RBI to Print Rs 1 Lakh Crore to Keep Government Happy

After Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank on Wall Street went bust in September 2008, the Federal Reserve of the United States, the American central bank, came up with three rounds of large-scale asset purchases (LSAP). The LSAP was popularly referred to as quantitative easing or QE.

Yesterday, Shaktikanta Das, the governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) announced a similar sounding GSAP or G-sec acquisition programme, where G-sec stands for government securities. India now has its own planned QE. (At the risk of deviation, it’s not just the Indian film industry which copies the Americans, our central bank also does.)

The government of India issues financial securities known as government securities or government bonds, in order to finance its fiscal deficit or the difference between what it earns and what it spends. Banks, insurance companies, non-banking finance companies, mutual funds and other financial institutions, buy these securities. Some are mandated to do so, others do it out of their own free will. 

What does GSAP entail? Like was the case with the Federal Reserve and the LSAP, the RBI will print money and buy government securities. For the first quarter of 2021-22 (April to June), the RBI has committed to buying government securities worth Rs 1 lakh crore. The first purchase under GSAP of Rs 25,000 crore will happen on April 15, later this month.

Why is this being done? Among other things, the RBI is also the debt manager for the central government. It manages government’s borrowing programme. After borrowing Rs 12.8 lakh crore in 2020-21, the government is expected to borrow another Rs 12.05 lakh crore in 2021-22. Due to the covid-pandemic and a general slowdown in tax revenues over the years, the government has had to borrow more in order to finance its expenditure and the fiscal deficit.

This information of the government having to borrow more than Rs 12 lakh crore again in 2021-22, came to light when the annual budget of the central government was presented on February 1. Due to this higher borrowing, the bond market immediately wanted a higher return from government securities.

The return (or yield to maturity as it is more popularly know) on 10-year government securities as of January 29, had stood at 5.95%. By February 22, the return had jumped to 6.2% or gone up by 25 basis points, in a matter of a few weeks. One basis point is one hundredth of a percentage. 

The yield to maturity on a security is the annual return an investor can expect when he buys a security at a particular price, on a particular day and holds on to it till its maturity.

As the latest monetary policy report of the RBI released yesterday points out: “Yields spiked following the announcement of government borrowings of  Rs12.05 lakh crore for 2021-22 and additional borrowing of Rs 80,000 crore for 2020-21.”

In May 2020, the government had announced that it would borrow a total of Rs 12 lakh crore in 2020-21. When the budget was presented, the government said that it would end up borrowing Rs 12.8 lakh crore or Rs 80,000 crore more. 

At any given point of time, the financial system can only lend a given amount of money. When the demand for money goes up, it is but natural that the return expected by the lenders will also go up. This led to the bond market demanding a higher rate of return on government securities, pushing up the yields or returns on government securities.

How did this become a bother for the government? When the returns on existing government securities go up, the RBI has to offer higher rates of interest on the fresh financial securities that it plans to issue on behalf of the government to fund the fiscal deficit. This pushes up the interest bill of the government, which the government is trying to minimise. 

Government securities are deemed to be the safest form of lending. Once returns on these securities go up, the interest rates in general across the economy tend to go up, which is not something that the RBI wants at this point of time. The hope is that lower interest rates will help the economy revive faster.

As the debt manager of the government, it’s the RBI’s job to offer the best possible deal to its main client. Hence, post the budget, the RBI got into the job quickly and to drive down returns on government securities launched an open market operation (OMO). As the monetary policy report points out: “Yields subsequently eased somewhat on the back of… the OMO purchases for an enhanced amount of Rs 20,000 crore on February 10, 2021.”

In an OMO, the RBI prints money and buys government securities from those institutions who are willing to sell them. The idea here is to pump more money into the financial system and in the process ensure that yields or returns on government securities go down.

With the GSAP, the RBI has just taken this idea forward. While the GSAP is not very different from the OMOs that the RBI carries out, it is more of an upfront commitment and clear communication from the RBI that it will do whatever it takes to ensure that yields on government securities don’t go up. Like between April and June, the RBI plans to print and pump Rs 1 lakh crore into the financial system. 

Let me make a slight deviation here. In this case, the RBI is also indirectly financing the government’s fiscal deficit. As the debt manager for the government, the RBI sells fresh securities to raise money in order to help the government finance its fiscal deficit.

These securities are bought by various financial institutions. When they do this, they have handed over money to the RBI, which credits the government’s account with it. In the process, the financial institutions as a whole have that much lesser money to lend for the long-term.

By printing money and pumping it into the financial system, the RBI ensures that the money that financial institutions have available for lending for the long-term, doesn’t really go down or doesn’t go down as much,

Hence, in that sense, the RBI is actually indirectly financing the government borrowing. (It’s just buying older bonds and not newer ones directly). A reading of business press tells me that the bond market expects more money printing by the RBI during the course of the year. One particular estimate going around is that of more than Rs 3 lakh crore. In that sense, even if the RBI prints Rs 3 lakh crore, it will indirectly finance around a fourth of the government borrowing given that it is scheduled to borrow Rs 12.05 lakh crore in 2021-22. 

Now getting back to the topic. Like in any OMO, while carrying out a GSAP operation, the RBI will print money and buy government securities. In the process, it will put money into the financial system. This will ensure that returns on government securities don’t go up. In the process, the government will end up borrowing at lower rates.

This is how the RBI plans to keeps its main customer happy. It needs to be mentioned here that with the second wave of covid spreading across the country, chances are economic recovery will take a backseat and the government will have trouble raising tax revenues like it did in 2020-21, the last financial year.

This might lead to increased borrowing on the government front. Increased borrowing without the RBI interfering will definitely lead to the bond market demanding higher returns from government securities. With the GSAP, the hope is that yields or returns on government securities will continue to remain low.

It is worth remembering that Shaktikanta Das’ three year term as the RBI Governor comes to an end later this year. Hence, at least until then, it makes sense for Das to keep Delhi happy.

Of course, the money printing leading to lower return on government securities, will also ensure that the interest you, dear reader, earn on your fixed deposits, will continue to remain low, and the real rate of interest after adjusting for the prevailing inflation, will largely be in negative territory. 

As mentioned earlier, lending to the government is deemed to be the safest form of lending. And if that lending can be carried out at low rates, the other rates will also remain low. This is the cost of the RBI trying to help the government, the corporates and the individual borrowers. It comes at the cost of savers. This is interest that the savers would have otherwise earned.

It is as if the RBI is telling the savers, don’t have your money lying around in deposits. Chase a higher return. Buy stocks. Buy bitcoin. 

If the RBI had let the interest rates find their own level, with the government borrowing more, the interest rates would have gone up and helped the savers earn a higher return on their deposits. This would have also encouraged consumption, especially among those individuals whose expenditure depends on interest income. The argument offered by economists over and over again is that lower interest rates lead to higher borrowing and faster economic recovery.

Let’s take a look at this in the case of bank lending to industry. As of February 2021, the total bank lending to industry stood Rs 27.86 lakh crore. As of February 2016, five years back, the total bank lending to industry had stood at Rs 27.45 lakh crore.

Over a period of five years, the net bank lending to industry has gone up by a minuscule Rs 40,731 crore or just 1.5%. Meanwhile, the interest rate on fresh rupee loans given by banks during the same period has fallen from 10.54% to 8.19%, a fall of 235 basis points.

So much for corporates borrowing more at lower interest rates. This is their revealed preference; the actions that they are taking and not the bullshit that they keep mouthing on TV and in the business media. Currently, the Indian corporate simply isn’t confident enough about the country’s economic future and that’s the reason for not borrowing and expanding, irrespective of the public posturing. 

Anyway, the point is not that higher interest rates are required. But the point is that if the RBI did not intervene like it has been doing, by printing money and buying bonds, slightly higher interest rates which would put the real interest rate in positive territory, would have been the order of the day. And that would have been better than the prevailing situation. A little better for the savers about whom neither the RBI nor the government seems to be bothered about.

But then as I said earlier, the government is the RBI’s main customer these days. And that’s the long and the short of it.

राजा बाबू से मंडेला — निर्मल आनंद से इंटेलेक्चुअल सटिस्फैक्शन तक का सफर  

कल शाम को चैनल बदलते बदलते, या फिर ये कहिये कि OTT बदलते बदलते, नज़र एक तमिल फिल्म पर आकर टिकी. नाम था, मंडेला
खाना खाते खाते फिल्म का पहला आधा घंटा देखा. मज़ा आया. फिल्म एक ब्लैक कॉमेडी है और ब्लैक कॉमेडी और हमारा तो पुराना याराना है. खैर, फिर कुछ काम आ गया इसलिए पूरी फिल्म नहीं देख पाया. एक-आद दिन में निपटा दूंगा. 
रात को तकिये पर सर रखने से लेकर नींद आने तक, मेरे दिमाग में एक ख्याल आया. आजकल हमारे लिए एक हिंदी फिल्म देखना बहुत ही मुश्किल हो गया है. 
एक ज़माना था जब हम सिनेमा निर्मल आनंद के लिए देखते थे. अब हम फिल्म निर्मल आनंद के साथ साथ, इंटेलेक्चुअल सटिस्फैक्शन के लिए भी देखते हैं. और जब तक इंटेलेक्चुअल सटिस्फैक्शन नहीं होता तब तक निर्मल आनंद भी नहीं आता है. 
अब जनवरी 21, 1994, की बात ले लीजिए. राँची के सुजाता सिनेमा में डेविड धवन कृत राजा बाबू लगी थी. हम लोग फर्स्ट डे फर्स्ट शो देखने पहुंचे. लाइन में लगे और थोड़ी धक्कम धुक्की होने के बाद हम लोगों को ड्रेस सर्किल की टिकेटें मिल गयी. ये वो दिन थे जब फिल्म देखने से ज़्यादा मज़ा फिल्म की टिकट मिलने में आता था. 
फिल्म शुरू हुई. वो गोविंदा का ज़माना था. और अगर साथ में अगर करिश्मा कपूर, कादर खान, शक्ति कपूर, समीर, आनंद मिलिंद और डेविड धवन, भी हों, फिर तो सुभान अल्लाह. गोविंदा के अलावा ये सभी लोग राजा बाबू से जुड़े थे. पर फिल्म में वो मज़ा नहीं था जितना कि गोविंदा की फिल्मों में अमूमन हुआ करता था. 
दो घंटे से ऊपर गुज़र चुके थे और पूरे हॉल में एक सनाटा सा छाया हुआ था. लग ही नहीं रहा था कि गोविंदा की फिल्म चल रही है. उसी साल आयी द्रोहकाल, जो कि एक ज़बरदस्त आर्ट मूवी थी, के शोज में, उस दिन से ज़्यादा हल्ला हुआ था. (जी हाँ हम उस समय भी आर्ट फ़िल्में देखा करते थे वो भी सिनेमा हाल में जाकर). 
फिल्म ख़त्म होने से कुछ समय पहले, परदे पर आया उस साल का एकदम सुपरहिट गाना. सरकाये ल्यो खटिया जाड़ा लगे. और पब्लिक ने तब तक गोविंदा और डेविड धवन से हुआ सब गिला शिकवा माफ़ कर दिया. कुमार साणु और पूर्णिमा के इस गाने ने एकदम बवाल मचा दिया. अगर अंग्रेजी में कहें तो द ऑडियंस वास् डांसिंग इन द aisles. 
वो ज़माना था डबल मीनिंग गानों का और सरकाये ल्यो खटिया जाड़ा लगे, मेरे हिसाब से, इन डबल मीनिंग गानों की लिस्ट में नंबर दो की पायदान पर आता है. आप पूछेंगे कि नंबर वन गाना कौन सा था. अब ये भी कोई बताने वाले बात है. हिंदुस्तान में रहकर, हिंदी सिनेमा देखने के बाद अगर इतना भी नहीं पता… तो आप एंटी नेशनल, टुकड़े टुकड़े गैंग में शामिल हो चुके लुट्येन्स दिल्ली के आखरी लिबरल हैं. 
ख़ैर, आप भी ये सोच रहेंगे के मैं भी कहाँ मंडेला से शुरू करके राजा बाबू तक पहुँच गया. शायद ये समझाने की कोशिश कर रहा था कि उस ज़माने में फिल्मों से सीधी सीधी अपेक्षा होती थी. 
फिल्म का हीरो थोड़ा रोमांस करेगा, गाना गायेगा, नाचेगा, विलेन की पिटाई करेगा और अगर इन सबके ऊपर अगर कॉमेडी भी करे, फिर तो पूरा पैसा वसूल.
रही हीरोइन की बात तो वो भी रोमांस करेगी, गायेगी, नाचेगी और थोड़ा रोयेगी. 
अगर फिल्म में विलेन है तो वो हीरो-हीरोइन के बीच में अपनी टाँगे अड़ाएगा. जैसा की मोहनीश बहल मैंने प्यार किया में कहते हैं, एक जवान लड़का और एक जवान लड़की कभी अच्छे दोस्त नहीं हो सकते. पहले कुछ इस किस्म उलटी-पुलटि बात करेगा और अंत में हीरोइन के साथ थोड़ी बहुत बदतमीज़ी भी, जिसके बाद हीरो आकर उसकी पिटाई करेगा. 
हीरो की माँ रोएगी और अपने बच्चे के लिए अच्छी नौकरी और अच्छी बीवी की दुआ करेगी. 
और फिर, एवरीवन विल लिव हैप्पिली एवर आफ्टर. 
अगर किसी भी फिल्म में इन सब चीज़ों का ठीक ठाक सा मिश्रण मिल जाता था, तो लोग उस फिल्म को दो एक बार देखकर चला ही देते थे. और हम भी ऐसी पब्लिक का हिस्सा थे काफी सालों तक. कम से कम 1993 से 1999 तक, जब हम रांची के सिनेमा घरों में अक्सर सिनेमा फर्स्ट डे फर्स्ट शो देखा करते थे. (करीब दस साल हो गए कोई भी फिल्म फर्स्ट डे फर्स्ट शो देखे हुए. अब जब आराम से ऐसा किया जा सकता है, तो मन नहीं करता है.) 


1999 के बाद चीज़ें बदली. थोड़ा पढ़ लिख ज़्यादा गये. थोड़ा अंग्रेजी सिनेमा देख लिया. और 2006 से 2009 के बीच में बहुत सारा इंटरनेशनल सिनेमा भी.
अंग्रेजी फ़िल्में देखने के बाद ये पता चला की उनकी फ़िल्में हमारे फिल्मों से कितनी बेहतर बनती हैं, या फिर हम लोग सीन बी सीन कॉपी करते हैं. अब शायद पॉसिबल नहीं है पर एक ज़माने में तो होता ही था. यकीन नहीं आता तो कभी 1934 की हॉलीवुड फिल्म, इट हप्पेनेड वन नाईट देखे और इसके बाद महेश भट की 1992 की फिल्म दिल है के मानता नहीं. सीन बाय सीन कॉपी है.  
यहाँ तक कि इट हप्पेनेड वन नाईट के डायलॉग्स को सीधे सीधे हिंदी में ट्रांसलेट किया गया है. और आश्चर्य की बात तो ये है कि डायलाग लिखे थे मशहूर लेखक शरद जोशी जी ने. 
जब इंटरनॅशनल सिनेमा देखा तो ये समझ आया की सीरियस मुद्दों पर भी फ़िल्में बनायीं जा सकती थी. और रोमांस, नाच, गाना, मार धाड़ के अलावा, फिल्मों में नुआन्स (nuance) भी हो सकता है. और निर्मल आनंद के अलावा फ़िल्में इंटेलेक्चुअल सेटिफेक्शन भी दे सकती हैं. 
और धीरे धीरे इंटेलेक्चुअल सटिस्फैक्शन हावी होता गया. केवल ये काफी नहीं था कि स्क्रीन पर क्या चल रहा है. ये भी जानना ज़रूरी था की फिल्म के डायरेक्टर और लेखक की पॉलिटिक्स क्या है. उन्हें इंस्पिरेशन कहाँ से मिला है. फिल्म के डायलॉग्स में दम है की नहीं. वगैरह वगैरह. एक फिल्म देखने में और एक किताब पढ़ने में ज़्यादा अंतर नहीं रह गया. 
और इसका नतीजा ये हुआ की धीरे धीरे हिंदी फ़िल्में देखना एकदम बंद सा हो गया है, क्यूंकि किसी भी फिल्म से जो उमीदें थी, वो बहुत ज़्यादा बढ़ गयी. और जैसे जैसे हमारा टेस्ट बदला वैसे वैसे गोविंदा का करियर भी ख़तम होता चला गया. क्यूंकि गीता का सार है, परिवर्तन ही इस दुनिया का नियम है. 
अब खोज रहती है अच्छी फिल्मों की. भाषा चाहे कोई भी हो, क्यूंकि मर्द को दर्द नहीं होता और इंटेलेक्चुअल सटिस्फैक्शन ज़रूरी है. 

Only 1.7% of Central Govt Petrol Taxes Shared with States – Where Has Cooperative Federalism Gone?

Note: Detailed analysis takes time. Like this piece took three weeks to write. Hence, please continue supporting this effort. Every rupee helps. 

Chintan Patel and Vivek Kaul

The devil, as they say, is always in the detail.

Nevertheless, in an era of instant digital journalism, where you, dear reader, are constantly bombarded with information, the real story, or should we say stories, often get buried under numerous headlines, lazy journalism, government press releases and the false news that is the flavour of the day.

But if one is willing to do some basic number-crunching, like we are, some interesting details and narratives can emerge.

This is one such story of the central government taking both the states and the common man, for a ride and that too in broad day light. At the risk of stretching the metaphor a bit too far, the scene of the crime is the petrol pump and the motive, the dire state of the economy.

But to do this story full justice, we need to set up the background with some dry, academic points as well as digress into some adjacent details.

So, kindly bear with us. While sensational things might get you excited and help us get a few more clicks, but as we said at the beginning, the devil is in the detail.

And here’s presenting the detail.

What’s the point?

Over the years, the central government has been sharing less and less of the overall taxes that it collects, with the state governments. This is the main point we make in this piece. 

The annual budget of the central government is presented in February ever year. The budget is analysed by the media in minute detail.

However, amidst all the analyses, one subject that is often ignored is the financial relationship between the central government and the state governments. After all, much of the services that the government provides are in fact delivered by local and state governments.

It is worth remembering that while the central government collects the bulk of the taxes in the country, it’s the states that the taxes ultimately come from. And given that, this money in one way or another needs to go back to the states.

But does it? The short answer is no. And there is a longer answer which explains the reasons, has some nuance and which forms the heart of this piece.

This piece is divided into three sections. The first section provides a background on how tax revenue is transferred from the central government to the state governments and the role of the Finance Commission.

The second section focuses on a special tax category – cess and surcharge, their increased prominence in recent times, and how that raises prices of petrol and diesel.

The third and final section examines the trend of total transfer of funds from the central government to the state governments.

This is an opportune time for such an analysis, since this year’s Union budget was accompanied by the unveiling of the 15th Finance Commission’s report for the period 2021-22 to 2025-26.

So, read on, to find out.  

Who Gets How Much?

The Constitution stipulates how taxes are collected and split between the central government and the state governments. It empowers the central government as well as the state governments to raise revenues from different sources of taxation.

The central government gets to collect more taxes while the state governments end up with the bigger portion of the expenditure, leading to a mismatch. This mismatch of money that is earned through taxes and other routes and money that needs to be spent, is referred to as a “vertical imbalance”.

Take a look at Figure 1. In 2018-19, the Union Government raised 62.7 per cent of the aggregate resources raised by both the Union and states, whereas the states spent 62.4 per cent of the combined aggregate expenditure. While Figure 1 shares data for just one financial year, what’s true for 2018-19 has also been true for other financial years.


Figure 1: Vertical imbalance (2018-19)

           Source: 15th Finance Commission Report. 

To offset this imbalance, the Constitution provides mechanisms for intergovernmental transfers – the transfer of funds from the central government to the state governments. A key player of this setup is the Finance Commission.

The Finance Commission (FC) is an advisory body that is appointed by the President every five years and which evaluates the state of finances of the central as well as the state governments, and determines how taxes collected by the central government are to be distributed between the central government and the state governments, and among the state governments.

Over and above this, the FC also recommends grants to states based on revenue needs, grants for local governments and grants for specific purposes e.g. health sector grants etc. Thus, there are two broad channels of transfer of funds under the FC umbrella – i) devolution of taxes, and ii) grants. 

At the heart of the idea of intergovernmental transfers and tax devolution is the concept of ‘divisible pool’. The divisible pool is the portion of the taxes (technically referred to as the gross tax revenue) collected by the central government, which is distributed between it and the state governments. What this means is that all the taxes collected by the central government aren’t shareable with the state governments.

Till the tenth FC which tabled its report in 1995, only union excise duties and personal income taxes made up the divisible pool. Under this arrangement, 85% of the personal income taxes and 40-45% of excise duties were shared with the state governments.

In 2000, the tenth FC recommended a constitutional amendment to expand the divisible pool to all central taxes. The central government accepted this recommendation and the 80th Amendment was passed making a certain portion of  central government taxes shareable with the state governments, effective retrospectively from April 1, 1996.

Further, the portion of the divisible pool that is shared with the states is referred to as the devolution of taxes and is determined by the FC. Before the14th FC which came into effect from April 2015, 32% of the divisible pool was shared with the states.

The 14th FC increased the share of the state governments in the divisible pool to 42%. At the same time, the sector-specific grants were eliminated. This decision was primarily in response to grievances expressed by the state governments. State governments prefer funding through devolution since such transfers are unconditional.

Other transfers of money, whether they are through FC grants, or through channels outside the FC (like schemes from central government ministries) impose policy priorities set by the central government over the state governments, compromising the latter’s fiscal flexibility or the ability to spend money as the state government deems fit.

To give an example, a FC health-sector grant can only be used for health spending by the states, or funds transferred to the states under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana can only be used to make roads.

When state governments have more flexibility in allocating funds for various initiatives, they can craft policy that is more responsive to the needs on the ground than having to blindly follow policy that is framed in New Delhi.

The 14th FC recognised this and increased the state share of the divisible pool from 32% to 42%. The intent behind this increase was not to increase the amount of transfers but rather change the composition of the transfers – from diverting conditional funds to diverting unconditional funds, to state governments.

The 15th FC tabled in 2021 lowered the divisible pool marginally to 41%, from the earlier 42%. The is because Jammu and Kashmir is no longer a state and the money allocated to it has not been counted as transfer to a state government. Given this, the 15th FC has kept the divisible pool distribution unchanged.  

And now we come to the most important point of this write up. A key detail in this entire discussion is that the only tax revenue that is excluded from the shared divisible pool are different kinds of surcharges and cess.

As we shall see next, this exclusion has proved to be the back door that the central government has been using to divert funds from the states governments’ kitty to its own.

A Tale of Two Taxes

Before we get into the details, let’s first try and understand what surcharge and cess actually are.

A cess is tax on a tax imposed by the central government attached to a specific purpose. For example, an education cess collected should be utilised only for financing education and not for any other purpose. It is worth remembering here that the education cess is imposed on the total income tax and not on the total taxable income.

Hence, as explained earlier, it is a tax on a tax. Examples include infrastructure cess on petrol and diesel, krishi kalyan cess, health and education cess on Income Tax, etc.

In theory, money collected under a cess is to be spent on the specific purpose for which it is collected but that’s not always the case.

A Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report for 2018-19 indicates that only Rs 1.64 lakh crore of the Rs 2.74 lakh crore or around 60% of the amount collected from cess and surcharge during 2018-19 had been transferred to their respective funds. Around 40% was still retained in the Consolidated Fund of India, which is the general-purpose fund of the Indian government.

The provision of levying a cess was intended to be used for shorter specific purposes. So, the procedure for introducing a cess is comparatively simpler than introducing new taxes, which usually require change in the law.

Coming to surcharges, a surcharge is also a tax on a tax, but is not tied to a specific purpose like a cess is. Let’s take the example of the surcharge on income tax. It is an added tax on the taxpayers having a higher taxable income during a particular financial year. So, an individual having a taxable income  between Rs 50 Lakhs and Rs 1 crore pays an income tax surcharge of 10%.

Further, an individual with a taxable income between Rs 1 crore and Rs 2 crore, pays an income tax surcharge of 15%, and so on.

Note that this surcharge is only on the base income tax, not on the income itself. So, if an individual earning Rs 1 crore in a year needs to pay an income tax of Rs 20 lakhs, the applicable surcharge would be Rs 2 lakhs (10% of 20 lakhs).

A surcharge can be utilised for any purpose of the government, without having to bend the rules, like they do sometimes for cess collections.

In the last few years, these surcharges and cess, which do not need to be shared with the state governments, have become the central government’s go-to tools to address the tax revenue shortfall.

Take a look at Figure 2a, which basically plots the total amount of surcharges and cess collected by the central government over the years, along with the surcharge and cess it hopes to collect during 2021-22, the current financial year.

Figure 2a: Total cess and surcharge revenue (in Rs crore).

Source: Union budget documents.  

Figure 2a clearly shows that the general trend is upwards, with small blips in 2017-18 and 2018-19. The government expects to collect total surcharges and cess of Rs 4,45,822 crore (revised estimate) in 2020-21.

This is surprising given that overall tax collection during the year is expected to come down. In comparison to the years before 2020-21, the collections for 2021-22 are also expected to be at a very high Rs 4,48,821 crore.

The collections of cess and surcharge surged from Rs 2,53,540 crore in 2019-20 to Rs 4,48,822 crore (RE) in 2020-21, an increase of a whopping 77%. This huge increase is almost entirely due to increased cess and surcharge on petrol and diesel – in particular, the road and infrastructure cess and the additional duty of excise on motor spirit (which is a surcharge), which increased by Rs 1,92,792 crore. Motor spirit is the technical term for petrol.

The increased reliance on cess and surcharge is also seen in Figure 2b below, which plots the total cess and surcharge earned by the central government as a proportion of the Indian gross domestic product (GDP). This is done in order to take the size of the Indian economy into account as well.

Figure 2b: Cess and surcharge revenue expressed
as a proportion of the GDP (in %).

Source: Union budget documents.

The above figure makes for very interesting reading. The total amount of cess and surcharges earned by the central government went up from 1.25% of the GDP in 2019-20 to 2.29% of the GDP in 2020-21, a massive jump of 104 basis points. Some of this jump was obviously because the size of the economy or the GDP is expected to contract in 2020-21. Nevertheless, the fact that cess and surcharges collected by the government went up in a year when the economy contracted, does come as a surprise.

In Figure 3, let us look at the breakdown between cess and surcharges earned by the central government over the years. Looking at the below figure it is evident that cess collections form the bulk of the total revenue.

Figure 3: Cess and surcharge breakdown (in Rs crore).

Source: Union budget documents.

Clearly, cess is bringing in more money for the central government, though the contribution of surcharges has also jumped up since 2019-20.

Now let’s try and understand, why has the central government increasingly become more dependent on earning money through cess and surcharges, and in the process it is sharing lesser proportion of taxes with the state governments.

This increased reliance on cess and surcharges in the last two years can be understood when one looks at what is happening with the total tax revenue. Figure 4 plots the total taxes earned by the central government or gross tax revenue as a proportion of the GDP.

Figure 4: Gross tax revenue as a proportion of GDP (in %).

Source: Union budget documents 

While the negative economic impact of the covid pandemic has been a telling blow, the downward trajectory in tax collections of the central government had started as far as back as 2018-19. The twin economic debacles of PM Modi’s first term – demonetisation and a shaky GST implementation – meant the economy was already tottering before the covid pandemic hit.

An obvious casualty of this slowdown has been a declining tax revenue as a proportion of the GDP. In the normal scheme of things, this would have meant that the central government would have ended up with lesser taxes for itself, after sharing with the state governments.

But this fall has been cushioned with the central government earning a higher amount of taxes through cess and surcharges (as can be seen from Figure 5).

Figure 5: Cess and surcharge as a proportion of total central government taxes. 

Source: Union budget Documents
RE = Revised Estimate
BE = Budget Estimate

 In 2019-20, the total taxes earned by the government or the gross tax revenue had stood at Rs 20.1 lakh crore. In 2020-21, it is expected to fall by 5.5% to Rs 19 lakh crore. The net tax revenue of the central government (what remains after sharing taxes with the state governments) in 2019-20 was at Rs 13.59 lakh core.

This is expected to fall to Rs 13.45 lakh crore in 2020-21, a fall of 0.9%, which is much lower than the 5.5% fall in gross tax revenue. While, the total gross tax revenue is expected to fall by Rs 1.1 lakh crore (Rs 20.1 lakh crore minus Rs 19 lakh crore), the net tax revenue is expected to fall by just Rs 14,000 crore (Rs 13.59 lakh crore minus Rs 13.45 lakh crore). 

In percentage terms, in 2019-20, the central government kept 67.6% of the taxes for itself in 2019-20. This shot up to 70.8% in 2020-21. 

Clearly, the state governments have been short-changed here, with their share of taxes falling from Rs 6.51 lakh crore in 2019-20 to Rs 5.5 lakh crore in 2020-21, a fall of a little over Rs 1 lakh crore or 15.5%, in such economically difficult times.

This is primarily because the share of cess and surcharge in total taxes collected by the central government has jumped from 12.67% in 2019-20 to 23.46% in 2020-21. Do remember that cess and surcharges are outside the divisible pool.

So, when the inflow of these taxes increases, the central government gets to keep all the revenue, as opposed to sharing 41% (15th FC guideline) with the state governments. So, it is far more efficient for the central government to increase cess and surcharge when it needs to increase tax collection. 

This overuse of cess and surcharges by the central government has not gone unnoticed. In fact, the chairman of the 15th FC, NK Singh has talked about introducing a constitutional amendment to include them in the divisible pool.

As he said

“I see no viable solution except a constitutional amendment. If that constitutional amendment is introduced, recognizing some proportion of cess and surcharge to the divisible pool, it will certainly allow greater flexibility to the successive Finance Commissions subsequently to be able to calibrate a framework.”

Ultimately, as we said at the very beginning, whatever might be the term used, a tax, or a cess or a surcharge for that matter, it is being paid by people. And hence, the money thus collected should be shared with the state governments.

How does all this affect you, dear reader?

If you have managed to make it thus far, many of you by now would be like how much gyan are these guys going to give. Why can’t they tell me straightaway how does all this impact me or the world at large or the aam aadmi?

Well, sometimes it is important to take a look at the bigger picture first and then arrive at how it impacts all of us.

The government’s increased reliance primarily on cess actually has had a direct impact on most citizens – in the form of increased prices at the petrol pump.

The biggest contributor to the spike in cess collection over the last two years has been cess collected on the sale of petroleum products. The figure below charts the total cess collected on petroleum products (crude oil, petrol and diesel) over the last five years. While the cess on petrol formed at least 50% of total cess each year, it was as high as 69% of the total cess revenue in financial years 2019-20 and 2020-21. 

Figure 6 clearly shows that the government has resorted to taxing petrol and diesel to make up for revenue shortfalls. This conclusion is hardly a revelation to anyone paying attention to prices at the pump, but the numbers help understand the government’s motivation.

Figure 6: Total cess on petroleum products (in Rs crore).

Source: Union budget documents

There is another way of looking at the cess on petrol and diesel. Table 1 below gives a breakdown of the union taxes on petrol and diesel for 2020-21 and 2021-22. Note that the table below only analyses central excise tax and excludes customs duty. There are technical complications in figuring out the per litre customs duty.  

Table 1: Central government tax breakdown on petrol and diesel.

Source: https://www.ppac.gov.in/content/149_1_PricesPetroleum.aspx

 

The total union excise duty on petrol and diesel, in 2021-22 are Rs 32.90 per litre and Rs 31.80 per litre, respectively, which are marginally lower than the previous year. All taxes other than basic excise duty, including special additional excise duty, which is a surcharge, are exempt from the divisible pool.  

1) For 2021-22, only ~5% of the excise taxes on petrol and diesel will go to the divisible pool. The rest (~95%) will be kept by the central government. In 2020-21, this portion was at around 91% for petrol and 85% for diesel. Clearly, the government is keeping a greater share of petrol and diesel taxes for itself.

2) The above point does not clearly bring out the gravity of the situation. Let’s do a simple calculation to show that. In 2021-22, the total excise duty on petrol stands at Rs 32.90 per litre. Of this, the basic excise duty of Rs 1.4 per litre is the only part which is a part of the divisible pool and hence, will be shared with the states. It is worth remembering only 41% of this or around 57 paisa per litre needs to be shared with the state governments.

What this means is that just 1.7% of the total excise duty earned by the central government per litre of petrol will be shared with the state governments. It was at 3.8% in 2020-21.

3) Now let’s carry out the same exercise for diesel. The total excise duty earned by the central government on the sale of one litre of diesel will be Rs 31.80 during 2021-22. Of this only Rs 1.8 per litre will be shareable with state governments. 41% of this amounts to around 74 paisa per litre.

This amounts to around 2.3% of the total excise duty of Rs 31.8 per litre earned by the central government per litre of diesel. It was at 6.4% in 2020-21.

4) In 2021-22, a new agriculture infra cess has been introduced. It amounts to Rs 2.5 per litre on petrol and Rs 4 per litre on diesel. This has led to the reduction of basic excise duty on petrol from Rs 2.98 per litre to Rs 1.4 per litre and that on diesel from Rs 4.83 per litre to Rs 1.8 litre. As mentioned earlier, only the basic excise duty needs to be shared with the state governments.

Hence, by introducing a new agriculture infra cess, the central government has ensured that state governments get an even lower share of taxes from petrol and diesel in 2021-22.

The general public is quite sensitive to price rise at the petrol pump since it is a highly visible and recurrent cost. That the government has still resorted to this strategy for increasing revenue, speaks to the lack of better options – a fact that is a direct consequence of the tepid economic scenario even before the pandemic began. Of course, the covid pandemic has only made things more difficult for the government on tax front.

Nonetheless, things are even more difficult for state governments, which don’t have many avenues to raise tax. Clearly, this amounts to the centre shortchanging the state governments during difficult economic times.

Oh wait, there is more – Total intergovernmental transfers

Other than the divisible pool of taxes, there are other channels of intergovernmental transfers between the central government and the state governments. So, to get the complete picture on the flow of money from the central government to the state governments, it is instructive to examine the total intergovernmental funds transferred in more detail.

Before diving into those details, a brief overview of intergovernmental transfers would be useful. Figure 7 below is a good graphical representation of all the ways in which the central government can transfer funds to the state governments.

Figure 7:  Vertical fiscal transfer channels. 

Source : Asian Development Bank

Broadly speaking there are two instruments of fund transfers.

1) Finance Commission funds: As discussed earlier, this includes the 41% of the divisible pool revenue, general-purpose grants for states with weak revenue raising capacity and specific purpose grants for funding local governments (panchayats and municipalities) and funding certain specific initiatives (eg. health-sector grants by the 15th FC). Most of the funds provided via the FC channel are not conditional and don’t require state government contributions.

2) Funds from central ministries: In addition to the FC funds, the central government also gives specific purpose grants through the respective ministries. These funds are transferred either through centrally sponsored schemes or central sector schemes. Central sector schemes are entirely funded by the central government. Some examples include the free LPG connections provided to poor households, crop insurance scheme etc.

The centrally sponsored schemes require a matching component from the state governments i.e. they have to fund a portion of the scheme. Examples of this include the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, the Swachh Bharat Mission etc.

As Figure 7 shows, the mechanism of intergovernmental transfer underwent a major transformation in 2015. Two things led to this. Firstly, the 14th FC gave its recommendations for increasing the devolution share of state governments from 32% to 42% and eliminating a host of specific purpose grants. The underlying rationale was to change the composition of state transfers to increase the “no-strings-attached” outlays and reduce conditional grants to give state governments more financial headroom.

Secondly, the newly elected NDA government disbanded the Planning Commission and replaced it with the NITI Aayog. While the NITI Aayog has some shades of resemblance with the Planning Commission, the five-year plans, which was the responsibility of the Planning Commission, were scrapped.

The five-year plans would have their own grants for states in the annual budget of the central government. The establishment of the NITI Aayog and the approval of the 14th FC recommendations were two initiatives that formed the basis the oft-cited “cooperative federalism” mantra of the NDA government, especially in the early years.

The argument put forth to claim this catchphrase was that the Modi-led administration was reversing the centralising tendencies of earlier governments and ushering in an environment where states had greater fiscal autonomy.

Does the data corroborate these claims? Let us examine. Figure 8 below charts the tax devolution to states as a portion of the gross tax revenue.

Figure 8: Tax Devolution vs Gross Tax Revenue (in %).

Source: Union budget documents

  

Some interesting observations can be made from Figure 8.

1) The first few years after the 14th FC came to effect (April 2015) saw a significant increase in the portion of taxes devolved to the states.

2) This increasing trend of devolution peaked in 2018-19 when the devolution was 36.6%. The last three years have seen this number come down, with the 2020-21 figure (~29%) close to the pre-2015 levels. So, all the talk about cooperative federalism has gone for a toss, in the last few years.

3) Note that these numbers don’t reflect the 32% (pre-2015) or 42% (post-2015) devolution share prescribed by the FC since cess and surcharge revenue is not devolved. This also explains why the devolution percentage has dipped sharply in the last two years, a period when cess revenue has had a corresponding increase (as shown earlier in Figure 5).

While the 14th FC may have been the catalyst, the Modi government can rightfully claim credit for strengthening fiscal federalism, at least in its first term. However, most of these gains have been reversed in their second term. This justifies N.K Singh’s lament

“ It should not be a cat and mouse game that every finance commission raises the devolution number and it then neutralised simultaneously by an increase in cess and surcharge leaving the states where they were, nor the opposite way.”

Next, in Figure 9, let us look at the total transfers made to state governments in recent years, not just tax devolution. The total transfers to states includes tax devolution, finance commission grants, centrally sponsored schemes, central sector schemes and other miscellaneous items listed as state transfers in the union budget.

The figure below charts the total transfers made to states as a percent of the total expenditure of the Union government.

Figure 9: Portion of total expenditure of central government
transferred to state governments (in %).

Source: Union budget documents

 There are two caveats on the chart above.

1) Starting 2014-15 there was a change in how expenditure for central schemes was routed to the states. The figures for 2013-14 have been adjusted to make the comparisons with the subsequent years correctly.

2) We have excluded loans made to states from the total transfer amounts and only included grants and devolution, since loans do need to be repaid.

That said, these figures also lead to similar observations made from Figure 8. The period from 2015-16 to 2018-19 (roughly co-incident with NDA’s first term) had a significant increase in funding to the state governments.

While the increased devolution of taxes could be attributed to the recommendations of the 14th FC, the increase in total transfer of funds was certainly government policy. The last two years (and the projections for the next year) show a steep decline in the intergovernmental transfers.  
The huge spike in cess and surcharge collections which are not shared with states and declining tax revenues during this period contributed to this effect.

There are two other conjectures one can make based on the trends seen above. First, when Narendra Modi won in May 2014, he was a sitting chief minister and his perspective on governance was heavily biased towards the challenges of governing a state.

Hence, financial outlays were perhaps favourable to the states. In the second term, he was well-entrenched as a national leader and the instincts were now honed favouring centralisation.

Second, the Bhartiya Janata Party has adopted an increasingly overt approach favouring homogenisation of the country. Whether it is the abrogation of Article 370, the passage of national farm laws, or flirtations with one-nation-one-language, it is evident that impulse is towards uniformity and centralisation. In this context, the trend of holding back funds from states, seems a natural accompaniment. 

और मिसेज़ (Mrs) वगैरह गांव में है क्या?

सितम्बर 2006 से मैं प्रभादेवी, मुंबई, के एक छोटे से कमरे में रह रहा हूँ.  मुंबई की कूल भाषा में ऐसे कमरों को स्टूडियो अप्पार्टमेन्ट कहते हैं, पर न ही ये स्टूडियो हैं न अपार्टमेंट. बस एक छत है जो अब तक गिरी नहीं और एकदम तेज़ बरसात में भी पानी अंदर नहीं आता है.
मेरे कमरे में चार अलमारियां हैं जिसमें किताबें हैं. एक और अलमारी है, जिसमें में वो सब चीज़ें हैं जो किसी दिन फेकनी हैं, कुछ पुराने लैपटॉप, फ़ोन और बहुत सारे कपड़े जो अब फिट नहीं होते हैं. 
इसके अलावा एक टेबल और दो कुर्सियां हैं, जो भी किताबों से खचाखच भरी हुई हैं. और एक पलंग है. जिस पर में उठता, बैठता, खाता, लिखता और सोता हूँ. 
अगर सरल भाषा में कहूँ तो थोड़ा अलग है. जो भी जब भी चाहिए वो सब सामने ही रखा रहता है. 
और इस कमरे में जब भी कोई आता है तो, थोड़ा चकित सा रह जाता है. अभी कुछ दिन पहले एक इलेक्ट्रीशियन आया. कमरे के अंदर आते ही थोड़ा भौचक्का गया, पर कुछ बोला नहीं.
दो ट्यूबलाइट बदलनी थी. वो बदलने और पैसे लेने के बाद, वो दरवाज़े पर रुक गया. उससे रहा नहीं गया और उसने पुछा:
“आप लाइब्रेरी चलाते हैं क्या?”
“नहीं,” मैंने जवाब दिया. 
“तो फिर इतनी सारी किताबें?”
“मेरी हैं.”
“हम्म्म. खरीदे हैं?”
“हाँ.”
“आप करते क्या हैं?”
“राइटर हूँ.”
“हाँ वो तो ठीक है, पर घर कैसे चलता है?” वो पूछता गया. 
“राइटिंग से.”
“सबका चल सकता है क्या?”
“सबका तो पता नहीं, पर मेरा चल जाता है.”
“और मिसेज़ (Mrs) वगैरह गांव में है क्या?”
“नहीं है.”
“गुज़र गयी क्या?”
“नहीं, मैंने कभी शादी नहीं की.” 
“तभी.” 
“तभी क्या?” मैंने पुछा. 
“चल जाता है.”
“शायद.”
“लेकिन सर, एक बात बोले, बुरा मत मानियेगा,” उसने कहा. 
“बोलिये.”
“घर तो बीवी और बच्चों से ही बनता है.”

मैं मुस्कुराया और चुप रहा. ऐसी फंडामेंटल बातों पे एक अजनबी आदमी से बहस करना और उसे अपनी ज़िन्दगी का फलसफा समझाना, सही नहीं समझा.  उसने भी हिंट लिया, खुदहाफिज़ कहा और सीढ़ियों की तरफ बढ़ गया. 
ये पहला व्यक्ति नहीं है जो मेरे कमरे को देख कर इतना जिज्ञासु हुआ है. मेरे पडोसी बहुत सालों से ये समझने की कोशिश कर रहे हैं कि ये आदमी दिन भर अपने कमरे में बंद रहकर आखिर करता क्या है और इसके पास इतनी सारी अमेज़न की deliveries क्यों होती हैं. 
और रही शादी और बच्चों की बात ये तो इसका महत्व मुझे कई लोग पिछले दो दशकों से समझा रहे हैं. 
जब मेरे पिताजी ज्योतिष में रूचि रखते थे, तो मेरी माँ अक्सर कहा करती थी, तुम्हारी शादी लेट होगी और तुम्हारे दो बच्चे होंगे. ये अब तक तो सच नहीं हुआ. पर क्यूंकि ये बहुत ही ओपन एंडेड पूर्वानुमान है, आने वाले समय में भी सही हो सकता है. जैसा की जेम्स बांड कह गए हैं, नेवर से नेवर. 
मेरे नानाजी एक कदम आगे गए और मेरे शादी न करने पर प्रश्न किया, क्या इसको लड़कियां पसंद नहीं है? ये करीब 15 साल पुरानी बात है, जब मीडिया ने नया नया समलैंगिक लोगों के बारे में बात करना शुरू किया था. 
मेरे पिताजी के भाई-बहनों ने जब मेरे ब्याह न करने पर काफी प्रश्न उठाये तो उन्होंने ये कह डाला, भाई अगर मुझे मंडप में बैठना होता तो मैं अब तक बैठ गया होता.
बाकी, जैसा की एक्सपेक्टेड होता है, थोड़ी बहुत इमोशनल ब्लैकमेलिंग रिश्तेदारों की तरफ से तो हुई ही. 
अब कोई कुछ नहीं पूछता है. अलग करते करते, मैं इतना प्रेडिक्टेबल हो गया हूँ कि मेरा गॉसिप वैल्यू बिलकुल गिर गया है. जाता हुआ समय सब कुछ बदल देता है. 
और अंत में, मजरूह सुल्तानपुरी से क्षमा मांगते हुए, ये दो पंक्तियाँ:
 
मैं अकेला ही चला था जानिब-ए-मंज़िल मगर,
न लोग ही साथ आये, न ही कारवाँ बना. 
 

Everybody Loves a Good Interest Rate Cut…Except the Savers

My main life lesson from investing: self-interest is the most powerful force on earth, and can get people to embrace and defend almost anything – Jesse Livermore.

Late in the evening of March 31, the department of economic affairs, ministry of finance, put out a press release saying that the interest rates on small savings schemes for the period April to June 2021, have been cut.

The social media got buzzing immediately. And almost everyone from journalists to economists to analysts praised the decision. It was seen as yet another effort by the government to push down interest rates further.

With the state of the economy being where it is, lower interest rates are expected to perk up economic growth. People are expected to borrow and spend more. Corporates are expected to borrow and expand. At lower interest rates individuals who have already taken on loans will see their EMIs go down, leaving more cash in hand, and they are likely to spend that money, helping the economy grow.

That’s how it is expected to work, at least in theory. Hence, everybody loves a good interest rate cut… except the savers.

On April 1, the social media woke up to the finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s tweet announcing that “interest rates of small savings schemes… shall continue to be at the rates which existed in the last quarter of 2020-2021.” She further said that the order had been issued by oversight and would be withdrawn.

Later in the day, the department of economic affairs put out a press release to that effect.

The fact that lower interest rates are good for the economy is only one side of the story. They also hurt the economy in different ways. People who are dependent on interest income for their expenditure (like the retired senior citizens) see their incomes fall and have to cut down on their expenditure. This impacts private consumption negatively. 

While this cannot be measured exactly, it does happen. Also, a bulk of India’s household savings (close to 84% in 2019-20) are made in fixed deposits, provident and pension funds, life insurance policies and small savings schemes. Lower interest rates bring down the returns of all these products and this negatively impacts many savers.

As the economist Michael Pettis writes about the relationship between interest rate and consumption in case of China, in The Great Rebalancing:

“Most Chinese savings, at least until recently, have been in the form of bank deposits…Chinese households, in other words, should feel richer when the deposit rate rises and poorer when it declines, in which case rising rates should be associated with rising, not declining, consumption.”

The same logic applies to India as well, with lower interest rates being associated with declining consumption, at least for a section of the population.

This is not to say that interest rates should be higher than they currently are (that is a topic for another day), nonetheless the fact that lower interest rates impact savers and consumption negatively is a point that needs to be made and it rarely gets made. I made this point in a piece I wrote for livemint.com, yesterday. 

Also, borrowing is not just about lower interest rates. It is more about the confidence that the borrower has in his economic future and the ability to keep paying the EMI over the years. I wrote about this in the context of home loans, a few days back.

This leaves us with the question that why doesn’t anyone talk about the negative side of low interest rates. The answer lies in the fact that they don’t have an incentive to do so. Let’s try and look at this in some detail.

1) Fund managers: Fund managers love lower interest rates because it leads a section of the savers, in the hope of earning a higher return, to move their savings from bank fixed deposits to mutual funds and portfolio management services which invest in stocks. In the process, their assets under management go up. More money coming into the stock market also tends to push up stock prices.

All in all, this ensures that fund managers increase their chances of making more money and hence, they love lower interest rates because their acche din continue.

2) Analysts: Analysts love lower interest rates because it leads a section of the savers, in the hope of earning a higher return, to move their savings from bank fixed deposits to stocks. In order to buy stocks, they need to open a demat account with a brokerage. When the new investors buy stocks, the brokerage earns commissions.

Further, it also means that the interest cost borne by corporates on their debt goes down, leading to higher profits. The stock market factors this in and stock prices go up. Given this, analysts have an incentive to love interest rate cuts.

3) Corporates: Do I need to explain this? Lower interest rates lead to a lower interest outflow on debt that a corporate has taken on and hence, higher profits or lower losses for that matter. This explains why corporate honchos are perpetually asking the Reserve Bank of India to cut the repo rate or the interest rate at which it lends to banks.

4) Banks: Banks love lower interest rates simply because at lower interest rates the value of the government bonds they hold goes up. Interest rates and bond prices are inversely related. Higher bond prices mean higher profits for banks or lower losses in case of a few public sector banks. This is why bankers almost always come out in support of interest rate cuts.

This also explains why the bankers hate the idea of small savings schemes offering higher returns than fixed deposits. Lower interest rates on small savings schemes pushes the overall interest rates in the financial system downwards. 

5) Economists: Most economists are employed by stock brokerages, mutual funds, banks, corporates or think tanks. As explained above, stock brokerages, mutual funds, banks and corporates, all benefit from lower interest rates. If your employer benefits from something, you also benefit in the process. Hence, your views are in line with that.

When it comes to think tanks, many are in the business of manufacturing consent for corporates. Their economists act accordingly. 

6) Journalists: With the media being dependent on corporate advertising as it is, it is hardly surprising that most journalists love interest rate cuts. Further, the main job of anchors on business news channels is to keep people interested in the stock market because that is what brings in advertising. And this can only happen, if stock prices keep going up. In this environment, anything, like interest rate cuts, that drives up stock prices, is welcomed.

Of course, some mainstream TV news channels also run propaganda for the government. So, in their case every government decision needs to be justified. That is their incentive to remain in the good books of the government.

7) Government: The central government will end up borrowing close to Rs 25 lakh crore during 2020-21 and 2021-22. Hence, even a 1% fall in the interest rate at which it borrows, will help it save Rs 25,000 crore. It clearly has an incentive in loving low interest rates. 

The point is everyone mentioned above tends to benefit if interest rates keep going down or continue to remain low. Further, they are organised special interests with direct access to the mainstream media. The savers though many more in number aren’t organised to put forward their point of view.

Also, it is easier to do the math around the benefits of interest rate cuts and low interest rates than its flip side. As economist Friedrich Hayek said in his Nobel Prize winning lecture, there is a tendency to simply disregard those factors which “cannot be confirmed by quantitative evidence” and after having done that to “thereupon happily proceed on the fiction that the factors which they can measure are the only ones that are relevant.”

That’s the long and the short of it.