Vivek Kaul
“Qu’ils mangent de la brioche” is a French phrase which means “let them eat cake” in English. It is often attributed to the French Queen Marie Antoinette. She had apparently said this to peasants when she came to know that they had no bread to eat.
There is no record that the Marie Antoinette, wife of Louis XVI ever uttered these words. But the myth has held even after all these years. And the story does make a broader point about the rich often having no idea about the state of the poor in their country.
A good example of this is Adi Godrej, the current president of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), who recently had his Marie Antoinette moment. In a recent interview to the Tehelka magazine Godrej suggested that the Indian farmers should sell their land and invest the money they get in stocks and mutual funds.
“If India has to become a developed country, you cannot have the livelihood of hundreds of millions of people depending on agriculture. They have to move on. They have to move into industry, into services. That’s how you develop a country. That has happened in every country,” Godrej said.
He further went onto add that the money that the farmers get by selling their land should be invested in stocks, so that it does not run out soon. “Why should it run out soon? It can be invested. It can be made into a much bigger value than land. Land has the lowest appreciation of all assets. The best investments are in stocks. Somebody should advise them to invest it in mutual funds so their wealth will rise faster,” Godrej said.
Let’s try and examine these statements in a little more detail. Agriculture contributes around 14% of India’s gross domestic product (GDP). This has fallen dramatically since 2004-2005, when it used to contribute around 19% of India’s GDP. At the same time it employs around 58.4% of India’s population. (Source: http://www.india.gov.in/sectors/agriculture/index.php).
So 58.4% of India’s population contributes around 14% of India’s GDP. It need not be said that this is a terribly inefficient way of working. Ruchir Sharma of Morgan Stanley calls this “a disturbing tendency of the farmer to stay on the farm” in his book Breakout Nations.
The contribution of agriculture to the overall GDP is expected to continue falling in the years to come. A calculation carried out by the Planning Commission shows that the contribution of agriculture to the total GDP would fall to as low as 7% by 2025-2026. This calculation assumes a fairly optimistic growth of 4% per year in agriculture GDP. At a growth rate of 2%, agriculture’s contribution to overall GDP by 2025-2026 is expected to be at 5.2%.
In making these calculations the Planning Commission assumes that the overall GDP will keep increasing by 8% every year, which is a very optimistic assumption to make given the current state of affairs. (You can see the calculations here).
But even assuming a 4% growth rate for agriculture and just 6% for overall GDP, the contribution of agriculture to the overall GDP can be expected to fall to around 9.8% (This is my calculation and not of the Planning Commission),from the current 14%.
So theoretically the contribution of agriculture to GDP will fall in the coming years. This can be said with utmost certainty. This means that other sectors of the economy like services and industry will grow at a much faster rate. Hence, it makes sense for farmers to sell their land, move on from farming and move onto other sectors of the economy.
And that’s what Godrej suggested in his interview to Tehelka. But even after that if the Indian farmer is unwilling to sell his land there must be some reason to it.
Akhilesh Tilotia of Kotak Institutional Equities has done some interesting analysis on this. As he points out in a recent report “a farmer makes about Rs30,000 per acre a year (assuming two crops a year) if he grows staples like wheat or paddy. One can argue that the price at which a farmer should be happy to sell the land would be at Rs 2-3 lakh an acre (or seven to ten times his annual income from the land).”
But then money is not the only issue at hand. As Tilotia writes “However, there is an element of sustainability and certainty for the farmer from agriculture and he suffers from a lack of skill to get him or his family employed elsewhere (either in the plant coming up or in the urban services industry): All this means the farmer is looking at farming as a means of livelihood and not from a pure ‘return on capital’ perspective.”
The average farmer does not want to sell out because he is not skilled enough to do anything else. A lot of them are still uneducated given that the effective literacy rate in India is around 74%.
Also the average land holding of an Indian farmer is around 1.4 hectares (one hectare equals around 2.5acres).This is very small and even if he sells, he is unlikely to make much money from it. The right to property is not a fundamental right in India. And over the years the government of India has acquired land forcibly from the citizens of this country at rock bottom prices. This is an impression that cannot be gotten rid off overnight. And hence the Indian farmer is unwilling to sell his land.
But things have gradually started to change as the government has started to offer reasonable prices for acquiring land. “National Highway Authority of India’s cost of acquisition of land was Rs 25lakh per acre in Financial year (FY) 2011…It acquired 8,533 hectares in FY2011, up from 3,120 hectares in FY2009. In FY2012, NHAI expects to acquire 12,000 hectares. The size of land acquisition is up 4 times over the past four years when the going narrative has been that land acquisition has been made impossible in India,” writes Tilotia.
So just saying that the Indian farmer needs to move is not enough. The conditions have to be right for him. He needs to have the skill-set to move on, which he currently doesn’t. Very little attempts are made by the government to rehabilitate those whose land is acquired. And more than that, the farmer needs to be offered the right price, which he wasn’t being offered till very recently.
The other suggestion that came from Godrej was that farmers should invest in stocks and mutual funds. It would be nice if he goes through a November 2011 presentation made by the
by the India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF). This shouldn’t be difficult given that IBEF is a trust established by the Ministry of Commerce with the CII. As pointed out earlier Godrej is the President of the CII.
The presentation throws up some interesting facts: A few of them are listed below:
– Despite healthy growth over the past few years, the Indian banking sector is relatively underpenetrated.
– Limited banking penetration in India is also evident from low branch per 100,000 adults ratio – – Branch per 100,000 adults ratio in India stands at 747 compared to 1,065 for Brazil and 2,063 for Malaysia
– Of the 600,000 village habitations in India only 5 per cent have a commercial bank branch
– Only 40 per cent of the adult population has bank accounts.
Given this it is unlikely that many Indian farmers have banks accounts. How can those who don’t even have bank accounts be expected to invest in the stock market? Also the stock returns in India even over the long term haven’t been great. The BSE Sensex over a period of 20 years has given a return of 8.9% per year. And even these returns haven’t been guaranteed.
So the first thing that Indian farmers should be doing is opening bank accounts.
Also, how can farmers be expected buy stocks when even the Indian middle class, which makes much more money than the Indian farmer has stayed away from investing in stocks. And there are genuine reasons for it.
As Shankar Sharma of First Global told me in a recent interview I did for the Daily News and Analysis(DNA): “We see too much of risk in our day to day lives and so we want security when it comes to our financial investing. Investing in equity is a mindset. That when I am secure, I have got good visibility of my future, be it employment or business or taxes, when all those things are set, then I say okay, now I can take some risk in life. But look across emerging markets, look at Brazil’s history, look at Russia’s history, look at India’s history, look at China’s history, do you think citizens of any of these countries can say I have had a great time for years now? That life has been nice and peaceful? I have a good house with a good job with two kids playing in the lawn with a picket fence? Sorry boss, this has never happened.”
This statement is as valid for the Indian farmer as it is for the Indian middle class. And so it’s time Adi Godrej realised that things in the real India are a little different. Marie Antoinette
may not have said “let them eat cakes” but Adi Godrej surely did.
(The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on September 12,2012. http://www.firstpost.com/business/adi-godrejs-marie-antoinette-moment-indian-farmer-should-invest-in-stocks-452776.html)
(Vivek Kaul is a writer and can be reached at [email protected])
Business
Why giving away coal blocks for free was never a solution
Vivek Kaul
In the year 2011-2012 (i.e. the period between April 1, 2011 and March 31, 2012) India produced around 540million tonnes of coal. This was 1.36% more than the amount produced in 2010-2011 (i.e. the period between April 1, 2010 and March 31,2011).
Of the 540million tonnes Coal India produced around 436million tonnes or a little over 80% of the total coal produced in India. The remaining was produced by Singareni Collieries Company and a host of other small companies.
This production wasn’t enough to meet the demand for coal in India. Hence, India also imported 99 million tonnes of coal during the course of the year primarily from countries like Australia, Indonesia and South Africa.
The amount of coal, India has been importing has been growing significantly over the years (as can be seen from the table below). What also comes out clearly is that the amount paid for importing coal grew at a much faster rate than the amount of coal imported between 2003-2004 and 2008-2009. This was the period when the international prices of coal were rallying and touched $190 per tonne in mid 2008.
Coal Imports In Million tonnes In Rupees crore
1999-2000 19.7 3548
2000-2001 20.9 4053
2001-2002 20.5 4536
2002-2003 23.3 5028
2003-2004 21.7 5009
2004-2005 29 10266
2005-2006 38.6 14910
2006-2007 43.1 16689
2007-2008 49.8 20738
2008-2009 59 41341
2009-2010 73.3 39180
2010-2011 68.9 41550
2011-2012 98.9 45723*
*from April-Oct 2011
Source: Provisional Coal Statistics 2011-2012, Coal Control Organisation, Ministry of Coal
Why this was not par for the course
All this would have been par for the course if India did not have enough coal reserves. Like is the case with oil. We don’t have enough known reserves of oil and hence we don’t produce enough oil to meet the demand. So we import oil.
But as numbers for the Geological Survey of India indicate as on April 1, 2012, India had 293.5billion tonnes of coal reserves. These reserves are referred to as geological reserves and are for valid for a depth between 0.9 metres and 1200 metres.
Not all of these reserves can be mined. Open cast mining of coal typically goes to a depth of around 250 metres below the ground level whereas underground mining goes to a depth of around 600-700 metres.
The amount of coal that can be extracted is referred to as extractable reserves. PC Parekh, a retired IAS officer in a presentation puts the extractable reserves at around 60billion tonnes. (You can access the presentation here). A few other experts this writer spoke to said that this number could be significantly higher.
But that’s beside the point. What this clearly tells us is that India has enough coal to mine unlike oil. Given this, India should not be importing the nearly 100million tonnes of coal that it did during the last financial year.
So then why is India not able to mine enough coal? The simple answer is that Coal India which is the biggest producer of coal in the country is not able to produce enough coal. One look at the following table clearly proves that.
Year Production (in million tonnes)
2011-2012 436
2010-2011 431
2009-2010 415
2008-2009 400
2007-2008 372
2005-2006 348
2004-2005 371
Average 396
Source: Coal India
Why coal blocks were given away for free
Between 2004-2005 and 2011-2012, the total coal production has increased by 17.5% or at a miniscule rate of 2.3% per year. The slow increase in the production of coal did not help given that India has been second the fastest growing economy in the world for a while now. Hence, the energy needs of the country have been growing as well. This meant greater demand for coal. A study published in 2011 shows that coal is used to meet 40% of India’s energy needs against the global average of 27%.
What did not help was the fact that between 2004-2005 and 2008-2009 there was a rally on in global commodity prices as China expanded at breakneck speech gobbling up commodities from all over the world. Hence, the price of coal shot through the roof. The international price of coal was a little over $20 per metric tonne in mid 2003. It shot up to around $40 per metric tonne in mid 2005 and kept rising after that. Prices shot up to around $190 per tonne internationally in mid 2008.
Given these reasons the government felt that there was a need to look beyond Coal India. In fact, the inability of Coal India to produce enough coal was the main reason why The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1973 was amended with effect from June 9,1973, to allow the government give away coal blocks for free.
The Economic Survey for 1994-95 points out the reason behind the decision. “In order to encourage private sector investment in the coal sector, the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 was amended with effect from June 9, 1993 for operation of captive coal mines by companies engaged in the production of iron and steel, power generation and washing of coal in the private sector,” the survey points out.
The total coal production in the country in 1993-94 stood at 246.04million tonnes having grown by 3.3% from 1992-93. The government understood that the production was not going to increase anytime soon because the newer projects were having time delays and cost overruns. As the 1994-95 economic survey put it “As on December 31,1994, out of 71 projects under implementation in the coal sector, 22 projects are bedeviled by time and cost over-runs. On an average, the time overrun per project is about 38months.There is urgent need to improve project implementation in the coal sector”.
Even though the decision to give away coal blocks for free came into effect in 1993, nothing much happened till 2004. Between 2005 and 2009, the government of India gave away 149 coal blocks for free. This was also the time when the global rally in coal prices was on and the Indian demand for coal was also on its way up. The conclusion that one can draw from this is that before 2004 it was cheap for a company to import coal because international coal prices were low. But after that things changed and it made more sense for companies to have direct access to coal.
But giving away the coal blocks for free did not solve any problem. As per the report prepared the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, as on March 31, 2011, eighty six of these blocks were supposed to produce around 73million tonnes of coal. Only 28 blocks have started production and their total production has been around 34.6million tonnes, as on March 31,2011.
Why Coal India cannot increase production at a faster rate
In all this, the question that nobody seems to be asking is that why is Coal India not able to produce enough coal? It has probable reserves of around 18.9billion tonnes, but is still unable to expand production at a higher rate.
If I was a television journalist I would say that Coal India has been unable produce more simply because it is inefficient like most Indian public sector companies. But the truth is a lot more complicated than that. And it to a large extent explains why the government’s decision of giving away coal blocks for free hasn’t worked.
India’s coal reserves are largely concentrated in the middle of the country in the states of Jharkhand, West Bengal, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh. There are some reserves in the North East as well, but they are at best miniscule. It does not help that the states that have the biggest coal reserves are also dealing with naxalite problem. Hence operating in these regions isn’t very easy.
A lot of the coal reserves are also in regions categorized as forest areas and getting clearances from the state governments isn’t always easy. What also has not helped is that the Ministry of Environment and Forests which gives the overall environment clearance isn’t known to be terribly efficient. As NC Jha told Times of India at the beginning of the year “Our 168 projects are pending environment and forest clearances at the Centre and State levels. Sixty-seven of these projects are greenfield and we are unable to make any investment in these. Remaining are ongoing expansion schemes, which too have been stalled.” Jha was the Chairman of Coal India at that point of time.
But these are small problems. The biggest problem facing Coal India is acquisition of land. The right to property is not a fundamental right in India. And over the years the government of India has acquired land forcibly from the citizens of this country at rock bottom prices. In the city of Ranchi, where this writer grew up, original landholders have still not been paid after their land was acquired to set up what was then one of the biggest public sector units in India.
Attempts to rehabilitate people whose land is acquired by the government, is rarely made. The homes built for this people are unlivable to say the least in a lot of cases. Hence, people resist to hand over their land, their only source of income.
Given this attitude of the government of India over the years the issue has become politicised. Hence, the state governments are not interested because by forcibly acquiring land they are likely to lose votes.
Due to these same reasons giving away coal blocks for free hasn’t worked and will not work. 193 out of the 195 coal blocks that government has given away for free are in the states of Jharkhand, West Bengal, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Maharashtra. All these states have a naxalite problem and that will effect the private and other government players as much as it has been impacting Coal India. The government’s environmental policy and the land acquisition policy continue to remain in a mess.
What also does not help is the fact that the expertise required to get a coal mine up and running is largely limited to Coal India. Mining coal isn’t exactly as easy as digging a tube-well.
In order to get a block up and running, companies need to prepare a mine plan, carry out the environmental impact study (EIS) of the area etc. The EIS essentially looks at what the current environment of the area is like, how mining coal will change that and what can be done to ensure that the current environment can be maintained. For Coal India this planning is done by Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (CMPDI), a 100% subsidiary. Such expertise is not easily available in the private sector.
To conclude
Coalgate is not a problem that emerged overnight. It is a problem created by the various Congress governments (given that the party has ruled the country for the most part since independence) over the years. This led to the Congress led UPA government giving away coal blocks for free to ensure that India produces more coal. But that is a problem that remains and will remain.
All data unless otherwise stated has been sourced from Provisonal Coal Statistics, 2011-2012, Coal Controller’s Organisation, Ministry of Coal.
(The article originally appeared on www.firstpost.com on September 11,2012. http://www.firstpost.com/business/why-giving-away-coal-blocks-for-free-was-never-a-solution-450915.html#disqus_thread)
(Vivek Kaul is a writer. He can be reached at [email protected])
'Tesco UK model shows organised retail will buy out kirana stores in India'
Few have approached marketing as a science like V Kumar. “My significant contribution to marketing is bringing science into it. Bridging science and practice,” says the IIT Madras alumnus, who has been greatly inspired by Philip Kotler. VK, as he is better known, is the Richard and Susan Lenny Distinguished Chair Professor of Marketing, and executive director, Centre for Excellence in Brand and Customer Management, Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, in the US. He was recently ranked amongst the top five marketing scholars worldwide, based on his research productivity. He is also the recipient of eight lifetime achievement awards (in various areas of marketing), which is a record and a consultant to some of the biggest companies in the world. In this interview, he speaks to Vivek Kaul.
Excerpts:
One of your core areas of work has been customer loyalty. Can you talk about that?
Fourteen-fifteen years ago the universal metric was that if somebody is loyal they are the most valuable customers. We questioned that linkage. Why is loyalty equal to profitability? Maybe in contractual relationships it is so. But most of the transactions between a firm and a customer are non-contractual .I am free to go and buy a shirt anywhere, a computer anywhere, a phone anywhere. Very few things are contractual. Your monthly subscription to your wireless plan is contractual. Maybe your internet connection at home and utilities, like electricity are. Given that we started to empirically test the relationship between loyalty and profitability and found it to be a very weak relationship. We went to the companies and said that if you want to engage customers then don’t use loyalty as a metric.
How was customer loyalty defined?
Loyalty was defined as how long a customer has been shopping with a company. How much money out of the total wallet size they have been spending with the company. How frequently they are coming and buying from the company. But there was nothing about profitability or the fact whether the company is making money out of the relationship. Banks were the first ones to start looking at how much profit a customer was bringing in and that too they were looking backwards i.e. how much profit the customers gave in the past and not how much profit they were likely to give in the future.
And you challenged that notion?
Yes. This prompted us to come up with a metric to value the customer. How much profit a customer is likely to give in the future? And we went to companies, got their transaction database of what customers are buying, how much the companies is spending on them in direct marketing costs, and accounting for all this we calculated the gross margin for each product sold. With these three pieces of data we were able to put together a customer life time value(CLV) metric. We did this in 2003-2004 and one of the first companies to implement this was IBM. In a pilot study we tested the customer life time value model and they made $20million instantly. Then that became the mantra for them into becoming a customer centric organisation and allocating resources to those customers where the most bang for the buck is. In India we worked with ICICI Bank . We worked with the Wells Fargo bank in the United States. We worked with the HSBC bank in Middle East. In telecom we worked with AT&T for six years. Then in the retail environment we worked with the Polo Ralph Lauren, Gallery Furniture, etc.
So the focus was on profitable customers and not necessarily the loyal ones…
Yes. In 2007 what happens is that suddenly there is a headline that the telecom company Sprint fires 1000 customers because they were unprofitable. So was it the right thing to do? The media came to us and said, you said profitability is the metric to chase and they are doing that and they are firing unprofitable customers. I said, if they are unprofitable what can you really do? It’s better to fire them, so that they will go to competition and make them unprofitable. It’s good for the company. But what if these customers spread bad word of mouth about the company, I was then asked? Who will listen to them, I replied. Because they are bad customers and hence they were fired. So if bad customers go and say they were fired, the response they will get is that of course something must have gone wrong in the relationship.
How did the company handle the situation?
Sprint also wrote about saying that these customers were calling the call centre eight times a month. At the rate of three minutes each time, it amounted to 24 minutes. Each cost call Sprint three dollars a minute. So the total cost was 72 dollars. And Sprint was making 15 dollars on them .So net net Sprint was losing 57 dollars a month on them. Over a year the company was losing over 600 dollars on a single customer. Sprint communicated to the customer base and told them that if they had not fired these customers, then the rest of the customers would have had to subsidize them..
Could you give us other examples of companies firing people?
After Sprint fired 1000 customers then the internet service providers Comcast and Verizon and all started putting a hold on the bandwidth. If people were hogging internet usage by constantly downloading movies and so on, then they said I am not going to service you or I am going to slowdown your speed. Proactively they tried to ensure that they did not lose money on somebody. They also fired a few consumers..
Some of your more recent work has been in the area of trying to figure out who is influential in the social media and using that insight in marketing. Could you take us through that?
This is the new wave. In 2008 me and my team developed this model. We basically wrote a software that could track everybody’s twitter and facebook conversation. Therefore when you put something on Facebook and others like it, then my software will see it. My software will also capture the tweets. You can ask if all this is legal? They had an open gate system at that point of time. Anybody could monitor anybody. Now they are putting plugs.
So how did the software work?
My software could crawl and track who is on Facebook and Twitter, what they are saying, who is tweeting to whom etc. Not only that, if I tweet something, you forward it to somebody else, they forward it to somebody else and they again forward it to somebody else, we could find out how far your tweet spreads. How far your Facebook like spreads? So when I tweet to you it spreads to 10,000 people. But if I tweet to someone else it only spreads to 200 people. So I then try and I figure out, why in a two week period your tweet spreads to 10,000 and the other person’s goes to only 200 people. And I find that you have more followers on Facebook and Twitter. And you are pretty active in the social media world and you are talking about multiple subjects or even a single subject but more of it. And whenever you say something to somebody they also reciprocate to you. We come up with eight measures like that. With the help of this we can pretty much say something like that if I use you as a seed to plant a message then it will reach 8500 people. That is what we have done.
Could you take us through a real life example on the above subject?
An ice cream retailer from Mumbai approached us and asked us to help them to promote this ice-cream. Our target group is college students and young adults, they said. They are the ones who are going to spread the word. They are active in the social media. So we want to use social media. We have a very limited budget.
So what did you do?
We created a stickiness index. Of all the conversations happening we tried to figure out who are the people who have a high degree of category relevance. So in this case who is talking about ice cream related products on Facebook or Twitter. People could be talking about milkshakes, or gelato. It could be just ice and of course ice cream. We applied the stickiness index on the influencers i.e. if there are 10,000people with a high customer influence effect meaning those who can spread the message the farthest, applying the stickiness index, we narrowed down the number to 300. So we take this 300 and bring them to the ice cream parlour and got them to taste the ice-cream. We also asked them to create their own ice cream and give a name to it.
And what happened after that?
After this we asked these guys to spread the word about the ice-cream. So in next step they put it up on Facebook. Tweeted about it. Other people who saw this on Twitter could take the hashtag associated with the tweet to the ice cream parlour and could buy the specific ice-cream created by the person tweeting. The parlour boy registered the hashtag. At the end of each day our computer read from each ice cream parlour of this chain and related it to the person who sent the message on Twitter. So what is in it for the person sending the message? Each week we had a competition where the winner got a t-shirt, tote bag, etc.
Which chain was this?
This was the Hokey Pokey ice cream chain.
So there are varying things that companies get their customers to do for them…
Yes. If I am the customer and you are the firm, then I can buy from you. If not buy, I can refer customers to you through incentives. If not, then I can write about you on my social media. If not, I can give you ideas to improve your service quality. Introduce this product. Add this feature to your product. When I give ideas to you, you take that idea commercialise it and then whatever profits you make you give a share of profits to me.
Can you give some examples on that?
Many women when they are getting married in the United States hunt for the right bridal wear and often they don’t find the one they like. So they create their own design and send it to the bridal wear company which can post it on its website and say here is a design which one of our prospective customers created. How many others like this? If 200 others like it and are ready to buy it then the company can produce 200 dresses of that design at the stated price and share profits with the person who came up with the design. Another good example is IBM. They put up the Linux operating system as an open source software. So you and I can create an application for IBM that runs on Linux code, give it to IBM, they will market it and share the profits.
Any other examples?
A fast food chain got into trouble when on a YouTube video somebody caught two of its employees picking their nose and then putting their fingers into one of their products. This was a challenging situation. The company decided to have a competition and let the customers design the ingredients. They had a competition. And two people won. The product the winners had designed entered the menu of the fast food chain and the profit was shared.
Can organised retailing compete with mom and pop stores in India?
Organised retailing at best in India could be at 9%. My prediction is this that mom and pop stores or kiranas as we call them will become more and more sophisticated. Today the store owners know people by their names, as the number will grow they will have to start building a database, but they don’t have the capabilities. So organised retailing will start buying mom and pop stores individually. And then they will put all of them under one banner. It will be like how Tesco is operating in the U.K with different store formats.. You have Tesco supermarket, convenience store, street corner store, express etc. So that is the way in India you will be see this evolving because otherwise there is no growth for them.
What is the evidence from other emerging markets?
If you look at evidence from China organized retailing has got more traction. That’s because they did not have many mom and pop stores to begin with. They were cultivating their own things which was locally community based. But with more cities coming up and migration of people from rural areas to cities, gives more scope for organised retailing in China. Also space is not an issue in China. In India space is a constraint. Look at China and India. China is much bigger than India but the population is pretty much similar. Look at Brazil, it is as much bigger than India but the population is maybe one sixth that of India. So they also have space.
Any other factors at work?
There is another major factor on which it depends whether they will survive or not, it is the homogeneity of the population in consumption behaviour. Does the country as a whole consume common things or there are regional biases? In a country like Brazil people eat similar foods that every retailer can sell. In India between South, East, West and the North, there is so much heterogeneity that you need localized catering and marketing .So consumption behaviour varies therefore unless you are willing to carry heterogeneous products in each of the locations it is tough. But the organised retailers have a choice now. Do they invest capital and build their own infrastructure or should they buy out these kiranas and build them up? And clearly I see the latter as a more viable strategy than putting up their own real estate.
Should we allow the likes of Wal-Mart into India?
Wal-Mart is a value conscious store. Even if Wal-Mart is there in every place, the way they are located is typically outside the city limits. So only people with time, motivation and a vehicle, will be able to go and buy things. And the combination of these three things is very rare. Therefore their ability to grow organically in a country like India by systematically expanding the number of outlets is going to be difficult. There will be a market if they are content at not being the largest retailer. If they say in India I am one among many, they will have a presence. Maybe at some point in the future, things might change, like Wal-Mart buying other retailers and that’s the way they can expand. Their specialty is supply chain and turning the inventory over multiple times than other retailers. They cannot turn it over multiples times here. Each time if they make a 1% margin they get a higher margin due to turning the inventory over multiple times. Here I don’t see them turning it over as many times as in other markets. It’s very difficult to do that.
(The article originally appeared in the Daily News and Analysis on September 10,2012. http://www.dnaindia.com/money/interview_tesco-uk-model-shows-organised-retail-will-buy-out-kirana-stores-in-india_1738905)
(Interviewer Kaul is a writer. He can be reached at [email protected]
The dirty business
Vivek Kaul
“Every action has an equal and opposite reaction,” states Newton’s Third Law of Motion. The law holds in political and economic space as well, the only difference being that sometimes the gap between the action and the reaction can be as long as two decades.
The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1973 was amended with effect from June 9,1973. The Economic Survey for 1994-95 points out the reason behind the decision. “In order to encourage private sector investment in the coal sector, the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 was amended with effect from June 9, 1993 for operation of captive coal mines by companies engaged in the production of iron and steel, power generation and washing of coal in the private sector,” the survey points out.
The reason for the change was simple. The government owned Coal India Ltd wasn’t producing enough coal to meet the growing energy needs of the country. The total coal production in the country in 1993-94 stood at 246.04million tonnes having grown by 3.3% from the last financial year.
What also did not help was the fact that there were huge time and cost escalations on the newer projects to mine coal. As the 1994-95 economic survey put it “As on December 31,1994, out of 71 projects under implementation in the coal sector, 22 projects are bedeviled by time and cost over-runs. On an average, the time overrun per project is about 38months.There is urgent need to improve project implementation in the coal sector”.
This change made nearly two decades ago allowed the government to give away coal blocks free to both government owned as well as private sector companies. The repercussions of this move are being felt now with the Comptroller and Auditor General(CAG) of India coming out with a report and putting the losses of giving out coal mines for free at Rs 1,86,000 crore. It also has led to a political deadlock in the functioning of the Parliament.
So what happened in between 1993 and 2011?
Between 1993 and 2003, the government wasn’t in any hurry to give away mines free. In a period of over ten years, the government gave away around 41 blocks (17 to private sector companies and 24 to government owned companies) for free. Even 2004 was a slow year with only 5 blocks being given away for free.
But come 2005 and the government was suddenly in a hurry to give away blocks for free. Twenty four blocks were given away during the course of the year. This continued over the next few years. Between 2006 and 2009 a total number of 145 coal blocks were handed for free to private sector companies, government companies and ultra mega power projects. The total geological reserves of these coal blocks amounted to around 40.9billion tonnes. As the CAG report points out the total geological reserves of coal in India, as on April 1, 2011, were at around 285.9billion tonnes. Hence, 14.3% of the total coal reserves in the country were given away by the government for free. For most of this period between 2006 and 2009, the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh doubled up as the coal minister as well.
Why was there a sudden increase in giveaways post 2005?
Data from ministry of coal shows that the total production of coal in India in 2005-2006 stood at 437.3million tonnes. As pointed out earlier the production in 1993-1994 was 246.04million tonnes. Hence over a period of 12 years, the coal production had grown at the rate of 4.9% per year on an average. Of the 437.3million tonnes produced in 2005-2006, Coal India Ltd produced around 348million tonnes or around 80% of the total produce.
The trouble was that the economy was growing at a much faster rate than the rate of coal production. Hence the total coal demand could not be satisfied by the coal being produced by Coal India and other few government owned companies.
This meant coal had to be imported. The amount of coal imported doubled from 19.7 million tonnes in 1999-2000 to 38.6million tonnes in 2005-2006. In 1999-2000 these imports cost Rs 3,548 crore. In 2005-2006, the coal imports cost Rs 14,910 crore. Hence, even though the amount of coal that the country imported had doubled, the total amount paid for it had gone up by 4.2 times.
This was primarily because the price of coal started to shoot up from mid 2003 onwards. The price was a little over $20 per metric tonne of coal at that point of time. It shot up to around $40 per metric tonne in mid 2005 and kept rising after that. Prices shot up to around $190 per tonne internationally in mid 2008. As can be seen from the following table, the import of coal kept going up over the years, but the money paid for it went up at a much faster rate.
The conclusion that one can draw from this is that before 2004 it was cheap for a company to import coal because international coal prices were low. But after that things changed and it made more sense for companies to have direct access to coal.
Coal Imports In Million tonnes In Rupees crore
1999-2000 19.7 3548
2000-2001 20.9 4053
2001-2002 20.5 4536
2002-2003 23.3 5028
2003-2004 21.7 5009
2004-2005 29 10266
2005-2006 38.6 14910
2006-2007 43.1 16689
2007-2008 49.8 20738
2008-2009 59 41341
2009-2010 67.8 NA
Source: Provisional Coal Statistics 2009-2010, Coal Control Organisation, Ministry of Coal
Coal India has not been able to expand production fast enough to meet this growing need for coal in India. Between 2004 and March 31, 2012, the production of coal has increased by just 65million tonnes to 436million tonnes. This means an increase in production at the rate of 2.3% per year on an average, over the last seven years.
Year Production (in million tonnes)
2011-2012 436
2010-2011 431
2009-2010 415
2008-2009 400
2007-2008 372
2005-2006 348
2004-2005 371
Average 396
Source: Coal India Ltd
Hence there was a need to look beyond Coal India. This in a way explains why the government gave away 145 coal blocks free between 2006 and 2009. But all this was of not much use.
The government’s decision to give away coal blocks free in the hope of increasing coal production hasn’t gone anywhere. As per the CAG report, as on March 31, 2011, eighty six of these blocks were supposed to produce around 73million tonnes of coal. Only 28 blocks have started production and their total production has been around 34.6million tonnes, as on March 31,2011.
Why expanding coal production is very difficult?
The root of the decision to give away coal blocks for free has been the inability of Coal India to expand production at the rate which meets the growing coal demands of the country. There are several reasons for the same. These reasons will apply equally even to the private sector companies and government companies which have got coal blocks for free but have been unable to produce coal.
A large part of the coal reserves in India are in the naxal dominated areas of Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Odisha and Maharashtra. So operating in these regions isn’t really easy. Over and above this, a lot of reserves are in forest areas. Mining in these areas needs clearance from the state governments and that is not easy to come. The overall environmental clearance comes from the Ministry of Environment and Forests and in this day and age of environmental activism, this clearance also takes time.
But the biggest problem for Coal India has been land acquisition. There are several reasons for the same. Over the years the government of India has forcibly acquired land for a lot of its projects and paid peanuts in return to the landholders. In some cases in the state of Jharkhand, money has still not been paid to original landholders even decades after the land was acquired to set up a big public sector unit.
There is a very little attempt made to rehabilitate the people whose land is being acquired. This writer has seen homes that were built by the Central Coalfields Ltd (a 100% subsidiary of Coal India which is headquartered in Ranchi and operates coal mines in the state of Jharkhand) for people whose land was acquired to mine coal and they were unlivable to say the least. Due to these reasons people don’t want to part with their land.
Also acquisition of land requires coordination with the local District Commissioners (DCs). The DCs are usually so overburdened with work that land acquisition isn’t really a top of agenda for them. Over the years the issue has become so politicised that bureaucrats like to stay away. The state governments are not interested because by forcibly acquiring land they are likely to lose votes.
On occasions even when the land is acquired the government can re-allocate the land for some other use like building a railway line. So the main thing to get the coal production going in this country is to have a proper land acquisition process. People whose land is acquired need to be properly compensated and rehabilitated. They should be willing to part with their land.
To conclude
Several suggestions have been made for setting the prevailing situation right. Commentators have asked for setting up of another government owned coal company. Several others have asked for auctioning of the coal blocks and allowing private sector companies to operate freely to mine coal.
All these are good suggestions in their own right but they won’t work unless the land acquisition process is cleaned up. If that does not happen coal production in India cannot be increased fast enough to meet all the emerging demand. And that is the main learning that the government needs to take from what is being called Coalgate.
(The article originally appeared in The Pioneer on September 9,2012. http://www.dailypioneer.com/sunday-edition/sundayagenda/cover-story-agenda/93154-the-dirty-business.html)
(Vivek Kaul is a Mumbai based writer and can be reached at [email protected])
All you wanted to know about the COAL SCAM but didn't know where to ask…
Vivek Kaul
What is the basic issue?
Between 1993 and 2011, the government of India gave away 206 coal blocks for free to government and private companies.
So if these blocks were being given away free from 1993, why so much commotion now?
The Comptroller and Regulator General(CAG) in a recent report estimated that the losses due to the policy of the government giving out coal blocks for free, amounted to Rs 1.86lakh crore.
Why is the Congress led UPA government being blamed if the policy started in 1993?
Estimates made by stock brokerage CLSA suggest that only 41 out of the 206 blocks given away for free, were allocated before the end of 2003. This means that 165 blocks were allocated between 2004 and 2011. The Congress led UPA government has been in power since May 2004. This amounts to nearly 14% Hence, a major number of coal blocks were given away free during the UPA rule.
And how is Prime Minister(PM) Manmohan Singh involved in all this?
The PM also happened to be the coal minister between 2006 and 2009. During this period 134 coal blocks were given away for free. Estimates made by Nomura Equity Research suggest that between 2006 and 2009 the coal blocks given away for free had geological reserves of around 40 billion tonnes. India has around 286billion tonnes of geological reserves of coal. This means that around 14% of total geological reserves of coal was given away free during the period Manmohan Singh was the coal minister.
What was the purported reason for giving the coal blocks for free?
This was done in order to increase the total coal production in the country. The government owned Coal India Ltd which accounts for 80% of the total coal production in the country hasn’t been able to produce enough to meet the growing energy needs of the country. Between April 1, 2004 and March 31, 2012, the production of coal by Coal India has increased by just 65million tonnes to 436million tonnes. This means a growth of a mere 2.3% per year on an average.
What is the reasoning behind CAG coming up with the Rs 1.86lakh crore number?
The CAG reasonably assumed that the coal mined from the coal blocks given away for free could have been sold at a certain price in the market. Since the government gave away the blocks for free it lost that opportunity. This lost opportunity is what CAG has tried to quantify in terms of a number.
So what were the assumptions that the CAG worked with?
While calculating the loss the CAG did not take into account the coal blocks given to the government companies. Only blocks given to private companies were taken into account. Further only open cast mines were included in calculating the loss. Underground mines were not taken into account.
How were the numbers worked out?
The total coal available in a block is referred to as geological reserve. Due to several reasons including those of safely, the entire geological reserve cannot be mined. The portion that can be mined is referred to as extractable reserve. The extractable reserves for the blocks (after ignoring the blocks owned by government companies and underground mines) came to 6282.5million tonnes. This is equivalent to more than 14 times the annual production of Coal India Ltd. And this is the amount of coal the government would have been able to sell if it had not given the blocks away for free to private companies.
But that’s just coal in tonnes, how did CAG arrive at a loss of Rs 1.86 lakh crore?
The government gave away 6282.5million tonnes of coal for free. It could have sold it at a certain price. Also mining this coal would have involved a certain cost. The CAG first calculated the average sale price for all grades of coal sold by Coal India in 2010-2011. This came to Rs 1028.42 per tonne. Then it calculated the average cost of production for all grades of coal for the same period. This came at Rs 583.01. Other than this there was a financing cost of Rs 150 per tonne which was taken into account, as advised by the Ministry of Coal. Hence a benefit of Rs 295.41 per tonne of coal was arrived at (Rs 1028.42 – Rs 583.01 – Rs 150).
The losses were thus estimated to be at Rs 1,85,591.33 crore (Rs 295.41 x 6282.5million tonnes) or around Rs 1.86lakh crore, by the CAG.
But isn’t Rs 1.86 lakh crore a very big number?
Yes it is a very big number. But still a conservative estimate. The CAG does not take into account the losses on account of blocks given away free to government companies. As I had mentioned on an earlier occasion in this newspaper, the transaction of handing over a coal block was between two arms of the government. The ministry of coal and a government owned public sector company (like NTPC). In the past when such transactions have happened revenue earned from such transactions have been recognized. A very good example is when the government forces the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) of India to buy shares of public sector companies to meet its disinvestment target. One arm of the government (LIC) is buying shares of another arm of the government (for eg: ONGC). And the money received by the government is recognized as revenue in the annual financial statement. So when revenues for transactions between two arms of the government are recognized so should losses. Hence, the entire idea of the CAG not taking losses on account of coal blocks given to pubic sector companies does not make sense. If they had recognised these losses as well, losses would have been greater than Rs 1.86lakh crore.
So this number could have been bigger?
Yes. The other point to remember here is that the CAG had assumed extractable reserves of a conservative 73% in case of mines were mine plans were not available. Typically extractable reserves are around 80-95% of geological reserves. The CAG has also been very conservative in calculating the benefit per tonne of coal by taking the average price of coal sold by Coal India Ltd. This price is typically the lowest in the market. Coal from other sources is very expensive. Coal India also sells coal through an e-auction. The price of coal sold through this route is higher than the normal Coal India price. As the CAG has pointed out in its performance audit of ultra-mega power projects, the average e-auction price for Coal India coal was Rs 1782 per tonne in 2010-2011. Imported coal sells at an even higher price. The landed cost of imported coal was Rs 2874 per tonne (based on NTPC data for November 2009), reports CAG. If these prices had been taken into account or a weighted average price would have been created using these prices as well as the average Coal India price of Rs 1028.42 per tonne, the loss number would have been higher than Rs 1.86lakh crore.
If all this is true, so what was that Chidambaram said about zero losses?
The union Finance Minister P Chidambaram wanted us to believe that almost all companies which have been given free coal blocks have not started to mine coal till date. Hence there are no losses. This is like saying that I gave away my house for free, but since the person I gave it away to is not able to sell it, hence I did not face any losses.
What about the argument that coal is a natural resource and hence should not be auctioned?
People who have come up with this argument also need to realize that coal like air is not an unlimited natural resource. So air need not be priced because it is unlimited, but coal needs to be priced because it is limited. And if that had not been the case the government would be giving away all the coal that Coal India produces for free.
(The article originally appeared in the Daily News and Analysis on September 3,2012. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_all-you-wanted-to-know-about-the-coal-scam_1735936))
Vivek Kaul is a writer and can be reached at [email protected]