. The same cannot be said about black money that has left the country. And is that why the government is handling those declaring black money in the next financial year, with kids gloves?

The one good thing that Jaitley has done is that he has not assumed the total amount of money he expects the government to earn through the black money amnesty scheme, as a part of the government income for the next financial year.

Guess there is no way to possibly estimate this. The last time the government launched such a scheme was in 1997. The scheme ran between July 1, 1997 and December 31, 1997. The scheme allowed individuals with black money to come out in the open and pay a tax of 30% on their black money. In case of others i.e. corporates and firms, a tax of 35% had to paid.

The government ended up collecting Rs 9,584 crore from around 4.75 lakh declarants. Nevertheless, the scheme was different from the one that will be launched in June this year, given that back then the black money wallahs did not have to pay any fine. This time around there is a 15% fine. Also, the response to the amnesty scheme on foreign black money launched last year, had had a thanda response.

Given these ifs and buts, it’s a good thing that the government has not made any assumptions about the total amount of money they expect to earn through this route. But this hasn’t stopped the stock market wallahs from trying to come up with a number.

Akash Prakash of Amansa Capital expects the government to earn Rs 50,000 crore through this route. He doesn’t explain how he came up with the number. The thing is that the government hasn’t gotten around to putting a number to the money it expects to earn is primarily because there is no way a reasonable estimate can be made.

In that scenario how did Mr Prakash come up with a Rs 50,000 crore number? Or like other fund managers was he just being optimistic for the sake of being optimistic? That as we know is a favourite pastime of the fund managers.

The column originally appeared on Vivek Kaul’s Diary on March 15, 2016

Fasten your seatbelts: Not only United Bank, a major part of banking is in trouble

 indian rupeesVivek Kaul 
In an editorial today (i.e. February 26, 2014), on the troubled United Bank of India, The Financial Express asks “Wasn’t anybody watching?”. “It is amazing that things could have been allowed to come to such a pass without action being taken to stop it,” the pink-paper points out.
In fact, The Financial Express should have been asking this question about the Indian banking sector as a whole, and not just the United Bank in particular. As of September 30, 2013, the stressed asset ratio of the Indian banking system as a whole stood at 10.2% of its total assets.
This is the highest since the financial year 2003-2004 (i.e. the period between April 1, 2003 and March 31, 2004) point out
Tushar Poddar and Vishal Vaibhaw of Goldman Sachs in a recent report titled India: No ‘banking’ on growth.
Interestingly, the public sector banks are in a worse situation that their private sector counterparts. As the latest
RBI Financial Stability Report points out “Among the bank-groups, the public sector banks continue to have distinctly higher stressed advances at 12.3 per cent of total advances, of which restructured standard advances were around 7.4 per cent.”
The stressed asset ratio is the sum of gross non performing assets plus restructured loans divided by the total assets held by the Indian banking system. What this means in simple English is that for every Rs 100 given by Indian banks as a loan(a loan is an asset for a bank) nearly Rs 10.2 is in shaky territory. The borrower has either stopped to repay this loan or the loan has been restructured, where the borrower has been allowed easier terms to repay the loan (which also entails some loss for the bank) by increasing the tenure of the loan or lowering the interest rate.
The restructuring of a loan happens through the Corporate Debt Restructuring(CDR) cell. The Goldman Sachs analysts point out in their report that
85% of restructured loans were restructured during the last two years (i.e. financial year 2011-2012 and 2012-2013).
What makes the situation even more precarious is the fact that the stressed loans could keep increasing. Goldman Sachs projects that among the banks its research team covers stressed loans could go up by as much as 25% in 2013-2014 (i.e. the period between April 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014). Also, some of the troubled loans have still not been restructured or classified as bad loans by banks. Hence, the situation is worse than what the numbers tell us.
As Akash Prakash of Amansa Capital wrote
in a recent column in the Business Standard “Most investors believe that many of the problem assets are yet to be recognised by the system. These banks continue to increase their exposure to the problem areas of power and infrastructure.”
Five sectors, namely, Infrastructure, Iron & Steel, Textiles, Aviation and Mining, have the highest level of stressed advances. “At system level, these five sectors together contribute around 24 percent of total advances of SCBs [scheduled commercial banks], and account for around 51 per 
cent of their total stressed advances…The share of above mentioned five sectors in the loans portfolio of Public Sector Banks,” the RBI Financial Stability Report points out. Hence, the public sector banks are in greater trouble than their private counterparts.
Of the five sectors the infrastructure sector has contributed around 30% of the total stressed assets even though its share of total loans is only about 15%.
The banks have also not been provisioning enough money against stressed loans. “Moreover, provisions for stressed assets are still low, and the lowest in the region. For public-sector banks under its coverage, our Financials Research team assesses the provision coverage ratio for stressed loans at only 24%,” write Poddar and Vaibhav.
What this means is that the banks are not setting aside enough money to deal with prospect of a greater amount of their stressed loans being defaulted on by borrowers and turning into bad loans. And to that extent, banks have been over-declaring profits. That wouldn’t have been the case if they had not been under-provisioning.
Despite the under-provisioning the capital adequacy ratio of banks has fallen dramatically in the recent past. “The Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR) at system level declined to 12.7 per cent as at end September 2013 from 13.8 per cent in as at end March 2013…At bank-group level, PSBs recorded the lowest CRAR at 11.2 per cent,” the RBI Financial Stability Report points out. In fact, since September 30, the capital adequacy ratio of the entire banking system would have fallen even more, given that bad loans have gone up. The capital adequacy ratio of a bank is the total capital of the bank divided by its risk weighted assets.
In the days to come, the banks, particularly public sector banks (given their falling capital adequacy ratio), will have to raise more capital to have a greater buffer against the mounting bad loans. The RBI estimated in late 2012 that banks need to raise around $26-28 billion (or around Rs 1,61,200 crore – Rs 1,73, 600 crore, if one dollar equals Rs 62) by 2018.
This is a huge amount. “The capital raising requirement could increase to US$43bn [Rs 2,66,600 crore] under a stress scenario where gross NPLs[non performing loans] and restructured assets rise to 15% of loans, the previous historical high,” estimates Goldman Sachs.
So where is this money going to come from? For the financial year 2014-2015 (i.e. the period between April 1, 2014 and March 31, 2015). the finance minister P Chidambaram has set aside only Rs 11,200 crore for capital infusion into public sector banks. This is simply not enough.
So should government pump in more money into the banks? It simply doesn’t have the capacity to do so. As Akash Prakash writes “There is no way the government can fund this; there is simply no fiscal capacity. Nor do investors want to stand in front of this freight train, since the capital needs for most banks are greater than their current market capitalisation.”
Let’s take the case of the United Bank of India. The current market capitalisation of the bank is around Rs 1442 crore(assuming a share price of Rs 26). The government has decided to pump in Rs 800 crore into the bank. Given that, the market capitalisation of the bank is around Rs 1442 crore, which private investor would have been ready to pump in Rs 800 crore? Also, when the State Bank of India tried to sell shares worth Rs 9,600 crore to institutional investors recently, it failed to raise the targeted amount and had to be rescued with the Life Insurance Corporation pitching in and picking up its shares.
If the biggest public sector bank in the country, which accounts for nearly 20% of Indian banking, is unable to sell its shares completely, what is the chance for other public sector banks being able to do so?
Given these reasons, Indian banking is in for a tough time ahead. Fasten your seatbelts. 
The article originally appeared on www.FirstBiz.com on February 26, 2014. 
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He tweets @kaul_vivek)