affordability

Why HDFC Finds Homes to Be More Affordable, When They Clearly Aren’t

Summary: HDFC is getting better home loan customers that doesn’t mean homes have become more affordable. HDFC’s conclusion of homes becoming more affordable is an excellent example of survivorship bias.

Before I start writing this, I have a confession to make. I have written about this issue before, around five years back. But given that things haven’t really changed since then, it is a good time to write about it again. Hence, to all my regular readers who have been following me over the years and might have read this earlier, sincere apologies in advance.

Home loans in India are given by two kinds of institutions – banks and housing finance companies (HFCs). Among the HFCs, Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC) has been a pioneer in the area of home loans.

The company regularly publishes an investor presentation along with every quarterly result.

I am not sure for how long the company has been doing this, but its website has these presentations going as far back as March 2013, a little over seven years. Since then, the company has had a slide in its investor presentation which talks about the improved affordability of owning a home in India. Usually, it is the eight or the ninth slide in the presentation (sometimes, but very rarely tenth).

This is the slide in the latest presentation for the period April to June 2020.

Improved affordability of homes

Source: HDFC Investor Presentation, June 30, 2020.

Let’s look at the chart between 2000 and 2020, the last two decades. The home loan market in the country before that was too small and evolving and hence, prone to extreme results. So, it makes sense to ignore that data.

What does the chart tell us? It tells us that affordability of homes in the country has gone up over the years. The chart defines affordability as home price divided by the annual income of the individual buying the home.

In 2020, the average home price has stood at around Rs 50 lakh. Against this, the average annual income of the individual buying the home stands at around Rs 15 lakh. Given this, the affordability factor is at 3.3 (Rs 50 lakh divided by Rs 15 lakh).

Hence, the average individual in 2020 is buying a home which is priced at 3.3 times his annual income. (Please keep in mind that the property prices are represented on the left-axis and the annual income is represented on the right axis).

As can be seen from the chart, the affordability factor at 3.3 is the lowest in twenty years. Hence, affordability of homes has gone up. QED.

The trouble is, this goes totally against what we see, hear and feel all around us. Real estate companies have lakhs of unsold homes with absolutely no takers. They have thousands of crore of unpaid loans. The banks and non-banking finance companies (NBFCs) have restructured these loans over the years and not recognized them as bad loans in the process, with more than a little help from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Bad loans are loans which haven’t been repaid for a period of 90 days or more.

Further, investors who bought real estate over the years have been finding it difficult to sell it. Indeed, if homes had become more affordable, this wouldn’t have been the case. Real estate companies would have been able to sell homes and repay the loans they have taken from banks and NBFCs. And the RBI wouldn’t have to intervene.

So, what is it that HDFC can see that we can’t? Before I get around to answering this question, let me tell you a little story. During the Second World War, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) had a peculiar problem.

It wanted to attach heavy plating to its airplanes in order to protect them from gunfire from the German anti-aircraft guns as well as fighter planes. The trouble was that these plates were heavy and hence, had to be attached strategically at points where bullets fired by the German guns were most likely to hit. The British couldn’t plate the entire plane or even large parts of it.

The good part was that they had historical data regarding which parts of the plane did the German bullets actually hit. And this is where things got interesting. As Jordan Ellenberg writes in How Not to Be Wrong: The Hidden Maths of Everyday Life: “The damage [of the bullets] wasn’t uniformly distributed across the aircraft. There were more bullet holes in the fuselage, not so many in the engines.”

So, historical data was available and hence, the decision should have turned out to be a very easy one. The plates needed to be attached around the plane’s fuselage. But this logic was missing something very basic. The German bullets should have been hitting the engines of airplanes more regularly than the historical evidence suggested, simply because the engine “is a point of total vulnerability”.

A statistician named Abraham Wald realised where the problem was. As Ellenberg writes: “The armour, said Wald, doesn’t go where bullet holes are. It goes where bullet holes aren’t: on the engines. Wald’s insight was simply to ask: where are the missing holes? The ones that would have been all over the engine casing, if the damage had been spread equally all over the plane. The missing bullet holes were on the missing planes. The reason planes were coming back with fewer hits to the engine is that planes that got hit in the engine weren’t coming back.” They simply crashed.

This is what is called survivorship bias or the data that remains and then we make a decision based on it.

As Gary Smith writes in Standard Deviations: Flawed Assumptions Tortured Data and Other Ways to Lie With Statistics: “Wald…had the insight to recognize that these data suffered from survivor bias…Instead of reinforcing the locations with the most holes, they should reinforce the locations with no holes.”

Wald’s recommendations were implemented and ended up saving many planes which would have otherwise gone down. (On a different note, both the books from which I have quoted above, are excellent books on how not to use data, especially useful if you are in the business of torturing data to make it say what you want ).

If you are still scratching your head and wondering what does this Second World War story have to do with HDFC finding homes more affordable, allow me to explain. Like the British before Wald came in with his explanation, HDFC is also looking at the data it has and not the overall data.

Look at the left-hand of the corner of the chart, it says based on customer data. The analysis is based on HDFC’s own historical customer data. When HDFC talks about an average home price of Rs 50 lakh and an income of Rs 15 lakh, it is basically talking about the set of people who have approached the HFC for a loan and gotten one. Hence, HDFC’s conclusion of better affordability is drawn from the sample it has access to.

But does this really mean that affordability has improved? Or does it mean that the quality of HDFC’s customers has improved over the years? The customers that HDFC is giving a home loan to are ones who can afford to buy homes. The HFC clearly has no idea about people who want to buy homes but simply do not have the financial resources to do so.

They don’t show up as a part of any sample, hence, the evidence on them is at best anecdotal. These people are like planes whose engines were hit and hence, they did not make it back to their base, in the Second World War. And like there was no data on the planes which got hit and didn’t make it back, there is no data on these people as well. Basically, HDFC’s data and conclusion are victims of the survivorship bias

In fact, HDFC’s investor presentation has always carried another interesting slide on low penetration of home loans in India. The following chart is from the latest presentation.


Home loans as a percentage of GDP

Source: HDFC Investor Presentation, June 30, 2020.

Total home loans outstanding given by both banks and HFCs in 2020 stands at 10% of the GDP (On a slightly different note, the ratio of homes loans given by banks to home loans given by HFCs is 64:36). In March 2014, the total outstanding home loans in India had stood at 9% of the GDP. If homes indeed were affordable this ratio would have gone up faster.

To conclude, it’s time that HDFC remove this misleading slide from its investor presentation or at least say that the affordability has improved for its customers and not for the country as a whole.

Real estate prices are not just about corruption; they are also about affordability


India-Real-Estate-Market

Last week, Suraj Parmar, a leading Thane builder committed suicide. In his suicide note Parmar talked about the corruption in the system. A report in The Indian Express quoted V V Laxminaryan, the joint commissioner of police of Thane, as saying: “The suicide note speaks of several problems that Parmar was facing, including difficulties in obtaining approvals and the stop-work notices issued to him. The note goes on to say that several people were repeatedly demanding bribes, that he had already paid them a lot in the past but that their demands were still continuing and it had become too much for him to deal with.”

Corruption in real estate at the government level has always been an issue. But now if builders are to be believed it has reached never before seen levels. As Niranjan Hiranandani, director of Hiranandani Group told NDTV.com, after Parmar’s suicide: “In the last couple of years, I think corruption is over but extortion has started. So, I think what was unbearable to the builder was the fact that there was no corruption in that sense of the term, but it had gone far beyond corruption levels that have ever happened.”

A June 2011 news-report in The Economic Times gets into the details of the issue. In Maharashtra, which happens to be the biggest real estate market in the country, a builder typically needs around 60 approvals to construct a property. Of this, 50 approvals need to be taken from the municipal corporation where the property is being built.

The Economic Times report then goes on to quote Pune builder Kumar Gera, as saying: “These clearances should not take more than three months…But in most states, it takes anywhere between one year and four years. And they add 20-30 % to a builder’s project cost.”

This is, in turn, passed on to consumers who want to buy homes. As a report in the Daily News and Analysis points out: “At every step, there is a price to be paid to obtain necessary clearances. The ‘Golden Gang’, a group of corporators and civic officials, calls the shots and builders are bound to cough up exorbitant sums to avoid harassment. This expenditure, so to speak, is then passed on to home buyers. That explains why real estate in Mumbai, Thane and Navi Mumbai is so prohibitively expensive.”

In fact, as a real estate consultant told The Economic Times: “Builders don’t just pass it on…They often add to it big time.” So builders add their own corruption premium to the price of homes they sell.

Most builders use corruption in government and increasing input costs to explain that the price of homes won’t fall anytime in the near future. Take the case of cement, a major input into building homes. As a recent newsreport in The Economic Times points out: “Cement prices have jumped 20-40 per cent over the past two months in top cities despite demand from the real estate industry, which is its largest buyer, being low.”

In this scenario the price of homes won’t fall, say builders. But this logic just takes into account the supply side of the equation. It only talks about the builders who supply homes and the costs they have to incur. What about the end consumers who want to buy these homes?

As John Kay writes in an essay titled Guess Who’s Come to Dinner which is a part of the book Everlasting Light Bulbs – How Economics Illuminates the World: “But surely people can’t spend an increasing proportion of their incomes on housing.” The affordability of homes also needs to be taken into account.

Also, owning a house is just not about putting up a down-payment, taking a home loan and paying the builder. There are other costs involved as well. Hence, as Kay puts it, it is important “to focus on the costs of house ownership rather than the cost of houses.”

Given this, affordability isn’t just being able to pay the price of the house. There is more to it than that. As Kay writes: “Mortgage repayments [home loan EMIs basically] are only a…part of the cost of buying a house: you have to pay for repairs and maintenance, heat and light, property taxes.” Then there is the cost of moving in, the cost of setting up the place, and so on.

In a scenario where home prices are anyway high all these costs make the entire cost of owning a home even more expensive. So, the point that builders make about their inability to cut prices doesn’t have any meaning. They can build homes and sell them at prices they think are right, but the question is will there be any takers at that price? And the answer is clearly no.

In any market there are always two sides – demand and supply. And that is a basic point that our builders need to remember. So, they can continue holding on to their prices, but at those prices there will be not much demand for homes. As Kay writes in another essay titled A Fetish for Manufacturing: “The rewards of different activities [are] detached from their position in the hierarchy of needs. You only [get] paid for producing goods that people [want].”

Kay makes another interesting point, which I would like to talk about here. As he writes: “In classic bubbles – from tulip mania to the dot.com frenzy – people bought things, not for their intrinsic worth, but to sell on to others at a higher price. That rarely happens with houses.”

This is not true in the Indian context. Homes in India have “not” always been bought “for their intrinsic worth” but they have also been bought “to sell on to others at a higher price”. And that clearly is not happening anymore. Over the last few years you would have been better off letting your money sit idle in a savings bank account rather than investing in real estate. Given this, the interest in owning real estate has come down. That is clearly visible from the huge number of unsold homes across cities as well as fall in the launch of new projects.

As Kay writes: “As in every asset market, short term price movements are driven by beliefs, not underlying realities.” The underlying reality is that at these prices it does not make any sense to invest in real estate. But the belief that real estate prices always go up is still reasonably strong. The question is for how long will the belief remain strong?

I think we are half way there.

The column originally appeared in The Daily Reckoning on October 15, 2015.