Indian economy

India’s MIDNIGHT TRYST with GST is Turning into a Priyadarshan Comedy

Summary: 

There must be some kind of way outta here
Said the joker to the thief
There’s too much confusion
I can’t get no relief.

— Bob Dylan, All Along the Watchtower.

 

India’s midnight tryst with the Goods and Services Tax (GST) is a little over three years old and is looking more and more like a bad joke which, we brought upon ourselves.

The state of GST takes me back to the last thirty minutes of several Priyadarshan comedies, where everyone is running after everyone else and no one knows what is really happening. (Actually, it can also compared to the ending of the wonderful comedy Andaz Apna Apna).

In reel life, all this confusion has the audience in splits. In real life, those going through the experience feel like they are a part of surreal black comedy.

Yesterday, the finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman said that the covid-19 pandemic was an act of god and that would impact GST collections negatively. An act of god is essentially a natural hazard which is beyond human control, something like an earthquake or a tsunami for that matter. No one can be held responsible for it.

The act of god has led to a situation where the GST collections have nose-dived. This is hardly surprising given that private-consumption has come down over the last few months. Also, by characterising the fall as an act of god, the central government doesn’t want to be held responsible for the fall in GST collections.

Nevertheless, it needs to be said here that GST collections weren’t doing well even before covid-19 struck. Let’s take a look at the growth/fall in GST collections between August 2018 and February 2020, before the covid pandemic struck.

All is well?

   
Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.

The above chart clearly shows that the growth in GST collections had been falling since early 2019 though it did recover a little since late last year, before stabilizing at half of the peak growth. In November 2018, the growth in GST collections was 16.5%. In February 2020, it was at 8.3%.

The point here being that the growth in GST collections had slowed down since early 2019. It picked up again in late 2019, thanks to a cap on the input tax credit that certain businesses could take. Festival season sales also helped.

This slower growth in GST collections was a reflection of a broader economic slowdown, for which the botched up implementation of GST was also hugely responsible. Of course, the spread of the covid pandemic has only made the situation much worse, with GST collections falling between March and July.

In a normal scenario, a fall in tax collections would mean lower expenditure by the government. But the situation that prevails is nowhere near normal. With private consumption falling, the governments (states and central) are expected to continue spending money, in order to keep the economy going.  Also, state governments are at the forefront of fighting the epidemic and they need money to do that.

The GST collections are split between the central government and the state governments. One of the carrots that the central government had offered to the states in a bid to make GST acceptable and to hasten India’s midnight tryst with GST, was a promise of a compensation if the GST revenues did not grow by 14% from one year to the next. The GST(Compensation to States) Act, guarantees state governments a revenue protection of 14% for the first five years of GST.

Of course, it doesn’t take rocket science to understand that GST revenues will contract in 2020-21, the current financial year. Hence, as per the GST(Compensation to States) Act, state governments need to paid a compensation by the central government.
As per the law, a compensation needs to be paid to state governments every two months. In fact, the compensation due to states for the period April to July 2020, stands at Rs 1.5 lakh crore.

This money comes from the compensation cess which is levied on both sin and luxury goods. The trouble is that like the overall GST collections, the growth in collections of the compensation cess had been falling through most of 2019. This can be seen in the following chart.

To sin or not to sin?


Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.

In June 2020 and July 2020, the collections of compensation cess fell by 9.4% and 15%, respectively. It needs to be said that even during an economic slowdown or a contraction, the consumption of sin and luxury goods does not fall at the same pace as the overall consumption. But despite that, the compensation cess collected in 2020-21 will not be enough to pay state governments to ensure a 14% growth in overall GST earned.

The shortfall in GST collections as per the central government is expected to be at Rs 2.35 lakh crore. It has said that this shortfall cannot be paid for through the consolidated fund of India, which is a repository for all the money earned by the central government through taxes as well as the money it borrows.

Basically, the central government after promising a 14% growth protection to states on GST, has come back and told them, hey, now that we are in trouble, you are on your own. It reminds me of an old line in buses in North India, sawari apne samaan ke khud zimmedar hai (the travellers are responsible for what they are carrying). The joke, the way the drivers of these buses drove, was, sawari apni jaan ke bhi khud zimmedar hai (the passengers are also responsible for their lives). This is the kind of joke that the central government has just cracked on state governments. This is black humour of the finest kind, which you won’t even see in an Anurag Kashyap movie.

In order to fulfil the gap, the options offered to the state governments by the central government are: 1) To borrow Rs 97,000 crore at a reasonable rate of interest from a special window at the Reserve Bank of India. The Rs 97,000 crore number is an estimate of GST loss due to implementation issues. 2) To borrow the entire gap of Rs 2.35 lakh crore. These options are only for 2020-21. The states can repay the money in the years to come by using the GST compensation cess they receive in the years to come.

This leads to a few points:

1) The central government basically sold the state governments a dummy in promising a 14% growth in GST collections. A narrative was created, it was marketed and then the constituents of the narrative were abandoned.

2) The state governments were also responsible for this to some extent given their resistance to the original law. Also, the central government was in a hurry to ensure India’s midnight tryst with GST, in order to create a narrative.

3) It is easier for the central government to borrow than for the states to do so. It seems here that the central government doesn’t want to spoil its fiscal deficit number any further than it already will this year. Fiscal deficit is the difference between what a government earns and what it spends.

Nevertheless, whatever be the case, the total government borrowing (centre + states) is bound to go up. So, I really can’t understand what is the fuss around the central government borrowing more. Also, with the GST in place, the ability of state governments to tax more is rather limited. Their main taxes on alcohol, real estate, petroleum products and vehicles, have already taken a huge beating this year.

4) It will be interesting to see the legal logic being used by the central government to take this stance. From what I understand, the GST Council and the central government are being considered separate entities (Maybe some lawyer can explain this in simple English).

5) If the state governments borrow from the market, how is it going to impact bond yields?

6) Also, the compensation cess on luxury and sin goods, will now have to be extended beyond 2022 and this will not go down well with businesses, which are already struggling.

7) There is bound to be in increase in compensation cess on some luxury and sin goods during this financial year. That remains the easiest way for the government to increase tax revenues. Also, I sincerely hope the GST Council doesn’t start increasing tax rates on normal goods in a bid to shore up revenues (Governments and government bodies have a tendency to do that).

Of course, the move hasn’t gone down well with state governments. Sushil Modi, the deputy chief minister of Bihar told this to the Press Trust of India, even before the GST Council meet: “It is the commitment of the central government to compensate the states for the shortfall in GST collections. It’s true that it is legally not binding on the Centre, but morally, it is.” Modi belongs to the BJP.

West Bengal finance minister Amit Mitra said: “The question is who should borrow. The Centre… can get a better rate and has more debt servicing capacity.” The finance minister of Delhi, Manish Sisodia, accused the Centre of “betraying” federalism by “refusing” to pay GST compensation to states.

As stated earlier, these options are only for 2020-21. What happens next year? With covid-19 pandemic continuing, the negative economic impact of this might be felt next year as well. The states have a week’s time to get back to the GST Council.

Of course, until then and even beyond, all the confusion will prevail. As I said, the entire scenario now looks like the last thirty minutes of a Priyadarshan movie, where everyone is going after everyone else, and no one knows what is actually happening. The irony is that this is in real life and not something to laugh at. But then when a government talks about an act of god to wriggle out of something that it clearly promised to many other governments, what else can one do anyway but laugh in pain.

There’s has got to be some difference between the government of the world’s largest democracy and an insurance company?

 

The ‘GULZAR’ Principle of Investing for Regular Income and Safe Returns

Summary: There is no real way of earning a regular and a safe income that is enough to meet the monthly expenses.

The headline was a clickbait. But now that I have your attention, let me explain the logic behind it.

The title song of the 1979 Hindi film Gol Maal was written by the lyricist Gulzar (Honestly, calling him just a lyricist is doing his talent a great disservice. Other than being a lyricist, he has written screenplays and dialogues for a huge number of Hindi films. He is a poet and a short story writer. He is also a translator of repute. Oh, and he has also directed a whole host of Hindi movies as well as a few TV serials along the way. Also, for the millennials, Hrishikesh Mukherjee made Gol Maal, much before Rohit Shetty started using the title for everything he could possibly think of).

Now getting back to the point I was trying to make. In the title song of Gol Maal there is a line which goes: “paisa kamane ke liye bhi paisa chahiye,” essentially meaning, in order to earn money, you first need money. And that is what I am going to write about today.

In the twenty months, as the economy has gone downhill, people have been getting in touch with me on email and the social media, with a very basic financial query. The numbers were small first but post-covid this has turned into a deluge. The question being asked is how a reasonable monthly income can be generated from savings, without taking any risk, in a safe way.

The answer to this question has become very important as people have lost their jobs or seen their salaries being slashed and incomes falling. What does not help is the fact that the post-tax return from bank fixed deposits are now largely in the range of 4-5%. The inflation as measured by the consumer price index is close to 7%.

Before I try answering this question, it is important to understand why interest rates on bank fixed deposits have fallen. The simple answer to this lies in the fact that there is too much money floating around in the financial system, with the banks not knowing possibly what to do with it.

Between March 27 and July 31, a period of little over four months, the non-food credit given by banks has contracted by Rs 1.32 lakh crore or around 1.3%. The banks give loans to the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and other state procurement agencies to primarily buy rice and wheat directly from the farmers at the minimum support price declared by the government. Once these loans are deducted from the overall loans given by banks, what remains is non-food credit.

What does non-food credit contracting tells us? It tells us on the whole borrowers have been repaying loans and at the same time not taking on enough new loans. It also tells us that banks are reluctant to lend. Further, as we shall see, there has been a huge surge in fixed deposits with banks, as people have increased their savings in the aftermath of the spread of the covid-19 pandemic. Banks will take time to lend all this money out.

Between March 27 and July 31, the total deposits of banks have gone up by Rs 5.95 lakh crore or 4.4%. In an environment, where the non-food credit of banks has contracted whereas deposits have jumped big-time, it is but natural that interest rates on fixed deposits have fallen. In fact, the weighted average term deposit interest rate or simply put average fixed deposit interest rate has fallen from 6.45% in February to 6% in June, the latest data available. Now that we are in August, the interest rates may have possibly fallen even more.

In fact, there is nothing new about interest rates on fixed deposits falling, this has been going on for close to eight years now. Having said that, interest rates shouldn’t be looked at in isolation, it is important to compare them with the prevailing rate of inflation. Take a look at the following chart. It plots the average interest rate on fixed deposits during the course of a year, along with inflation as measured by the consumer price index. The difference between the two is referred to as the real rate of return on fixed deposits.

Interest v/s Inflation


Source: Reserve Bank of India.

What does the above chart tell us? Between 2014-15 and 2018-19, there was a healthy difference between the average interest paid on fixed deposits and inflation. (Of course, this is without taking tax on fixed deposit interest into account, else, the difference would have been lower).

These were the years when first Dr Raghuram Rajan and then Dr Urjit Patel were at the helm at the Reserve Bank of India. In 2019-20, the real return on fixed deposits narrowed to 1.6%. Shaktikanta Das took over as RBI Governor in December 2018.

Let’s take a look at the real return on fixed deposits month wise since December 2018, the month when Das took over as RBI Governor. The real return on fixed deposits as explained earlier is the average interest rate on fixed deposits minus the prevailing rate of inflation.

Crash in real returns


Source: Author calculations on data from the Reserve Bank of India.

This chart is as clear as anything can get. The real rate of return on fixed deposits has simply collapsed since end of 2018. This has happened as the interest rate on fixed deposits has fallen and inflation has gone up.

The interest rate on fixed deposits has fallen primarily because the rate of loan growth for banks has crashed over this period. This we can see from the following chart.

Loan growth crash


Source: Reserve Bank of India.

The above chart clearly tells us that the loan growth of banks has crashed since December 2018. In fact, for the week ended July 31, it stood at just 5.4%. Given this, the Indian economy was slowing down even before covid-19 pandemic struck.

Hence, as economic growth has slowed down, the loan growth of banks has slowed down and this has led to fixed deposit interest rates coming down as well. The point being that in economics everything is linked.

Of course, there is more to this than just the economy slowing down. Since February,  like the rest of the central banks, the RBI has printed and pumped money into the financial system to drive down interest rates, in the hope of getting businesses and people to borrow more.

Also, with collapse in tax revenues, the government will have to borrow more this year, in order to keep its expenditure going. Hence, it likes the idea of borrowing more at lower interest rates. The RBI goes along with this because among other things it also acts as the debt manager of the government.

The problem is that India’s economic crisis has grown worse since the covid pandemic hit the world, leading to a lot of individuals losing their jobs or facing salary cuts. Small businesses have been majorly hit and incomes have come down dramatically.

In this environment, people are now looking to generate some sort of a regular income from their savings. Of course, most them want to do this in a risk free way. As one gentleman recently asked me: “I am currently not employed after having worked in the corporate sector for 10 years. My request to you is to honestly guide me on how and where to invest to earn steady income especially when the fixed deposit interest rates have fallen so low.”

The first thing I can clearly say is that the gentleman believes that there is a solution to his problem. He believes that it is possible to generate a good steady income despite fixed deposit interest rates having fallen.

I see this belief among many people. My guess is, it stems from the fact that way too many personal finance publications believe in offering solutions to everything. I mean, why will a reader read you, if at the end of it you say something like there aren’t really any solutions to this problem that you might have. At least, that’s how their thinking operates. Also, they need advertisers. And advertisers love solutions to everything, even when none really exist.

In June 2020, the average rate of interest on a fixed deposit was 6%. Once we take income tax into account, the rate of return would be much lower. Of course, there are banks out there which are offering a rate of interest of 7% or more. Nevertheless, these banks are perceived to be among the riskier ones. So, the question is are you willing to take on more risk, for a 1-1.5% higher return? If yes, then these investments are for you.

While, we live in an era where no bank is going to go bust, they can and have been put under a moratorium or periods under which only a limited amount of money can be withdrawn from them. And money that can’t be spent when it is needed, is essentially useless. Hence, if you do end up putting money in a bank which offers a 1-1.5% higher return, do remember not to put all your money into it.

There are corporate fixed deposits which offer a slightly higher return but again they don’t have the same safety as a bank does.

If you are senior citizen, you can look at the Senior Citizens Savings Scheme. But that comes with the pain of dealing with the post office.

Debt mutual funds as many people have found out over the last one year, come with their own share of risks. They were marketed to be as safe as fixed deposits, but they weren’t anywhere close. Also, irrespective of what financial planners and wealth managers might say, debt mutual funds are fairly complicated products, which I am sure most people selling them don’t understand. And that’s why they are able to sell them in the first place.

A lot of individuals in the last few months have turned towards investing in stocks. The logic is that the stock market has rallied from its March low. On March 23, the BSE Sensex, India’s premier stock market index was at 25,981 points. Yesterday, August 26, it closed at 39,074 points, a jump of over 50% in a period of a little over five months. This rally has been driven by a few stocks and if you had invested in the right stocks, you would have ended up with good gains by now.

While, one can’t question this logic, but what one needs to remember is that on January 12, the Sensex was at 41,965 points. From there to March 23, it fell by 38% in a little over two months. The point being the stock market can fall as fast or even faster than it can rise. Also, do remember this basic point that a 50% fall can wipe off a 100% gain. (A 38% fall would have written off a 61% gain).

Hence, the larger point here as I mentioned in this piece I wrote a few days back is, just because an investor takes a higher risk by investing in stocks, it doesn’t mean he will always end up with higher returns, precisely the reason the word ‘risk’ is used in the first place. And by the way, the 10-year return on stocks (including dividends) is less than 9% per year.

So, the question is what should a person looking for a regular and safe income, actually do? As helpless as it might sound, there aren’t many options going around beyond the humble fixed deposit, especially for people who aren’t senior citizens. The trouble is the fixed deposit interest rates are at very low levels.

If you need to generate a monthly income of Rs 20,000 at 6% per year, this needs an investment of Rs 40 lakh.

The moral of the story here being that if you want to generate a regular safe income which is enough to meet your monthly needs, you need to invest more money. Or as Gulzar wrote in Gol Maal: “paisa kamane ke liye bhi paisa chahiye.” I would like to call this the Gulzar principle of investing for a regular income and safe returns.

Also, there are corollaries to this. These are very difficult times. Hence, there is a good chance of individuals ending up in a situation where they might have to spend their savings (rather than just the return on savings) to keep meeting expenditure.

Let’s take the example of a middle-class household with monthly expenses of Rs 50,000. In order to generate this income through a fixed deposit, an investment of Rs 1 crore is needed. Of course, the chances of a middle-class household with expenses of Rs 50,000 per month having savings of a crore, are rather minimal. In this scenario, they will have to resort to spending their savings. Given this, as I keep saying, the return of capital is much more important now than the return on capital.

In the short run, the only way to generate a good regular and safe income is find a job or any other source of income by selling the skills that one has (Like I write. I can do that for a media house or do it individually). In the long run, the next time you see interest rates of 8-9% available on fixed deposits or any other safe investment, invest in these assets and lock in the high returns for as long as possible.

While, this might not sound much like a solution but that is the long and the short of it.

RBI Gives a Covid Spin to Cash Touching Pre-Demonetisation Levels

We live in an era of narratives. Politicians create them. Corporates create them. Social activists create them. Commentators, public intellectuals, economists and analysts also create them. And there are days when we are even lying to ourselves in our heads and creating narratives for ourselves.

In all this, it is hardly surprising that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), with Shaktikanta Das at its helm, has also padded up and gotten into the business of narratives and spin. Before I explain this in detail, let me give you some background to this piece.

In November 2016, the central government demonetised Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes. The citizens had to deposit these notes into their bank accounts. The result was that 86% of the currency by value suddenly went out of the financial system.

Paper money has different uses, but its main use is as a medium of exchange. It basically facilitates the process of buying and selling. Of course, if people want to, the process of exchange can be carried out through other means like issuing a cheque, making a demand draft, carrying out a money transfer or even paying money digitally.

But India back in 2016 was a country which believed in operating in cash. When the cash went out of the system, the economic transactions especially in the informal sector took a beating. The gravity of the situation never really came out fully, except perhaps anecdotally, given that the government data collection for the informal part of the economic system was and continues to remain abysmal. I guess, which is why it is called an informal sector in the first place.

Between November 2016 and now, I have closely tracked the total amount currency in circulation gradually increasing. Of course, as the economy expands, the currency in circulation is bound to go up. In order to take care of this, the data that needs to be tracked is the currency in circulation divided by the gross domestic product (GDP), expressed as a percentage. (I will refer to this as cash in the system). The GDP is the measure of the size of any economy. The cash in the system basically adjusts for the size of the economy.

My contention over the years has been that the cash in the system will eventually rise to touch the pre-demonetisation level. Earlier this year, in April 2020, writing in the Mint, I had said: “The cash in the system [as of March 2020] works out to 12% of GDP.” I had made this calculation on the basis of the currency in circulation as of March 27 and the GDP forecast for 2019-20 (up until then, the actual GDP numbers were yet to come in).

A formal confirmation of this came yesterday with the RBI  releasing its annual report. In the annual report, the RBI says: “The currency-GDP ratio increased to its pre-demonetisation level of 12.0 per cent in 2019- 20 from 11.3 per cent a year ago, indicating the rise in cash-intensity in the economy in response to the pandemic [emphasis added].” The currency in circulation constitutes of cash with banks and cash with the public.

Before analysing this statement, let’s look at the following figure, which plots the currency in circulation to the GDP ratio or the cash in the system, over the years.

Cash in the System


Source: Reserve Bank of India.

In March 2017, a few months after demonetisation was carried out and after the whole country had queued up to deposit the demonetised Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes into their bank accounts, the cash in the system fell to 8.7% of the GDP.

The reason for this was very straightforward; the government and the RBI couldn’t replace the cash in the system at the same pace as they had taken it out. There were all kinds of problems, including banks having to reset ATM trays in order to take care of the smaller size of the new notes.

As of March 2020, the cash in the system is back to 12% of the GDP, which is at an almost similar level of 12.1% of the GDP as of March 2016, before demonetisation was carried out. The RBI feels this has happened because there has been a dash for cash in light of the spread of the covid-19 pandemic. People hoarded on to more cash than they normally do and this led to a faster rise in the cash in the system than it normally would have.

The point to be remembered here is that we are talking cash in the system as of March 2020 and not August 2020. At that point of time, people had just started to take covid-19 seriously. Let’s take a look at the monthly increase/decrease in currency in circulation during the course of 2019-20.

Changes in currency in circulation


Source: Author calculations on data from Reserve Bank of India.

It is very obvious from the above chart that at Rs 99,040 crore, the maximum monthly increase in cash in the system during the year, happened in March 2020. Does this then imply that there was a dash for cash as the fear of the pandemic spread? In order to say this with surety we will have to look at weekly increase in cash levels in the system during the course of March 2020.

Dash for Cash?


Source: Author calculations on Reserve Bank of India data.

India went into a physical lockdown starting March 24, 2020. It is only around then that most of the country realised the gravity of the pandemic. This can be seen by increase in cash in the system in the week ending March 27. This implies a higher than normal increase in currency with public with a higher withdrawal of money from the banking system than would have been the case if all was well.

But the bulk of the increased withdrawals in March had happened before March 20. Close to 62% of the withdrawals in March (at Rs 61,354 crore) had happened before March 20. Interestingly, up until then the fear of the pandemic hadn’t really spread. This weakens the entire dash for cash argument.

Let’s say if things had gone on normally then it is safe to say that the increase cash in the system in March would have been around 80-85% of what it eventually got to. At this level of increase, the cash in the system as of March end would have been around 11.95% of the GDP, which is not significantly different from 12.03% of the GDP, it eventually came to. The RBI’s dash for cash argument hangs on a few basis points.

Even if assume, that increase in the cash in the system in March 2020 was at around 60% of the actual number, the cash in the system would have worked out to 11.84% of the GDP, which is slightly lower than 12.03% of the GDP. And even at 11.84% of the GDP, the cash in the system would have been higher than where it was as of March 2019, and would have continued to go up, as it has since November 2016. This is the more important point.

While India of November 2016 was a country which believed in operating in cash, so is the India of March 2020. Yes, digital transactions have gone up along the way and that’s a good thing. But that could have happened anyway without putting the country through the trouble that demonetisation did.

Also, it is time we realised that people don’t store their black money in cash. In fact, data from a White Paper on black money published in May 2012 showed that around 4.9% of the total undisclosed income admitted to during search and seizure operations between 2006 and 2012 was held in the form of cash. Cracking down on black money is much more complicated operation than just cracking down on cash in the system.

Further, societies with more cash aren’t necessarily more corrupt. If that was the case Japan with a cash in the system of around 20% of the GDP would be more corrupt than India. On the flip side, Nigeria which has a cash in the system comparable to that of Norway, wouldn’t be a country as corrupt as it is. The government needs to make peace with this fact.

To conclude, I think one reason the RBI might have resorted to this spin and is trying to create a narrative, lies in the fact that when demonetisation was carried out, the current RBI governor Shaktikanta Das was the finance secretary.

My guess is that a part of Das still wants to justify demonetisation as a good thing and show it by telling the nation that the cash in the system rose to the pre-demo level simply because of the Covid-19 pandemic, something that wouldn’t have happened otherwise.

But as I showed above that is a very weak argument. It is time the RBI sang a different tune on this front and moved a dash for cash to Das for cash.

What do higher household financial savings tell us about the economy?

The household financial savings, which form a bulk of the overall savings in the Indian economy, went up in 2019-20. This after they had fallen in 2018-19. The question is how did this happen and what does this mean for the Indian economy in the post-covid world? Mint takes a look.

What was household financial savings rate in 2019-20?

Household financial savings essentially refers to the savings of households in the form of currency, bank deposits, debt securities, mutual funds, insurance, pension funds and investments in small savings schemes. The total of these savings is referred to as gross household financial savings. Once the financial liabilities, that is, loans from banks, non-banking finance companies and housing finance companies, are subtracted from the gross savings, what remains is referred to as net household financial savings. The net household financial savings in 2019-20 rose to 7.7% of the GDP from 7.2% in 2018-19. This primarily happened because the liabilities fell from 3.9% of the GDP in 2018-19 to 2.9% in 2019-20.

What explains this uptick in household financial savings?

The gross financial savings of households in 2019-20 stood at Rs 21.63 lakh crore, marginally better than the gross savings in 2018-19 which was at Rs 21.23 lakh crore. Nevertheless, the net financial savings jumped to Rs 15.62 lakh crore in 2019-20 from Rs 13.73 lakh crore, a year earlier. This was primarily because the financial liabilities reduced from Rs 7.5 lakh crore to Rs 6.01 lakh crore. This pushed up net financial savings. Why did this happen? This happened primarily because the Indian economy has been slowing down from start of 2019. The per capita income in 2019-20 grew by just 6.1% (nominal terms, not adjusted for inflation), the slowest since 2002-03, when it had grown by 6.03%.

How did slow growth in per capita income impact savings?

A double digit growth in per capita income has happened only once since 2013-2014. In 2016-17, the per-capita income grew by 10.39%. Over the last few years, income growth has slowed down, and in 2019-20, it slowed down dramatically to 6.1%. This has led to a slowdown in lending growth. The non-food credit growth of banks in 2019-20 was at 6.7%, the slowest in more than a decade.

What does this tell about the overall state of the economy?

A slowdown in income growth has led to a slowdown in consumption as well as a slowdown in loan growth. What hasn’t helped is the weak financial state of non-banking finance companies, which has added to the lending slowdown. Also, this means that people were looking at their economic future bleakly, even before covid-19 had struck. At an individual level, the good part for them is that they tried to go slow on their borrowing in comparison to the past. But at the societal level, this hurt the economy because it led to a consumption slowdown.

Where will the household financial savings settle in 2020-21?

The period between April and June will lead to higher savings. As a recent RBI research paper states, a spike in household financial savings “is likely in the first quarter of 2020-21 on account of a sharp drop in lockdown induced consumption.” In fact, this explains why bank deposit rates have fallen in the recent past. The money deposited with banks has gone up, while the banks are unable to lend. But this spike in savings is likely to taper in the months to come simply because of “lags in the pickup of economic activity”.

A slightly different version of the piece appeared in the Mint on June 15, 2020.